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Summary 
This thesis provides the first complete dedicated narrative on Britain's political and military 
involvement in Upper Silesia between 1919 and 1922. It establishes the background to the 
Paris Peace Conference's decision to conduct a plebiscite in this important industrial region 
on the new Polish-German frontier. It also demonstrates how the region's long-standing 
ethnic tensions, combined with Polish national aspirations and class consciousness, led to 
three insurrections in Upper Silesia between August 1919 and May 192 1. British military 
leaders utilised the prevailing fears about the post-war industrial unrest in Britain to reduce 
their military commitments in Europe. The thesis explains how this action resulted in a 
French ascendancy on the inter-Allied Commission administering Upper Silesia and the 
military forces policing it. The initial absence of the British troops also affected the attitude 
and effectiveness of the British contingent serving with the inter-Allied Commission. The 
internal conflicts within the Commission are dealt with, as are the differing attitudes of the 
French, British and Italian Commissioners towards the highly partisan, and often violent, 
Polish and German plebiscite campaigns. 
Using mainly unpublished official documents and private papers, this work describes 
the attitude and conduct of the British officials serving in Upper Silesia. It identifies each of 
the British military units eventually sent to Upper Silesia and records the British soldiers' 
confrontations with German and Polish Upper Silesian para-militarists during the final 
insurrection in May - July 192 1. Attempting to settle the controversial questions about the 
6 outvoters', the thesis provides an individual analysis of the result in each one of the 1,545 
voting constituencies. And, apart from demolishing the myth perpetuated in English- 
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V 
language historiography that Germany somehow or other 'won' the plebiscite, the thesis 
examines Upper Silesia's significance from an international perspective - particularly its 
effect on British relations with Poland and Germany, relations within the Entente, and the 
involvement of the League of Nations - an action resulting in Upper Silesia's partition in 
1922. 
Summary 
vi 
Maps and Plates 
Maps 
Page 
1. Upper Silesia and the Partitioned Areas of Poland 4 
2. Upper Silesian Plebiscite Area 1920-1922 37 
3. Upper Silesian Insurrection August 1919 [Based on 69 
T. Jedruszczak Polij)&a Polski w sprawie Gornego Slaska 
1918-1922 (Warsaw 1958)) 
4. The Commissioners' Recommendations of 24 April 1921 262 
5. Military Division of Responsibility 358 
6. Italian Foreign Minister's Proposals 24 May 1921 406 
7. French and British Proposals at Paris Conference 8- 13 422 
August 1921. 
8. International Line after League of Nations Judgement until 440 2 nd World War 
Plates 
Photo 1 Conjunction of the Three Empires near Mystowice. 5 
Photo 2 Site of Inter-Allied Commission Opole. 118 
Photo 3 Amphitheatre Gora Sw. Anny built during the Nazi era 345 
on the site of the Freikorps victory over Polish Silesian 
Insurgents, May 1921. 
Photo 4 Freikorps Memorial Gdra Sw. Anny 346 
Photo 5 Monastery on top of G6ra S'w. Anny 347 
Photo 6 Entrance to Schloss Turawa 462 
Photo 7 The Stables at Schloss Turawa 463 
Maps and Plates 
Vil 
Tables and Charts 
Tables Page 
1. Inter-Allied Forces for Plebiscite and Garrison Areas. 106 
2. Revised Schedule of Inter-Allied Forces for Plebiscite 113 
and Garrison Areas. 
3. Distribution of Officials in the Inter-Allied Upper Silesia 123 
Administrative and Plebiscite Commission by Nationality, 
September 1920. 
4. Provisional List of Voters February 22d 1921. 232 
5. Finalised List of Registered Voters in Towns 20'h March 1920. 235 
6. Finalised List of Registered Voters 2e March 1921. 236 
7. Result of Plebiscite By Voting Units Won 2e March 1920. 244 
8. Numerical Result of Plebiscite by Districts 20* March 1921. 245 
9. Result of Plebiscite by Voting Units Won 2e March 1921. 248 
(Industrial Areas & Coalfields Only) 
10. Numerical Result of Plebiscite by Districts 20* March 1921 249 
(Industrial Areas & Coalfields Only) 
Charts 
1. Coal Production During and After Insurrection 332 
2. Distribution of Coal During and After Insurrection 333 
Tables and Charts 
viii 
Illustrations 
Except where otherwise indicated, the following cartoons are from a selection of 
contemporary satirical Polish UppSr Silesian Journals such as, edited, and published by 
Wilhelm Szewczyk in Powstania Slgski 1919,1920,1921 (Katowice 196 1). 
1. The Prussian Stork 64 
2. Proof of German Superiority 64 
3. Mixed Commission Officials 64 
4. The Three Commissioners (Heather Soutar, Dundee 1998) 117 
5. The Problem (Punch, August 18,1920) 150 
6. Polish Plebiscite Poster 207 
7. German Plebiscite Poster 207 
8. 'Outvoter' Released from Prison 215 
9. Father Ulitzka 215 
10. The Bitters of Victory (Punch, March 30,1921) 252 
10a. Sir Harold Stuart (Heather Soutar, Dundee 1999) 298 
11. The God mothers and the Enfant Terrible (Punch, May 25,192 1) 299 
12. Orgesch Organizer 302 
13. German and Silesian 302 
14. Impatient Polish Silesian 302 
15. The Pole Stars (Punch Almanac 1922) 323 
16. Poland Strikes at Germany 323 
17. The Silesian Goose; (Punch, October 19,192 1) 451 
18. Grandmother Europe 458 
19. Irishman to Silesian 458 
20. Kocynder Reader 468 
Illustrations 
ix 
Abbreviations and Glossary 
(for archive abbreviations see bibliography) 
Alto Commissario The Ecclesiastical Commissioner for the Plebiscite areas 
Ecclesiastic in Upper Silesia, Kwidzyn and Olsztyn. 
BAOR British Army on the Rhine. 
Balfikum General von der Glotz German volunteers expelled from 
Russia's ex-Baltic provinces in 1919. 
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation. 
Bloc National French nationalist block in the post-war Chamber of 
Deputies. 
Bojowka-Polska Polisb armed bands. The original name came from the 
armed squads formed in 1905 by Pilsudski prior to the 
formation of the PPS revolutionary wing in 1906. 
Bund der Oberschlesier Upper Silesian League for (depending on the prevailing 
political circumstances) an independent state or an 
autonomous province within Germany. 
Burgermeister Mayor or Provost. 
Burgerwehr Citizen guard. 
CIGS Chief of the hnperial General Staff. 
Comintern Communist International. 
'DagO' A contemptuous term for a person of Latin extraction. 
Deutsch Bbhmen Gennans in Czechoslovakia. 
Deutscher Schutzbundflir League for the Defence of Germany on the Border and 
Das Grez- und A uslands- Abroad. Ostensibly a privately funded organisation, the 
Deutschtum. Schutzbund fronted the Government's Retchzentralefi7r 
Heimaldienst and raised public awareness of the Upper 
Silesia issue. Often referred to as simply the Schutzbund 
'Chink' A contemptuous term for a person of Chinese extraction. 
Abbreviations and Glossary 
x 
DMI DiTector of MilitaTy Intelligence. 
DMO Director of Military Operations. 
Erfidlung The label given to Wirth's declared policy of fulfilling 
the Peace Treaty's provisions. 
Freikorps Extreme German nationalist volunteer para-military 
units used by the first Weimar Governments to end the 
German revolution, put down socialist revolts 
throughout Germany, and crush separatism in Upper 
Silesia and then the Rhineland. 
FreikorpsfiArers Leaders of the Freikorps units. 
FreikorpsOmpfer Member of a Freikorps unit 
Geimendewhache Communal Police. 
Gm. Gomy (Upper). 
GrenzIdufer Workers crossing border from Poland to work in Upper 
Silesia. 
Grenzschutz Border defence force. 
Gutshezirke The manorial estates registered as the numerically 
smallest voting units in the plebiscite. 
Heimatstreur Persons bom in the country but living outside it. 
H-K-T Society German nationalist, imperialist pressure group in the 
Prussian provinces before 1914. 
Kaiserreich Term used to describe Imperial Germany 1871-1918. 
Kapp Putsch Extreme political militarists' unsuccessful attempt to 
overthrow the German Government in March 1920. 
KNP Komitet Narodowy Polski (Polish National Committee) 
Kreis Small administrative district in Germany. 
Kulturkampf The term used to describe Bismarck's attempt to forge a 
Prussian-German nationalism across the German Reich 
after 1871. 
Abbreviations and Glossary 
xi 
Laisserfaire Govemment policy of non-intervention, especially over 
economic matters. 
Landkreis Rural district 
Landrat Kreis administrator. 
Landtag German provincial parliament 
Narodowa Demokracja The Polish National Democrat Movement. 
NRL Naczeina Rada Ludowa (Supreme National Council). 
Oberland Notorious Freikorps unit. 
Oberprasident Provincial governor. 
Oberburgermeister First mayor of a city. 
Orgesch Organisation Escherich Local civil guards organised by Dr. 
Escherich into a reserve militia for the German Army. By 
1921 almost all of the different types of civil guards had been 
incorporated into the Orgesch. 
Outvoters Non-resident voters, born in Upper Silesia and entitled to 
vote in the plebiscite. Overwhelmingly German voters, they 
amounted to 16% of the total electorate. 
Papal Nuncio The Pope's representative. 
Perfide Albion Perfidious England. The traditional French view of England. 
PID Political Information Department (Foreign Office). 
Politische Leitung The Committee of Twelve formed to represent German 
Silesian interests on the outbreak of the third insurrection. 
Polska Obrona Gdrnolonska Defenders of Polish Upper Silesia. 
POW Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (Polish Military 
Organisation). 
PPS Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (Polish Socialist Party). 
Rathaus Town hafl. 
Abbreviations and Glossary 
xii 
Regierrungsbezirke An administrative district. 
Regierungsprdsident District govemor. 
Reichswehr The name of the German Army between 1920 and 1934, 
when it became the Wehrmacht. 
Schutzbund see Deutscher Schutzbund 
Schutzpohzei Protection police. 
Seim Poland's parliament. 
Selbstschutz German self-defence militia. 
Sicherheitspolizei Paramilitary security police. 
Swatkommissar State Commissioner. 
Str. Stary (Old). 
Strumtruppen Storm troopers. 
I §W. Swiety (Sacred). 
Stosstrupps Shock troops. 
Vereinigle Verbdnde United Associations (parts of the Schlesische Auschuss not 
incorporated in the German Plebiscite Commissariat). 
Wirtschaftspolitische Political Information Management Company. A front for a 
Geselischaft Government campaign organising tours and making material 
on the history, politics, economic problems and the need for 
an eastern frontier revision, available to foreign authors. 
Zentralle' Organisation established in Wroclaw to direct Germay's 
covert financial, political and military activities in Upper 
Silesia. Funded by the Reichszentraleftr Heimatdienst 
which channeled Foreign Ministry money to it. 
ZW. D Zwiazec Demokratcji (Poland's Democratic Union Party). 
Abbreviations and Glossary 
Introduction 
In his 1928 publication The Aftermath, Winston Churchill dealt with the world crisis 
which developed after the World War had ended on the Western Front in November 
1918. He devoted just two paragraphs to the disposal of Upper Silesia - an important 
industrial region held by Germany but claimed by the resurrected Polish state. After 
an interpretation of the events at the 1919 Peace Conference leading to the decision to 
consult Upper Silesia's population, Churchill described the outcome as follows. 
A plebiscite was eventually held in 1920 under the authority of British and 
French troops. While these were occupying the disputed zones and preparing 
for the voting, a violent incursion of Poles under one Korfanty, a former 
deputy of the Reichstag, was organised with the object of preventing the 
election ... A sort of civil war 
broke out in which the British troops sympathised 
with the Germans and the French with the Poles.... However, law and good 
sense prevailed. The plebiscite was duly taken and a German majority of 6 to 4 
declared itself. ' 
The words may be clear but the statement is inaccurate in almost every respect. Since 
the plebiscite (held in March 192 1), British historiography has perpetuated similarly 
inaccurate versions of the events that occurred. These mistakes have now permeated 
into other media. For example, speaking over emotive 1922 cinematic footage of 
Silesian refugees, the narrator of a recently transmitted BBC Television documentary 
series which has enjoyed world-wide distribution, informed viewers that: 
Though they'd won the plebiscite, German speakers on part of the new Polish- 
German border were driven from their homes and the Poles took the territory 
anyway. To German eyes the Poles had seized what was rightfully German. 
The sense that they'd been robbed only added to German grievances. 
2 
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These are serious charges. Firstly, they are untrue: secondly, they affect the 
manner in which the general public perceives inter-war Poland: thirdly, they imply 
that the Second Polish Republic acquired part of Upper Silesia illegitimately, the 
corollary being that Germany's decision to invade Poland in 1939 and what followed 
was perhaps partly justified by Upper Silesia's partition. For, by then, as well as 
demanding the return of Gdansk (Danzig) and the 'Polish Corridor', Hitler was also 
claiming that 90% of Upper Silesians had voted for Germany in the 1921 plebiscite. 
Seeking a means to satisfy the German public that their attack on Poland was justified, 
knowing their sensitivity to Upper Silesian issues (reinforced by 20 years of relentless 
Weimar and Third Reich propaganda), the Nazis chose to fabricate an incident on the 
Polish Silesian border at Gliwice (Gleiwitz) to launch the Second World War. 3 In an 
interesting twist to history, 15 years after publishing The Aftermath, developments in 
that war led to Churchill's own involvement, along with Stalin and Roosevelt, in yet 
another partitioning of Central Europe. 4 This time, however, there was no talk of 
plebiscites or self-determination and, in 1945, Poland's western boundary was shifted 
further west than even the most ardent Polish nationalist had dared to dream in 1918. 
Frederick the Great acquired Prussia's Silesian provinces from the Habsburg 
Empire by force of arms in 1742. Both Silesia and the adjacent Duchy of Cieszyn 
(Teschen) had fallen into Habsburg hands in 1526 when the Bohemian estates elected 
Ferdinand I as their King. The Polish monarchy had renounced its overlordship of 
5 both territories in favour of Bohemia in 1335 . By the time Prussia annexed Silesia; 
Lower Silesia had already been colonised by German-speakers. Frederick prized 
Lower Silesia, but he had no great regard for Upper Silesia, which he described as 'a 
ruined country, incapable of defence, whose inhabitants would never be loyal' -a 
comment acknowledging the significant ethnic differences between the two regions. 
introduction 
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However, the acquisition of Silesia was the making of Prussia. First, the income from 
Lower Silesia's rich farmland augmented the meagre amounts of taxation derived 
from the sandy, forested lands of Brandenburg and East Prussia. Secondly, unforeseen 
by Frederick, Upper Silesia's rich mineral resources were rapidly developed during 
the 19 th century to provide the 'iron' for Bismarck's 'blood and iron' policies, on 
6 
which the Reich was forged. 
After the final partition of Poland in 1795, Prussia shared the great Silesian 
coalfield with Austria and Russia. There was similarly sustained industrial investment 
in and around Cieszyn (which the Habsburgs had retained in 1742). But in Dombrowa 
(in the Russian area of partition) after much initial development, for strategic reasons, 
further investment was progressively withheld. By 1914 the Russian mines and plant 
were old-fashioned and inefficient. It should also be noted that by the start of the 
twentieth century, the Ruhr had overtaken Silesia as Germany's principal 
manufacturing region. The industrialists in Upper Silesia began looking east for new 
markets and in 1915, when the war against Russia turned in Germany's favour, they 
were leading advocates for the annexation of Russian Poland- 7 
During Prussia's stewardship of Upper Silesia, the land colonisation continued. 
By 1900 ethnic-German farmers occupied almost all of the Prince Hohenlohe's land 
on the West Bank of the Oder - the meandering river whose course dominates the 
whole of Silesia. However, on the Oder's east bank, almost all the rural and industrial 
land still remained firmly under the control of the Prince of Pless, the Donnersmarck 
dynasty, and other wealthy land-owning industrialists who could be counted among 
the wealthiest and most influential magnates of Europe. 8 By 19 10, Upper Silesia's 
population was almost two million. 9 The ethnic-German population, a high proportion 
of which was transient, was concentrated in the urban areas. These ethnic-Germans, 
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and also the ethnic-Germans who had migrated to the area on a permanent basis, were 
supplemented by Upper Silesians assimilated into the predominant German culture of 
the landowners, civil servants, administrators, and imported engineers and technicians. 
Like the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians, assimilated German Silesians, retained their 
Roman Catholic faith - which continued to mark them out from ethnic-Germans who 
were invariably Protestants. Because the Catholic Church retained its dominance in 
Upper Silesia, its clergy's freedom to participate in the plebiscite campaign became a 
contentious political issue, casting the Vatican in the uncomfortable role of arbitrator. 
Polish-speaking Upper Silesians predominated in the rural estates, villages and 
the communes located in and around the 'industrial triangle' and the south-east - see 
Map 2 (p. 37). First industrialised when still under feudal bondage, Polish-speaking 
Upper Silesians were the miners, the lowest grade of industrial workers, and the 
workforce on the great estates. 10 Two to three generations on, conscious of their 
exploitation by the German capitalists: reacting to the intensified German nationalism 
of the post-Bismarck era: many of these Upper Silesian miners and industrial workers 
started identifying their 'Polishness' rather than their 'class', as differentiating them 
from their 'Prussian oppressors'. Encouraged by the success of the Polish movement 
in Poznania (Posen) and West Prussia (Polish provinces seized during the 18th century 
partitions), Upper Silesia's indigenous Polish-speakers replicated these political and 
cultural organisations and formed parallel labour organisations to those established by 
German workers. The privations of war accelerated this trend. When the Kaiserreich 
crumbled in 1918, the Polish nationalists immediately demanded that Upper Silesia be 
incorporated in the new Poland, now rising phoenix-like from the ashes of the Austro- 
Hungarian, Russian, and German Empires. This thesis examines the role Great Britain 
played in the Polish Silesians' struggle to take their place in the Polish Republic. 
Introduction 
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Over the past twenty years, there have been five English-language publications 
addressing various aspects of this topic. There have also been several other interesting 
articles published on related themes. All of these have been by scholars working in the 
United States. After 1945, probably because of the class-perspective inherent in the 
Polish-speaking Silesian worker's struggle, in Upper Silesia itself almost an entire 
publishing industry was built on events surrounding the plebiscite. " Unfortunately, to 
date, none of the more reputable Polish accounts have been translated into English. 12 
That said, historians in the English-speaking world dismast works produced under the 
now-defunct socialist regimes. Conversely, during the Cold War, the Polish historians 
were trained not to trust any work undertaken by expatriate Poles or Americans. W. J. 
Rose's 1936 publication The Drama of Upper Silesia is the only English-language 
political history held in any great regard. Of the inter-war English-language works, by 
far the best factual account of the plebiscite campaign is Sara Wambaugh's Plebiscites 
Since the World War, published in 1933. The many British articles on Upper Silesia 
which were published around the time of the plebiscite deliberately reflect the British 
Government's point of view. The only published British inter-war military history of 
the plebiscite is a weak chapter in General J. E. Edmonds' The Occupation ofthe 
Rhineland 1918-1929. This was to be the final volume of the British official history of 
the First World War, but only 100 copies were printed on its completion in 1943 .13 
Regarding British involvement in Upper Silesia. Apart from Patricia Gajda, 
who examined British Government policy towards the new Polish-GeTman frontier, 
and co-authors Anna Cienciala and Titus Komamicki, who have analysed Polish 
foreign policy over the same period (1919-1925), all other English-language works 
rely solely on the published British foreign policy documents. This thesis not only 
uses these documents plus the same extensive resources used by Gajda, Komarnicki 
Introduction 
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and Cienciala, it also cites British military documentation and many personal papers 
that were unavailable to them. Unlike this thesis, neither GaJda nor Cienciala and 
Komarnicki dealt exclusively with events in Upper Silesia. Nevertheless, this thesis 
has gained from both publications. 14 The same can be said for Stewart Stehlin's work 
on relations between Germany and the Vatican, and of Richard Blanke's Orphans of 
Versailles. Of all recently published works, however, the thesis has derived greatest 
benefit from T. Hunt Tooley's meticulously researched National Identity and Weimar 
Germany. 15 Tooley's authoritative German sources and his analysis, coupled with the 
many unpublished British documents introduced by this thesis, gives this work a much 
broader perspective around its core subject than any previous English-language work 
on the subject 
Apart from a brief chapter by Leshiewski in Peter Stachura's Poland Between 
The Wars, there is no English-language narrative describing Britain's involvement in 
Upper Silesia from the Armistice through to the hand-over of the territory in July 
1922.16 This thesis goes some way towards rectifying this anomaly. In addition to 
documenting, analysing and explaining Britain's role, the attitudes struck by British 
politicians, their officials, the press and the public towards the Polish Upper Silesians, 
the following work also narrates the progress of the plebiscite campaign and describes 
the tensions, often leading to crisis, that it generated within the Entente. Not least of 
these points of friction was Britain's last minute withdrawal of its troops from the 
inter-Allied military force sent to Upper Silesia in January 1920. This left the force 
under-strength and greatly affected its response to challenges to the authority of the 
inter-Allied Commission sent to organise the plebiscite and administer the territory. 
The sudden withdrawal of the British troops was due to the British Army's 
difficulties in fulfilling its extensive post-war commitments. Apart from resuming its 
Introduction 
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normal Imperial duties, it had to contend with new and extensive territorial mandates 
in the Middle East, nationalism in Egypt and India, trouble in Ireland, a perceived 
revolutionary threat in mainland Britain, as well as the many plebiscite and garrison 
duties the Peace Conference had imposed on it. Its budget was under pressure and, 
initially, it had difficulty in finding recruits. This transition from war to peace was 
handled by the Secretary of State for War, Winston Churchill, the Army Council and 
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. The 
manner in which they resisted the repeated demands for assistance in Upper Silesia is 
studied. The thesis also details the political background to the British forces' arrival 
prior to the plebiscite in March 192 1: their work during the plebiscite: and their role in 
helping to terminate the third Polish insurrection, which broke out a few weeks later. 
Whilst there were many other sources of Anglo-French friction (such as their 
differences over relations with Russia and divergent policies regarding Turkey and 
Greece), Upper Silesia was both literally and metaphorically at the centre of European 
economic and political affairs. Apart from Poland and Germany, many other countries 
had an interest in the plebiscite's outcome. This wider interest was enhanced when the 
League of Nations became involved in August 192 1. But where previous studies have 
portrayed a deadlocked Supreme Council off-loading its Upper Silesian problem on to 
the League, this thesis demonstrates that League officials had lobbied the British and 
Italian governments for the referral. The focus of contemporary political observers, 
however, was on the corrosive effect that Upper Silesia was having on Anglo-French 
relations. As well as encapsulating irreconcilable differences over post-war relations 
with Germany, several of the outstanding issues that awaited settlement between the 
Entente and Berlin (such as reparations and disarmament) also impinged on the Upper 
Silesian question. This provided the German Cabinet with repeated opportunities to 
Introduction 
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exacerbate the friction existing between the British and the French - an avenue the 
German Foreign Office exploited to the full. 
Apart from the wider objectives outlined above; this thesis has two narrower, 
specific objectives concerning the plebiscite itself The first is the establishment and 
promotion of a correct interpretation of the plebiscite vote. The second is a resolution 
of the long-standing argument over how many non-residential voters, or 'outvoters', 
participated in the plebiscite and their effect on its outcome. These objectives relate to 
points made about British historiography at the start of this introduction. Admittedly, 
Churchill's mistake over the plebiscite date and his confusion over the sequence of 
events surrounding it were extreme examples. But his and the BBC's major error, the 
assumption that Germany had won the plebiscite because the Germans had obtained 
more votes than Poland, is commonplace in English-language histories discussing the 
period. But this misapprehension should not be wholly ascribed to a laxity amongst 
historians unfamiliar with the topic. Its roots extend back to the manner in which the 
British and German governments chose to announce the plebiscite results in 1921. 
The plebiscite was a means of establishing which of Upper Silesia's communities 
wanted to join Poland, and which of its communities favoured the status quo. A vote 
was taken in 1,545 individual communities. After the voting, instead of presenting the 
result by communes won or lost and their vitally important location, the British and 
German leaders deliberately presented the result as a single constituency vote. This 
was complicated by the arguments about the effect that between 150,000 to 19 1,000 
overwhelmingly German, non-resident 'outvoters' had on the plebiscite. The Poles 
claimed that the Germans had used these outvoters to win key marginal communes 
'targeted' inside the industrial district. To establish the truth of this allegation and to 
try to discover just how much influence the outvoters really had on the plebiscite's 
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outcome, the voting returns in each one of the 1,545 voting areas have been analysed 
and assessed - an exercise which has yielded surprising results., AJI the original 
statistics and data that were used can be found in the Addendum, Annex 1. 
Finally, it is necessary to make two stylistic points regarding the following five 
chapters. For brevity, the term 'Allies' has almost always been used in preference to 
the correct but much longer 'Allied and Associated Powers'. Secondly, place names 
have been given in Polish. On its first usage, a place name's related Germanic name 
(the name used at this time) is included after the Polish place name. A list of all of the 
German-Polish place names used is included in the Addendum, Annex 2. 
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Chapter 1 
The Peace Conference and 
The First Polish Insurrection 
President Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' were the key to the unlocking of Upper 
Silesia from Prussia and the German Reich Wilson's address to a joint session of 
Congress on 8 January 1918 amplified several points which Lloyd George had made 
three days earlier in a speech to a Trade Union Conference in London. Both leaders 
endorsed a peace based on national self-determination. Wilson's thirteenth point 
particularly specified that 
An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the 
territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a 
free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence 
and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant. ' 
The implication of a post-war settlement based on Wilson's Fourteen Points was not 
lost on Germany's political leaders. Gustav Stresemann, destined to become the 
Weimar regime's most influential Foreign Minister, noted that they made the loss of 
Alsace-Lorraine, Upper Silesia, Posen and parts of East Prussia a possibility. He 
added that 'the loss of the iron-works in Alsace-Lorraine and the coal mines in Upper 
2 
Silesia would strike at the very vitals of our economic system' . The 
basis for the 
claim for all Polish-populated areas in Eastern Germany made by the Paris-based 
Komitel Narodowy Polski (KNP), led by Roman Dmowski, was the Prussian census 
of 1910. Because it appeared irrefutable, the Polish claim went unquestioned by the 
Allied and Associated Powers. This endorsement was reinforced by the strength of 
Great Britain's scepticism over Polish territorial claims elsewhere. In compiling the 
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census, the Prussians had ascribed nationality on the basis of religion and language 
spoken in the home. The statistical picture that had emerged was that of an 
overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, Polish-speaking, Upper Silesia. 3 But since German 
unification in 1870, the pressure on Polish-speakers to assimilate into the wider 
German culture, applied through avenues such as education, employment, military 
service and religion, had modified this picture somewhat. It was also true that in 
early 1918, loss of territory was the last thing being contemplated in Germany. On 
the contrary, most Germans were expecting victory to deliver large-scale territorial 
annexations in both Eastern and Western Europe and to provide them with many 
more overseas colonies. 
On 3 March, Russia had signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. This had imposed 
conditions so extreme as to be without precedent. It signalled to France, Italy and 
Great Britain just what they could expect in the event of a Central Power victory. 4 
But despite the transfer of German divisions to the western front and Germany's 
initial success in a final German offensive against the Entente, the advance soon 
faltered. Reinforced by thousands of fresh American troops arriving in France daily, 
the Allies reversed the German tide. The German Army began to disintegrate. 
Fearing total defeat and national humiliation, Ludendorff, the Chief of Staff, called 
on Hindenburg, Head of all the German Armies and the Minister for War, to demand 
an immediate armistice. 5 At a special meeting at the Reichstag on 30 September 
1918, the leaders of Germany's political parties received the High Command's news 
in a stunned silence. They and the German people had been lulled into believing all 
was well. Stresemann asked bitterly why the German people had been kept so 
persistently ignorant of the true state of affairs. Hurriedly reviewing Wilson's 
Fourteen Points, they found the items relating to Poland acceptable only as a basis 
Chapter I 
16 
for discussion. 6 On 3 October, Prince Max, the new Chancellor, asked Ludendorff 
and Hindenburg for their opinions. From their reaction he concluded that neither had 
read Wilson's statement. Hindenburg stated that, if necessary, the High Command 
were prepared to concede Alsace-Loraine, 'but that the surrender of German territory 
in the east was out of the question'. 7 
In Allied political circles, especially in America, feelings were clearly against a 
negotiated peace. With this support behind him, Wilson proved unyielding and on 12 
October the Germans were forced to accept the Fourteen Points. Just three days later, the 
leader of the Polish Upper Silesians, Wojciech Korfanty presented the national claims of 
the 'Prussian Poles' to the Reichstag. Henceforth, he declared, all Poles living in the 
Polish districts of Prussia would consider themselves citizens of a Polish state. 'The 
Polish deputies withdrew from the Reichstag and amidst the revolutionary fervour 
engulfing Germany, the Polish leaders organised a Provisional Diet of 1,500 delegates. 
The largest contingent came from Upper Silesia, the Prussian province with the greatest 
Polish population. Meeting in Poznan' (Posen) between 3 to 6 December 1918, the Diet 
elected an eighty strong Nacze1na Rada Ludowa (NRL) or 'Supreme National Council' 
with a small permanent executive. 9 In Poznania and the other Polish districts in West 
Prussia, conflicts between the Poles and the newly established Soldiers' and Workers' 
Councils were avoided because Poles had generally won majorities in them. In fact, the 
Councils' Praesidiurn in Poznan' (The Soldiers' and Workers' Rada), consisted of two 
Poles and a German. 10 By January 1919 all of these Councils had disintegrated. 
This pattern of development had not been repeated in Upper Silesia where, rather 
than uniting the majority of the population against Germany, assimilation policies (such 
as Bismarck's Kulturkampf, and those influenced by the populist (v&kisch) nationalism 
which emerged during the I 890's), had caused stratification of Upper Silesia's social 
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culture and created a nationalist schism in its politics. " Over 25 years, a tradition of 
separate national organisations developed. When Soldiers' and Workers' Councils were 
formed in Silesia, the Polish-speaking Silesians, who formed the vast bulk of the manual 
workforce, were excluded. Instead, they formed their own Polish Workers' Councils - 
further enhancing that nationalist divide. 12 
This chapter describes the socio-economic and political conditions existing in 
Upper Silesia at the end of the Great War. It outlines the British foreign policyinaking 
process and explains why, after having decided to support Upper Silesia's inclusion in a 
reconstituted Poland, the British leaders threw that decision over in favour of the German 
demands for a plebiscite. Although Polish relations with the Great Powers have already 
been analysed in depth by Kay Lundgreen-Nielson's definitive work The Polish Problem 
at the Paris Peace Conference, nevertheless, the chapter focuses on several key decisions 
taken during these discussions which had an important bearing on the outcome of the 
plebiscite. 13 Where appropriate, military and political developments occurring in both 
Germany and Poland are included. The chapter concludes by outlining the events in 
Upper Silesia which led to the First Polish Insurrection, the dangerous international 
political situation that it created, and describes the Allies' belated response to it. 
After the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, the German Government's attempt to force 
national unification on the different nationalities and religions incorporated within the 
new Reich, accentuated long-standing differences between Poles and Germans. Reacting 
to German nationalism, Poles in the Prussian provinces cultivated their national identity. 
But the type of Polish nationalism that developed in Upper Silesia was of a quite different 
order to that which emerged amongst the Poles in the neighbouring agricultural province 
of Poznania. When the Prussians had seized Poznania and West Prussia during the 1793 - 
1795 Polish partitions, it had absorbed a complete national homogeneous social grouping 
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- Polish landowners, land-owning peasants and a Polish intelligentsia. The Upper Silesia 
that Prussia had acquired from Austria fifty years earlier had been a backward, feudal 
society. During the region's industrial expansion in the 18th and 19t" centuries, the 
German landowners transformed the lives of their Upper Silesian serfs and peasants by 
forcing them into the mines they had opened to supply the raw materials for the foundries 
and blast furnaces - most of which they also owned. The industrialisation of most Upper 
Silesians not only engendered class-consciousness but provided them with an awareness 
of their existence as a nationality distinct from that of the German owners. This class- 
consciousness and patriotism eventually merged to find expression in a struggle which, 
the Germans claimed, other Polish nationalists were not slow to exploit. 14 There were no 
indigenous landowners in Upper Silesia and the price that any Upper Silesian had to pay 
for even the slightest socio-economic advancement, was near total assimilation into the 
predominant German culture. The small Polish-speaking Silesian middle class that 
developed by the end of the 10' century was restricted mainly to law and journalism - 
professions given to politics. It was from their ranks, the lower echelons of the Catholic 
clergy and from the labour movement, that Upper Silesia's Polish leaders emerged. 
Despite growing solidarity amongst workers elsewhere in Europe, relations between 
the industrialised Polish Upper Silesians (who were generafly employed in the mines) and 
the many assimilated German Upper Silesians (employed in the foundries and factories), 
were characterised by nationalist antipathy. It was strong enough to prevent the German 
Social Democratic Party (the largest working-class party in Europe), from making any 
real headway in Upper Silesia. Their failure was also partly due to the firm grip that the 
Catholic Centre Party had retained on all Upper Silesians workers before 1903 - when it 
had joined the German Government. The first Polish political party to emerge in Upper 
Silesia was, the Prussian arm of the Polska Partia Soqjalistyczna (PPS) founded in 1893. 
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It played an important role in encouraging the formation of separate Polish trade unions 
in Upper Silesia and forging links with Poles living in the Russian and Austrian areas of 
partitioned-Poland. In contrast, the agricultural region of Poznan' was the stronghold of 
the Narodowa Demokraqja (National Democrats) - the bitter opponents of the Polish 
socialist parties. Socialism was weak amongst both Poles and Germans in Poznania. But 
the National Democrats had nurtured Polish consciousness in Upper Silesia, therefore the 
socialists there accepted Poznan"s leadership in the joint struggle against the Germans. 15 
Before the Armistice was signed in the Forest of Compiegne on II November 
1918, the Allies and Associated Powers had already recognised the National Democrat- 
controlled KNP as Poland's official representatives. However, in the defacto free-Poland, 
comprising the unified ex-Russian and ex-Austrian partitions, one of the PPS's founders, 
General Pilsudski, had become the temporary Chief of State and the Commander in Chief 
of Poland's military forces. When J@drzej Moraczewski succeeded in forming a socialist- 
led provisional Polish Government on 18 November 1918, this was recognised by the 
political parties throughout these 'liberated' areas of Poland, but not by the KNP in Paris 
or by Poles in Poznan' and West Prussia. Poland therefore had two governments, one in 
Paris and another in Warsaw, neither recognising the other. 16 And because the Armistice 
had left sovereignty over Upper Silesia and Prussia's other Polish provinces in German 
hands until the outcome of the Peace Conference, when the Poles there elected the NRL 
(see above) in Poznan, this had created yet another centre of Polish political authority. 
In many ways Polish Upper Silesians were politically as well as geographically 
closer to the new independent Poland than they were to the National Democrat leadership 
in Poznan. But with the Allies assuming responsibility for establishing Poland's frontier 
with Germany, including Upper Silesia, Pitsudski realised that there was little that Poland 
could usefully do until these decisions had been taken. On the other hand, Poland's 
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eastern borders were undefined and the lands in turmoil. Possessing very few military 
resources, Polish volunteers had been forced to engage the Ukrainians in East Galicia and 
were fighting bands of Bolsheviks who were encroaching on the Polish populations in 
Belorussia and Lithuania. In the Duchy of Cieszen (in the ex-Austrian area of the Silesian 
coalfield), the government in Prague would soon overturn a local border agreement and 
spark a Polish-Czechoslovak conflict. These problems and the necessity to gain the 
recognition of the Allied Powers by achieving a workable relationship with his National 
Democrat rivals in Paris were pressing issues for Pitsudski to deal with. That said, he well 
knew that Germany would do everything in its power to retain Upper Silesia. Although 
political control over the Upper Silesian Poles ultimately rested in Poznan' with the NRL, 
to meet any future military contingency, he encouraged the expansion of the Polska 
Organizacja Wojskowa (POW) across Upper Silesia. After an unpromising experience 
during the first Silesian Insurrection in August 1919, the Upper Silesian POW emerged as 
a formidable fighting force. 17 
As we have noted, Upper Silesia belonged to a few powerful landowners. They ran 
their huge estates at a profit, benefited from the mineral rights beneath them and owned 
much of the related industry. They were amongst the richest people in Europe and were 
well practised in influencing German domestic and foreign policy. That the monarchy 
had been toppled and that both Germany and Prussia were governed by two Rat der 
Volksbeauftragten (Councils of Peoples' Commissars) composed of moderate and 
extreme socialists, did not diminish the Upper Silesian landed aristocracy's influence. 
They found that the Commissars were also determined to minimise Germany's territorial 
losses. But the severity of the Armistice terms, the speed with which the German Army 
re-established its superiority in the east, and the resilience of Prussia's established order, 
were additional factors which helped boost the Upper Silesian landowners' and 
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industrialists' resolve to hold on to what they had. As for the Prussian military caste, to 
relinquish territory that Frederick the Great had acquired by conquest was deemed to be 
something utterly unthinkable. But apart from an inherent disparagement of everything 
Polish, the one extra factor which was of great psychological significance to Germany's 
general commitment to retain Upper Silesia was that, unlike Poznania and West Prussia, 
it had not been part of partitioned Poland. British policymakers appreciated the likely 
strength of the German resistance. Circulating a paper to the Cabinet on the restoration of 
Poland in October 1918, Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, indicated just how 
difficult it would be to take the Silesian coalfields away from Germany. Agreeing that the 
region had been 'ethnographically Polish from time immemorial', nevertheless, he 
pointed out that since it 'was of the utmost economic value to Germany' they were 
unlikely to let it go very easily. 18 
What mattered most to Germany and its Central European neighbours were 
Upper Silesia's coalmines. In addition to supplying the local furnaces, foundries and 
manufacturing plants, Upper Silesia had supplied around 23% of Germany's pre-war coal 
requirements. All remaining production had been exported to neighbouring countries. 19 
Balfour suggested that it would take a 'crushing defeat' to tear Upper Silesia from their 
grasp. 20 The Armistice spared the Germans from that scale of defeat. Thereafter, through 
that first winter of peace, the maintenance of Upper Silesian coal production became vital 
in holding Germany together in the face of Spartacist threats and separatist pressures. 
And later, as the Paris Peace Conference progressed, British and American economic 
experts become concerned that any loss of coal production there threatened the speed of 
Europe's economic recovery. This ensured that threats to coal production and Germany's 
pleading over the region's future sovereignty vis-a-vis Allied demands for reparations, 
were taken seriously by Britain at least. 
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Throughout Europe, the Armistice was accompanied by massive reductions in 
coal output. Apart from the retreating German Army's deliberate destruction of coal 
mines on the Western Front and the war-time deterioration of the mines and mining 
equipment which had occurred everywhere, the main reason for the post-Armistice slump 
in coal output was a spate of industrial disputes in Britain and France. However, in the 
Ruhr, Upper Silesia and elsewhere in Germany, coal production had fallen throughout 
1918. This had been due to the Allied blockade and its effect on the coal miners' physical 
capacity. During 1918, Upper Silesian miners had been subsisting on about one third of 
the calories necessary per day. Although Upper Silesian miners' wages had doubled since 
1914, the price of food available at government-controlled prices had tripled. By 1918, 
the black market had undermined the regulated economy to such an extent that it had 
become the only source for many essential provisions - but at vastly increased cost. 
People were disillusioned and hungry, and respect for authority had deteriorated as the 
shortages had worsened. Officials responded to increasing urban unrest by tightening 
controls on the producers. Where they could, German peasants and farmers resisted by 
diverting even more of their produce to the black market. Apart from some food-relief 
operations in March 1919 which had been pressed for by Allied military officers sent to 
Germany after the Armistice, the Allied 'hard liners' took no immediate steps to lift the 
21 blockade. It was maintained until Germany ratified the Peace Treaty on 12 July 1919. 
In Upper Silesia, strikes over the food shortages and the general living and 
working conditions had been breaking out since 1917. To many Silesians, promises 
about the abundant food supplies that would be freely available to them as members of 
the new, predominantly agricultural, independent Poland, must have been enticing. In a 
rare English-language description of events in Upper Silesia during this period, T. Hunt 
Tooley has described how in the light of the imminent Armistice and Wilson's Fourteen 
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Points, the Prussian leadership suddenly became concerned about the low morale of the 
Upper Silesian population, especially the workers. As the war progressed and their 
enthusiasm waned, hard-pressed Upper Silesian workers had started to define themselves 
more precisely as hard-pressed 'Polish' workers. The civil authorities tried countering 
this growing tide of national awareness amongst Polish Silesian workers, by maintaining 
extensive surveillance and arresting anyone suspected of 'agitation'. German managers 
also had the power of life and death over the workers. The war gave them the privilege of 
releasing workers to the army or recalling them from the trenches at will. One German 
historian has concluded that instead of nationalist motives, the hate Polish workers 
directed towards German managers during the plebiscite period might be more 
appropriately ascribed to the personal antipathy they had aroused during the war. 22 
Even before the Armistice was signed, the region's industrial leaders and its 
administrators already anticipated some form of referendum on Upper Silesia's future. 
They decided to run a campaign to convince both the local population and the Allies that, 
rather than Upper Silesia being a colonial adjunct to Prussia, it was in fact a fully-fledged, 
much-valued German province. Money was no object to the campaign. A central office 
was opened in Berlin followed by a campaign headquarters in Opole - the administrative 
centre of the area. Within a few weeks it had established itself across the region. But 
those attracted to the campaign were the old Pan-German colonisers and the 'Hakatist, 
nationalists, active with their own divisive messages since before the turn of the century. 
Along with Silesia's aristocratic landowners who also joined the campaign, membership 
therefore reflected the nationalistic, authoritarian views of the ethnic-Germans. And as 
monarchists, most of the campaigners only reluctantly acknowledged the legitimacy of 
the National Government in Berlin. Tooley implies that it was perhaps a mistake to 
involve such conservative and reactionary opinion because it robbed the campaign 'of 
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influence over 60 percent of the people' in Upper Silesia. But apart from the fact that 
these were bound to be the very people attracted to such a campaign, if his figures are 
correct, then they illustrate that one third of Upper Silesia's population was already 
committed to an extreme pro-German viewpoint. Other German-supporting Upper 
Silesians, alarmed at 'the Polish danger', took a different route by supporting a growing 
demand for Upper Silesia's independence. The people following this 'separatist' path 
were mainly the assimilated German Upper Silesians forming the majority of 'Germans' 
in Upper Silesia. Though assimilated, they retained their Catholic faith and had, therefore, 
continued experiencing some discrimination from the predominantly Protestant ethnic- 
Germans. Fearing that the socialist-dominated governments in Berlin might introduce 
anti-clerical measures, at this very early point in the developing saga of Upper Silesia, the 
Catholic Church and the Centre Party were also supporting the independence campaign - 
23 
which was seen as essentially a temporary manoeuvre to avoid annexation by Poland. 
With the Armistice signed, the Polish Silesian miners' strike grew in strength, and 
spread to many other mines. Examining the situation in late November 1918, the German 
Government concluded that Upper Silesian coal was of such vital importance that it was 
essential that the authorities maintain order there. Previously, it had taken the threat of 
military force or the use of military force to end the war-time strikes in Upper Silesia, but 
both the German and Prussian governments had few disciplined troops at their disposal. 
When the Majority Socialists suggested a paramilitary Heimatwehr (Homeland Defence 
Force) be recruited to force the miners back to work and secure the Polish border, the 
Independent Socialists in the government raised the twin spectres of reaction and counter- 
revolution and turned it down. In a bid to maintain administrative cohesion and continuity 
within Silesia's civil administration, the Prussian Government disregarded Centre Party 
and their own socialist supporters' demands for reform there, and left its 'political' office 
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holders in place. Previously, these senior posts, such as Oberprasident (provincial 
governor), the Regierungs prdsident (district administrators), down to the Kreis 
administrators (Landrate), had been given out to Prussian officials subject to the 
monarchy's approval. 24 Officials filling these posts were, therefore, closely associated 
writh the old regime's authoritarian and discriminatory policies. With no pressure on them 
to change, local officials continued practising these methods and were wholly involved in 
the industrialists' and landowners' campaign to save Upper Silesia. The first violent post- 
Armistice clampdown on the Silesian workers occurred when the civil authorities took 
pre-emptive action after full-scale fighting broke out between Poles and Germans in 
Poznan and West Prussia. The catalyst was an unexpected, unscheduled visit by the 
world-famous Polish patriot, Ignacy Paderewski, to Poznaii on 26 December 1918.25 
Paderewski had arrived in Poznan' in the company of three members of a British 
fact-finding mission en route to Warsaw. Though unofficial, it was the very first Allied 
mission to arrive in Poland at the end of the war. It was clear to London that there had to 
be some form of conciliation between the KNP (who had already sent a representative to 
Warsaw) and Pilsudski. 26 During the war British and American politicians and officials 
had found the KNP a convenient body to deal with on most Polish matters (especially in 
raising a Polish Army) but only the French had accorded it 'Govemment-in Exile' status. 
However, the re-establishment of the Polish Republic and emergence of Pilsudski had cut 
the ground from under the KNP's feet. Some KNP members were portraying Pitsudski as 
a pro-German collaborator, hanging on to power by throwing in his lot with the 
Bolsheviks. However, the Foreign Office had reason to distrust information supplied by 
Dmowski and the KNP and decided to send a small mission to Poland to establish the 
faCts. 27 
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Led by Lieutenant Colonel H. H. Wade, British Military Attachd in Copenhagen, 
the mission was instigated by Esme Howard who as British Minister in Sweden had kept 
a watching brief on Poland. He was in London preparing to attend the peace conference 
in Paris and he nominated Wade to lead the Mission. Two naval officers were detailed to 
accompany Wade. His orders were 'to proceed to PoznaA and there await the arrival of 
Messrs Kimens and Kenney', two experienced Foreign Office officials travelling via 
Berrie. 28 Wade and his party were to be picked up in Copenhagen by the destroyer HMS 
Concord and taken to Gdansk (Danzig). But shortly before the Concord was due to depart 
from London, at Balfour's request, it was delayed until Paderewski and his wife could 
join it to sail, in Paderewski's words, 'to unite Polish hearts'. 29 
A world famous concert pianist, Paderewski was probably the only Polish patriot 
known to members of Britain's governing circle. He had spent the war fund-raising and 
publicising the Polish cause in the United States. Though not a National Democrat, his 
wartime work led to a close association with Roman Dmowski. On receiving news of the 
Armistice he left America and sailed directly to France, meeting Dmowski in Paris. After 
spending a few days discussing the Polish situation, Paderewski then travelled to London 
where he met Balfour, a friend of long-standing. The available evidence indicates that 
Paderewski hoped to gain a passage to Gdansk to visit Pilsudski in Warsaw. At this time, 
it was the Royal Navy who conducted all the Allied movements around the Baltic. He 
probably discussed his proposals with the British Foreign Secretary who told him about 
Wade's fact-finding mission. Since conciliation between the Poles was also a British aim, 
Balfour arranged for Paderewski to travel with Wade to Gdansk . 
3() At Spa, the British 
members of the Allied Armistice Commission advised the Germans that Paderewski 
would be travelling directly to Warsaw from Gdansk .31 All previous work on this subject 
has assumed that Paderewski's original itinerary was to be via Poznan' -a very indirect 
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route for someone in a hurry. 32 When HMS Concord docked at Gdansk on Christmas 
Day, Korfanty and several other prominent National Democrats from Poznan' were there 
to meet Paderewski. Despite German objections, Wade insisted on Paderewski's party 
accompanying him to Poznan". On such decisions history turns. " 
Arriving in Poznan'on the evening of 26 December, Wade's party found the town 
decorated with Polish and Allied flags. Crowds of Poles lining their route from the station 
to their hotel received them 'with extraordinary enthusiasm'. 34 Unlike Upper Silesia, 
where the 'old-guard' administrators and officials had remained, in Poznania and in parts 
of West Prussia, the Poles by now controlled most areas of local administration. Realising 
that the Poles were a majority across all classes there and that they, as a government, had 
few other options available, Berlin avoided taking measures against them - much to the 
disgust of recently formed Volksrilte (German National Committees) and local leaders of 
pre-war nationalist organisations such as the Deutscher Ostmarkenverein (German 
Eastern Marches Association). These organisations joined to launch a campaign to retain 
Poznania and West Prussia as part of Germany. Encouraged by the arrival of a volunteer 
Grenzschutz (Border Defence Force) sent to secure the Polish frontier, on 27 December, 
about 200 armed German civilians tore down all the Allied flags flying in Poznan" and 
besieged Paderewski's hotel. They attempted to destroy PoznaYi's NRL headquarters and 
rob a Polish bank. As light faded they started firing at random - Paderewski's room was 
hit by four bullets. 35 The following day the Polish militia occupied the whole town. As 
the fighting quickly spread throughout Poznania and parts of West Prussia Korfanty, who 
was now the NRL's Minister for War, helped to forge the different Polish paramilitary 
units into the PoznaA 4MY. 36 The Allies finally forced a cease-fire on both parties in 
February 1919, leaving most of Poznania and parts of West Prussia in Polish hands. 
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Whilst Poles were making rapid military progress in Poznania and West Prussia, 
fearing a similar rising in Upper Silesia, the authorities cleared the way for an immediate 
clampdown on the striking miners and any related Polish nationalist activity. 3' The check 
on government-sponsored counter-revolutionary measures had been removed by the three 
Independent Socialists resigning from the National Government on 27 December 1918 
(the day the fighting broke out in Poznan). Three more Majority Socialists replaced the 
Independents. One was Gustav Noske who was appointed Minister of Defence. Noske 
was especially forceful about supporting the recruitment of paramilitary volunteer units. 
On reminding his colleagues that areas taken by the Poles in the east would deprive 
Germany of coal and food, they quickly agreed to the local recruitment of a Grenzschutz 
force in Upper Silesia, measures to revitalise the regular Army, and gave retrospective 
approval to the volunteer paramilitary Freikorps units already formed by the Army's 
High Command. 38 
After the Freikorps units had snuffed-out the Spartacist threat in Berlin (10 - 17 
January 1919), they and all other available disciplined Army units were sent to secure 
Germany's eastern frontiers. The Army's General Headquarters also moved from Cassell 
to Kolobrzeg (Kolberg) on the Baltic coast. Special military commands were established 
and troops from the west were augmented by local enlistment. Many younger members of 
the pool of dispossessed and discontented 'Baltic Germans', who had retreated into the 
region from Russia's Baltic provinces, now joined the new Freikorps formations. These 
units were particularly attractive to discharged junior officers and young Germans filled 
with heroic tales about the self-sacrificing Sturmtruppen battalions - whose spirit these 
Freikorps units claimed to emulate. 39 Orders were issued from Berlin to use all available 
military and paramilitary forces to end the Upper Silesian strike movement. Martial law 
was imposed throughout the industrial area, including the Pszczyna (Pless) and Rybnik 
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districts, public meetings were banned and military courts were established to sentence 
the offenders. It was also announced that any activity aiming at the secession of Upper 
Silesia from Germany would be treated as high treason. For both Polish and German 
industrial workers as well as the Polish peasants in the area, these proclamations and the 
choice of Otto Horsing as Swatkommissar (State Commissioner) to implement these 
measures, signalled the start of an unprecedented repression. 40 In response, the Upper 
Silesian arm of the NRL, which was headed by a committee of four prominent Poles, 
including Korfanty, extended their activities across Upper Silesia. They called for a 
boycott of Germany's National Assembly elections due to be held on 19 January, and 
sent representatives to Paris to lobby the Peace Conference delegates about the inclusion 
of Upper Silesia in the new Polish State. 41 
When the Peace Conference eventually began, the British Foreign Secretary, 
Arthur Balfour, his successor, George Curzon, and the Permanent Under-Secretary, 
Charles Hardinge, headed the Foreign Office's hierarchical structure. There were also 
two highly influential Assistant Under-Secretaries, William Tyrrell and Eyre Crowe - the 
latter closely involved with developments over Upper Silesia. Prior to the implementation 
of the Peace Treaty in January 1920, matters pertaining to Upper Silesia were dealt with 
by the Peace Conference. After this, they were handled in London by the Foreign Office's 
Central office headed by S. P. Waterlow. Though the functions of the Foreign Office had 
been expanded during the war, in terms of influence, by 1919 it was a much-diminished 
institution. The pre-war criticism of the Foreign Office's role and the competence of its 
officials had intensified during the war. By the Armistice, demands of critics such as the 
Union of Democratic Control [of foreign policy] were common currency amongst League 
of Nations supporters and organised labour. However, by this time, the Foreign Office's 
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influence over British foreign policy had been usurped by the organisational demands of 
total Warfare. 42 
This decline in influence had occurred with the appointment of Lloyd George's 
Coalition Government in December 1916. Seeking a speedy decision-making process, 
Lloyd George had adopted a presidential style of government by appointing a small War 
Cabinet comprising ministers without departmental responsibilities. 43 Thus the Foreign 
Secretary was excluded and his department lost its role as the Cabinet's leading foreign 
policy advisor. Compounding this, Lloyd George gathered a team of personal advisors 
together who not only recommended policies to the Prime Minister but also executed 
them on his behalf - sometimes over the heads of the responsible departmental ministers. 
His chief foreign policy advisor was Philip Kerr, the former editor of the quarterly 
review, 'Round Table'. 44 Known as Lloyd George's 'Garden Suburb' because they 
worked in temporary accommodation erected in the garden of 10 Downing Street, these 
advisors reported to the Prime Minister through the Cabinet Secretariat. 45 This 
department had evolved under Lloyd George's predecessor and its function was to 
centralise prime ministerial control over the administration. It was headed by Maurice 
Hankey -a gifted administrator but a person never slow in advancing his own foreign 
policy initiatives to the Prime Minister. 
Capping the changes had been the appointment of Balfour as Foreign Secretary. 
Testimonies to Balfour's charisma abound, but his contemporaries often alluded to his 
lack of application. And, Whilst his relationship with Lloyd George appears to have been 
one of mutual respect, it is generally accepted that the partnership only worked because 
Balfour allowed Lloyd George a free hand with foreign affairs. This was a practice Lloyd 
George subsequently continued - much to the annoyance of Balfour's successor. In his 
biography of Curzon, Leonard Moseley records that the new Foreign Secretary believed 
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that Balfour had been 'the worst and most dangerous of the British Foreign Ministers' for 
having allowed himself 'to be displaced in Paris and pushed aside'. 46 Lloyd George's 
aversion to diplomats and experts, the Balfour-Lloyd George relationship, and a belief in 
his own infallibility, goes some way towards explaining his domination of the Peace 
Conference. It also helps to explain his many foreign policy failures in his remaining 
three years of power after it. Reviewing British foreign policy shortly after Lloyd George 
had resigned in 1922, one well-informed commentator observed that in his time as Prime 
Minister, Lloyd George had taken the country from a position of acknowledged world 
leadership in 1919 to near complete isolation. This had been brought about by the deep 
and widespread distrust of Great Britain engendered amongst other countries: 
Of that distrust ý& Lloyd George had become the occasion and the chief object 
abroad, because foreign countries, to whom at that juncture British foreign policy 
mattered so immensely, were quick to perceive that it was essentially Mr. Lloyd 
George's policy, and for its perplexing and alarming instability they learned, not 
without reason, to fasten responsibility upon him personally rather than upon the 
minister nominally in charge of the British Foreign Office. 47 
One country which suffered greatly from Lloyd George's 'perplexing instability' was 
Poland. 48 Once they arrived in Paris, the ease with which the British Prime Minister could 
be persuaded to throw-over a policy, saw the early British support for a 'Greater Poland' 
scrapped. Lloyd George's personal raft of anti-Polish prejudices bolstered by the German 
campaign to undermine the Polish claims to Upper Silesia, helped British advocates of a 
'Small Poland' convince him that the German and Russian hostility towards Poland 
would be minimised by ensuring a homogenous Polish population. 
The 'Small Poland' group within the British Delegation was headed by James 
Headiam Morley, Assistant Director of the Foreign Office's new Political Information 
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Department (pD). 49 The PID consisted of academic experts, temporarily recruited to co- 
ordinate and analyse the mass of political intelligence that had flowed into the Foreign 
Office during the war. 50 Many of these temporary officials had studied in Germany and 
some made an important contribution towards shaping British post-war attitudes towards 
Poland. " Headlam Morley had been a permanent official with the Education Department 
whose interest in European history earned him a reputation as an expert on Germany. 52 
While the Foreign Office's most senior officials continued to be marginalised at the 
Peace Conference, Headlam Morley's determination to influence British policy led him to 
strike up a good working relationship with Philip Kerr. 53 As the Conference progressed 
and the decision-making process gradually degenerated into a series of conversations 
between Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Wilson, the British Prime Minister increasingly 
relied on Hankey and Kerr for foreign policy advice with Headlarn Morley as his advisor 
on German territorial questions. Kerr had no inhibitions about accepting the PID experts' 
backdoor advice, especially where their views reinforced his own. 54 In fact, by filtering 
the PID experts' views and feeding them and his own to the Prime Minister, Headlarn 
Morley ensured that nobody influenced the outcome of the Peace Conference for Poland 
more than he did. He laid the political ground work for the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, 
pushed for 'free-city' status for Gdansk and helped to initiate and draft the much-resented 
minorities treaty, designed to protect Poland's Jewish minority populations. 
Kerr had a particular affinity with the views of the PID's Central European expert, 
Lewis Namier. This was despite Namier's inability to provide an objective assessment in 
any report dealing with Polish affairs. For example, on first exchanging a series of letters 
with Keff in 1917, Namier stressed the danger of British Government contacts with 
'Dmowski and his whole Polish Black Hundred Crew'. 55 A recently naturalised British 
citizen, Ludwik Niemirowski was the son of prosperous Polonised Jewish land owning 
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parents, living in Poland, on the Russian-Austrian line of partition. After study in Europe 
and America and making a mark as a student in Oxford, Namier was recommended by 
56 friends working in wartime intelligence agencies as an advisor on Polish affairs. 
Though he had a formidable intellect he was perhaps not suited for this role. He was 
suspicious of Polish ambitions regarding the re-establishment of their state, yet he 
supported Ukrainian independence and was an avid Zionist. His convictions caused 
problems. Paul Latawski claims that Namier's repeated clashes with Dmowski did lasting 
damage to Anglo-Polish relations. 57 He was not included in the British Delegation to 
Paris in case the French objected to his presence. Nevertheless, Headlam Morley, who 
knew all Namier's faults, believed him to be the ablest of all the PID experts. -5'Just a few 
days after he arrived in Paris, Headlain Morley wrote to Keff: 
I agreed before I came across that Narnier should correspond with me about the 
Polish question. As you know he is not altogether persona grata, and it is I think 
increasingly difficult for him to get a hearing; on the other hand I am sure that his 
knowledge and his point of view deserves attention. I am, at his request, sending 
you privately and unofficially, some of the letters and papers which I have 
received from him. 59 
He continued to do so, sometimes editing out Namier's most outrageous anti-Polish 
remarks. Later, Headlam Morley arranged for Namier to travel to Paris to help draft the 
minorities treaty. 60 What Headlam Morley probably did not know was that, in addition to 
bypassing his superiors in London to communicate directly with him, Namier sometimes 
bypassed Headlam Morley as well and sent material directly to Kerr . 
61 Namier's views on 
Poland were well-received by some of the other officials - the Russian and East European 
experts in particular. With Kerr and the Prime ý&nister increasingly turning to Headlam 
Morley for their 'Small Poland' ideas and arguments, Namier's distrust of the Poles 
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permeated and then came to dominate Britain's policies towards Poland. During the 
Peace Conference, one of Namier's early targets was Paderewski and the reconciliation 
achieved between the KNP in Paris and Warsaw. 
Paderewski had arrived in Warsaw on I January. Two weeks later he agreed to 
form a coalition government. Because of his acceptability at international level, he also 
acted as Poland's Foreign Minister, with Dmowski and the KNP continuing to represent 
the Poles at the Peace Conference. Constituent Assembly elections were held in Poland 
on 26 January but no party pined an overall majority. Paderewski's appointment was 
welcomed and Allied recognition of the Polish Government quickly followed. But the 
Wade-Paderewski escapade in Poznan' had not been well received in London. In fact, 
Wade had escaped immediate recall only because London believed that the popular 
acclaim surrounding his arrival in Warsaw had given him a political significance 
favourable to Britain. Wade's initial despatches attracted favourable comment by some 
Foreign Office officials. But once the military intelligence officers began pouring cold 
water over his assessment of Poland's precarious military position, until his removal in 
March 1919, he was cruelly portrayed as a dupe of the Poles and his (highly accurate) 
information was generally disregarded. 62 
This fate was also visited on Esme Howard who arrived in Warsaw on 12 February 
as the British representative with the Peace Conference's inter-Allied Commission 
investigating the conditions in Poland. On the day that the Commission had left Paris, 
writing to Namier, Headlam Morley noted that since arriving in Paris, Howard had been 
coming under Polish influence. 63 Howard's despatches from Warsaw not only confirmed 
Wade's reports but one of his first letters to Balfour warned him that the Poles in Upper 
Silesia 'are desirous of taking the government into their hands ... especially in view of the 
depredations committed by German voluntary bands'. 64 When the Commission arrived in 
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Poznan'on I March, Howard noted that the German military forces deployed around the 
area appeared to be preparing to attack Poland . 
65 The Commission's French President 
also reported to Paris that the German High Command understood that the Allies were in 
a hurry to disarm and would therefore not send troops to Poland. He believed that the 
German High Command intended provoking a wider Polish rising in the East, thus giving 
the Germans a pretext to resume military operations and evade decisions taken in Paris 
regarding Prussia's Polish provinces. 66 Howard himself predicted that this provocation 
would take the form of arbitrary arrests and requisitioning in Upper Silesia and parts of 
West Prussia. Before leaving Poznan the Commission therefore urged Korfianty to do all 
67 he could to stop the Polish inhabitants of these districts rising to the German bait . 
The members of the British Delegation in Paris treated Howard's warnings with 
great scepticism. Headlam Morley told Namier that 'the members of the Mission have all 
become pure Poles'. 68 In fairness to the sceptics, although the inter-Allied Commission 
comprised experienced diplomats, they were being ushered around the region by Polish 
diplomats and almost all of their reports were derived solely from Polish sources. Crowe 
nevertheless agreed that the Germans had 'no ground for apprehending that either British 
or American, or even French troops would resume hostilities'; and he predicted that 'the 
longer the settlement is delayed, the greater will be the danger that Germany will not 
sign' . 
69 The Polish Delegation in Paris had also been acutely conscious of the detrimental 
effect that any Upper Silesian rising would have on their image at the Peace Conference. 
The Polish Army's advance against the Ukrainians in Galicia and the fighting that had 
broken out between Poles and Czechs in Cieszyn, had caused the Conference to issue a 
warning on 24 January that henceforth, any acquisition of territory by force would 
prejudice that country's other claims. 
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By March 1919, despite an Allied-imposed 'cease-fire', Poznanian Poles were 
defending themselves from German bombardments and infiltrators and were unable to 
redirect resources to Upper Silesia. In Warsaw, meanwhile, the Polish Government was 
well aware that an uprising in Upper Silesia could lead to war with Germany - something 
for which they were both militarily and politically unprepared. In response to the Polish 
leadership's pressure to not give the Germans cause to act further, Upper Silesia's Polish 
nationalists resisted the temptation of a 'Poznan" type solution'. In this, the preponderant 
influence was Korfanty. He was well-supported by the Polish Trade Unions whose 
leaders tried, where possible, to quash agitation and prevent strikes. TLearning that an 
armed insurrection was due to take place on 22 April, Korfanty persuaded its organisers, 
an Upper Silesian branch of the POW, to abandon it. As the leader of the Poles, however, 
Korfanty's actions at this time, later cost him credibility amongst the more forceful Polish 
elements in Upper Silesia. W. J. Rose records that some groups would blame Korfanty's 
faith in diplomacy for the suffering which Upper Silesia experienced between 1919 and 
192 1. This was because this period of relative calm in early 1919 permitted the German 
Army to re-establish itself in the region and eventually deploy nearly 350,000 troops 
71 
along the Polish border. As a result of the Polish Silesians' self-discipline, the external 
political pressure, Korfanty's policing, and the gradual deployment of German forces in 
the area, by April 1919 Upper Silesia had momentarily ceased being a territorial problem 
worth mentioning to Paris. 72 
But persuading the Polish Silesians to await the Peace Conference's decision 
entailed reassuring them that there would be a speedy fulfilment of Upper Silesia's 
unification with Poland. Such reassurances could only come from the progress being 
made in Paris, where a sub-committee of the Conference's Polish Commission had 
started to draw up the new Polish-German frontier. Unlike anywhere else on Germany's 
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eastern frontiers, unanimity had prevailed amongst the Allies on the amount of Upper 
Silesian territory to be transferred to Poland. This was based on a proposed 'British line' 
following the existing administrative lines east of the liver Oder and taking in some 
territory on its west bank. H. J. Paton, the British Delegation's ethnographic expert, 
attended the sub-committee's first meeting on 3 March. He later explained that the sub- 
committee started their work on Germany's new eastern frontier with the line through 
Upper Silesia. The line had already been agreed with the American experts. But the 
experts became over-generous to Poland. Spurred on by the French representative, 
General Henri Le Rond, who wanted to establish a strategic frontier some distance away 
from the industrial area (all of which they had awarded to Poland), the new border edged 
73 ftirther and further into Germany. Having identified areas with clear Polish majorities, 
the experts rounded these upwards by accommodating natural features such as rivers and 
lakes, and then, bit by bit, they started incorporating adjacent umsport infmstructure and 
any territory deemed strategically essential to Poland - all this from areas with 
populations which were wholly German. Though there was no official Polish 
participation in the sub-committee's decision, the Polish Delegation must have 
acquiesced to the proposal to transfer this additional territory. This was a mistake. The 
injustice of it ftuther fired the Germans' resistance within Upper Silesia and provided 
much emotive and statistical ammunition, all of which they used to good advantage, 
74 
ultimately undermining the outcome for Poland . 
Whilst the German militarists in the east were preparing to salvage their Polish 
provinces by armed resistance, the German Foreign Office had began pursuing the same 
objective by diplomatic means. Unscathed by the war's outcome and the revolution, the 
German Foreign Office and its propaganda network were working non-stop in an attempt 
to lessen the political and material impact of Germany's military defeat. Expecting 
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negotiations to take place at some point during the peace process, it established a special 
section to prepare its Peace Conference delegates on all of the subjects that might arise in 
PariS. 75 Three documents were prepared on Upper Silesia. One stated Germany's historic 
claim, another its economic claim, and yet another claimed to provide evidence of Polish 
attempts to annex the region since the Peace Conference had got underway. 76 The 
Paxkonference documents were for internal use, but they are interesting because not only 
do they underpin the philosophy behind the German counter-proposals but also reveal the 
fundamentally different expectations of the Germans from the Allies on how the peace 
would be concluded. One memorandum set out the general principles based on Wilson's 
77 Fourteen Points by which all Allied claims were to be judged . Addressing Wilson's 
Thirteenth Point, an independent Polish state, instructions to plenipotentiaries advised 
them to assert that: 
It would be unjustifiable to include West Prussia and Upper Silesia, because in 
that case East Prussia would be severed from the Reich, and because the 
possession of Upper Silesia, which produces 22 per cent of Germany's coal, is 
indispensable to the life of Germany. 78 
Even Poznania's transfer should not be accepted without a fight. A memorandum on this 
suggested several pre-conditions; each bearing a remarkable resemblance to the tests later 
applied in Upper Silesia. These included holding a plebiscite after the peace had been 
concluded, voting by communes and permitting ex-residents to return to vote. As the 
Conference progressed and differences between the Allies became public, they kindled 
further German hopes for an easing of the peace terms. Remarking on Allied divergences 
over Gdansk and West Prussia, one German diplomat observed that delimiting Poland's 
frontiers was one of the most contested issues before the Peace Conference. He did not 
know how far the Allies had responded to Polish claims to Upper Silesia, but he gained 
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the impression that should an attempt be made to separate it from Germany, it would be 
dropped if it encountered German resistance . 
79 This is exactly what occurred within the 
British Delegation when Germany indicated that it would resist the Draft Peace Terms 
handed over on 7 May. 
With the cessation of hostilities there had been a move amongst British experts in 
the PID towards adopting a more sympathetic approach towards Germany. It was fuelled 
by a belief that the Allies should regard Germany as having turned over a new leaf and 
that they should support its Republican goverment in its fight against the Spartacists. 
One sought-after measure was the lifting of the blockade and the despatch of food relief 
But, at this point, these were sentiments that were not yet widely supported by the British 
public. Following the post-Armistice general election in Britain, the Conservatives, who 
took a hard line on how Republican Germany should to be handled, dominated the 
winning Lloyd George coalition. This meant that gestures of support towards a socialist 
government in Berlin were out of the question - sentiments echoed by the Conservatives' 
counterparts in the General Staff. Although the PID experts and others seeldng a more 
compassionate line towards Germany were initially disappointed over this, nevertheless, 
accounts of food shortages and chaotic conditions within Germany soon caused the Allied 
Military Intelligence Services to send a number of officers to survey conditions inside 
Germany, including Upper Silesia. 80 Though aspects of their reports were greatly flawed, 
they were used by moderates such as Headlam Morley to argue for much more 
circumspect treatment for Germany, and to challenge existing policies such as the need 
for a 'Greater Poland'. It was probably his warnings based on these reports which alerted 
Lloyd George to the real possibility of creating a revanchist German State. 
The primary objective of the missions into Germany was to investigate economic 
conditions and food shortages, but the officers also carefully recorded material on the 
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military and political situation inside Germany. " Although the missions gave the Allies 
an opportunity to gather political intelligence, because they were conducted under the 
auspices of the German Foreign Office and the military authorities, they provided its 
unreconstructed bureaucracy and the militarists with a conduit leading directly to the 
Peace Conference. Therefore, whilst at best the missions could gather some political 
intelligence, more often than not these reports simply relayed crude propaganda designed 
to exploit Allied differences, back to Paris. 82 
The first report from Upper Silesia came from two members of a United States 
mission who spent 24 hours there in mid-February. They found conditions there to 
be worse than anywhere in Germany. The faces of the workers are haggard. The 
women and children are pitiably emaciated. Although snow was lying on the 
ground ... twenty 
five per cent of the women and children were on the streets 
83 barefoot. 
In his preliminary report for the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), Major Knyvett, 
who headed a three-man mission to Silesia between 23 and 31 March, also found that the 
population was underfed, under-clothed, badly housed and subjected to 'continuous 
Bolshevistic propaganda'. 84 In his full report, Knyvett noted 'the lack of morale among 
the mining and industrial workmen'. A civilian administrator explained that despite the 
commencement of Allied food relief deliveries to Germany, the National Government 
would not forward any to them because the region was now relatively quiet compared to 
85 the other provinces in Germany. 
Contrasting with the picture of latent anarchy, starvation and fears of a Polish 
invasion that he had painted about many other aspects of civilian life there, Knyvett's 
assessment of the German military authorities in Silesia (VI Army Corps) was much 
more positive. Convinced of the military authorities' goodwill towards the Entente, he 
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claimed that they were anxious that an Allied Military Commission be sent to Wrocýaw 
(Breslau) 'to join hands with them in their anti-Bolshevik efforts. And with regard to the 
antagonism which existed between the local administration and Berlin, he reported that 
the former believed that 'Berlin was utterly out of touch with the immediate local 
conditions'. He also noted how the military officers used every opportunity to attack the 
Berlin 'socialists' and their inability to govern the country. 86 A later observation by J. H. 
Morgan that 'while the Republicans were in office, the Nationalists were in power', may 
have had far more applicability in Silesia d= Berlin. 87 
Apart from their military missions, there was no Allied diplomatic representation 
in Germany until the Peace Treaty's implementation on 10 January 1920. To overcome 
their isolation, Germans utilised Allied embassies and legations in neighbouring states to 
route their views to the Peace Conference. In early March, Prince Henry of Pless, one of 
Upper Silesia's richest land-owning industrialists, contacted Cecil Gosling, the British 
Minister in Prague, wanting to know the British Government's likely reaction to 'a 
movement among socialists and working classes of Silesia to declare their independence 
of Germany'. Pless claimed that this would save the region from Bolshevism and increase 
coal production. 88 It had been the Czech President, T. G. Masaryk, who had referred him 
to Gosling. In a separate interview, Masaryk told Gosling that the Czechs favoured the 
idea but he went on to emphasise that the Czechoslovak Government 'should not take any 
active part in the movement because it would arouse the resentment of the Poles who 
formed the majority of the population in the Eastern Kreise'. 89 A joint Czechoslovak- 
Polish Committee meeting in Paris on I April, rather naturally decided to discourage the 
idea. 90 
Many other unsolicited documents arrived in Paris from 'German Sources'. For 
example, some documents contested the findings of the 19 10 Prussian census, others 
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argued that possession of the Silesian coal field was vital to enable Germany resist 
Bolshevism. 91 As Knyvett's reports confirm, at this time all sides in the region generally 
labelled their opponents 'Bolshevistic'. The only Polish threat Germans were admitting to 
in Upper Silesia was an external one. This was demonstrated by a German academics' 
petition sent from Wroclaw University and the city's Technical College. Generally, these 
unsolicited communications arrived via DMI officers attached to the British Delegation. 
General von Hammerstein, the leader of the German representatives at Spa, handed this 
one to General Haking, the Armistice Commission's senior British officer. The Armistice 
Commission at Spa was yet another route by which German views were transmitted to 
Paris. The academics' petition rehearsed many arguments used in the German response to 
the Draft Peace Terms. It explained that Upper Silesians were ignorant of Poland's 
history and its language. Apart from German, the language in which all school lessons 
had been conducted there since 1871, they only spoke Wasserpolnisch (Water Polish). 
They described this as a dialect comprising Polish and German words. It was non-literary 
and undocumented; therefore it could not signify 'nationality'. They further argued that it 
was only through undisturbed union with Germany that 'Silesia's treasures' could remain 
available for all its peoples. Polish nationalism was ascribed to Upper Silesia's rapid 
industrialisation. This, explained the petitioners, had attracted 'outsiders' to the region. 
These 'outsiders' had inculcated a minority of native Silesians with Pan-Polish ideas. 
They appealed to the Allies to keep Silesia undivided and part of Germany and Prussia. 92 
The Armistice Commission, the Foreign Office's diplomatic services, the PID, the 
DMI and the War Office's military missions sent into Germany are a few examples of the 
means by which the British Delegation in Paris gathered information on Upper Silesia. It 
was also supplied by British military missions located in Paris itself and by the officials at 
the Paris Embassy. 93 The American and French delegations circulated information and 
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the Poles also made submissions. Parisian social life provided another important source 
of intelligence. Informal meetings at lunchtime between lobbyists and delegation officials 
were routine, as was the incessant round of dinner parties and other such functions where 
politicians, delegates and officials were entertained by those hoping to advance particular 
interests. Depending upon the prevailing circumstances and the particular prejudices of 
each official or delegate, the influence of the sources varied. For example, American, 
French, and Polish inputs were generally wasted on the British advocates of a 'Small 
Poland', whilst British advocates of a 'Greater Poland' usually found themselves arguing 
against pro-German reports submitted by the military missions. Lloyd George eventually 
modified the Delegation's original decision to award Upper Silesia directly to Poland. It 
must therefore be conceded that the most influential sources were the military missions 
and intelligence agencies whose views were fed to him via Keff and Headlam. Morley. 
Of course, Upper Silesia's future was not being decided in a vacuum. Many 
broader factors were helping to shape British policy towards the new Germany. By the 
end of March, Lloyd George's 'Fontainebleau Memorandum' urged the Allies to make 
peace on terms acceptable to Germany. The Prime Minister's bout of moderation was 
helped by his military stafrs new worry that, should Bolshevism spread throughout 
Europe, its senior officers feared that the British Army was in no condition to confront it. 
With British strategic demands satisfied, compromise and support for Germany was 
deemed to be the answer. But France was also resolute over her demands in the west. 
This left the German-Polish border the only territory available to Lloyd George where he 
could make gestures to the Germans. Lloyd George's rejection of the Conference's Polish 
Commission's recommendation to return Poland's ancient port of Gdansk had signalled 
his firm conversion to a 'Small Poland' philosophy. Instead, he had adopted Headlam 
Morley's proposal to re-establish Gdansk as a Hanseatic-style 'Free City'. This change of 
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policy at the top coupled with the effect of the British intelligence reports and the flood of 
German propaganda urging moderation, destroyed the previous unanimity over Poland 
generally existing within the British Delegation on Poland. 
The first real intimation that a plebiscite might be necessary in Upper Silesia was 
provided by Captain Thornley Gibson. On his return from a tour of the German regions, 
he reported that Upper Silesia's industrial magnates had persuaded Germany's politicians 
to resist Upper Silesia's inclusion in Poland. However, he went on to suggest that the 
Germans might find a referendum acceptable. This was because 'it was by no means 
certain that such a plebiscite would result in favour of the Poles'. 94 There could be no 
doubt that the Germans had the means to resist annexation. Apart from the German VI 
Army Corps with its 70,000 regular troops in Silesia, Knyvett had estimated the number 
of paramilitary volunteers in Upper Silesia to be around 3 5,000.95 Alarmed by this news, 
Paton, who was the Delegation's ethnographic expert, recommended that measures be 
taken to calm the area before the peace terms were announced. Headlam Morley agreed. 
He was 'sure that the Germans would make a great fuss, and press the necessity of having 
a plebiscite. But the Delegation's senior military expert on Poland, Lieutenant Colonel 
F. H. Kisch, described any idea of conducting a plebiscite as 'appeasement'. 
Certainly Germany will not be happy at losing Industry possessing such great 
economic value. Surely, however, such cases should be decided on their merits 
and not on 'the fuss' (vide Mr. Headlam Morley's Minute) which the Germans are 
likely to make ... If the 
German Government knows that even the prospect of a 
'fuss' is likely to modify the decision of the Conference, we can count on their 
fermenting trouble in other regions besides Upper Silesia. 96 
No action was therefore recommended. The annexation of Upper Silesia to Poland 
remained a provision of the Draft Peace Terms presented to the German Delegation at 
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Versailles on 6 May. The terms were greeted by an outburst of German indignation and 
resentment. Berlin declared the terms to be unacceptable unless revised. But replying for 
the Conference, Clemenceau indicated that the Allies would only accept 'practical 
suggestions' improving the drafting of the treaty's chief provisions. 
A further German note on the territorial questions conceded that some of the 
Treaty's provisions had met Wilson's principle of self-determination. But (ironically in 
view of Germany's own war aims and the Brest-Litovsk Treaty) it went on to complain 
about Germany's populations and territories being 'bartered about from sovereignty to 
97 
sovereignty as if mere chattels and pawns in a game' . Recording the German public's 
reaction, a British official in Cologne found that even the most moderate of the middle 
classes 'considered the terms utterly impossible'. On the other hand, he felt the official 
reaction to the Draft Peace Terms had been 'a series of carefully engineered manoeuvres' 
and the similarity that he found in the German press reports was 'much more apparent 
than usual'. 98 The British Delegation's more moderate members felt that the individual 
provisions were justifiable. Nevertheless, Germany's outright rejection of the draft terins 
and its condemnation by a large swathe of articulate British and American opinion had 
discomforted them. Even the British officials and delegates who had favoured a 'Greater 
Poland' were shaken by reports that the Germans might not sign the Peace Treaty. In the 
political climate developing in Britain, a prolonged occupation of Germany or, at worst, a 
resumption of hostilities, were options the government could not very easily contemplate. 
Compromise at Poland's expense was the easier option and with his many prejudices 
about Poland shared by several of the Liberals and near universal in the Labour Party, 
from Lloyd George's standpoint such a sacrifice would prove popular. 99 Indeed, it might 
even be seen as a principled gesture towards liberalism and go some way towards 
restoring his reputation amongst past support that he might need once again. 
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The reasons for these anti-Polish sentiments in Britain are not difficult to find. 
The British public and politicians had a profound ignorance of Europe beyond Berlin. 
Added to this, the partitioning powers had spent 150 years justifying the partitions by 
denigrating everything Polish. Clichds about Poland abounded. Poles were prejudiced, 
unjustifiably proud romantics with no administrative abilities. They were also dangerous 
revolutionaries. The Polish populations were described as inherently backward and ruled 
by aristocratic landlords. They were impetuous, acting like children. These and many 
other stereotypical Polish 'faults' and perceived characteristics, can all be found in Lloyd 
George's Peace Conference utterances. After Poland had been partitioned, throughout the 
19th century and especially at times of heightened Russian-British confrontation, British 
liberals would express support for Polish independence. Now, British parliamentary 
support for Poland was mainly limited to a few Conservatives in the House of Lords. Like 
the Labour Party (which had just renewed its links with the German Social Democrats 
and feared that revolutionaries or reactionaries might overthrow the new democracy), 
many of the Conservative Ws were feaffid that enforcing the Peace Terms as currently 
drafted might spark a Spartacist revival in Germany. 100 
Apart from these prejudices and the political considerations accompanying them, 
in what has remained a legacy of that period, these negative views of the Poles and the 
possible consequences of supporting Poland against either the Germans or the Russians, 
were supplemented by vicious anti-Polish propaganda campaigns in both Britain and the 
United States. As we have seen, the Conference's failure to address the problem of 
Russia's border-states was one of several factors that had forced Pitsudski to engage the 
Bolsheviks on Poland's eastern front. This led to charges of militarism and imperialism 
by Poland's enemies. But the most enduring damage done to Poland's reputation during 
this critical period was widespread press coverage alleging that Warsaw had encouraged 
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the bouts of rampant anti-Semitism allegedly sweeping the country. These were denied 
by British officers on the spot and later refuted by Allied Commissions sent to Poland to 
investigate. 101 But fighting their own battle with Jewish Orthodoxy over the questions of 
secularism and Jewish nationalism, westerri-oriented Zionists exaggerated and exploited 
the slightest incident of anti-Semitism reported from Poland - describing them as Polish 
pogroms. 102 The debate was complicated by the equation of Jews with Bolshevism, 
something many others apart from the Poles, readily asserted. This, and the British labour 
movement's campaign against military intervention in Russia (bracketing the Poles along 
with the White Russians as the primary exponents), culminated in the launch of a 'Hands 
off Russia' campaign on 22 June 1919 - five days prior to a hugely supported 'Jewish 
National Day of Mourning against the Massacre of Jews in Poland' when between 50,000 
to 100,000 protesters marched to a rally in Hyde Park, London. 103 
In Paris, final confirmation of the need for a plebiscite in Upper Silesia arrived for 
the British Delegation's moderates in the form of a brief report from Dr. Winthrope Bell 
who had visited the region between I and 10 May. 104 Along with American and British 
journalists, he witnessed a series of rallies (held with the encouragement of the Prussian 
administration), protesting against Upper Silesia's inclusion in Poland. Bell reported that 
20,000 of Opole's 36,000 inhabitants took part in a rally held there on 9 May. Rallies 
were also held in Katowice and other cities and towns. 105 Bell admitted that his report 
was entirely focussed on obtaining a plebiscite for Upper Silesia. He believed universal 
public usage of the German language by Silesians; with Polish names confirmed a wish 
for continued German rule. Instead of questioning why the situation existed, he criticised 
the basis of the Allied decision to annex Upper Silesia to Poland, arguing that it was a 
mistake to base this on the racial descent of the majority of the population. He wrote that 
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the numbers of bearers of Polish names whom I found opposed to the idea of 
union with Poland leads me to believe that there is perhaps no region of those 
affected by the Peace, where a plebiscite is more necessary to determine the real 
relative strengths of the two parties. 106 
He claimed he had taken the question up with both sets of supporters and found that while 
the Germans wanted the vote to be taken en bloc, and the Poles wanted the removal of all 
German managers beforehand, neither side actually feared the result of a plebisite. 107 
Winthrope Bell's report was given a wide circulation. British Delegation members 
seeking an easing of the German terms seized on it to argue the need to grant a plebiscite. 
However, one member, Francis Bourdillon, who later served in Upper Silesia, labelled 
the report 'German propaganda' and claimed that it was 'grossly misleading'. Rejecting 
the statistics and conclusions, he noted that the district was currently under martial law 
and that to express a desire for annexation to Poland was a treasonable offence punishable 
by death. He pointed out that possessing a Polish name in Eastern Europe was not an 
indication of Polish national sympathy: many Poles had German names. He also accepted 
the Polish Delegation's contention that out of the German element in the district, as many 
as twenty per cent (18 1,000), had no permanent connection with Upper Silesia. These 
Germans were located in the larger towns and normally comprised the garrisons, teachers, 
officials and other types of government employees, including the majority of the railway 
staff. Regarding employment, Bourdillon also pointed out that 
The managers, clerks, foremen and bailiffs of the great industrial and land 
owning magnates ... are all Germans and they virtually exclude the Poles from any 
position other than manual labouT ... The state services and the railways have 
equally been barred to Poles, and education in Polish has been prohibited even 
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gratis and in private. The opportunities of the Poles have thus been very 
limited. 108 
This, he explained, was how Prussia treated minorities. Yet, where they were permitted to 
rise, many Poles had succeeded in breaking German monopolies in jourrmlism, medicine, 
law and commerce. Of the population the Polish Comiz ission were assigning to Poland, 
Bourdillon claimed that around 1,250,000 were Poles and 300,00-400,000 were Germans. 
He concluded by pointing out that despite several centuries of separation from Poland, the 
Upper Silesians had retained their Polish national characteristics. 109 
F. H. Kisch and Esme Howard endorsed Bourdillon's criticism of Winthrope Bell's 
report but it was too late. The increasingly influential Headlam Morley had decided that 
the peace terms related to Upper Silesia were unjustifiable. 110 He was not alone in 
thinking this. Aided by the Conference's leaders' exasperation %rith Poland over Cieszyn, 
East Galicia, and Lithuama, and the bad publicityentailed in Poland's difficulties with 
the Zionists, the German campaign to force the Allies to rethink the Upper Silesian award 
was successful. Even befbre Paris had received Germany's official reply to the Draft 
Peace Terms, most of the experts and officials within the British Delegation in Paris had 
convinced themselves that an Upper Silesian plebiscite should be offered. 
Had they thought otherwise, there can be little doubt their political masters would 
have over-ruled them anyway. On 22 May, Jan Smuts, the South African Prime Nfinister 
(one of several British Empire representatives in Paris), wrote to Lloyd George reiterating 
what were essentially German arguments. Poland's enlargement and the Rhineland's long 
military occupation were 'the two cardinal errors in policy of this Treaty. In resurrecting 
Poland the Allies were simply 'reversing the verdict of history'. He recommended 
leaving the whole of Upper Silesia to Germany. "' Lord Robert Cecil, another of the 
British ministers with the Delegation also expressed his misgivings to Lloyd George. He 
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believed awarding Upper Silesia to Poland 'was not really defensible': Wilson's Fourteen 
Points 'would have to be stretched a good deal to include the territories assigned to 
Poland'. ' 12 H. A. L. Fisher, one of Lloyd George's Liberal ministers, also warned him that 
if the Peace Terms could only be enforced by renewing the war, 'there would be a violent 
revulsion of feeling against the Government'. 113 From Spa, similar fears were "pressed 
by General Haking about this and the use of British forces in Upper Silesia. The Germans 
had convinced Haking that their army had been reduced to such impotency that it would 
now be 'incapable of forcing the Silesians to hand over the richest part of their province 
to the Poles, whom they hated'; if the Poles should 'seize the property they have so 
cheaply won ... the Allies will be called upon to restore order'. Expanding on his thesis, 
Haking claimed that European instability would soon force the Great Powers into taking 
military action. Rather than crush Germany, the Allies should be calling upon her to help 
restore order in Europe. With the Germans balancing French power and supplying the 
military action in Europe, Britain would be able 'to concentrate on safeguarding her own 
affaiw. 114 
The German reply was received in Paris on 29 May (twenty-four hours after its 
publication in the German press). Apart from the reasons that the Germans had already 
advanced for their retention of Upper Silesia, it was their economic argument that caught 
Lloyd George's eye. They claimed that Upper Silesia's coalmines supplied all of East 
Germany's industry as well as parts of Southern Germany and Bohemia. Compared with 
Upper Silesia's annual coal output of 43.5 million metric tons, pre-war Poland's output 
was a mere 6.8 million tons. Allied interests would therefore be served by leaving Upper 
Silesia with Germany because it was only by using these resources that Germany could 
'meet her liabilities resulting from the war'. The response concluded with a blunt and 
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prophetic warning. The German Government gave notice that if the region was torn from 
their country, then 
wounds would be inflicted on her, which would never heal, and from this first 
hour of separation the recovery of the lost territory will be the burning desire of 
every German. This will greatly endanger the peace of Europe and of the world. 1 15 
Discussing the German counter-proposals at dinner that evening, Lloyd George 
agreed that the two main obstacles to a peace settlement were reparations and Upper 
Silesia. Reminded that 'it might be difficult to go back on the Poles', he replied: 
Nevertheless, the question of reparations is bound up with this. If the Poles won't 
give the Germans the product of the mines at reasonable terms, the Germans say 
they cannot pay the indemnity. Therefore the Allies may be cutting off their nose 
to spite their faces if they hand the mines to the Poles without regard to the 
question of the indemnity [reparations]. ' 16 
Bonar Law, the leader of the Coalition's Conservatives, also had difficulty justifying 
the award of Upper Silesia to the Poles. He believed that this would hamper German 
industry, making it impossible for them to pay real reparations and difficult to demand 
German coal exports as part of that indemnity. 117 On 31 May, Lord Derby, the British 
Ambassador in Paris, wrote to Balfour stating that Lloyd George had agreed with him 
that despite the strong French support for Poland, it would be impossible for them not to 
grant the Germans a plebiscite. 118 This was not news to Balfour. At a meeting earlier that 
day Lloyd George, Balfour and the British Delegation had resolved that an Upper Silesian 
plebiscite should be held. Their problem was to get the other powers to agree to it. 119 
Lloyd George had already raised the Upper Silesia question at a Council of Four 
meeting on 30 May. After skilfully associating the Council's previous criticism of Polish 
defiance over East Galicia with this issue, he had tried out several German arguments that 
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he had selected from their response. At this point neither Wilson nor Clemenceau would 
be drawn into premature discussion. It was only when Lloyd George had attacked the 
work of the Polish Commission that Wilson put up a brief defence. 120 The Americans and 
French had ignored the German response and their counter-proposals, and awaited the 
British reaction. Characteristically, Wilson believed that terms sincerely arrived at ought 
not to be eased simply to get them signed. This apparent last-minute appeasement of 
Germany over a point where British interest appeared to be unaffected, irritated him 
profoundly. 12 1 Kerr wrote, 'we are at the crisis of the Peace Conference'. 122 
On 2 June Lloyd George returned to the subject in the Council of Four. By then 
the British Prime Nfinister had his Cabinet's and the British Empire representatives' 
endorsement to revise the Polish provisions. He announced to the Council that Britain 
would not continue the war or march on Germany unless some of the Peace Terms were 
amended. Declaring that public opinion in England 'wanted Peace and did not care so 
very much about the details', he said that his government believed Germany's case was 
strongest regarding their eastern frontiers. Clemenceau pointed out that although the 
British believed concessions would bring Peace, the French knew the Germans better; 
'the more concessions made, the more the Germans would demand'. He reminded the 
Council that Poland's re-establishment was not only meant to redress one of the greatest 
wrongs in history but it was also meant 'to create a barrier between Germany and 
Russia'. 123 This Council of Four meeting and all subsequent ones where Upper Silesia 
was mentioned, would prove to be the most acrimonious of the Peace Conference. 
The American Delegation assembled the following morning to discuss the British 
demands for revision. Though against a plebiscite in principle, nevertheless, its Polish 
expert, R. H. Lord, thought that it could favour Poland. But this was highly conditional. 
The plebiscite could not be held while German troops and officials occupied the territory. 
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Lord then drew the meeting's attention to the present 'veritable reign of terror in Upper 
Silesia' where 
Such a state exists there that they have been arresting every prominent Polish 
leader; they have been placing people on trial charged with being guilty of high 
treason for the crime of making speeches in favour of union with Poland, or 
collecting money in favour of national causes. 124 
Under present conditions it was impossible to hold a fair plebiscite and Lord wondered if 
the Allies were prepared to occupy the region with their troops. He pointed out that it was 
extremely difficult for the people there to vote as they pleased: 'I can think of few 
countries where the countryman finds it so dangerous to express his opinions at the polls'. 
When Herbert Hoover (the Conference's Director General of Relief) raised the question 
of expediency, Wilson said that he did not favour changes solely on this basis. It made 
him 'a little tired' when people told him that they were afraid the Germans would not 
sign, especially when 'their fear is based upon things that they insisted upon at the time'. 
Asked if this meant the French, Wilson replied: 
Not as much as the British. Here is a British group made up of every kind of 
British opinion, from Winston Churchill to Fisher. From the unreasonable to the 
reasonable, all the way around, they are unanimous, if you please, in their funk. 125 
The Council of Four's debate was resumed later that day, 3 June. This was their most 
important meeting regarding Upper Silesia's future. Wilson stated that the American 
experts believed it impossible 'to obtain a truly free and genuine vote from a population 
which has so long been in a state of vassalage'. Lloyd George disagreed. His sources, he 
said, confirmed that while Silesia was the most vital question for Germany, the British 
experts were convinced that a plebiscite would result in Poland's favour. He agreed that 
the German administrators should be removed and he suggested that since 'it was better 
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to send an American or an English Division to Upper Silesia than an Army to Berlin', the 
Allies should also occupy the territory. There then followed a heated exchange about the 
alleged violation of the Fourteen Points, but eventually Lloyd George's perseverance paid 
off and an outline agreement was reached. 
The Germans would be offered a plebiscite under the surveillance of an inter- 
Allied Commission. This Commission would have a division of Allied troops at its 
disposal to police the area if this became necessary. German troops would have to 
withdraw but Lloyd George suggested that resistance would be unlikely if they were told 
that it would be American troops that would replace them. No Polish soldiers would be 
admitted to the area. At Wilson's request, should the plebiscite go against the Germans, 
provisions were to be inserted to prevent expropriation of German assets without fair 
compensation, and coal supplies would be guaranteed to them at the same cost as to the 
Polish consumers. 126 For Lloyd George this was complete victory. He had even half- 
committed Wilson into sending a division of American soldiers. But the plebiscite was 
never intended as an Allied solution to the specific problem of Upper Silesia. For Lloyd 
George and the British Government the question had only ever been about what would 
happen should the Germans refuse to sign the Treaty? If the Germans held out, Lloyd 
George believed that it would have been impossible to have renewed the war or 
maintained an extensive occupation of Germany just to force them to hand Upper Silesia 
over to Poland. In other words, the plebiscite in Upper Silesia was simply a political 
device to overcome the practical difficulties that would have arisen had Germany refused 
to sign the Peace Treaty. The other members of the Council of Four felt that there was no 
need for a plebiscite. Germany would have signed. They had only agreed to it in order to 
prevent a split between the Allies - something which would have benefited the Germans 
even more. 
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It fell to Paderewski to say why Poland objected to a plebiscite when he addressed 
the Council of Four on 5 June. Should this be held, he declared, as things stood Poland 
stood little chance of winning the agricultural areas. The German state-appointed clergy 
were hostile to Polish nationalism. Like the clergy, the German landlords also exerted a 
direct influence over Polish peasants and estate workers. That said, he believed Poland 
could win the important industrial districts. Poland needed the region's mines, plant and 
other resources to build a viable Polish industrial sector. Therefore, with no other choice 
on offer, Paderewski was forced to accept Lloyd George's plebiscite. However, this, he 
stressed, was on condition that the vote was counted by individual communes. 
Counting the votes of over 1,500 communes individually was, the Poles believed, 
the only means they had to ensure that a fair line of partition would be established across 
Upper Silesia. Should the vote be counted as a single constituency, Paderewski made it 
plain that, because of Germany's preponderant influence over Polish-speaking peasants in 
the north and their direct control over the areas west of the Oder, the Germans would win 
the plebiscite. After assuring Paderewski on this point, Lloyd George quietly instructed 
Headlam Morley to ensure that the vote was taken en bloc. Commenting on this back- 
door instructions later, Headlam Morely pointed out that if he had attempted to comply 
with Lloyd George's request, the French, Americans, and Italians would have ensured a 
Polish plebiscite victory by demanding a much smaller plebiscite area. 127 
The plebiscite had been referred to the new 'Eastern Frontiers Committee'. It had 
been appointed to outline the plebiscite regulations, amend the related parts of the Peace 
Treaty dealing with Upper Silesia, and make minor adjustments to parts of the Polish- 
German border. Three members of the original Polish Commission, Le Rond, Lord, and 
Marquis della Torretta were appointed to the Committee along with Headlam Morley. 
The British official's appointment did not prevent Lord forwarding Le Rond's, Torretta's, 
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and his own negative reflections on the proposed plebiscite to Wilson. 128 When the 
Committee first met on 6 June, Headlam Morley found his position rather isolated. All 
agreed that due to its disturbed state, Upper Silesia would require a much longer Allied 
presence than any of the other plebiscite areas. Believing that a delay favoured the Poles, 
Le Rond suggested a period of three years. Headlain Morely suggested six months. This 
was reserved for the Council of Four to decide. 129 After this meeting, Headlam Morley 
wrote to Keff asking Lloyd George to give him a free hand to negotiate what he believed 
was the Prime Minister's over-riding objective, to 'deprive the Germans of any possible 
reason for maintaining that the decision was unfair to them'. 130 When their work was 
completed, the near-unanimity of the Committee's recommendations understated the hard 
negotiating that had taken place, not only over the plebiscite, but also over the changes 
.0 Lloyd George had demanded along the Poznan and West Prussian frontier. 131 
On their assembly on II June to present their recommendations to the Supreme 
Council, Lloyd George refused to see them at first, citing the bias of some of the 
Committee towards Poland as his reason. Clemenceau took this opportunity to reaffirm 
his opposition to the plebiscite and to remind the Council that France had only accepted it 
to avoid difficulties. Lloyd George said that the plebiscite had to be held to avoid conflict 
in the region: 'In the eyes of the Germans, the Poles are an inferior and despised people'. 
To place them under Polish domination would create a dangerous source of irritation and 
trouble. Asking Lloyd George to remember his words, Clemenceau predicted that the 
' 32 Germans would cause trouble 'whether or not there was a plebiscite . The Committee's 
recommendations were presented by Le Rond, later appointed President of the inter- 
Allied Commission in Upper Silesia. Putting the Committee majority's case for an 
occupation of between one and two years, he argued that nobody in Upper Silesia could 
freely express an opinion there. 
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Since the Armistice, the Germans have done everything possible to keep Polish 
opinion in check. The Polish press has been suppressed. Polish priests have been 
sent to other dioceses. The Germans of Upper Silesia have been organised into a 
kind of militia, which includes not only residents but also Germans from other 
provinces. 133 
Time was needed to 'change a regime so strongly established and allow the inhabitants to 
emerge from their prostration'. The Polish Silesians were currently being subjected to a 
campaign to persuade them that separation from Germany would be a disaster for them. 
Before Headlarn Morley intervened to state his minority view, Lloyd George suddenly 
accepted the longer period of occupation. 134 By way of explanation to Headlarn Morley, 
who was seated beside him, Lloyd George whispered that he understood the Germans 
now wished for the longer plebiscite period anyway. 135 
Le Rond and the other members then withdrew, leaving the Council to discuss 
their other recommendations. The inter-Allied Commission sent to administer the area 
and conduct the plebiscite would be granted full executive authority, with only taxation 
and legislative powers withheld. Japan was relieved of any involvement, and the four 
remaining powers agreed to participate in the military occupation. German troops would 
evacuate the plebiscite area two weeks after the Peace Treaty was signed (this was later 
amended to two weeks after ratification). Transit rights for Allied troops travelling to 
Upper Silesia were established and the Council agreed that it would carry the initial 
financial cost of the Commission - recovering them from Upper Silesia later. 136 The 
decision to hold a plebiscite also affected Moravian and German communities living 
close to the former Austrian border. The southern area of Raciborcz (Ratibor) and the 
southern part G? ubczyce (Leobschutz) had already been allocated to Czechoslovakia. in 
the case of the Gtubczyce district, however, its transfer had been agreed simply to avoid 
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placing 100,000 hostile Germans in Poland - Czechoslovakia being regarded as the lesser 
of two evils. Now, sensing that the decision to hold a plebiscite by communes provided 
Gitibczyce's population with an opportunity to determine their own future, Wilson raised 
the question of their participation in the plebiscite. 137 The following day, 12 June, Crowe 
appeared before the Council of Four to answer. 
Crowe proposed that the southern area of Raciborcz around I-fluc'in (Hultschin) 
should remain allocated to the Czechs. However, the southern part of the CAUbczyce 
district should be reunited with the north and included in the plebiscite area. He said 
It is what seems to me most fair. If Upper Silesia remains German, CAubczyce 
must share its fate; if Upper Silesia is Polish, Glubczyce will be isolated and can 
only go to the Czechoslovak state. 138 
In other words, after the plebiscite, when the Supreme Council decided the partition line 
across Upper Silesia, a vote for Germany would mean just that, but in the unlikely event 
of any of Crtubczyce's communes voting for Poland, this would be interpreted as a desire 
for inclusion in Czechoslovakia. The Council of Four's decision was unfortunate for the 
Poles. Poland had not claimed any part of Gfubczyce, had no interest in the result there 
and did not run a campaign. Nevertheless, as we will see, because it suited their political 
objectives, rather than present the plebiscite's outcome by communes won or lost, Britain 
and Gennany presented the results en bloc. All of the 65,387 votes cast in Gtubczyce for 
Germany (against 295 for Poland/ Czechoslovakia) were included in the columns of total 
votes cast. Even if the Council of Four had not eliminated Polish interest in the northern 
part of the G4ubczyce district, their action in including the southern part in the plebiscite 
area would still have added 31,120 votes to Germany's total (against 104 votes for 
Poland/Czechoslovakia). 139 A similar exercise was conducted in the northern reaches of 
the tenitory. A small portion of the NamyslOW (Namslau) district located outside the 
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original plebiscite area was added to the district of Kluczbork (Kreuzburg). Although this 
area only provided another 3,018 German votes (against 87 for Poland), this plus the 
G4ubczyce district's total, including several thousand non-resident 'outvoters', amounted 
to 9.6 per cent of Germany's total plebiscite vote. 140 The German vote might have been 
even greater. In November Berlin asked the Peace Conference to reconsider including the 
Hlu'Cin region within the plebiscite area. 14' There is no record of a reply. 
On 14 June Paderewski and Dmowski again appeared before the Council of Four. 
Responding to confirmation that a 'plebiscite by communes' would be held, Paderewski 
emphasised that the decision to hold a plebiscite would cause bitter disappointment in 
Poland. He feared that all sorts of impossible and unreasonable promises would be made, 
and that 'chaotic conditions' would be provoked within the plebiscite area. Paderewski 
concluded by saying that 'the Polish Delegation could only accept the decision with 
profound respect but with deep sorrow'. Both Wilson and Lloyd George hastened to state 
that they were convinced that the industrial regions would elect to become Polish. 
Dmowski was also confident of the result. Wilson confirmed that the inter-Allied 
Commission administering the region would employ equal numbers of Germans and 
Poles. Paderewski hoped that in order to quieten things down the plebiscite might be held 
within three to six months of the Peace Treaty being signed. This was agreed and when 
the two Polish delegates withdrew, the Council amended the previously agreed period of 
Allied occupation to read 'from six to eighteen months'. 142 Leaving the meeting, Paul 
Mantoux, one of the Conference's interpreters, compared the plebiscites with the time- 
bombs and booby-traps that the Germans had left behind in the western territories when 
forced to Withdraw. 143 
The Council of Four's agreement to an Upper Silesian Plebiscite formed a large 
part of the Peace Conference's reply to Germany's objections to the Draft Peace Terms. 
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The Peace Treaty was finally presented to them on 16 May with Article 88 and its annex 
devoted exclusively to Upper Silesia. 144 They were given a week to accept. Should 
Germany refuse to sign the Peace Treaty, the Allied Powers had approved a contingency 
plan for its occupation. It proved superfluous, though at times it seemed possible that it 
might have to be implemented. During this weeklong crisis the Allies also demanded an 
early German evacuation from Russia's Baltic provinces (thus dashing the militarists' 
hopes there), and the German fleet was scuttled at Scapa Flow. The last word on whether 
or not to accept rested with the military High Command. Speaking for them, Hindenberg, 
made it clear that there were no alternatives 
In the event of a resumption of hostilities we can re-conquer the province of Posen 
[Pozn'ania] and defend our frontiers in the east. In the west, however, we can 
scarcely count upon being able to withstand a serious offensive on the part of the 
enemy in view of the numerical superiority of the Entente and their ability to 
outflank us on both wings. 145 
Rather than accept responsibility for the peace, the Government resigned. On 22 June, 
by a majority of 99, the German Assembly authorised a new Cabinet composed of 
Majority Socialists (SPD) and the Centre, to sign the Peace Treaty. In the Versailles 
Palace's Hall of Mirrors, on 28 June 1919, the new Foreign Minister, Herman Miller, and 
the Minister for Justice, Johannes Bell, signed the Treaty of Versailles. That same day the 
German newspaper Vorwdrts declared: 
The Treaty is only valid so long as the Entente has superior force. We consider it 
a scrap of paper and will not rest until it is tom up. When that day comes, we must 
be armed and prepared to assume the position due to us among nations. 146 
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However, as Hindenberg had indicated, along the Polish frontier, particularly in Upper 
Silesia, it was the Germans who had the superior forces, and here this combative attitude 
had already been given a free rein. 
Both Lord and Le Rond had drawn the Council of Four's attention to the violent 
German repression occurring within Upper Silesia. As we have seen, in the autumn of 
1918, all of Upper Silesia had shared in the apparent overthrow of Germany's governing 
political and social order. But their freedom had been short-lived. To prevent a similar 
insurrection to the one which had broken out in Poznan, in January 1919 the President of 
the Opole Regierungsbezirk (Upper Silesia's administrative district) had announced that 
any activities aimed at Upper Silesia's secession ftom Germany would be considered as 
high treason. Otto Horsing had been appointed as the State Commissioner with a brief 
from Berlin to end the strikes paralysing coal production. As noted above, at the Allies' 
instigation and because of pressure from Polish leaders in Poznan, Warsaw, and Paris, 
Korfanty and the other leaders of the Polish nationalists in Upper Silesia worked to 
prevent a violent reaction to Horsing's methods. They were successful until a series of 
strikes and Polish counter-demonstrations against officially organised pro-German 
demonstrations (witnessed by Winthrope Bell), were followed by even more strikes and 
escalating violence, leading to the outbreak of the first Upper Silesian insurrection in 
August 1919. Throughout this period there had been no serious attempt to oust Germany 
from Upper Silesia but Polish Silesian self-restraint had enabled the authorities re-impose 
close military control of the region. Once re-established, the military forces, most notably 
the Freikorps units, attempted to incite the Polish Silesians into an armed revolt - hoping 
that by doing so it would provoke Warsaw into a cross-border intervention and discredit 
the Polish claim. The Poles were not yet drawn, but this did not prevent mounting tension 
in the region. 
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By August 1919, apart from the police and smaller security organisations, such as 
the forest guards, the Silesian authorities had thousands of locally recruited volunteers in 
the region's Grenzschutz and Landschutz (civil guards). Anna Cienciala has noted that it 
47 
was the Freikorps who had initially rescued the German cause there earlier that year. ' 
At this time the Freikorps in Upper Silesia were nominally under the command of the IV 
Army Corps headquarters at Wroclaw. The most prominent formations in Upper Silesia 
during 1919 were the von Aulock, Hasse, Tullmann, Eulenburg, and the Hessisch- 
Thuringen-Waldecksche Corps. Present also was one of the von Loewenfeld's Marine 
Freikorps and the most notorious of all, Ehrhardt's Baltic Freikorps, whose members 
wore the swastika on their helmets. Regular Army officers distrusted Horsing because of 
his Social Democratic background and his government appointment. However, as long as 
he suppressed the Polish nationalists and the strikers, he enjoyed the paramilitary forces' 
full and enthusiastic support. When Spartacist rioting broke out in Gliwice on 28 April, 
the management closed the mines in nearby Katowice, spreading the strike to the Polish 
Silesian miners. From 30 April, the locked-out miners demanded that the mines be 
reopened and that the Freikorps units and the Reichswehr troops be withdrawn. '" On 
Poland's National Day, May 3, the strike escalated into Polish demonstrations demanding 
Upper Silesia's separation from Germany. German counter-demonstrations and physical 
attacks on Polish supporters followed in the wake of this strike which was ended on 14 
May, 149 The Upper Silesian branches of the NRL were abolished on 16 May and many of 
its leaders fled across the Polish frontier to avoid arrest. '50 This action accelerated the 
build-up of the administrative and command structure of a Polish 6migrd paramilitary 
force at Sosnowiec. 
Along the PoznaA and West Prussian demarcation line Allied observers were now 
reporting continual German artillery fire and cross-border incursions. A German attack 
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was expected on Poznan" almost daily. Meanwhile, German news agencies were reporting 
to the world that it was the Poles who were preparing to attack Germany. ' 51 The British 
were kept well-informed about the Armistice violations. The new British Minister in 
Warsaw, Sir Percy Wyndham, relayed British officers' reports from the area to the 
Delegation in Paris. 152 However, his appeals for steps to be taken to stop these 'German 
offensives' fell on deaf ears and, like Wade and Howard before them, Wyndham's and 
the British officers' objectivity was called into question. 153 Wyndham's own diplomatic 
contacts in Warsaw had warned him that a rising of Polish populations in districts still 
held by Germany was a real possibility. From Korfanty he learned that news about the 
proposed plebiscite was also causing the Polish Silesians to question Allied integrity. 154 
Another intervention by Korfanty, on 22 June, stopped Polish partisans rising in 
the Pszczyna district. 1-55 That night, however, heavy German artillery mounted a cross- 
border attack on railway lines around Czestochowa. This was reported in the Rhineland 
Army's daily newspaper, The Cologne Post. The report added that German aircraft had 
machine-gunned several Polish towns including Alexandrow and Konin; three German 
battalions had entered a Polish border town (Herby) after a German aircraft had been shot 
down; and a German infantry attack on Wieraszow had been repulsed by Polish troops 
but the town had been left in flames. The report concluded with the news that throughout 
Upper Silesia the Polish population was being subjected to 'sanguinary reprisals'. 1-56 The 
day before the Peace Treaty was signedý Paderewski reported to the Council of Four that 
over 12,000 Silesian Poles had been arrested. 157 By then, however, the German Cabinet 
had informed the Allies that 'it declined all responsibilities on its eastern frontier'. 158 
There could be no doubt that the Polish Silesians were being persecuted and that 
the number of political prisoners were increasing daily. There was also evidence of an 
extensive German propaganda campaign being directed at the population. Reports 
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reached Paris from Warsaw that the Prussian Ministry of Defence was urging that all 
available resources, including the use of aircraft to leaflet the population, be employed to 
encourage support for Germany. 159 But like all Polish intelligence material sent to the 
British then and over the following months (retrospectively, very accurate data), it was 
labelled 'Polish propaganda' and disregarded. The brutality of the paramilitary forces, 
however, negated any success the propaganda might have enjoyed. The German brutality 
is still remembered in Upper Silesia today. 160 In a memorandum forwarded to the Foreign 
Office after the first insurrection had broken out, the Polish Government claimed that the 
Germans had taken advantage of the delay in the Peace Treaty's ratification to cause the 
Polish Silesians to doubt the new Polish state's viability. While Poland and the Allies 
looked on, they had deliberately created social unrest by transferring moveable equipment 
out of the territory, demobilising whole industries and leaving great masses of workmen 
unemployed. The Germans had hoped that this would make their propaganda 'more 
efficient amongst the uneducated classes'. In support of this theory, they had arrested and 
deported educated Polish Silesians - Germany admitted a list of 262 persons debarred 
from returning. But when the propaganda and arrests had failed, they had then employed 
cvexatious measures and brutal treatment to provoke the working classes to disorder, in 
order to have a pretext for crushing them by force'. 161 
Wyndham added to this graphic account of the German authorities' behaviour 
prior to the insurrection. Finding that the Poles had not been provoked into a rising by the 
loss of their leaders, the German authorities had then started to arrest and detain workers 
as well. Several thousand fled across the border into Poland. Some were killed or 
wounded resisting arrest. Others hid in disused mineshafts, supported by their families. 
To force the families to reveal their hiding places, the German volunteers were reported 
to have tortured the fugitives' wives and children mercilessly. This put the Polish 
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Government in a difficult position. For humanitarian reasons the Polish public expected 
them to assist the Polish Silesians. The pressure to intervene was dramatically increased 
on Saturday 16 August, when the sound of artillery and machine gun fire heralded the 
start of the first Upper Silesian insurrection. 162 
Apart from the intensive persecution of Polish nationalism, this first insurrection 
was also the culmination of the series of strikes in July and August. Initially, the strikes 
were of an economic nature. The Polish miners were demanding an increase in wages to 
compensate for the ever-rising cost of food. 163 A new dimension was added when the 
striking miners were joined by miners and workers laid-off from mines and factories 
which their owners had declared non-viable and closed. A demand for their reopening 
and their workers' reinstatement was added to the wage demands and to protests against 
the continuation of martial law and political arrests. The strike intensified when, despite 
Horsing's attempts at a meeting on 15 August to dissuade them, the German power and 
railway workers joined the strike. They too were seeking compensation for the rising food 
prices. The food shortages were not unique to Upper Silesia. Food riots had also occurred 
in Lower Silesia and, on 8 August, at Chernnitz in Saxony, 70 soldiers and ten civilians 
were reported to have been killed during rioting there. 164 
The striking workers in Upper Silesia, who now numbered over 200,000, added 
financial bonuses and the opening of the frontier to Polish food, to their list of demands. 
As the general strike intensified, rumours spread that the adult male populations of whole 
villages were being rounded up and marched off for reconstruction work in France. 165 
The spark igniting the flame of insurrection was finally struck when the large crowds in 
Katowice protesting at high food prices, were fired on by German troops. Rioting ensued 
with many shop windows smashed and premises plundered. The Times reported that the 
threatened deportations of unemployed Polish workers had begun. 166 That same day at 
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nearby Myslowice (Myslowitz), Polish miners queuing to collect outstanding wages were 
ordered by Grenzschutz volunteers to form themselves into groups of ten. Fearing 
deportation they refused and ten people were killed and many wounded when soldiers 
fired on a section of the crowd. 167 In Bierun Str. (Alt. Berun) in the Pszczyna district, 
workers began disarming Grenzschutz volunteers while the German Army, now renamed 
the Reichswehr, rushed reinforcements into the industrial area from Wroc4aw and other 
military depots in the surrounding districts. 168 
The news swept through the industrial area. Exasperated by the relentless German 
persecution that they had been experiencing, within hours Poles in Katowice, Tarnowski 
Gory, Bytom and the smaller towns and villages around them, rose in spontaneous revolt. 
British documentation on the fighting is diverse and diffuse, but while the fighting was by 
its very nature fragmentary, it was clearly widespread - occurring first in the eastern 
districts then spreading out through the districts of Pszczyna and Rybnik. 169 Horsing 
ordered all workmen to return to their jobs and announced that any insurgents caught with 
arms would be shot without trial. 170 Army technicians and German strikers placed under 
military guard immediately resumed work and brought the transportation and power 
systems back to life. There were even reports that Spartacists, who had made little 
impression on the Catholic, Polish Silesian workers, had linked up with the German 
volunteers to suppress them. Amidst the confusion, some POW units were also self- 
activated. Although poorly equipped at first, several thousand rifles were captured and 
turned on the German volunteers. 17' Around nine thousand Upper Silesian dmigr6s who 
had recently fled into Poland to escape German persecution, joined the insurgents. Hastily 
formed into military units, these armed 6migr6s re-crossed Upper Silesia's southern 
frontier to support the rebels. German aircraft and troops later attacked the ýmigr& bases 
and tefforised towns and villages on the Polish side of the frontier. In turn the German 
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troops and volunteers were attacked from the rear by Polish villagers on the Silesian side 
of the frontier. 172 Citing his Gennan sources, Gregory Campbell has noted the authorities 
blamed Spartacist agitation for inciting the rebellion. 173 This was the line that was taken 
by Horsing's press bureau and it was widely quoted in the Gennan national newspapers. 
But the British left-wing Daily Herald's Berlin correspondent was more balanced. He 
attributed the crisis to a combination of nationalist and labour issues - believing that the 
'the class struggle which is raging in the coalfields' was being unnecessarily complicated 
by German and Polish sovereignty claims. 174 The paper also highlighted the Freiheit, a 
German socialist paper's view that 
The unrest is simply one of the fruits of Horsing's policy of violence. Unless now 
at the eleventh hour, Horsing is recalled, Upper Silesia will be lost to Germany; 
the Poles, who are in a great majority there, only long for freedom from Noske 
and Horsing. 175 
In Germany itself, the prolonged strikes and now the insurrection were causing shortages 
of gas and electric power. But of much more political significance, Germany was failing 
to deliver the quantity of coal France had demanded to help compensate for the deliberate 
wrecking of its coalmines in 1918. 
The first official communication concerning the insurrection to arrive in Paris 
came from Herbert Hoover. He had been visiting the headquarters of the Allied Coal 
Commission at nearby Ostrava, when the fighting broke out. '76 Hoover stressed Central 
Europe's dependency on Upper Silesian coal. Believing that only an Allied military 
occupation would restore coal production there, he recommended the immediate despatch 
of a special inter-Allied Commission to take control of the area until the inter-Allied 
Plebiscite Commission arrived. 177 Discussing Hoover's telegram on 18 August, the Heads 
of Delegations to the Paris Peace Conference (under whose control it continued after the 
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Versailles Treaty was signed), discovered that until all the Allied governments had also 
ratified the Treaty, they required the German Government's permission to enter Upper 
Silesia. Nevertheless, the Heads of Delegations agreed that because the coalmines were a 
vital asset, they would be justified in anticipating the Peace Treaty's implementation in 
Upper Silesia 'by a few weeks'. It was decided that the Germans should first be asked to 
protect the mines and restore order. Meanwhile, the inter-Allied military force currently 
on standby on the Rhine for service in Upper Silesia, would be prepared for an early 
move there. 178 But before these instructions had been despatched, telegrams indicating 
the seriousness and extent of the fighting began to flood into Paris. 
In the eastern and southern parts of the proposed plebiscite area, the local Polish 
inhabitants backed by the armed dmigrds who had re-crossed the frontier, now occupied 
several strategic points. With almost 70,000-anned personnel available, the Reichswehr 
and the volunteers were retaliating with great force. Indeed, from Katowice, The Times 
correspondent declared that the 'cruel methods' employed by the German military was 
'the ugliest feature of the whole catastrophe'. To recover Rozdzien (Rosdzin), which after 
its capture the Germans admitted had been defended mainly by youths, 'artillery, trench 
mortars, gas, machine guns, and even an armoured train were used'. Since the insurgents 
preferred death rather than surrender, the German troops took very few prisoners. Instead, 
when clearing recovered towns and villages, they arrested anyone they could lay there 
hands on. In compliance with Horsing's edict, executions were conducted wholesale but 
many unarmed Poles were also shot and some were killed by other methods. 179 Refugees 
poured over the border into Poland. The Times correspondent reported that by 18 August, 
over 2,000 women and children had collected at the hamlet of Bobrowniki (opposite 
Katowice). Many were cut and bleeding on the face and body from the blows that they 
had received before fleeing. They had waded breast-high across the Przemsza river whilst 
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German soldiers on the far bank shot at them. 180 Polish sources estimate that at least 
22,000 Polish Silesians sought refuge in Poland. 181 
In Warsaw, Wyndham feared that the Polish Government might find it impossible 
to resist the popular demand for intervention if the Reichswehr troops crossed the Polish 
border. He felt that these tensions would be eased if Paderewski could claim that Allied 
pressure was being applied to the German authorities. 182 In Paris, Balfour cautioned the 
Council against granting Germany a license to conduct repressive measures in their name. 
On 19 August, the Heads of Delegations decided that they would now seek Germany's 
permission to send an inter-Allied Commission to Upper Silesia. They hoped that this 
would obviate the need to place their Allied troops under the German Government's 
command. 183 On his return to Paris, Hoover had stressed that the critical fuel shortage 
could be alleviated only by increased production across the whole Silesian coalfield. IM 
On 21 August he informed a Heads of Delegations' meeting that although the German 
Government wanted order restored in Upper Silesia, it was very difficult to judge what 
power Berlin exercised over the various military bodies. They did not appear to be fully 
in control of the German volunteers and were replacing them with Reichswehr troops. 185 
Balfour's suggestion that Hoover represent the Allies' views to Berlin was accepted. But 
before the meeting had broken up, news arrived that due to the publicity the volunteers in 
Upper Silesia were attracting, the German Government had invited the Allied military 
representatives in Berlin to despatch a military commission of investigation. 186 
While the discussions had been underway in Paris and the Allied Officers in Berlin 
were negotiating the powers of their investigative commission, the British Legation, s 
staff in Warsaw were doing all that they could to discourage the Polish Government from 
bending to public pressure on Upper Silesia. As a result of the influx of the Reichswehr's 
reinforcements, by 21 August fighting in Upper Silesia was, in the main, confined to a 
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pocket around Tarnowski Gory and the border areas of Katowice, Pszczyna and Rybnik 
districts. 187 A British military representative in Warsaw reported that 'the Germans are 
188 
putting down the insurrection in the German manner - ruthlessly'. I German assurances 
to the Polish Government that executions had been stopped proved worthless. The Poles 
supplied verifiable examples, such as the execution of seven Polish soldiers captured on 
the ftontier on 21 August and shot on the orders of Katowice's military commander. At 
Szoppinitz fourteen Polish prisoners were executed on a battalion commander's orders. 
At Janow hand grenades were tied around prisoners' necks and exploded - one of the 
Freikorps volunteers' favourite method of execution. 189 Estimates of the Polish dead vary 
between 477 and 2,500.190 To record the ftill. breadth and horror of what they were 
witnessing and to avoid the charge of sensationalising their reports, on 24 August The 
Times and Morning Star correspondents collaborated to compile one lengthy joint 
report. 19' It should be noted that the tactics and the practices of the Freikorps and other 
reactionary-militarist 'security organisations' described here, were later meted out just as 
ruthlessly to German workers in, for example, Berlin, Saxony, and the Ruhr. 192 
In response to these and the many other similar reports of mass executions and 
atrocities, national political organisations held rallies all over Poland. Addressing a rally 
of National Democrats in Warsaw, a Silesian Pole told them 'if Poland did not undertake 
the defence of her suffering children they would lose faith in her'. The meeting resolved 
that the Polish districts of Upper Silesia should be occupied by Polish troops. At a huge 
rally organised by the Socialists and held in Warsaw's Theatre Square on 21 August, 
there were more demands for the government to take action - including supplying the 
insurgents with arms. Afterwards, a small delegation including Feliks Perl, the veteran 
socialist and editor of the Robotnik; called at the British Legation where Wyndham 
received them. Perl reminded Wyndham that since the Allies 'had taken upon themselves 
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the settlement of the war, it must be carried out in a manner that would not lead to more 
war'. Wyndham, however, was becoming increasingly concerned that the political parties 
were manipulating the outcry the Polish Silesians' suffering had aroused in an attempt to 
embarrass and upset the Polish Government. With the public and political rank and file 
both overwhelmingly in favour of intervention, resisting their demands might cause the 
Paderewski government to fall. Weighing up this prospect, however, Wyndham was able 
to report to Balfour that Pilsudski, the man who really counted on military matters, was 
more relaxed and more optimistic about the situation than anyone else. 
The governmental crisis was averted when Paderewski called a meeting of party 
leaders on 23 August. After listening to a report from a member of the committee whom 
they had sent to Sosnowiec to investigate, the meeting gave its unanimous backing to the 
Prime Minister's strict adherence to the Peace Treaty. 193 Apart from sporadic resistance 
in some remote villages, the fighting in Upper Silesia was over the following day. On 25 
August Berlin broadcast a statement claiming that order had been re-established in Upper 
Silesia and that a complete resumption of work was expected the next day. Lumby, The 
Times Warsaw correspondent, wrote that while Horsing might claim that the strike had 
been broken, this had occurred only because, 'faced with a choice of working or being 
deported, the strikers had sullenly chosen the former'. 194 Returning to Warsaw after a few 
days absence, the Commander of the British Military Mission there found that the Peace 
Conference's handling of Upper Silesia had evoked deepening distrust of the Entente. 115 
On 26 August, an Allied military investigative commission led by Lieutenant 
Colonel Tidbury, arrived in Gliwice. '96 It was quickly apparent that the terms of reference 
that Berlin had imposed on them were too limited to address the amount of prejudice and 
hatred that they had found in Upper Silesia. 197 Fortunately, Paris had proceeded with its 
request to Germany for permission to send a special inter-Allied Commission to Silesia. 
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Although the German Government made it clear that there could be no early occupation 
by inter-Allied military forces, they agreed that the three senior Allied generals in Berlin 
(Dupont, Bencivenga, and Malcolm), could form this special inter-Allied Commission for 
the Peace Conference. 198 On the Commission's arrival in Katowice on 2 September, it 
was joined by its American member, Colonel Goodyear from the Coal Commission at 
Ostrava. He had been acting as the Peace Conference's intermediary in the area since 19 
August. 199 How much the presence of this Commission and Colonel Tidbury's team 
helped calm the situation remains an open question, but Goodyear believed that they both 
helped in the restoration of order. Nonetheless, he warned Paris that whilst the industrial 
districts appeared outwardly calm, unrest and dissatisfaction lurked beneath the surface. 
In his own final report to Paris, Goodyear urged that the Allies be induced to act promptly 
on the Commission's recommendations. 200 However, with order re-established and Upper 
Silesian coal being produced once again, the attention of the Peace Conference focussed 
on new problems. When a telegram from General Dupont, President of the special inter- 
Allied Commission, was read out to a Heads of Delegations meeting, the sole response 
was provided by Balfour who reiterated that they could do nothing until the governments 
had ratified the Peace Treaty. 201 
Within a few days of arriving in Katowice the Commission produced two reports. 
In their report to Paris the commissioners declared that they could not establish where 
responsibility for the outbreak of the insurrection lay. They recommended that a strong 
Allied Commission backed by a military presence be established in Upper Silesia and that 
more pressure be applied to the Polish Government to stop the POW organising itself 
there. 202 Returning to Berlin on 9 September, Dupont also handed the German Foreign 
Office a memorandum summarising the Commission's findings and recommendations. 
These were 
Chapter I 
76 
(a) The immediate cessation of the brutality committed by the troops. 
(b) Permission for all fugitives to return and their employment on their return. 
(c) Careful revision of a list of 262 persons who, the local authorities declared 
must be prevented from returning to Upper Silesia. 
(d) These measures to be followed in due course by an amnesty for all persons not 
accused of offences against common law. 203 
In a separate individual report to the DMI, General Malcolm observed that the special 
inter-Allied Commission's greatest difficulty had been finding impartial evidence. He 
also acknowledged that the combination of national, industrial and religious differences 
in Upper Silesia had been rendered even more acute by the prospect of a plebiscite. The 
Germans had undoubtedly been practising a brutal repression but he blamed the Poles for 
the political agitation. His conclusion was that as long as either Polish or German agents 
were attempting to influence the plebiscite's outcome, then continued discontent had to 
be expected in Upper Silesia. 204 
Whilst the confrontation in Upper Silesia eased, British and French delegates in 
Paris came close to undermining the uneasy peace that had been established. Discussing 
yet another failure of the German Government to evacuate their troops from the Baltic 
provinces, Lloyd George suggested their possible replacement by Polish troops. This was 
supported by Foch and, to a lesser extent by Clemenceau . 
205 This prospect alarmed the 
United States plenipotentiary. He warned Clemenceau that confrontation between Polish 
and German troops in the Baltic would renew the Upper Silesian Conflict. 206 Expanding 
on this at the next Delegates' meeting, he claimed that; 'It was extremely necessary to 
maintain the situation in Upper Silesia in a calm state in order not to increase the actual 
difficulties of the coal shortage'. He concluded by pointing out that, since none of the 
powers was presently prepared to render financial aid to Poland, they should not risk 
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starting a war between Poland and Germany. Clemenceau agreed. 207 Lloyd George 
maintained his enthusiasm for a few more days, relenting only when it was agreed to 
coerce Germany into compliance by threatening economic and financial sanctions and 
prolonged retention of their prisoners of war. 
This proposal to use Polish troops in the Baltic was a fairly typical example of the 
British Prime Minister's impulsive and erratic interventions into foreign affairs. As with 
the imperatives which motivated his advocacy for an Upper Silesian plebiscite - we again 
find Lloyd George attempting to solve an immediate problem (getting the Germans out of 
the Baltic provinces) at the risk of another crisis (renewed conflict in Upper Silesia). 
summga 
Prior to the Peace Conference, British policy towards Poland can be summarised 
as a mixture of optimistic assurances and stem cautions. His Majesty's Government stood 
by its pledge to secure full recognition of Poland's aspirations at the Peace Conference - 
which included the incorporation of Upper Silesia. Britain and the other Allied powers 
would do all in their power to secure Poland from German attack and assist them to resist 
the Bolsheviks, provided 'the Polish people showed their fitness for independence'. This, 
of course, would be demonstrated by obedient compliance with any instruction the Great 
Powers handed down. Unfortunately, the people taking power in Poland in November 
1918, were not well-versed in these unspoken diplomatic assumptions. It was not long 
before the British in particular, came to regard Poland as always slightly wayward. 
In accepting the Fourteen Points, Gerniany's politicians, if not its General Staff, 
realised the implications that they held for Prussia's Polish territories. However, the speed 
with which Germany's middle and upper classes regained their confidence after a 
traumatic military defeat and revolution, caused many of those interested in Upper Silesia 
to believe that they could still save the province. Germans hoped that the Paris Peace 
Chapter I 
78 
Conference would be the prelude to a negotiated peace. When this proved not to be the 
case, their outrage was heartfelt and uniform. But before this point had been reached, 
Upper Silesia's ethnic and assimilated Germans, its land-owning industrialists, the civil 
administration, the Army, and even the German-controlled Catholic Church, had joined in 
several different initiatives to defeat the territory's annexation to Poland. Their initiatives 
complemented Berlin's and the German Foreign Office's manoeuvres to persuade the 
Allied Powers to hold a plebiscite. 
As the Peace Conference got underway and events in Central and Eastern Europe 
ran their course, Poland's interests increasingly conflicted with British interests. This 
occurred almost immediately over Russia. Whilst the Poles did not want to be threatened 
by a Bolshevik Russia, this outcome did not appear to be much different to them from the 
'liberal Russia' which the British hoped that their support for the White Russians would 
help to create. This helps to explain Britain's early concerns about Pilsudski's attempts to 
secure Poland's eastern border. Lloyd George wanted a 'liberal Russia' to take control of 
the Tsarist's 'border states' including the Baltic provinces and the old eastern provinces 
of pre-partitioned Poland that Pilsudski was moving into. However, the greatest clash of 
interests occurred over the fixing of Poland's western frontiers - especially the annexation 
of Upper Silesia from Germany. When Germany refused to sign the Draft Peace Terms, a 
range of domestic political considerations in Britain dictated that Lloyd George had to 
persuade the Allies to arrive at some form of compromise with Germany. Apart from 
Lloyd George's determination to obtain reparations for Britain, everything that Britain 
wanted from Germany had been included within the Armistice terms. America and Italy 
had no vital claim on Germany, the Czechs already occupied most of their German 
territories, and France had surrendered its claim for the Rhineland. Only the resurrected 
Polish state's claims on Germany were available for barter. With its enormous industrial 
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capacity and its untapped potential, retaining Upper Silesia was a territorial and economic 
goal that united all Germans, whatever their political persuasion. Berlin made it plain that 
a plebiscite there was the absolute minimum price for them accepting the Peace Treaty. 
Apart from the motives and the manner of the plebiscite's inception, for Polish 
Silesians the consequences of this decision were compounded by the Allied failure to 
protect them. Alsace-Lorraine was handed directly to France in 1918, but the Armistice 
terms only required Germany to evacuate the parts of Poland outside Germany prior to 
the outbreak of war in 1914. Although the Poznai6 rebellion and the Allied intervention 
which quickly followed, altered the situation there, the German ascendancy in Upper 
Silesia continued even after the signing of the Peace Treaty on 28 June. Hugh Gibson, the 
United States Minister in Warsaw, commented that the roots of the first insurrection were 
developed throughout the time that the Upper Silesian authorities remained unchecked. 'O" 
Despite many warnings about German intentions, the Allies hoped that their exhortations 
would prevent strikes and maintain coal production until an inter-Allied Commission 
took over Upper Silesia's administration - an event always anticipated 'within two to 
three weeks'. Once the insurrection broke out, it was a fear over the consequence of the 
looming coal shortage, not the treatment of the Polish Silesians, which caused the Peace 
Conference to address the problem. But even this was strictly under the aegis of 'crisis 
management'. 
The real problem for the British after the Peace Treaty had been signed was how 
to deal with the German Government. A%Ist never enamoured by the thought of helping 
socialists remain in government anywhere, British contacts in Berlin nevertheless insisted 
that allowances had to be made for the German Government's political problems. Reports 
from General Malcolm, for example, warned that if the Republic collapsed, it would lead 
to total anarchy in Central Europe and the end of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Therefore, 
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because of the Republic's shaky democratic foundations (which many Germans regarded 
as having been forced on them by the Allies), in dealing with the German Government a 
question of striking the correct balance between exhortation and coercion nearly always 
arose. Germany's political leaders turned this to their advantage. After the Peace Treaty 
had been signed, what Britain especially perceived as Berlin's apparent weakness became 
its greatest asset. For example, should Germany indicate that the French or the Poles were 
claiming too much or pushing too hard, this often resulted in Lloyd George launching a 
defence of Germany's interests and modifying a proposal. Ironically, within Germany, 
persecuting the Polish population in Upper Silesia was the one area where any German 
Government could count on near-unanimous public and political support. But when the 
question of the need for intervention in Upper Silesia arose in August 1919, rather than 
brush aside German protests and rush Allied troops there, the Allies gave due deference 
to German sovereignty and the position of the German Government vis-a-vis its political 
opposition. As a result, there was no help forthcoming for the Polish Silesians. Although 
they had urged the Upper Silesian plebiscite on the Peace Conference, the British only 
played a small role in settling the troubles it was provoking -a pattern which would be 
repeated over the following months. Balfour showed insight into the problems created by 
the insurrection, but allowed his interest to fade as soon as the Germans re-imposed their 
authority. 
In this first crisis the British were not well served by their intelligence sources. 
The information available through the DMI and the Foreign Office, particularly military 
intelligence, was highly predictable. From the moment the first British missions entered 
Germany, despatches from Berlin and Spa became increasingly pro-German. To a lesser 
extent, the converse was true of intelligence from the British military mission in Warsaw 
and its outposts. Although Headlam Morley would be horrified at such a term, 'the 
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competing factions' he was instrumental in developing within the British Delegation in 
Paris, were highly selective in which intelligence they used and dismissive of whatever 
information did not fit in with what they wanted to believe. Reading these reports seventy 
years later, what is striking about them is not their content, but the highly prejudiced 
views expressed through the recipients' minutes - particularly the junior intelligence 
officers' remarks. For example, an early report from Colonel Wade in Warsaw warning 
that both Germans and Czechs were representing the Silesian Polish National movement 
as a form of Bolshevism, was dismissed as nonsense along with the comment that 
'Colonel Ward [sic] has apparently plenty of leisure if he can find time to have this sort 
of thing typed for our benefit'. 209 With regard to the August 1919 insurrection itself, daily 
reports contained in The Times and Morning Star from correspondents on the spot, must 
have been of more use to the delegates in Paris than the skewed versions received via 
General Malcolm in Berlin. In fact, Malcolm's decidedly pro-German attitude and the 
perceived indifference the British appeared to display over the Polish Upper Silesian's 
fate, resulted in greatly increased Polish scepticism about Britain's ultimate intention for 
Upper Silesia. 
For Paderewski's Government, the insurrection was a test of its ability to resist the 
simple patriotic fervour that new-found freedom had aroused in Poles everywhere. But if 
the Sejm had succumbed to popular demand and moved to confront Germany over Upper 
Silesia, there would have been direct confrontation between them and Pilsudski. Poland's 
military resources were stretched, and it is highly unlikely Pilsudski would have played 
into the German militarists' hands. The intelligence documents forwarded by Wyndham 
reveal that the Poles were well aware of the purpose of Germany's provocative actions in 
Upper Silesia and the military incursions into Poland. How much Wyndham realised is 
unclear, but the War Office reports received from the British military mission in Warsaw 
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express no fear of Polish military intervention. It might also be noted that despite the 
British Minister's alarm, the political rallies held in Warsaw during the insurrection were 
relatively circumspect in their demands. 
Finally, what did emerge in Poland during the insurrection was the awakening of 
popular consciousness over the Polish Silesians' predicament. This led to the wholesale 
establishment of Polish organisations dedicated to supporting future struggles in Upper 
Silesia - struggles they hoped would be eased, if not ended, by the Peace Treaty's 
implementation and the arrival of the inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission in Opole. 
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Chapter 2 
The Inter-Allied Commission, 
Development of French Ascendancy 
and the Second Insurrection 
On Wednesday, II February 1920, at 10.30 a. m., the three Allied Commissioners 
responsible for supervising the plebiscite arrived at Opole railway station. They and 
their senior officials were treated to a grand ceremonial reception. Allied colours 
decorated the station and a guard of honour was in place. General Gratier, the 
Commander of the inter-Allied military force was there, as were the representatives of 
the German Government headed by the Regierung-praesident. A military band played 
the French, British, and Italian national anthems, the guard was inspected and 
speeches made. 
The Regierung-praesident made a short speech welcoming the 
Commission to Upper Silesia and saying that all subordinate officials were 
prepared to continue their functions and observe loyalty towards the new 
administration. General Le Rond replied, stating that he expected implicit 
obedience on the part of officials and he hoped all would do their common 
good for Upper Silesia. 1 
This chapter examines Britain's role in creating the French domination of the Upper 
Silesian inter-Allied Commission - something unappreciated and scarcely commented 
upon in English-language historiography. It analyses how the Commissioners, their 
officials, and the local German administration set about preparing for the plebiscite and 
also the manner in which their efforts became impaired by personal conflicts within the 
Commission and by struggles developing between the Powers outside Upper Silesia. 
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The structure and dynamics of the Commission are described, as are the Polish and 
German campaign organisations and propaganda strategies. Local factors, including 
the Roman Catholic clergy's participation in the plebiscite, are discussed, as are the 
events leading to the August 1920 insurrection. The Commission's reaction to this and 
subsequent breakdown in trust between the Allied Commissioners is also examined. 
The chapter concludes by analysing the reaction of the Foreign Office to this crisis, the 
reasons why Britain was prepared to withdraw from the Commission, and the 
diplomatic issues surrounding this decision. The latter is necessary because, as the 
manoeuvrings around the question of French security versus German economic 
recovery intensified, the British Commissioner, Colonel H. F. P Percival, quickly 
allowed himself to be reduced to the role of diplomatic cat's paw for the Foreign 
Office; and soon, relations within the Commission reflected in microcosm this wider 
struggle over the Entente's attitude to Germany. Upper Silesia became a pawn in this 
game. This was manifested in petty jealousies and squabbling amongst officials and 
controllers over national amour propre - something exploited by both the Poles and 
the Germans. 
Despite the persistent arguments advanced by the French military experts and their 
Peace Conference delegates in favour of a genuine inter-Allied presence in Upper 
Silesia, the French were destined to find themselves almost solely responsible for 
administering and policing the plebiscite area. There were two main reasons for this. 
First, the United States refused to ratify the Peace Treaty. Secondly, for Britain, the 
unsettled international situation, the commitments posed by an expanded Empire, the 
troubles in Ireland and the industrial unrest at home, combined to place an excessive 
demand upon its armed services. This was a time when Britain's domestic political 
circumstances and professional army tradition made any further extension to wartime 
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military conscription untenable. For the British contingent on the inter-Allied 
Commission the consequence of the British Army's default was their relegation to a 
supporting role. This came to be resented by the British Commissioner and many 
officials. It manifested itself in a constant critique of the Commýission's French 
members who, due to France's enforced greater military commitment, held most of the 
key positions on it. When law and order broke down, and the number of French (and 
even less numerous Italian troops) proved insufficient to reassert the Commission's 
authority, the French in Upper Silesia found themselves accused of pursuing self- 
interested policies, jeopardising the very future of the Entente itself. 
From the start of the Armistice, the British Army opposed commitments in East 
Central Europe. Most British politicians supported this stance. As early as January 
1919, the War Cabinet rejected Marshal Foch's request for British help in securing the 
passage of military aid through Gdansk to Poland. 3 And mindful of the British public's 
aversion to any renewal of military engagements, at the Peace Conference the British 
Delegation attempted to load new military commitments on to the United States - 
4 
though without much success. They also continued their wartime practice of pushing 
Polish affairs over to the French. But the French, wanting to keep the. &Ilies fully 
involved in Europe, demanded genuine inter-Allied participation everywhere. 
Therefore, when the plebiscite in Upper Silesia had been agreed, Lloyd George had 
5 
conceded that 'if necessary all the Allies would have to contribute troops'. On 26 June 
1919, two days before the Peace Treaty was signed, the Supreme Council referred the 
question of the Upper Silesian military forces' size and composition to the Supreme 
War Council's military representatives at VersailleS. 6 
As well as the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, the Peace Conference had already 
stipulated several other areas of Allied military occupation in East-Central Europe. For 
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example, the ports of Gdansk and Memel had to be held until the League of Nations 
could negotiate suitable local administrations. Plebiscites requiring Allied troops were 
being held on the German-Danish border, on the Polish - Czechoslovak border at 
Spisz and Orava, and in East Prussia where Poland claimed territory around Olsztyn 
(Allenstein) and Kwidzyn (Marienwerder). In September 1919 the Supreme Council 
decided that a plebiscite should also be held in the Duchy of Cieszyn. These Peace 
Treaty commitments alarmed the British Army. It was experiencing difficulty meeting 
its existing commitments and wanted to withdraw from Europe completely. To 
Headlam Morley, the British official advising Lloyd George on the plebiscite detail, 
the Army's strong objections (while predictable) were misguided. 7 Leaving the 
continent to France was not an option. Apart from the political implications, British 
military reports concerning the areas to be occupied stressed that the German 
populations would resent the presence of French troops. 8 The Director of Military 
Intelligence (13M), General Thwaites despaired at 'these continued proposals for the 
policing of Europe by British troops'. However, Headlarn Morley was correct in his 
assessment. 
No doubt the constant call for British troops is inconvenient, but we have 
undertaken serious political obligations and at whatever inconvenience, our 
credit is involved in carrying them through ... 
if the Principal Allied and 
Associated Powers cannot provide the small number of necessary troops now 
wanted, it is to be feared that complications will ensue which should entail a far 
greater burden. 9 
On 10 July 1919, the War Council's Military Representatives at Versailles reported 
back to the Supreme Council on the size of the Upper Silesian garrison. Its members 
recognised that there was a danger of crowd disturbances in the important industrial 
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towns where 'the population was split into two elements of such different mentality 
and tendencies that they will only accept the new condition of affairs with reluctance'. 
They recommended that an armed force of about one infantry division (about 13,000 
men) was 'at least for the time being, indispensable to guarantee the maintenance of 
order and ensure the authority of the inter-Allied Commission'. The question of the 
composition of this international force was ignored completely. 'O There can be little 
doubt that it was the influence of the CIGS, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, which 
was behind this. 
Wilson believed that the Allied leadership's handling of international affairs was 
inept and that the Peace Conference had been a disaster. He thought that the British 
Government consistently disregarded the Army's post-war difficulties. Today, these 
problems are now attributed to 'imperial over-stretch' - inadequate resources to meet 
world-wide commitments. Wartime acquisitions such as Mesopotamia and Palestine 
had placed new demands on the Army. Around the Black Sea and at Constantinople, 
the Turkish resistance to Greek demands (supported by Lloyd George) had tied down 
several British battalions. There was a battalion at Fiume and the nationalist threat in 
Egypt and India had required an increased security presence. A credible military 
presence of around 200,000 British troops was also necessary in Western Europe until 
Germany ratified the Peace Treaty, after which a smaller, permanent force had to be 
maintained in the Rhineland. In Eastern Europe and the Far East, British support for 
the various White Russian leaders was proving expensive, and the military presence in 
North Russia was also unpopular at home. In Britain itself, the Government feared that 
forthcoming industrial confrontations might be of a revolutionary nature and wanted 
troops to be held in readiness to support the civilian authorities. And in Ireland, more 
than 30,000 British soldiers were struggling to contain the nationalists there. " Given 
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these demands, policing plebiscite areas or maintaining order in Memel and Gdansk 
were at the bottom of Wilson's priorities. So when Thwaites telephoned him from 
Paris to tell him that the War Council's Military Representatives had recommended 
that an Allied force be sent to Silesia, Wilson exclaimed, 'not one British soldier! '. 12 
The War Office's underlying problem was a manpower shortage. Unlike the 
peacetime conscription practised by the continental Powers, the British armed services 
were normally recruited on a voluntary basis. Millions of British men had volunteered 
or had been inducted into the services under emergency conscription for the War's 
duration. Whatever the legal position, many soldiers and, importantly, their families, 
believed that their engagements expired on Germany's defeat. 13 During the December 
1918 election campaign, Lloyd George's Coalition candidates had raised expectations 
by promising a speedy demobilisation. 14 However, the demobilisation plan was 
flawed, discipline began breaking down and incidents, often verging on mutiny, 
occurred amongst British troops in North Russia, Egypt, France and in holding camps 
in England. 15 British soldiers returning to France in January 1919, had demonstrated in 
Whitehall at the very heart of their government. On one occasion, Sir Henry Wilson 
dissuaded the Prime Nfinister from receiving a deputation from amongst the soldiers 
congregating outside Downing Street. 16 The British Government was forced to remind 
the public that the War would not be over until the Peace Treaty was drafted, signed 
and ratified, and after this the country would still provide occupation forces. These 
events and problems have been detailed by Keith Jeffery in The British Army and the 
Crisis ofEmpire 1918-1922.17 
Churchill was appointed War Secretary on 10 January 1919. He immediately 
drew up an equitable demobilisation plan based on the 'first in, first out' principle. 18 
The plan was well received but his scheme to solve the Army's manpower shortage by 
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extending conscription until April 1920, met with some political opposition. This was 
because it broke specific pledges given during the election. Churchill aimed to retain 
900,000 men for overseas service by extending conscription until April 1920. This was 
a measure that was vital for the Army. Churchill stressed the urgency of a decision 
and, eventually, reluctant approval was obtained. But when the Paris Conference 
started to drag on and the Peace Treaty's ratification was delayed it became apparent 
that the number of conscripts that had to be retained for overseas service had fallen far 
short of the necessary numbers. 19 Recruitment of volunteers became a priority but this 
was not really successful until the British economy slid into recession in late 1920. 
Even then, the standard of volunteers was often deemed unsatisfactory when the 
recruits were compared to the quality of the pre-war Army. Many of them were just 
young boys. In an earlier bid to increase numbers, the enlistment age had been lowered 
to seventeen. The most serious shortages were of skilled personnel such as drivers, 
artificers, mechanics, telelgraphists and wireless operators . 
20 Because Treasury 
constraints on expenditure restricted the funding to train them, these shortages 
persisted for many years. 21 These types of problems, and especially the need to secure 
Britain's 'home base' (including Ireland) and the Empire, provided Wilson's 
justification for resisting the despatch of British soldiers to the plebiscite areas. 
Wilson's campaign against committing British troops began when he attended 
the discussions in Paris on the Nfilitary Representatives' report on garrisoning Upper 
Silesia. Under Wilson's influence, the British Delegation's new policy was to avoid 
participating in the multi-national inter-Allied forces stipulated by the Peace Treaty's 
various plebiscite clauses. Instead, they wanted each plebiscite area's control 
commission and military force to be provided by individual Allied Powers. Thwaites 
believed that the French intended to take Upper Silesia. 22 Since it was accessible by 
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sea, the British Delegation's preference was for Gdansk. 
23 However, the talks held on 
July 15,1919, were inconclusive - with each delegation declaring difficulty in finding 
24 
the necessary troops. Crowe, now the senior Foreign Office official in Paris, had 
been under the impression that Wilson had supported this policy, but the latter made it 
clear to Thwaites that he still opposed British military involvement anywhere in 
Europe. If troops were taken from the Rhine he did not know how they would 
behave. 25 And he warned the British Delegation not to commit British troops anywhere 
after 31 March 1920. That was when the new Conscription Act lapsed and 'no troops, 
except the new post bellum volunteer army required for normal garrisons, would be 
available after that date 5.26 
At the Heads of Delegation's meeting on 21 July, it was finally decided that the 
Upper Silesia force could be taken from the Allied Army on the Rhine. Marshal Foch, 
however, stipulated that it must comprise an equal ratio of Allied troops, a condition 
that he adhered to over subsequent negotiations. This was referred back to individual 
27 Allied Governments for their approval . When General Sackville West, the British 
Military Representative at Versailles, took over Thwaites' duties with the British 
Delegation, he wrote to Wilson to say that he believed that Balfour, the Delegation's 
leader, realised the British Army's problems. However, he noted, not everyone in the 
British Delegation agreed with Wilson's ideas; therefore, sustaining Wilson's position 
of non-involvement would not be an easy task . 
28 The accuracy of Sackville West's 
assessment was confirmed when, on 8 August, the Heads of Delegations agreed that 
'the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, would each supply a quarter of the 
total effectives necessary for Upper Silesia'. 29 
Despite this apparently unequivocal resolution, it is quite clear that only the 
French Delegation believed in the principle of equal troop contributions. During the 
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discussions Balfour had alluded to the difficulties that would arise in supplying British 
Army units in Silesia, giving him the excuse to propose British activity be restricted to 
the two Baltic ports and East Prussia. He went on to suggest that since it would be 
easier for the French Army to operate in Upper Silesia, France could perhaps make a 
proportionally larger contribution there. Although the dispersal of the plebiscite forces 
would be modified, the numbers and the overall ratio of troops from each country 
could remain the same. This idea was resisted by France, but at meetings over the 
following weeks, the British Delegation pursued this idea ruthlessly. 30 Meanwhile, as 
recorded in Chapter One, escalating violence that month culminated in the first Upper 
Silesian insurrection. This forced a review of the number of troops to be sent there 
once the Peace Treaty that had been ratified by Germany and the Allies - which it was 
envisaged would be sometime during October. 31 
Discussing the insurrection with the Heads of Delegations on 22 August, Foch's 
Chief of Staff, General Weygand, told the delegates that the population of Upper 
Silesia had demonstrated that they were capable of military action. After pointing out 
that the recommendation to send just one division of Allied troops had been based on 
an assumption that the region would be tranquil, he proposed that at least two divisions 
(circa 26,000 men) be sent instead. The Heads of Delegations agreed and ordered 
Weygand to consult Wilson and General Bliss about furnishing British and American 
troops. 32 But the following day Balfour once again took the opportunity to challenge 
the concept of distributing the plebiscite forces on a composite basis. Clemenceau 
drew attention to the political significance of a composite force, as well as his 
country's very close relations with Poland. Balfour agreed with the latter point and 
suggested that, this being the case, France should enjoy having the largest Allied 
representation in Poland. This appealed to Clemenceau, and the delegates asked the 
Chanter 2 
104 
military experts to examine means by which homogeneous forces could be distributed 
throughout Gdansk and the plebiscite areas. " However, the French military authorities 
opposed this. Citing the Allied resolution of 8 August, they claimed that this decision, 
which called on each of them to contribute one quarter of the force for Upper Silesia, 
precluded discussion on homogeneous units. 34 To cover all of the Peace Treaty's 
commitments, Wilson calculated that the Allies would have to find over four divisions 
(circa 52,000 men) for possibly up to eighteen months. Yet it appeared that Italy could 
only spare three battalions and after talking to Generals Pershing and Bliss, Wilson felt 
that the Americans could not be counted on for any. 35 It seemed that France and 
Britain might each have to find 26,000 men. Writing to Churchill, Wilson pointed out 
that in a few months time they would not be able to lay their hands on two divisions 
even if they wanted to. 36 
The problem was compounded in September when the Allies decided to also 
hold a plebiscite in Cieszyn. Crowe (who had now taken over ftorn Balfour as head of 
the British Delegation), reaffirmed Britain's disapproval of composite forces. 37 But 
General Le Rond, who had served on the Peace Conference's Cieszyn and Oravia Sub- 
Commission, reasserted the French military's contention that the Allies had collective 
responsibility for each plebiscite area. Crowe replied 'that the British military 
authorities felt so strongly they hesitated to send troops to any part of the world, until 
this principle is settled'. The French answer was that the military occupation by a 
single power gave the Germans grounds for complaint. They also highlighted the 
danger of homogeneous forces being used to create spheres of influence in areas in 
which they were interested. That said, they appeared to have given way when a French 
38 Foreign Office senior official conceded that a formula might be found. 
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Reporting this to Curzon, Crowe noted that the suggestion now was that 
command of each occupied area should be awarded to the largest military contingent. 
Therefore by supplying the main forces in Gdansk, Memel, Kwidzyn and Olsztyn, 
Britain could secure command there. 39 Sackville West also recommended this to 
Wilson . 
40 At the War Office, Sir Percy Radcliffe, the Director of Military Operations 
(DMO), quickly prepared a paper estimating the number of troops necessary - adding 
that any other Allied detachments 'should be kept as small as possible'. He suggested 
that only one British battalion be sent to Upper Silesia. 41 Policy approval was rushed 
through for a Heads of Delegations meeting in Paris on 13 October. 42 However, when 
the meeting opened and Crowe began to reveal the British proposals, his interpretation 
of the previous discussions was immediately challenged by Foch who said that he 
knew nothing about this divergence. He only recognised the Versailles Treaty. If it was 
not to break down, at least two divisions had to occupy Upper Silesia, and it had 
already been resolved that this force would comprise equal contingents. Pichon, the 
French representative, quickly stepped in to affirm that his Government had admitted 
the principle of homogeneous forces, but they had not admitted that the military units 
representing the other Allies could be so small. The whole subject, he said, was 
dominated by politics. Occupation by inter-Allied forces was necessary to prove the 
unity of the Allies in guaranteeing the Peace Treaty's execution. In this spirit, Foch 
proposed that a special meeting be held to discuss the subject from both a political and 
a military point of view. 43 
This meeting, on 14 October, was a great success for Crowe and Sackville 
West. Before it had commenced the French had moved some way towards their 
position and they must have felt that the Italians' difficulties in finding troops, also the 
Americans' increasing self-marginalisation, suited their single power solution. And so 
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it proved. At the meeting's conclusion, practically all of the British proposals had been 
accepted. France would take military command in Upper Silesia with an inter-Allied 
force comprising eighteen battalions and some ancillary units (in total about 22,000 
men) . 
44 Britain had to contribute just three infantry battalions there -just two more 
than the DMO had allowed for . 45 However in reporting the decision (tabulated below) 
to London, Sackville West also warned London that the Italians might still only 
provide three battalions and the Americans remained doubtful. 46 
Table 1 
Inter-Allied Forces for Plebiscite and Garrison Areas 
Uppgr Silesia 
Battalions 
18 
GB 
3 
USA 
4 
France 
6 
Italy 
5 
Command 
French 
Cieszyn 3 - I I I French 
Gdansk 4 2 1 1 British 
Kwidzyn 2 1 - - I Italian 
Olsztyn 4 3 1 - British 
Memel II British 
Total 33 10 797 
In mid-November the United States Senate refused to ratify the Peace Treaty and the 
Anglo-American security guarantee to France - the British guarantee falling with it. 
With good reason, the French felt deceived, deserted and isolated. To help contain 
Germany, they turned even more towards the Czechs and the Poles. As a consequence, 
they now took more interest in Upper Silesia. And having already been awarded 
military command there (another decision taken by the Heads of the Delegations), this 
inevitably elevated the designated French commissioner General Le Rond, to the 
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Presidency of inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission, whose task it would be to govern 
the region and prepare the way for the plebiscite. 47 
Apart from the British Army desire to have a minimum presence in Upper 
Silesia, several other factors conspired to produce French domination of the inter- 
Allied Commission. While some decisions were taken by the Allied Delegates, others 
were made by the Commission formed in Paris to interpret and execute the Peace 
Treaty. 48 Later known as the Ambassadors' Conference, this Commission, chaired by 
Le Rond, negotiated the protocol on the Peace Treaty's implementation with the 
German Delegation in Paris. Le Rond also chaired talks between the President- 
designates for the various other plebiscite commissions. These established such things 
as common manpower requirements, the common procedures for the handing over of 
territories and defining the extent of administrative control to be included within the 
Protocol which was signed on 9 January 1920 . 
49 An important factor which emerged 
during the discussions was that holding a plebiscite commission's presidency entailed 
additional executive obligations. It was decided that the nation holding the presidency 
had to supply these extra officials. And, although it was still hoped the United States 
might participate in Upper Silesia, until that happened the American share of the inter- 
Allied Commission's administration was also assumed by France. 50 
The British could have shared in providing these extra officials needed to run 
the Upper Silesian Commission but they declined. Instead, VAiitehall started to raise 
all sorts of petty obstacles. For example, it took Crowe several weeks to obtain 
Treasury permission for British officials to be paid at the high salary rates which the 
French thought necessary to recruit competent personnel. 51 And after having sought 
control of the plebiscite areas around the Baltic because of their easy access by sea, the 
War Office then found themselves unable to provide the military contingents, 
Chanter 2 
108 
including their own, with sea transportation to these areas - leaving it to France to 
arrange rail transport through the not very accommodating Germans. 52 None of this 
augured well for the parties' future relationships, but despite these problems the 
military element now appeared to be in place. At least that was the impression. 
Despite his rhetoric, during October 1919 Wilson had responded to the political 
requirement for plebiscite troops by forming a British 'Independent Division' on the 
Rhine, under General W. C. Heneker. 53 This force comprised depleted battalions of 
conscripts who were awaiting demobilisation. Many were untrained; some of them had 
never fired a rifle. " With the extended period of conscription due to end on 31 March, 
the Peace Treaty's delayed implementation meant that the Army had to replace this 
force with regular soldiers from Britain. 55 Unfortunately, many of the battalions that 
Wilson had in mind contained a high proportion of young recruits still undergoing 
their basic training. In mid-December Sackville West informed Foch that the earliest 
date British troops could move to the plebiscite areas would be 15 January 1920. ' The 
three battalions placed on standby for duty in Upper Silesia were the I' Battalion 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion Gordon Highlanders, and 2d Battalion Cameron 
Highlanders. 57 However, leaving aside the effect that the United States' default may 
have had on the inter-Allied force's credibility, events within Upper Silesia were also 
calling the adequacy of the size of the military force in question. 
Because of their poor performance in Upper Silesia's local elections (which 
had been postponed until November 1919 because of the strikes and the disturbances 
leading up to the insurrection), Germans there were now feeling much less confident 
about the plebiscite's outcome. The State Commissioner, Otto Horsing, had held these 
elections against the advice of his compatriots. Nevertheless, they were a constitutional 
pre-requisite for the Prussian Landtag granting Upper Silesia the status of an 
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independent province. Apart from the Poles mobilising their existing support, the new 
voting system had also given the poorer, Polish-speaking Upper Silesians, an increased 
proportion of the vote. 58 Out of 11,255 councillors elected, 6,822 were Polish party 
supporters and only 4,373 were German. 59 From Upper Silesia, Colonel Tidbury, who 
was there with the small inter-Allied Commission sent from Berlin in August, reported 
that if the Poles had enjoyed absolute freedom, they would have won by much more. 60 
Believing that Horsing, a Social Democrat, had gravely jeopardised the German cause, 
the nationalists forced him to resign. 61 German nationalist pressure was mounting. The 
election results had come on top of a ftirther influx of irregular forces into Upper 
Silesia. The Peace Treaty's plebiscite clauses required the Reichswehr and other serni- 
military formations, such as the Grenzschutz, to be withdrawn or disbanded before the 
inter-Allied military force arrived there. The Prussian administration used the outsiders 
to create the semblance of a new regular German armed formation in Upper Silesia. 
This force was the Sicherheitspolizei (security police). 62 
These heavily militarised police forces were being established across Germany. 
They comprised locally recruited ex-army officers and NCO's. Housed in barracks, 
they were generally equipped with machine guns, mortars, artillery, and even some 
aircraft. Allied officials recognised this as a blatant attempt to circumvent the Peace 
Treaty's disarmament clauses. But the British Foreign Office concluded that, given the 
prevailing unrest in Germany, it was difficult to see how order could otherwise be 
maintained . 
6' Nevertheless, establishing the Sicherheitspolizei in an area to be policed 
by an Allied force was a different matter. The Polish Government demanded that it be 
evacuated along with the Reichswehr. 64 And in a note to the delegates in Paris, sent 
just a few days before the Treaty's implementation on 10 January, 1920, Foch 
highlighted 'the abnormal deployment of police forces' in Upper Silesia, also the 
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influx of young men from von der Goltz's demobilised Baltikum 'whose bad character 
and want of discipline are well known'. He pointed out that, apart from intimidating 
the population, the presence of these 'active elements of agitation' would undoubtedly 
lead to conflict with the occupying inter-Allied force. Thus, from the start, the 
Plebiscite Commission would find itself 'in inextricable difficulties I. 61 
This was dealt with by Le Rond through the protocol he was negotiating with 
von Simson, the German Foreign Nfinister. Viewing the Sicherheitspolizei as a means 
to augment the inter-Allied military forces, the Heads of Delegations decided to limit it 
to 3,000 men, reduce its weaponry, and bring it under the inter-Allied Commission's 
control. However, the Commission's failure to tackle its German character would later 
provide the Polish Silesians with a constant source of grievance. The recruitment of the 
Baltikum and many other FrejkorpskUmpfer by the Upper Silesian landowners and 
industrialists as insurance against Polish nationalist activities, was something the Allies 
thought that they could do little about. These professional ultra-nationalists, hidden 
away on the larger landed estates as Abergemeinschaften (labour associations) or else 
employed in the mines and factories as security guards, helped the landowners to 
maintain their grip on the Polish-speaking peasantry. They were also the nucleus 
around which the German Selbstschutz (self-defence force) would be formed and their 
activities proved an ever-increasing source of tension and instability in the region. 66 
Discussing a German request that the size of the proposed inter-Allied force to 
Upper Silesia be reduced by one third, Crowe reminded the delegates in Paris about the 
build-up of the German paramilitary forces and warned against the Allies having 
insufficient forces there. 67 Refusing the German request, in their reply the delegates 
nevertheless made a virtue of the absence of the United States contingent . 
63 Ironically, 
whilst the British Delegation in Paris was urging its French and Italian counterparts to 
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maintain the plebiscite forces as they stood, Churchill, in response to Wilson's 
prompting, started a last minute campaign to withdraw the British military contingent 
altogether. This appeal was based on the Army's diminishing ability to deal with 
perceived challenges to the Government's authority in Britain . 
69 The British press had 
excited public opinion by running 'Red Scare' stories over a forthcoming rail strike. 
To rally support for unpopular fiscal measures, the British Government had been 
portraying itself as a bulwark against revolution and anarchy. 70 The quality of their 
self-deceit was such that at a meeting of the Supply and Transport Committee held on 
15 January 1920 (after the movements of British units to Upper Silesia and elsewhere 
had started), Churchill and Wilson witnessed first hand the 'near hysteria and 
irresolution' which some of its members displayed over the 'Bolshevist threat'. They 
raised the question of the strike at a meeting with Lloyd George in Paris the following 
day. 71 Wilson recorded that 'Winston asked formally to be excused from sending the 
II Plebiscite Battalions'. 72 But neither Bonar Law, the Coalition's Conservative leader 
(who had already been harangued by Wilson over the plebiscite battalions and the state 
of the nation), nor the Prime Minister's personal staff were convinced. 73 
Reinforced by the arrival of Sir Robert Home, the Minister of Labour who had 
painted the direst of scenarios at the Supply and Transport meeting a few days earlier, 
Wilson and his companions, who included Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Beatty, and the 
First Lord of the Admiralty, Walter Long, continued pressing the point. On Sunday, 18 
January, Lloyd George finally gave way and promised to take the matter up with 
Clemenceau. 74 He did this the following day. Just before a meeting of the Supreme 
War Council, the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, informed Wilson 'that Lloyd 
George had told both Clemenceau & Nitti [the Italian Prime Minister] that owing to 
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the internal conditions at home he was not able to send the Battalions to the 
Plebiscite! '. In his diary, Wilson recognised that 'this would have grave consequences 
in France and Germany' . 
75 Although Wilson claimed that Toch took the news like the 
great man he is', Foch was reported to have observed to Wilson; 'Now you are not 
Allies but Associates'. 76 
The obvious question arising from this decision not to send the British troops is 
why, in the light of his own well-documented scepticism over the 'revolutionary 
nature' of the industrial unrest, did Lloyd George yield to the hard-liners' demands? 
The answer may be that his post-war politics were expedience personified - the 
plebiscite in Upper Silesia being just one illustration. Often, his actions were sops to 
the Coalition's Conservative majority. Many of its members represented business 
interests and readily believed that revolution was a real possibility. Therefore, pressed 
to take some action to reassure the British public and calm the fears of his Coalition 
partners (however irrational he thought they might be), withdrawing the plebiscite 
troops would have been the easiest of gestures presenting itself to the Prime minister. 77 
It is perhaps significant that Wilson's diary records that neither Churchill nor Lloyd 
78 George appeared to think anything of the consequences of what they had done. 
The question of how to garrison the two Baltic ports and secure the plebiscite 
areas with the reduced forces available, was tackled by two inter-Allied meetings held 
the next day, 20 January. 79 These were attended by the Allied Prime Ministers and 
Foreign Secretaries. Weygand, Foch's Chief of Staff, envisaged great difficulties in 
Upper Silesia and Clemenceau stated that the inter-Allied Commission could only 
really proceed to Opole if its President, Le Rond, accepted this reduction in military 
support. Foch suggested a meeting of political and military representatives with the 
presidents of all the plebiscite commissions. They met that afternoon. There, Le Rond 
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said that he could not see how any reduction could be countenanced in Upper Silesia. 
He pointed out the military and political dangers awaiting his Commission and 
predicted that the Germans would revolt at the first opportunity. Without the three 
British battalions, Le Rond believed that in any emergency it would be impossible to 
occupy the principal industrial centres, the strategic railway crossings, and the cities 
that had to be held. Lloyd George, however, warned Le Rond that it was the Poles who 
were most likely to cause difficulties in Upper Silesia. But, he added, after talking to 
Wilson, that he might now be able to offer two British battalions - one for Gdansk and 
one for Olsztyn. Representing France at his last-ever meeting of Allied ministers 
before retirement, Clemenceau proposed partially to compensate for the loss of the 
four United States and three British battalions from Upper Silesia by furnishing two 
more French infantry units. 80 
Table 2 
Revised Schedule of Inter-Allied Forces 
for Plebiscite and Garrison Areas 
Battalions GB USA France Italy Command 
Uppgr Silesia I1 8 3* French 
Cieszyn 2 -I I French 
Gdansk 2 11 British 
Kwidzyn I - I Italian 
Olsztyn I I - British 
Memel II French 
Total 18 (33) 200) (7) 11 (9) 5 (7) 
(recommended battalions) *plus two artillery 
battalions 
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Over the coming months this reduction in the size and composition of the 
plebiscite force would have severe political repercussions. It was not long before the 
British came to rue the loss of influence the decision cost them in Upper Silesia. But 
that lay ahead. For the moment Sir Henry Wilson was delighted to have saved his 
battalions. With the exception of the Yd Battalion Royal Fusiliers and the I" Battalion 
Royal Irish Regiment, who were going to Gdansk and Olsztyn respectively, he ordered 
all other troop movements cancelled and recalled the advance parties. 8' The Peace 
Treaty had come into effect on 10 January 1920, the Reichswehr and associated forces 
had been evacuated and the French element of the inter-Allied force had departed to 
secure Upper Silesia prior to the Commission's arrival in Opole on 11 February. And 
so, even before it had arrived there, the French military and administrative ascendancy 
in Upper Silesia was complete. 
The French leaders had not sought this outcome, quite the reverse. It was 
thrust on them by the United States' failure to ratify the Peace Treaty, and by the 
inadequacy of Britain's resources to meet the political, economic and military 
demands placed on her in the wake of the Great War. The wide diversity of 
factors underlying these basic problems was very much apparent in the 
negotiations surrounding the size of the plebiscite force and its composition. 
Whilst the French had attempted to maintain a unity of purpose amongst the 
Allies (albeit from motives related to the wider issue of European security, and 
French security in particular), in Italy, the United States and Britain there was 
already growing disillusionment with the Peace Treaty. 82 Paradoxically, in 
Britain, one of the leading figures undermining the Treaty was Lloyd George 
himself This contradiction was not only attributable to his desire to conciliate 
Germany, but was partly due to attempts to rehabilitate himself in the eyes of 
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liberals, radicals, and even Labour Party supporters, all of whom had provided 
him with political support in the past. 83 Unlike the British Government, Wilson 
had confidence in France, or at least in its military leadership. Provided the 
French did not distract British attention (or troops) from the Empire, he did not 
see too much wrong with the picture Lloyd George was starting to paint of a 
France acting as 'the new militaristic power, pursuing Napoleonic dreams of 
empire'. 84 
But outside Westminster, such opinion had started to come into its own. 
British 'revisionists' opposed transferring any more German territory to France's 
ally, Poland, and consistently attacked Poland's attempts to re-establish its eastern 
borders. Underlying this new liberal view was a passionate desire to return to a 
mythical pre-war economic 'golden age'. The loss of Upper Silesia's resources 
would undermine Germany's role as the economic motor for European recovery. 
The cost to Poland if the Polish Silesians failed to acquire these industries went 
either uncontemplated or discounted. 85 Instead, the view of the Poles as a people 
enslaved by land-owning military imperialists was one widely held by Western 
liberals and socialists, and one much exploited by Poland's enemies, especially 
Germany and Russia. 86 
Several British Army officers who were seconded as officials to the 
Commission arrived in Upper Silesia already viewing Polish abilities in these very 
negative terms. This was usually coupled with a similar contempt for their French 
colleagues. The most prejudiced were the ex-members of General Malcolm's British 
military mission in Berlin. 87 Malcolm's close friend, the historian John Wheeler 
Bennett, claimed later that the mission's reports from Berlin had played an important 
part in moderating the original conditions of peace. 88 VVNIst any overt partiality by the 
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French towards the Polish Silesians also threatened the plebiscite area's stability, it 
was highly noticeable that in successfully evading their security responsibilities in 
Upper Silesia, the British had studiously ignored this danger. They had paid scant 
regard to the many cautions they had received about sending French forces into these 
areas. A warning that French sympathy for Poland might possibly endanger a peaceful 
plebiscite, was first raised in a War Office paper briefing British personnel travelling 
to Silesia. 89 It was echoed again by Malcolm in a letter to Headlam Morley in February 
1920. He felt that 'the dice were now being loaded against the Germans'. 90 Malcolm 
visited Opole shortly before the Commissioners arrived on II February. Reporting his 
impressions to London, he remarked how these British officials who were already in 
Upper Silesia were embarrassed by their French colleagues' open declaration of 
sympathy for Poland. He believed the French soldiers and officials to be extremely 
unpopular [with the Germans] and that before long they might provoke serious 
demonstrations against themselves. 9' Those searching for discrimination could find it 
everywhere. For example, the day after the inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission arrived, 
a British official protested to it about a French military order disarming all civilians. 
He believed that only the 'better class [the Gennans] would comply, leaving them at 
the mercy of the 'unruly class' [the Poles] who would not'. 92 
As we have seen, the Commission's structure had been agreed when all the 
Plebiscite Commissioners had met in Paris during November and December 1919. The 
Presidency of the Upper Silesian Commission had gone to General Henri Le Rond. 
The British Commissioner was Lieutenant Colonel Harold Fran Percival and the 
Italian Commissioner was General Armando de Marinis. All three controlled the 
Commission, which was, in turn, responsible to the Conference of Ambassadors, 
which met in Paris. After the Peace Conference's last meeting (9 January, 1920), this 
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H. F. P. Percival Armando de Ma nis 
Henri Le Rond 
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Photo 2: Site of Inter-Allied Commission Opole 
"General Henri Le Rond a fliend of Poland" 
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93 Conference of Ambassadors took charge of the Peace Treaty's detail. The plebiscite 
Commissioners in Upper Silesia were nominally independent. In practice, however, 
they increasingly referred their problems to their individual governments and acted on 
instruction. 94 This itself encouraged even more external interference, which did much 
to increase friction between its members, but the administrative practices that evolved 
in the Commission also contributed to this development. 
At first, the Commission's governmental decisions were taken at daily meetings 
between the three Commissioners and their most senior officials. These were the 
'directors' of Upper Silesia's various administrative departments. The directors 
communicated the Commission's orders to their department's executive officials and 
the original Prussian administrators who, along with their staff s, had almost all 
remained in place. 95 The Commission's control of the various departments was quite 
rigid and jealously guarded. Dealings with the Prussian and German Governments 
were only handled through the respective director. Having met the directors, the three 
Commissioners would retire to discuss new proposals, problems on which they had 
disagreed, and the following day's business. Though the Commissioners were equal, 
the President was 'more equal' than the others. He was the ceremonial and 
administrative figurehead, the Commission's executive authority and he handled all 
official communications. He also co-ordinated the work of the Departments. After just 
three weeks, Marinis was complaining bitterly to Percival about their lack of influence 
in the conduct of public affairs. But Percival told him that their 'positions in the 
Commission were necessarily subordinate to that of the President, for if it were 
absolutely equal we were bound to pull in different directions'. 96 
Once immersed in their own departments, the directors showed an increasing 
reluctance to attend meetings which had little or no relevance to them. The directors' 
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meetings thus became less frequent and were eventually replaced by encounters 
between individual directors and the Commissioners - placing even more departmental 
co-ordination in Le Rond's hands. One other practice that quickly fell into abeyance at 
this time was the discipline of the deputy Commissioners attending the meetings and 
recording the decisions that had been reached. This made it increasingly difficult for 
Percival and Marinis to question Le Rond's actions. With little else to do, the British 
and Italian Commissioners started receiving private deputations and requests to initiate 
this or that action in the Commission. Before long, rifts that had always existed 
developed into chasms. 97 By September 1920, analysing the British Commissioner's 
performance over the first nine months of the Commission's life, a senior Foreign 
Office official formed 'the pretty definite conclusion that things have been rather badly 
mismanaged by Col. Percival and his deputy Bourdillon'. 98 The view of the principle 
under-secretary, Lord Hardinge, was that 'Percival had shown himself to be weak, and 
overawed by General Lerond [sic]'. 99 
Another practice detrimental to good inter-Allied relations, was Percival's 
insistence whenever the business under discussion involved departments headed by a 
French or Italian director, on calling that director's subordinate British officials to the 
meeting as well. But perhaps the greatest strain was over the languages. Despite having 
agreed in Paris that the official language of the Commission would be French, Percival 
insisted on conducting business in English. Apart from Le Rond, few French officials 
understood English and almost none of the Italians, including Marinis. All the official 
correspondence between British officials was conducted in English; as was business 
transacted in the two departments headed by British directors - Communications and 
Food. ' 00 On this subject, Percival told Le Rond that he was only reiterating some of his 
subordinates' fears 'that England was likely to lose prestige' if French was the 
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Commission's only political language. Since Percival's subordinates had also objected 
to only French being used on the official stamps, he forced Le Rond to concede the use 
of the English term 'District Controller' on the stamps of British officials engaged in 
this work. 101 
Each of Upper Silesia's administrative districts (Kreise) was the responsibility 
of a district controller. Helped by one or two assistant controllers, they represented the 
Commission at local authority level. At first there were five British, five Italian, and 
ten French district controllers. Relying very much on their own initiative, they dealt 
with all sorts of problems, ranging from strikes, murders, disputes between political 
opponents and, not least, the implementation of the Commission's decrees. Generally 
working through existing local officials such as the Landrat or the Burgermeister, they 
were responsible for maintaining law and order in their district. The civil police came 
under their orders and they could also call on the local military commander's help. 102 
As we have seen, because of the British and American troop withdrawals, the 
Commission had retained the services of the 3,000 strong German Sicherheitspolizei. 
Like the district controllers and the civil police force, they were controlled by the 
Commission's Interior Department. The German Silesian population naturally wanted 
the Sicherheitspolizej to be retained, but the military commanders distrusted this all- 
German para-military force. In a co-ordinated operation, the Commission's French 
troops partially disarmed them, leaving them with just enough weapons for police 
work. 103 This eased the military force's anxieties even if the Commissioners 
recognised that the security force at their disposal was too small to deal with major 
problems, such as a general strike in the mines or the railway works. 
On 30 March, Percival informed the Foreign Office that the Commissioners 
had asked the Ambassadors' Conference for three additional battalions and a cavalry 
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regiment. In London, Crowe reminded the Foreign Secretary that the force was under- 
strength because various War Offices had claimed that they did not have enough 
troops, but Curzon did not think that Britain could help. '(4 In fact, prior to the 
plebiscite in March 1921, the force never exceeded the 13,000 troops that had been 
recommended by the military experts for 'tranquil conditions'. 10' The revised 
establishment of eighteen battalions (22,000 men) was never achieved. 106 Yet the 
administrative element did enjoy a proportionally greater increase in its personnel. 
To closely supervise the activities of each Upper Silesian administrative service, 
it had been suggested that each Power send out between 50 and 60 officials but the 
British had reftised this on cost grounds. At first the Commission's staff comprised 98 
officials (69 French, 33 British and 26 Italians); the French also supplied the clerks, 
interpreters, chauffeurs, telephone operators and orderlies. By September 1920 the 
numbers and distribution of officials (classified by grades I- 3) had climbed to 139 
(75 French, 39 British, and 25 Italians) with 56 additional employees. As a result of the 
Commission's reorganisation in November 1920, the numbers then started to rise quite 
dramatically. By May 1922 its total strength had risen to 274 officials (122 French, 82 
British, and 70 Italians) with 293 employees (comprising 159 French, 101 British, and 
33 Italians). 107 The British contingent's expansion was agreed by the Foreign Office 
because Percival believed more British officials were necessary to enable the French 
activities in Upper Silesia to be monitored more closely. However, a large proportion 
of the extra numbers were brought in to train and run the Commission's new mixed 
plebiscite police force. This was formed from what remained of the Sicherheitspolizei 
after the second Polish insurrection in August 1920. By controlling this police force, 
London had hoped it would compensate for the absence of British troops. 
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Table 3 
Distribution of officials in the Upper Silesia Administrative 
and Plebiscite Commission by Nationality, September 11920.108 
French British Italian 
Role/ Class of Official Class of Official Class of Official 
Department 1. 2.3. total 1.2.3. total 1.2.3. total 
Cabinets 1 19 11 112 4 1-2 3 
Sec. General 1 12 4 
Interior 1 33 7 
Finance 1 13 5 1 2 
Justice I I- 2 - 1 11- 2 
Economics 133 7 12 3 -22 
Military 123 6 112 
Comms. 13 4 62 8 22 
Food Cont. 11 2 14 6 22 
Districts 10 17 27 58 13 459 
Total 75 39 25 
In its relations with the German Government, the Commission first conducted 
negotiations through their representative to the Commission, von Moltke. He was 
superseded by Prince Hatzfeldt who extended his own role with the Commission to 
include speaking on behalf of the German Silesians. 109 The Polish Government was 
represented by its own Consul General, Daniel Keszyecki. 110 Locally however, 
Keszyecki was eclipsed by the role and personality of Wojciech Korfanty - who had 
now been appointed by Warsaw to head the Polish Plebiscite Commissariat and was 
destined to become both the British and German governments' bete noire. The Polish 
and the German plebiscite campaign teams maintained support committees in 
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practically every Upper Silesian town and village. They also had support committees 
in the trade unions, the political parties and the professional associations. Sporting and 
cultural groups were vociferous campaigners, and organisations that had been formed 
in Poland to assist the Polish Silesians, during the August 1919 insurrection continued 
their support. 
In terms of resources, however, the two sides were worlds apart. The 
Prussian state administration directed Germany's covert financial, political, and 
military activities in Upper Silesia through the Zentralle, a special organisation 
established in Wroclaw for that purpose. "' In Upper Silesia, the German Plebiscite 
Commissariat was led by Dr. Urbanek, a lawyer and recently the mayor of Rozbark 
(Rossberg), a surburb of Bytom. The Commissariat was a development of the 
Schlesische A usschuss (Silesian Committee), an existing executive body for a loose 
federation of German associations located throughout Silesia. 112 As with the Polish 
organisation, the German Commissariat aimed to unite representatives from practically 
all the German political parties, the trades unions and any semi-official German bodies 
- bringing them under its political and industrial Control. 
113 Its district offices acted as 
intelligence centres and information bureaux, uniting local German organisations, co- 
ordinating campaigns and representing German interests in their dealings with the 
district controllers. Schlesische Ausschuss's branch associations, which had not been 
incorporated into the Commissariat, continued as the semi-independent Vereinigte 
Verbdnde (United Associations) -a propaganda organisation which also brought 
individual German supporters together. 114 Almost all German language newspapers 
were at the German Commissariat's disposal. And since they were the preserve of 
educated people sympathetic to them, the German campaigners also enjoyed the 
support of Upper Silesia's professional associations and societies. All the principal 
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landowners, the mine-owners, and the industrial magnates were allied to the German 
Commissariat and the Vereinigte Verba**nde. The senior clergy of all denominations 
also supported them; as did practically all the schoolteachers, the public officials and 
(important since most of them lived in the industrial area) the Jewish population. " 5 
Due to their socio-economic position, the Polish-speaking population was much 
less well organised. Some still remained grouped in German trade unions and most of 
the agricultural labourers were not organised. This made the Polish Commissariat's 
task much more difficult. It attempted to extend the Polish network by making 
sentimental appeals to the Polish-speakers' national consciousness - drawing attention 
to every iniquity that they were suffering. The Germans countered by working to retain 
Polish-speakers in their organisations, attacking the Polish leadership and obstructing 
their attempts to organise the Polish Silesians. 116 Failing to understand the political 
battle raging around him, Percival put it all down to agitators and terrorists. And rather 
than avail himself of the French-controlled Interior Department reports, he made do 
with the personal reports and the opinions of the British district controllers. 
Unsurprisingly, his reports to London reflected their general hostility towards the 
Poles. From May his main theme was French partiality towards the Poles; and from 
August (after suspecting that he was being spied on), he started dwelling upon Le 
Rond's alleged duplicity. 117 
General Le Rond's knowledge about Upper Silesia's problems was unsurpassed. 
He had participated on almost every Peace Conference committee handling Polish 
questions, attended all the Supreme Council and Heads of Delegations' deliberations 
about the plebiscites and had negotiated the agreement implementing the Peace Treaty. 
The Director of the Upper Silesia Food Department, J. 1. Craig, who was widely 
experienced in both British and Colonial governments, thought that General Le Rond 
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was 'one of the cleverest men' he had ever met. Craig also admired the President's 
deputy, Ponset. In Craig's view, both men worked harder than anyone else on the 
Commission and he believed that their achievements proved 'what brains backed by 
hard work can do'. "8 This was not an opinion wholly shared by Percival's deputy. In 
his 1923 final report on the Commission, Bourdillon allowed that Le Rond was 'an 
indefatigable worker' who literally lived in the Commission's headquarters. He was 
also very persuasive but 
He was not physically courageous. He was disliked both in Paris, where his 
rapid rise had promoted jealousy, and in Upper Silesia, where he bullied his 
subordinates into submission or resignation... He had few scruples, hardly ever 
lost his temper, even when roundly abused, and scarcely showed any 
embarrassment when discovered in deception. ' 19 
Bourdillon concluded by claiming that before long, acquaintances doubted anything Le 
Rond said in any scheme that he proposed. 120 That said, in Craig's view, the British 
and Italian Commissioners' abilities fell far short of Le Rond's. One theory circulating 
amongst British officials was that the British and Italian leaders had been 'specially 
selected so as not to give too much trouble' . 
121 This was probably not the case, but 
once Percival and Marinis were in place it was certainly in Le Rond's interest to keep 
them in Upper Silesia. Le Rond was especially dismissive of Marinis, and in their first 
months in Opole, Percival twice talked the Italian out of resigning. 122 
Apart from spending two years as an instructor at the Army Staff College and the 
first few months of the war in France as a staff officer with the British Expeditionary 
Force, since 1909 the greater part of Percival's career had been spent at the War 
Office. 123 After the Armistice he had spent several months with Malcolm in Berlin 
where he prepared reports on the military occupation of Gdansk, Memel, the plebiscite 
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He was 44 years old and had an extensive knowledge of German history and literature 
- continuing these studies when he became Steward of Christ College, Oxford on his 
retirement from the Army in 1929. Because he displayed an over-abundance of the 
qualities British Army officers tended to attribute to themselves - honour, duty, 
loyalty, and fair-mindedness, it is tempting to caricature Percival in some stereo- 
typical manner, but this would be unfair and misleading. In the best sense of the term, 
Percival was a gentleman, sensitive to the feelings of others and, when first in Upper 
Silesia, refusing to condemn anyone out of hand. But in the Commission's world of 
nationalist rivalries, government by decree and international politics, to some extent 
these same qualities made him the proverbial 'innocent abroad'. Here, Percival's open- 
mindedness led to indecision, his fair-mindedness to manipulation and pliability, and 
his non-confrontational nature to a festering dissent within himself. Exposure to this 
world affronted his sense of honour. 
Witnessing Le Rond nudge Upper Silesia's political balance towards the Poles, 
Percival's scarce-suppressed support for the German 'underdogs' surfaced. But despite 
Percival's anger being reinforced by the many German representations he received, the 
French military force's partiality and his own resentment at Le Rond's manipulation of 
the Commission, the British Commissioner's resistance (which had started developing 
from around May, 1920), always remained confined to subjects on which he was under 
firm Foreign Office instruction. 125 The real water-shed in his relationship with Le 
Rond occurred during the August 1920 insurrection. 126 Supported by Marinis, from 
then onwards Percival opposed almost every French initiative and encouraged British 
officials in the districts and various departments to report each and every perceived 
misdemeanour on the part of their French colleagues directly to him. 127 Thus, some, 
though not all, British officials acquired dual loyalty and responsibility. Working for 
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the Commission meant professional responsibilities and allegiance to their colleagues 
and superiors. Yet, as Foreign Office appointees themselves, they also felt a separate 
responsibility and patriotic loyalty to the British Commissioner. 
Percival's support within the British contingent was most readily forthcoming 
amongst colleagues at the Commission's headquarters in Opole and British officials 
serving in departments headed by French directors. The opportunities this afforded to 
the Germans were seized on and exploited. For example, in the Economics Department 
the German civil servants fed the Commission's British officials a stream of warnings 
and dire forecasts about the detrimental effect that Poland winning the plebiscite would 
have on Upper Silesian industry. The British officials passed these directly to Percival 
who forwarded them to London, where they confirmed similar messages fed through 
the British Commercial Secretary in Berlin. 128 Less active co-operation was forth- 
coming from officials in the two 'British Departments' - Communications and Food. 
There, success was readily apparent and all of the officials had to pull together to 
achieve it. 129 In any case, with the higher officials being British, they would scarcely 
complain about themselves. Percival's increasing contrariness had little effect on the 
British district controllers. Most of them had been complaining about their French 
colleagues and the Polish Silesians since the moment they arrived in Upper Silesia. 
The Commissioners nevertheless were aware that the Commission's various 
elements had to present a united profile to the Upper Silesians and took steps to foster 
good relations between their officials. IN They established an inter-Allied club in Opole 
for them where they entertained each other and their guests. Families started to arrive 
to join the officials in Opole around mid-April. "' After this there were regular dinner 
parties - often with local and visiting dignitaries as guests. But, as within the 
Commission, when the personal relationships became less cordial, social life also 
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divided itself into two camps. 132 Hereafter, the Percivals' most frequent guests would 
be de Marinis, Prince Hatzfeldt, von Moltke, and his own immediate staff on the 
Commission. 133 Bourdillon attributed the animosity and the deteriorating relations 
specifically to Le Rond's behaviour rather than to any changed attitude on Percival's 
part. He asserted in his final report that, after returning from attending the Spa 
Conference and several meetings in Paris in July 1920, Le Rond began abandoning all 
his appearance of impartiality. From then on, according to Bourdillon, Le Rond strove 
'to obtain the greatest possible share of Upper Silesia for Poland by fair means or 
foul'. But how much 'this was of his own devising or how far it was enjoined on him 
in Paris', Bourdillon could not say. 134 However, if true, this raises an interesting point 
because at this time there were Franco-Czech negotiations taking place over industrial 
concessions in Cieszyn. 135 
Le Rond had participated in the attempts by the Peace Conference to resolve 
the Polish-Czech frontier dispute in Cieszyn. He was still involved in the question of 
Cieszyn's security through the Commission's control of the small inter-Allied force 
which had recently arrived there. 136 At the Spa Conference which Le Rond had just 
attended, in exchange for the Entente's (unspecified) help in halting the Red Army's 
advance into Poland, the Polish representatives had been forced into abandoning the 
plebiscite in Cieszyn (which they stood a good chance of winning) to permit the 
Entente to fix the frontier. 137 The British were convinced of the economic argument for 
the Czechs' possessing the area. With France having a vested interest in Czech control 
of Cieszyn's industries as well, then placing the decision in the hands of the Entente 
amounted to Poland conceding the full Czech demands there and then. Not wanting to 
alienate the Poles, it is possible that in exchange for dropping the plebiscite, the French 
gave the Poles informal promises of support over Upper Silesia. 138 Although there is 
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gave the Poles informal promises of support over Upper Silesia. 138 Although there is 
no evidence to support this either, alternatively, Le Rond's own understanding of the 
situation, his alleged political ambitions, and the pivotal position he held on the Upper 
Silesia Commission, provided both motive and opportunity for what might have been a 
personal initiative to secure the region for Poland. 139 
Meanwhile, during the spring of 1920, around Opole and especially within the 
industrial district, incidents between the French forces and German Silesians started to 
escalate. Polish Silesians had been disappointed that demonstrations to welcome the 
Allies had been discouraged. With the Grenzschutz units disbanded and the 
Reichswehr gone, they had hoped to welcome the 8,500 French soldiers as liberators. 
But even without the demonstrations, the French soldiers felt and responded to the 
warmth of the Polish greetings. On the other hand, Upper Silesia's German population 
had greeted them with overt displays of nationalist hostility. The French population 
had of course suffered greatly in the Great War with the north of France enduring a 
particularly brutal German occupation for four years. Unsurprisingly then, there were 
many instances where French soldiers also behaved badly. For example, in a bar room 
brawl early in April 1920, a French soldier, accompanied by two Italians, shot three 
Germans, one of whom died. At the best of times, such behaviour was undesirable; but 
with the inter-Allied Commission's military deficit, it was both short-sighted and 
reckless. Over the following two days, crowds of angry young Germans held illegal 
demonstrations in front of the Commission's building in Opole and gangs of Germans 
chased French troops through the town's streets, wounding ten of them. 140 The 
Commissioners realised the delicacy of their position. Le Rond knew how unpopular 
the French contingent was and feared the reaction if, in restoring order, his troops 
started to shoot German Silesian civilians. The military, however, believed that Le 
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Rond was too soft with the demonstrators. The inter-Allied Military Commander, 
General Jules Gratier, who had crushed similar demonstrations in Gliwice in February, 
sent a note to the Commission protesting that, 'the Allies were there as conquerors and 
had not come to be insulted by the conquered'. 141 
Le Rond's inclination was to have the Sicherheitspolizei or the local police deal 
with any troubles of a political nature. Nevertheless, even Percival admitted that in 
matters involving the Germans, the Sicherheitspolizeis loyalty was questionable. 142 
The Commission finally authorised the French cavalry and infantry to clear away the 
crowds, but this only gave rise to further allegations of French brutality. 113 On the day 
of the funeral well over two thousand German mourners followed the procession. In 
Katowice that same day, a French officer struck a German electrician with a riding 
whip and the workers retaliated by cutting the area's water and power supplies until 
the officer had apologised. The Commissioners sent for Gratier and warned him 
that he was not commanding in a hostile country, but in one which was at peace 
with the Entente, and the action of his troops in the last few days was 
calculated to make the conduct of the government here impossible. 144 
Because Percival was based in Opole he tended to only record incidents occurring 
there, but such events were repeated throughout the plebiscite region each day. 145 
Typical daily incidents would be the throwing of stones at soldiers and tearing down 
Allied flags. 146 Gradually the composition of the French troops changed with young 
conscripts, who had no desire to serve in Upper Silesia, replacing many of the 
seasoned soldiers. 147 The mutual antipathy between the French forces and the German 
Silesians deepened, causing very difficult public order situations. 148 Not wanting to 
upset the German Silesians further, the Commission held back on some of the more 
necessary reforms such as the reconstitution of the Sicherheitspolizei to include Polish 
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Silesians. The Commissioners had been charged with creating the conditions necessary 
for a free and informed plebiscite vote to take place. Their inaction therefore resulted 
in the Poles starting to become impatient for change. 
Aspects of the discussions leading up to the Supreme Council's decision to hold 
a plebiscite in Upper Silesia had displayed an enlightened understanding of the need to 
grant sufficient time and take measures to help certain groups of Polish-speaking 
Upper Silesians rid themselves of a life-time's mentality of servitude. 149 Germany's 
new constitution permitted its citizens, including those living in Upper Silesia, equal 
rights. But in Upper Silesia the ingrained racial prejudice and the ethnic conflict meant 
many constitutional rights remained theoretical. 150 The Poles wanted the Commission 
to implement measures that would raise their status and boost Polish self-esteem. They 
had expected Polish appointments to be made to the all-German administration and 
public services. 151 But after the Commission's first two months of operation, their only 
advance had been the establishment of Polish as an official language - and even this 
had not been fully implemented. On 28 April, Korfanty led a deputation of 15 Polish 
leaders for talks with Commission. Amongst their demands were disbandment of the 
Sicherheitspolizei; officials to swear allegiance to the Commission; a halt to the export 
of some foodstuffs from Upper Silesia to Germany; the expulsion of agitators who had 
entered Upper Silesia from Germany. They expected a definite answer by 5 May. 
Replying for the Commission, Le Rond told Korfanty that the Commission would not 
be coerced into adopting measures not in the country's interest. 1 52 
Percival disliked Korfanty intensely. Scarcely a despatch (or diary entry) by 
the British Commissioner mentions Korfanty in a positive light. That said, Percival 
would probably have been unaware of the Polish leader's contribution (in response to 
Allied requests) towards maintaining peace in Upper Silesia in the aftermath of the 
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Poznan' rebellion in early 1919.153 With similarly negative reports on Korfanty 
reaching the Foreign Office from Germany, it is not surprising that the officials 
handling them in London also adopted and circulated this view. With the exception of 
Sir Eyre Crowe, who became Permanent Under Secretary in the Foreign Office at the 
end of 1920, none of the Foreign Office officials dealing with Upper Silesian matters 
were familiar with the Paris negotiations. And again, unlike Crowe who had been 
involved, they all failed to appreciate the merits of the Polish case. 154 Their attitude 
towards the Poles was not helped by the arrival at the Foreign Office in October 1920 
of Major L. E. Ottley, the former District Controller of Bytom Land, to advise them on 
Upper Silesian issues. 155 Ottley's reports about his difficulties in Bytom and accounts 
of private conversations with Korfanty, whose headquarters were in Bytom, helped to 
colour Percival's pro-German despatches to London. 
It must be said that neither Percival's, Ottley's nor any other British district 
controllers' personal circumstances suggest familiarity with the oppressive world and 
the relentless grind of daily life that was the lot of most Polish-speaking Silesians. In 
his comprehensive study of Upper Silesia, W. J. Rose commented on the manner in 
which the 'mill and the mine' shaped the lives and attitudes of the people working 
them, no matter where they lived. Upper Silesians were no different. Rose found them 
much less polite than their cousins in the Polish Republic. They were very 'down to 
earth', their 'religious piety obscured by the rough brutality with which they treated 
each other', and 'even among the halfway educated classes, it was a difficult task to 
find urbanity. '-6 Outside the industrial area, their reputation for lawlessness was 
legendary. 
Committed to physical toil, they could appreciate muscle and the advantages 
of possessing it far more than any intellectual gifts. It was the admitted fact that 
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the man who could make his authority felt, if and when necessary, by the use of 
force was the best foreman. 157 
Such people looked for strong, active leadership, and so Korfanty the journalist and 
politician gave way to Korfanty the demagogic dictator -a brash, assertive figure who 
knew how to inspire confidence in a sceptical people, much hardened by their recent 
experiences. From the fortress that was the Polish Commissariat's headquarters at the 
Hotel Lomnitz in Bytom, he issued orders and directed events. 158 However, political 
reality contrasted sharply with Percival's portrait of Korfanty the despot, who was 
allegedly behind every indignity and inconvenience that the Commission suffered. 1'9 
Korfanty's position in the Polish coalition of forces was far weaker than the 
image he presented to the world. There was little or no linkage between his political 
campaign and the Polish para-militarists. Despite experiencing unremitting attack in 
the German press and being pilloried by the British and Italian Commissioners, many 
of his own side regarded Korfanty as being too close to the Commission. He did not 
control the undisciplined bands of armed Polish Silesians who later emerged, nor the 
Bojowka-Polska death squads that would terrorise some areas. Though Korfanty had 
little say over the para-military forces he was often blamed for their actions. 160 It was 
not every Polish Silesian who shared his belief that a fair diplomatic settlement could 
be achieved. As we have noted, critics claimed that his part in preventing a Poznan- 
style coup de main in Upper Silesia had simply bought the Germans time to reinforce 
themselves before provoking the disastrous Polish rising in August 1919. Military 
leaders, such as Michal Grazynski of the POW (appointed Governor of the province in 
1922) continually questioned his tactics. 161 Korfanty also sometimes clashed with the 
more headstrong of the Polish labour leaders. Rather than dissipate support in the 
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sporadic industrial actions they had sometimes become embroiled in, he demanded that 
strikes should be co-ordinated with his political initiatives. 162 
Another organisation Korfanty had no direct influence over was the Catholic 
Church. Whether they considered themselves German, Polish or neither, nearly all 
native Upper Silesians, were Roman Catholic. In the 19 10 Prussian Census 1,779,494 
are listed as Catholic and only 175,079 as Protestant. This explains the Catholic Centre 
Party's powerful position in Upper Silesia. With the Centre becoming the mainstay of 
the German Government's coalition and therefore of Germany's fragile democracy, 
this added a party political consideration to the many economic reasons Berlin had for 
retaining Upper Silesia. And because the great majority of the people in the territories 
threatened with annexation were Roman Catholic, Germany, in its search for allies to 
modify the likely peace terms, had revived full diplomatic relations with the Vatican. 
This opened up fascinating rounds of diplomacy centred on the Vatican's Curia, as 
Poland and Germany (often aided one way or the other by Percival, the Foreign Office 
and Count John de Salis, the British representative at the Vatican) tried to influence the 
organisation of the Church's affairs in Upper Silesia. 163 
The plebiscites themselves proved a dilemma for the Papacy. Poland had been a 
bulwark of the Catholic faith for centuries and the Vatican had supported the Prussian 
Poles in their struggles against assimilation following Bismarck's Kulturkampf. 164 This 
had aimed at securing a Prussian ascendancy in post- 1870 Germany by imposing the 
Reich's authority on to the Catholic Church and then using it to encourage loyalty to 
the Prussian dominated Reich. But in Upper Silesia as elsewhere in Prussian Poland, 
the Kulturkampfs effect and later attempts at cultural assimilation was the opposite to 
that intended - instead of eliminating non-German allegiances, they reinforced them. 165 
For the Vatican, this new post-war relationship with Gennany offered the Catholic 
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Church an opportunity to improve its position in the new Republic. However, whilst 
over 23.8 million Germans (around 35%) had been Catholic in the pre-war Reich, due 
to the annexations this had fallen to 17.5 million (around 29.5%) and it would fall by 
almost a further two million if Germany lost Upper Silesia. The German Catholic 
hierarchy needed its Government's help to preserve its existing ecclesiastical 
boundaries across the new Polish-German frontier which the plebiscite was designed 
to establish. The diplomatic struggle surrounding these and other issues related to the 
plebiscite, have been detailed in Stuart Stehlin's Weimar and the Vatican 1919- 
1933.166 
Upper Silesians assimilating into German culture found it easier to support the 
4 state-organised' Catholicism than did Polish-speaking Upper Silesians. 167 When 
Georg Kopp had been appointed Bishop of Wroclaw in 1890, Polish-speakers in his 
diocese, which included Upper Silesia, had suddenly found themselves to be rather 
second class citizens. One reason was that Kopp moved his clerics away from the Latin 
elements of the mass and ordered that singing and notices must now to be conducted in 
the German language. 168 By mid-1919, realising the critical role that the Church could 
play in influencing how Polish Silesians voted (a point Paderewski made at the Peace 
Conference), Kopp. s successor, Cardinal Adolf Bertram, relaxed the political and 
linguistic constraints on his priests. 169 Enforced over the years, these had ensured that 
all the Church's hierarchy and at least 75% of the Upper Silesian clergy supported the 
German cause. 170 Of course, this was not the only solution favoured by German 
Catholics. Another group supported the Bund der Oberschlesier's campaign for an 
independent Upper Silesia -though this was really a German-inspired pis aller to 
pen-nit the region to slip back into the German fold when an opportune moment 
arrived. 171 
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Most Polish clerical support came from the clergy's lower ranks - the 
clerical work-face, so to speak - and from outside the Wroclaw diocese. 
172 Responding 
to Polish moves to persuade the Pope to suspend his ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the 
plebiscite area and appoint an impartial apostolic vicar for the duration of the 
plebiscite, Bertram asked the Papal Nuncio in Munich, Eugenio Pacelli (Pope Pius 
XII, 1939-1958) to intercede. In December 1919 Bertram visited Rome and warned the 
Curia that Berlin would interpret such a move as favouring the Poles. Steering a 
middle course, the Pope (Pius X), appointed the Papal Nuncio to Warsaw, Achille 
Ratti (Pope Pius XI 1922-1939), as the religious commissioner for the plebiscite areas. 
To placate the Germans, Bertram continued holding his ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
whilst Ratti was instructed to reside in Upper Silesia rather than Warsaw 'so that he 
would not be seen to be unduly influenced by the Poles'. 173 Percival had objected to 
the nomination, requesting that a local priest be appointed instead. 174 But the Vatican 
pointed out that it would be difficult to find a neutral Upper Silesian. 175 
When Ratti finally took up residence in Opole his every move was scrutinised by 
both sides and he eventually found that pursuing 'strict impartiality generally meant 
dissatisfying both parties'. 176 He had not been helped by the Polish press trumpeting 
that his appointment was a great political success for Poland. In fact, Ratti always 
acted impartially - though not very effectively. As the political tension mounted 
throughout 1920, at one point Percival noted that clerics could invariably be found 
amongst the more extreme nationalist agitators on both sides. Fearing riots and 
demonstrations if Bertram appeared in Upper Silesia, the Commission blocked the 
Bishop's entry into the plebiscite area - something to which he could not reconcile 
himself Ratti visited Bertram in Wrociaw to explain matters and he and others such as 
177 G Hatzfeldt, made frequent appeals to the Commission to allow him in. iregory 
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Campbell notes that 'mindful of Polish resistance to Bertram, Church officials [in 
Rome] hoped that he would voluntarily cancel his visit if the Commission formally 
recognised his right to enter Upper Silesia'. 178 Early in November Ratti paid what 
proved to be his last visit to Wroc4aw to propose a solution along these lines. He was 
not well received and writing to Berlin about the visit, Hatzfeldt made some 
uncomplimentary observations about Ratti who, in less than fifteen months time, 
would be the new Pope. 
We will never find the slightest support from this man. He is the typical 
diplomat of the Middle Ages, slick as an eel and he squirms like an earthworm; 
he engages in monologues - even with the Cardinal - and in every sentence 
there is a 'but'. 
179 
The Commission's problem with Bertram was not their only long-standing 
conflict with Germany. Tensions, however, had been minimised by the finn line the 
Commission took to ensure that the Prussian officials in the administration remained 
co-operative. Whilst the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians had good reason to be 
disappointed with their lack of emancipation under the Commission, the slowness of 
the pace was in part attributable to the Commission's desire to maintain German co- 
operation. That said, it was also in Germany's interest that its officials remained where 
they were. This not only encouraged the German supporters but it helped to prevent 
Polish supporters getting their jobs. 180 Though the Germans had earlier promised the 
Commission loyalty, and they were forbidden to participate in any political activity, 
this did not mean that all of the officials refrained from doing so. The line that they 
dare not cross was drawn on March 23,1920, when the German Government advised 
the Upper Silesian judiciary to refuse to co-operate with the Commission's plan to 
introduce a Supreme Court and a Court of Appeal staffed by Allied law-officers. The 
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officials took their cue and adopted a hostile attitude to the Commission. 18 1 The 
German trade unions followed suit, with the Railway Union threatening to strike if 
their official gazette was printed in Polish as well as German. 182 When a senior judge 
was dismissed his colleagues took strike action. 183 
The confrontation re-ignited the German plebiscite campaign, something Percival 
suspected the whole affair had been engineered for. 184 However, the Germans were 
shaken when Le Rond told von Moltke to inform Berlin that henceforth the 
Commission would regard any dissent by officials 'as a request to be relieved from 
office' and that they would be replaced by Polish officials 'to the last man if 
185 
necessary'. Learning this, the Germans quickly backed down and although the 
judges' strike dragged on well into the summer, the officials remained superficially co- 
operative. 
By June 1920 the pattern of the German and Polish plebiscite campaigns 
had started to emerge. Here it is useful to summarise their respective political 
arguments and their tactics, most of which remained unchanged through to the 
vote on 20 March 192 1. The Gennans could rely upon about 90% of the votes cast 
by the educated and skilled population. The Polish vote was concentrated 
amongst agricultural labourers, peasants, the miners and unskilled industrial 
labourers. The battle was on for the many Upper Silesians who had no strong 
nationalist leanings and were likely to vote for the side offering them the greatest 
political or economic advantage. The German campaign was supported by Berlin, 
run from Wroclaw, well funded and highly sophisticated. The Polish political 
campaign was organised locally, but because of the enormous problems Poland 
was experiencing during 1920-2 1, the campaign relied heavily on French 
diplomatic support. 186 The Germans claimed that Poland had no fhends, no agreed 
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frontiers, and was unlikely to survive as a state. If internal pressures failed to 
cause it to self-destruct then its neighbours would re-partition it. To this, the Poles 
argued that Poland was free and that it enjoyed the Allies' protection. They 
counter-claimed that following the Reich's defeat and revolution, it might be 
years before the Germans completely recovered their independence. Germany 
could fall to a restored autocracy or to the Communists before then. 
To the German claim that a 'corrupt army of inefficient Galician and 
Congress Poles' would replace the Prussian officials currently administering the 
country, the Poles replied that only the officials sent from other parts of Germany 
'to oppress the inhabitants' would be removed. To the charge that 'the educated 
German landowners would be replaced by uneducated Polish nobles' the Poles 
replied that, as with the officials there, the native Upper Silesian landowners 
4 would be left umnolested'. The suggestions that Protestants would be persecuted 
and that personal liberty would be better assured in Germany, were also rejected - 
the Poles pointing out that the new Polish constitution, the minorities treaty and 
Polish history itself, all guaranteed individual rights. And since they considered 
Poland to be the regional home of the Roman Catholic Church, there would be 
neither socialist hostility towards the Church nor government oppression such as 
Bismarck's Kulturkampf. Attempting to make a virtue out of the Peace Treaty, 
GeTman suppoTteTs Teminded UppeT Silesians of the militaTy conscTiption still 
existing in Poland. The Poles argued back that, under Polish sovereignty, the 
atmosphere of the Prussian parade ground associated with every Upper Silesian 
church, school, factory, farm, and mine would disappear forever. 187 
The most effective German arguments were their economic ones. By 
claiming that a vote for Poland would mean inefficient management of industrial 
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units as the leaders of industry withdrew and the German markets were lost, they 
called every individual's economic security into question. This, they forecast, 
would result in the ruin of industry and widespread unemployment. Poland had no 
regard for the true interests of the inhabitants, the Poles only wanted to exploit the 
country's riches to bolster the low-valued Polish currency. Whatever the case, the 
workers were bound to lose their existing levels of security because Poland could 
never maintain the benefits of German social legislation. 188 
The Polish response to these charges was to adopt a very pragmatic line. 
They claimed that should capital and expertise withdraw to Germany, offers ftom 
Western Europe and America would never be lacking. Upper Silesian markets 
such as Poznania and parts of West Prussia had already been incorporated into 
Poland. Germany still required Upper Silesia's coal, and there would always be a 
market in south and south eastern Europe. The Ruhr's mines and industries 
dominated Germany. This meant that over the longer term, agricultural Poland 
offered Upper Silesia's mines and manufacturing industry a far bigger, expanding 
market than Germany ever could. Instead of depending on imported food, Polish 
agricultural resources would ensure that Upper Silesia enjoyed its share in this 
self-sufficiency. 189 Appealing to Upper Silesia's landless agricultural labourers, 
the Poles cited recent and forthcoming land reform legislation in the Polish Sejm, 
to suggest that in parts of Upper Silesia the large estates might be broken up for 
settlement. 190 They guaranteed continued payment of pensions and allowances to 
invalided war veterans from the German Army, even hinting that they might be 
increased. Then, responding to the jibe about being unable to maintain standards 
of German social security, the Poles attacked the German industrialists for having 
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'treated Upper Silesia as a Cinderella', paying lower wages to its workers there 
than anywhere else in Germany. '" 
Both the German and Polish sides had to deal with Bund de Oherschlesier's 
call for a neutral, independent Upper Silesia. 192 Support for this had waned after 
the plebiscite had been announced and the Catholic Centre Party, which had been 
early advocates, now wanted Upper Silesians to vote to remain in Germany. 193 
Nevertheless, the Bund had given the idea of autonomy intellectual respectability, 
and in an attempt to win over its residual support, both the Polish and German 
campaigns promised Upper Silesians devolved government. To give credence to 
these promises, both Warsaw and Berlin passed legislation to facilitate this. 194 
After the plebiscite there was a slight revival of interest in the Bund's ideas, when 
elements within the German Foreign Office thought that it might be used to avoid 
partitioning the industrial area. '9' 
Mass demonstrations, legal or otherwise, played a big part in both campaigns. 
As we have seen, 'political funerals' provided an opportunity, so did holidays. On I 
May 1920, and for several days afterwards, German nationalists paraded through 
Polish areas. 196 On the Polish National Day (3 May), quasi -religious processions 
whose significance was lost on the British district controllers, demonstrated Polish 
strength. '9' Percival records that the German demonstrations passed off without any 
'unpleasantness' but the much smaller Polish ones, parading 'illegal national symbols' 
had caused disruption by provoking the German youths and the Sicherheispolizei into 
attacking them. 198 The Polish Consulate building in Opole was besieged and the 
Gazetta Polska's premises were sacked. 199 But because of their unpopularity, Le Rond 
still refused to permit French troops to be used on the streets . 
200 Both sides intensified 
national sentiments by widely publicising any incident highlighting the morality of 
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theircause . 
201 This, however, did not mean that the Polish Silesians wished to be left to 
the mercy of the German gangs. When Korfanty refused the Commission's request to 
call-off a strike in support of the Polish demands made on 28 April (see above), he met 
the Commissioners to tell them that the conditions prevailing in Upper Silesia were 
untenable. The Upper Silesian Poles were being terrorised and should the Commission 
continue to take no action, they would be forced into helping themselves. 202 That this 
meeting had to take place in the forest between Bierdzany (Bierdzan) and Olenso 
because, in Percival's words, 'Korfanty's life in Opole would not be worth a farthing's 
purchase', perhaps confirmed the Polish Silesian leader's assessment. 203 Events over 
the following months provided ftirther testimony to the Commission's reluctance to 
confront the major problems of internal security. 
The differing sympathies between the French and British district controllers 
were most vividly illustrated in the Bytom district, where the French ran the town and 
Major Ottley controlled Bytom Land. Their respective authority often overlapped, 
resulting in the emergence of conflicting priorities. 204 On the evening of 25 May, 
Ottley became the local Germans' hero when during a crowd disturbance in the town 
square, he took their side against a French military patrol attempting to restore order 
there. 205 This naturally annoyed the French officials, who asked him not to interfere in 
a town in which he was not the Controller. During fresh disturbances in the town 
between off-duty French soldiers and local Germans three nights later, Ottley had to 
refuse to help a crowd of Germans who had besieged his office, begging him to take 
charge over the heads of the French. At the same time, some local Germans took the 
opportunity to attack the Polish Commissariat's Headquarters at the Hotel Lomnitz. 
Both sides used firearms, and the hotel's ground and first floors were sacked before 
French troops arrived from Katowice and elsewhere to restore order. 206 Ottley reported 
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that during the fighting he had seen Korfanty throwing hand grenades out of one of the 
windows. 207 Though he continued to maintain contact with Korfanty, from then 
onwards Ottley was increasingly used by the Germans to register complaints against 
the Poles and to articulate their interests to the Commission via Percival - who saw 
nothing amiss. 208 In fact, when Le Rond appeared to be about to prohibit the district 
controllers from associating with the Polish and German political leaders, the British 
Commissioner immediately headed this off - noting in his diary that this 'would not 
suit my book at all, as it would mean I should lose .... perhaps the most important 
source of information at my disposal'. 209 Without being unfair or unjust to someone 
with many admirable qualities, this entry sums up a great deal about Percival's acumen 
in relation to his position and work on the Commission. 
Another person whom Ottley must have impressed was E. H. Carr. A well- 
known historian in later years, he was then British Secretary to the Ambassadors' 
Conference. After spending a few days in Upper Silesia early in June, one in Ottley's 
company at Bytom, he produced a report for the Foreign Office. He believed that the 
Poles were desperate, on the offensive and pursuing a policy of disruption. Advancing 
the usual pro-German arguments, Carr declared that the area's problems were not 
ethnic but economic. He had also found a total lack of confidence in the French 
officials and French troops. However, British prestige stood 'extraordinarily high' and 
'the presence of a British officer alone [Ottley? ] suffices to quell an incipient riot'. 210 
He thought that the Commission should be re-organised under a British President, the 
French pre-dominance eliminated and that British troops be deployed throughout the 
plebiscite area . 
21 1 Though both Hardinge and Curzon found the report interesting, 
nevertheless, Crowe regarded Carr as 'a misleading guide'; in a private letter to Carr, 
Headlam Morley cautioned him against 'pressing his points too far'. 212 
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Shortly after Caff 's visit, the Commission decided to send Le Rond to Paris 
to persuade the Ambassadors of their difficulties - especially over the shortage of 
213 Allied troops which Le Rond believed was the root of their troubles. But Percival 
refused to approach London directly about the shortage. Instead, he declared that his 
own Government 'knew sufficient of the situation to decide for itself matters of this 
description'. 214 His diary entry for 21 June mocked Le Rond's summary of their 
position, which was that 
In spite of the fact that the Commission has a hostile population, a hostile 
police force, a hostile magistracy, a hostile German Government, and a not 
altogether friendly Polish Government, it could be maintained that on the 
whole Upper Silesia has been fairly quiet and at any rate has not flared up, 
which might well have happened had our own [the Commission's] Government 
been less wise (!! ! ). 
215 
But events elsewhere were about to dramatically alter this situation. 
By the close of 1919 the Red Army had defeated the Allied-backed White 
Russians on almost all fronts. Compounding this for Poland, Britain had lifted its 
Russian naval blockade to permit a resumption of trade. But unlike Lloyd George, 
Pilsudski did not regard Bolshevism as a mere transitory phenomenon and he was 
convinced that once the Red Army had finished-off the last of the Whites and 
consolidated Soviet power in the Ukraine, they intended attacking Poland. An 
independent Ukraine was a vital factor in Pilsudski's vision of a Polish-led association 
of states on Russia's western border but it had been taken over by the Bolsheviks. 216 
After prolonged and difficult negotiations, on 21 April 1920, Poland and the Ukrainian 
Peoples' Republic had signed political and military agreements. 117 Four days later, two 
Polish armies supported by two divisions of Ukrainians had advanced into Ukraine and 
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quickly captured Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, from the Bolsheviks. But their success 
218 
was short-lived. By mid-June the Poles were in full retreat. On 4 July, the Red Army 
launched its counter-offensive across Poland's still undefined eastern frontiers. The 
Red Army's advance would take them to the gates of Warsaw and threaten the 
continued existence of Poland itself For the Germans the equation was simple: 'no 
219 Poland - no plebiscite' . 
Poland's British critics, indeed, began anticipating its demise. CWming that 
events had now justified his negative views, the Foreign Office's former Polish expert, 
Lewis Namier wrote, 'should the Gods still favour me with a Polish collapse soon, 
even my vanity as a prophet will be satisfied' . 
220 To Headlam Morely it appeared 
retribution was coming to Poland much quicker than expected . 
221 The British Trades 
Union Congress and the Labour Party responded to a Soviet call for members of 
socialist organisations everywhere to implement a European-wide boycott of Polish 
trade. And to prevent Britain providing the Poles with any military assistance (which 
the British Government had little intention of doing), their hastily convened joint 
222 'Council of Action', threatened Lloyd George with a general strike. Should Poland 
go under, Churchill was already speculating about the Entente's need to seek German 
assistance to contain the spread of CommUniSm. 223 Whatever remaining credibility 
Lloyd George had with the Poles evaporated when he urged the Polish Government to 
accept the Soviet's peace terms - something which would have effectively turned 
Poland into a Soviet satellite. From Warsaw, the British Army's DMO, General 
Radcliffe commented . 
It is a humiliating thing to listen to the foreigners' criticism of our own P. M. 
and feel that it is highly justified. Whatever happens in this country I am afraid 
that our prestige has received a blow from which it can hardly recover. 224 
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The Polish Army's retreat also helped prompt huge German majorities in the 
Kwidzyn and Olsztyn plebiscites. 225 They had been held on II July, and the British 
officials in Opole believed that these results and the Russian advance would have a 
very great effect on Polish support in Upper Silesia. 226 Posters'-with the words 'Upper 
Silesians Follow This Example' splashed above the East Prussian plebiscite results, 
started appearing all over Upper Silesia. 227 Hoping that former Polish support might 
now favour independent statehood, the Bund der Oberschlesier started pressing their 
ideas once again. 228 A Polish leader, favouring this as a temporary expediency, told 
Percival that 'it was unreasonable for loyal Poles to commit this country to a Poland 
229 
which, for all they know, might have Bolshevik tendencies in a few weeks time' . 
Despite their proximity to it, the implications of the Polish crisis were not discussed by 
the Commission until 3 August. 230 Two days later, Le Rond announced that it was 
quite possible that Warsaw would be occupied by 10 August. 23 1 Percival noted that 
even if this occurred, the general feeling was that there was little danger of trouble in 
Upper Silesia. 232 Events proved this assessment wildly inaccurate. 
The opportunities that the Soviet advance offered Germany's opposing political 
factions are clearly presented in Norman Davies' work on the Soviet-Polish War. 233 
Most importantly, they believed that should the Soviets defeat Poland, then they would 
be freed from the constraints that the Peace Treaty had placed on Germany in the East. 
After assurances that the Red Army would respect Germany's frontiers, the German 
Government declared their neutrality on 20 July. And though Berlin did not control 
Upper Silesia, they considered the Commission also bound by their declaration. 
German neutrality was very much to the Soviets' advantage. 234 An order forbidding 
shipment of war material across German territory was implemented. Suspecting that 
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French troops or munitions travelling to Upper Silesia were bound for Poland, German 
officials interpreted the order as including anything being sent there. 235 
If Germany's neutrality might not have been constitutionally applicable to Upper 
Silesia, German fears that the region could be turned into a battlefield did have a basis 
in fact. 236 At Spa on 14 July, when discussing Upper Silesia in relation to the Soviet 
advance, NIarshal Foch had stated that if Poland was defeated, then the remnants of its 
Army could 'crystallise' around the inter-Allied force in Upper Silesia, and 'hold on 
for some time'. 237 Reports of 'an extraordinary number of movement of troops' 
connected 'with the Polish lbacle' began appearing in Upper Silesia's German 
press. 238 Coincidentally, Paris informed Le Rond that his request for the transfer of the 
inter-Allied force in Cieszyn to Upper Silesia had been granted. 239 On 10 August the 
Commission duly became embroiled in the neutrality question when it delayed the 
implementation of some of the related German decrees about military supplieS. 240 
Railway workers started obstructing the transfer of the troops from Cieszyn into Upper 
Silesia and on 15 August, four French soldiers were killed and several injured when an 
engine was run into one of their trains. 241 Press articles called for a general strike to 
'prevent the movement of French troops in Upper Silesia'. Public meetings were held 
to call for the neutralisation of the plebiscite area, and German officials protested about 
the Commission returning soldiers in Polish uniform back over the border instead of 
interning them. 242 
Le Rond attributed these protests and other incidents to orders issued from 
Berlin, but Percival disagreed. 243 He told London they were simply due to the people 
of Upper Silesia wanting to be bound by Germany's declaration of neutrality. In a note 
delivered by von Moltke on 17 August, the Commissioners learned that Moscow had 
warned Berlin about the possibility of Polish troops being concentrated in Upper 
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Silesia. The German Government assumed that the Commissioners had agreed that 
Upper Silesia was bound by the declaration of neutrality. They proposed co-operation 
between themselves and the Commission to ensure that 'arrangements are made to 
244 
render neutrality effective' . When 
he delivered the note, von Moltke reminded the 
three Commissioners 
that the German Government still had considerable authority in Upper Silesia, 
and if this authority was to be used to support the Commission, it was 
necessary for the German Government to know that its own declaration of 
neutrality would not be infringed in Upper Silesia. 245 
In reply von Moltke was reminded that it was the Commission which now constituted 
Upper Silesia's Government, not Berlin. Le Rond said that he could not understand 
why Germany doubted the Commission's own neutrality. However, after heated 
exchanges in which Le Rond accused Germany of being partly responsible for the 
disturbances, it was conceded that the Commission would intern all Polish soldiers 
who crossed into Upper Silesian territory. 246 
Earlier that morning, the German trade unions had surprised the Commission by 
notifying them of a 24 hour general strike in protest at what they alleged was the 
Commission's support of Poland by armed force . 247 Whilst the Commissioners were 
talking to von Moltke, outside their headquarters in Opole and across Upper Silesia all 
public services, shops and factories had closed down, demonstrations were underway, 
and resolutions in favour of Upper Silesian neutrality were being endorsed. 248 Sara 
Wambaugh notes that it was generally believed that these demonstrations were 
supported by Berlin. 249 In Katowice, German demonstrators greeted a press report 
about the Red Army having captured Warsaw, by cheering Lenin and Trotsky and 
attacking the French soldiers on duty. The Sicherheitspolizei failed to intervene either 
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then or later that same evening, when a mob armed with rifles, revolvers and hand 
grenades stormed the District Controller's offices and broke open an arms store. By 
this time the Germans had killed four French soldiers and wounded eight more. A 
Polish-sympathising doctor tending the wounded was dragged from his home, lynched, 
and his body thrown in the river. Meeting hurriedly, the Commissioners declared a 
state of siege in Katowice. When Allied troops fired on the crowds to disperse them, 
they killed ten Germans and wounded between 30 and 80 more. 250 With the situation 
calmer, the troops were ordered out of the town leaving the Sicherheitspolizei to 
enforce the state of siege. What followed was almost inevitable. The German mob 
returned to the streets, besieged the Polish plebiscite campaigners' offices and set them 
on fire. When the occupants attempted to escape the flames, one was shot, two were 
beaten to death and the remainder taken prisoner. With nobody to stop them, because 
the Sicherheitspolizei had absented themselves, the mob proceeded to pillage all Polish 
shops and property, including the offices of the Gazeta Ludowa They murdered the 
owners and attacked anyone whom they suspected was a Polish sympathiseT. On 19 
August, almost 24 hours later, four companies of Italian troops arrived in the town to 
bring the situation under control. However, by then Korfanty had issued a 
proclamation calling the Polish supporters to arms. 251 
Whilst Upper Silesian Germans and the Government in Berlin had been busy 
pressing neutrality on the Commission, the Polish Army had launched a successftd 
counter offensive. The magnitude of Pilsudski's victory was only now beginning to be 
realised. 252 When the riots had started in Katowice on 17 August, instead of Warsaw 
falling to the Soviets, it was the Red Army that was now in full retreat. Armed with 
this knowledge and the failure of the Commission to protect them, the Polish para- 
militarists finally took the action Korfanty had been threatening for several months. A 
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20,000 strong army of ragged Polish-speaking youths appeared, some from refuge over 
the Polish border but the majority from towns and the villages in and around the areas 
of industry. First they occupied Siernianowice (Siemianowitz), Huta Laura 
(Laurah7dtte) and Szopieniel (Schopinitz) and other villages around Mystowice. The 
action then quickly spread throughout the districts of Rybnik, Pszczyna, Bytom and 
Tarnowski Gory. A strike by Polish miners shut down three-quarters of the region's 
coal mines. 253 When Percival seized on a chance to question Korfanty about these 
actions, the Polish leader pointed to the Commission's failure to protect the inhabitants 
and claimed that had the Polish leadership not done something to protect them, the 
whole population would have risen in revolt. 2-54 
The insurgents' first actions were specially directed at German authority as 
represented by the Sicherheitspolizei, the police, customs officials and the forest 
guards . 
255 They were disarmed and expelled along with other German functionaries 
from the local administration which the Poles took over and ran themselves. A two- 
way traffic in prisoners, hostages and supplies was opened up across the Polish 
border. 256 By 31 August, the insurgents operations extended into the districts of 
Lubliniec and Toszecko-Gliwicki (Tost-Gleiwitz). This was not conducted without 
disturbances. Numerous murders took place and a German village, Holdun6w 
(Anhalt), was partially burned down. But with the French soldiers fraternising with the 
insurgents and the Poles again demanding that the Sicherheitspolizei be disbanded, the 
Commission and the Germans were forced to negotiate. 257 This was too much for some 
of the British district controllers and four, including Major Ottley, promptly 
resigned. 
258 
The common thread running through their resignation statements was resentment 
at the manner in which the Commission had dealt with the disorders and how this had 
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now disadvantaged the German population. Major Perry particularly objected to the 
Commission taking the decision (see below) to disband the Sicherheitspolizei and to 
grant the Poles equal rights even before the insurgents had been disarmed. 259 Captain 
Macpherson claimed that his 'British standard oflustice, impartiality and integrity' did 
not permit him to participate in the Commission's current poliCy. 260 Major Cassels 
complained about the French troops in his district being anything other than 'impartial 
261 and strictly neutral'. Major Ottley, however, identified the Allies' greatest problem. 
He stated that the Commission had to be 'in a position to impose its will upon the 
population, in spite of any possible resistance'. But, continued Ottley, no one could 
now feel any confidence in the French military contingent's willingness to attack the 
Poles if ordered to do so. Some British controllers' requests for military assistance had 
been rejected or simply ignored, whilst others had been told that they should have 
brought their own British troops . 
262 In his report to the Ambassadors' Conference, Le 
Rond highlighted the Commission's shortfall in military personnel and stated that 
because of this, GratieT's military measures had been restricted. They only had half the 
number of troops which the military experts had recommended and when faced with a 
general breakdown in law and order, these had proved to be inadequate. 263 
Though this second Polish insurrection was a setback for the Commission 
and the German campaign, it also tested the Polish leadership's ability to control the 
insurgents. For example, one incident in which ten Germans were executed and buried 
in woods beside the hamlet of Josefthal, was later used repeatedly in anti-Polish 
propaganda. When the bodies were uncovered a few days later, Ottley's brother (who 
had been visiting him) took the photographic evidence of the killings directly to the 
Foreign Office. 264 To help persuade the Polish rebels to stand down, yet provide them 
with security after disarming themselves, Korfanty suggested an interim measure 
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whereby the local councils appointed an armed Burgerwehr (citizen guard) of mixed 
population. Le Rond agreed, provided the strikers returned to work . 
265 By 27 August 
nearly all of the mines were in production and after the leaders of the Polish and 
German Plebiscite Commissariat's had met in Bytom and confirmed the Polish gains, 
the armed bands began to melt away. 266 
The Bytom Agreement's origin was a provisional understanding between 
Korfanty and Dr. Urbanek concluded on 25 August. 267 Other Upper Silesian leaders 
were consulted and the respective heads of the two plebiscite organisations signed the 
Agreement in Le Rond's office on 2 September, 1920. Because the Germans concurred 
in the concessions to the Polish Silesians, neither Percival nor Marinis felt justified in 
withholding their recognition . 
268 The Agreement had been the Polish Silesians' first 
tangible achievement in their long struggle for equality in their own country. it went 
some way towards rectifying the Commission's failure to establish the conditions 
under which a fair plebiscite could take place. One of their main gains (the immediate 
disbandment of the Sicherheitspolizei and the proposed expulsion of the remaining 
Freikorps and Baltikum elements) were demands the Commission could have granted 
at any time. In fact, the Commission initiated the deportation process whilst the talks in 
Bytom were still underway. 269 Also included in the Agreement was the Commission's 
long-standing commitment to grant the Polish-speaking Silesians equal representation 
in a new mixed Plebiscite Police force . 
270 But other clauses, such as prohibiting 
intimidation and discrimination in industrial and social settings, establishing joint 
committees to examine reports of attempts to unlawfully influence the plebiscite, and 
the setting-up of a twenty-man joint German-Polish committee to supervise the terms 
of the Bytom Agreement, could probably only have been achieved at the point of a 
gun. 271 Though the insurgents wanted much more, it is a measure of the Polish 
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Silesians' restraint and a vindication of Le Rond's optimism over Percival's 
pessimism, that their demands were so limited. But yielding to Polish demands, 
however reasonable and moderate they appeared to be, was foreign to any German. 
And they were accepted with equally bad grace by the leaders of the Commission's 
272 British contingent. On the day that the Commission endorsed the Bytom agreement, 
Percival offered the Foreign Office his resignation. 273 
These events in Upper Silesia had not passed unnoticed in Germany. Concern 
about the insurrection had replaced fears about infringements of German neutrality in 
the Soviet-Polish War. The German Government's attention focussed on the Polish 
miners' strike and the effect that this would have on the commitment that they had 
given at the recent Spa Conference to maintain reparation coal deliveries - Upper 
Silesian coal being a crucial element in this operation. 274 In a note delivered to the 
Ambassadors' Conference, the German Government denied encouraging disturbances 
in Katowice and pointed out the impossibility of fulfilling reparation coal deliveries 
under the prevailing circumstances. 275 The Ambassadors rejected a German proposal 
for an international commission of enquiry to investigate the disturbances but did ask 
Poland to halt the flow of arms across its frontier into Upper Silesia. 276 
Disturbances had also occurred in Wroclaw after an anti-Polish demonstration 
there. At a meeting in Berlin on 29 August, speakers attacked the Polish Silesian 
miners for halting production 'when every ton of coal was of supreme value to 
Germany'. They claimed France was bent on destroying Germany by taking away the 
her coalfields. They then marched down the Unter den Linden some waving placards 
illustrated with a pile of fleas and bugs beneath the words Was kann mann sich aus 
Polen - holen (What do you get out of Poland? ). 
277 In conversation with the British 
Minister in Berlin the following day, the German Foreign Minister also mentioned 'the 
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serious and grave consequences' that could result from losing Upper Silesia's coal 
production. 273 And in Upper Silesia itself, the mine-owners in Pszcyna asked the 
Commission to suppress what they described as the outbreaks of 'Bolshevism' that 
were occurring there. Polish miners had been driving out anyone that they suspected 
might support Germany and they had told the German officials administering the 
mines 'to clear out or take the consequences' - and many had complied. 
279 
With neither the Germans nor the Poles confident in the Commission's ability to 
protect them, Percival correctly predicted that this could only result in arms flooding 
into the area . 
280 He doubted the Bytom Agreement's durability and neither he nor 
Marinis shared Le Rond's perception that it had resulted from his 'tactful handling of 
the situation'. 281 In Percival's view, the Germans had been 'driven to the conference 
282 
table because they felt themselves unprotected by the troops'. In the private letter 
containing his offer of resignation, Percival expressed his disenchantment with the 
Commission and its President. 
The events of the last few days have opened my eyes. I fear that there is little 
doubt that the French have no intention of playing the game. The President is, I 
think, the worst offender, but he has managed things most cunningly, so that 
there is no deflnite proof against him personally.... 1 hate the whole thing. 283 
With the French troops unlikely to oppose any future Polish insurrection, Percival 
believed that by simply threatening a new putsch, Korfanty could dictate terms to the 
Commission. He noted the President's continuing 'violent bias against the Germans' 
and the manner in which the absence of British and American troops was invariably 
mentioned whenever he questioned the French military contingent's commitment. He 
also complained about Le Rond's reluctance to share information with either himself 
or Marinis, that he purposely kept them ignorant of the Commission's activities and 
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employed French Secret Service agents to spy on them. The whole atmosphere was 
one of mutual suspicion and both Percival and Marinis were convinced that they could 
no longer rely on Le Rond to conduct the plebiscite with strict impartiality. 284 
Responding to this in the Foreign Office, the Central Desk's senior official, S. P. 
Waterlow minuted that 'the Silesian tension is pregnant with dangers to the peace of 
285 Europe'. Recent despatches had brought 'the Silesian situation to a head and make 
necessary a decision affecting our whole relations with the French Government . 
286 
Representations on developments in Upper Silesia had also been received from 
the German Charge dAffaires in London. The district controllers' resignations and 
their reasons had appeared in the Berlin press. 287 In early September, Lord Derby, 
British Ambassador in Paris, asked if the officers' resignations and the future of the 
Commission had to be settled by the Ambassadors' Conference . 
288 Should this be the 
case, he wanted the Foreign Office's instructions. 289 This task fell to Waterlow who 
noted the effect the unrest could have on Europe's general economic situation and its 
potential to disrupt the Spa Agreement. 290 It seemed obvious to him that a breakdown 
in Upper Silesian coal production 'would have far-reaching political results'. They 
would have to seek a solution in accordance with the Peace Treaty, which meant the 
restoration of the Commission's prestige and holding a fair plebiscite. Waterlow 
recommended that Le Rond and General Gratier be replaced and that the Commission 
be re-organised. Since it seemed to be clear that they were prepared to resign, Britain 
could offer to replace Percival and his staff. Should the French decline this proposal, 
he suggested Britain's only alternative would 'seem to be that we withdraw altogether, 
and make public our reasons for doing Soý. 291 Curzon agreed, and he suggested that the 
Italian Government be asked to support Waterlow's proposals at the Ambassadors' 
Conference in Paris. Notes to this effect were despatched to Paris and Rome. 292 
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Waterlow used the district controllers' resignation statements and supplementary 
reports which Percival had asked them to compile, to formulate his detailed proposal 
for the Commission's re-organisation. He believed that their content 'fully justified the 
action which we [Britain] have taken in pressing for a thorough cleansing of the 
Augean stables of the Commission'. But Crowe who had represented Britain on the 
committee in Paris which had established the Allied troop contributions, cautioned that 
'it was just possible that the French forces were not really adequate'. He predicted that 
before agreeing to censure Le Rond and recall Gratier, the French would argue much 
along these lines. 293 When Waterlow interviewed Bourdillon (who had travelled from 
Opole to advise him), the extent of the Commission's malpractices began to emerge. " 
These were confirmed when Percival's analysis of the Commission's organisational 
defects arrived in London. From these sources, Waterlow was able to conclude that the 
absence of fundamental organisation and 'the mechanical precautions that it is 
necessary to take in dealing with Frenchmen', had diminished the roles of the British 
295 
and Italian Commissioners to an unacceptable level . And although Percival had little 
or no experience with inter-Allied organisations, Waterlow found it 'almost incredible 
that anyone with common sense' could fail to insist that proper minutes be kept, the 
Secretariat be organised, and that all three of the Commissioners be involved when any 
submissions were discussed or decisions were taken in their name. 
I cannot therefore altogether acquit Colonel Percival himself of responsibility 
for a situation which has got entirely out of control. But his fault has been not 
lack of goodwill, nor even lack of tact, firmness and personality. It has simply 
been failure to perceive that proper organisation is all-important. For this 
reason, if for no other, it will be necessary to replace Colonel Percival by some 
one experienced in inter-Allied organisation. 296 
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On 18 September, two documents, one outlining the Commission's deficiencies 
and another proposing changes, were sent to Derby. 297 Learning that Le Rond had been 
invited to state his case to the Conference, the Foreign Office endorsed Derby's 
request that Percival also travel to PariS. 298 However, on II September the British 
Commissioner suffered a nervous breakdown and had to be sent over the Czech border 
for a period to rest. After some shuffling of personnel, Ottley and Bourdillon were sent 
to Paris instead. 299 For the British Ambassador this was not a happy choice. Derby's 
success as Ambassador was due to his easy affability with the top figures in French 
politics and he must have found Ottley's zealotry quite trying. When the negotiations 
were concluded, thinking Ottley was under General Malcolm's command, Derby wrote 
to the C. I. G. S. 
This is the young gentleman who is supposed by the French to be at the bottom 
of all our Upper Silesia trouble. Personally I think that he was quite right in 
protesting but I cannot say that I think he was extremely tactful. I took rather a 
dislike to him. He poured words out like a torrent and was very venomous.... I 
wonder whether you could give him a post elsewhere and not where he might 
meet people with whom he has quarrelled in Upper Silesia. 300 
But far from being removed, bizarre though it must have seemed to the French, Ottley 
soon found himself in London at the Foreign Office, installed as their expert on Upper 
Silesia. 
sum 
The situation developing in Upper Silesia had resulted from factors, each of which 
had been predictable, but whose overall effect could probably not have been foreseen. 
For the British, Upper Silesia had come down to a question of priorities. Having forced 
the plebiscite on their Allies and expressed concern that it should be fair, extraneous 
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factors meant that the British could not supply the means to ensure conditions to 
ensure this. A combination of 'imperial over-stretch', troubles in Ireland and an 
illusionary revolutionary threat in Britain, had caused the British Government to push 
responsibility for organising and holding the Upper Silesian plebiscite on to France. 
By resorting to 'Red Scare' tactics, Churchill and Wilson had finally persuaded Lloyd 
George to withhold the British military contingent from the inter-Allied military force. 
At the time, the British Prime Nfinister had little to lose from this and a lot to gain by 
agreeing. 301 This situation changed as a result of French policy, forcing reparations up 
the international agenda and dragging the Upper Silesian plebiscite along with it. 
By 1920 the British people were taking a much more complacent and increasingly 
sympathetic view of Germany after its defeat than the French could afford to do. Not 
unreasonably, the French demanded a tangible security guarantee against a resurgent 
Germany. Therefore when the linked American and the British security guarantees to 
France collapsed, France reverted to a policy aimed at hindering Germany's recovery 
by imposing a rigid application of the Peace Treaty and encouraging the Rhineland's 
separation. British policy towards Germany sought to encourage economic recovery, 
therefore the intensification of French policy after the Peace Treaty's implementation 
in January 1920 put the Entente allies at odds with each other. The theatre where this 
policy clash was most graphically illustrated was Upper Silesia. 
Although Ottley and many other British officials serving with the Commission 
were fi-tistrated by their marginal role in its affairs, it must not be assumed that the 
Commission's troubles were due solely to their opposition. Far more cogent reasons 
can be found when examining the situation which the Commission had encountered on 
its arrival, the reduction in size of the military force, and the effect of two international 
developments occurring during the first months of the Commission's life - the Spa 
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agreement on reparation coal deliveries and the Soviet-Polish War. That the German 
organisations in Upper Silesia and the Prussian officials retained in its administration 
would do what they could to further Germany's cause in Upper Silesia was only to be 
expected. The German population's hostility towards French troops had been widely 
predicted while it was only natural that French soldiers would identify with the Polish- 
speaking Silesians who had welcomed them as liberators. In fact, Dr. Lukaschek, the 
German Silesian leader whom Percival saved from expulsion by the Commission's 
Interior Department, later revealed to him that the agitation against the French troops 
had been orchestrated and that 'in spite of several instances to the contrary, the 
302 discipline of the French troops was undoubtedly good' . But without the requisite 
number of troops Le Rond walked a diplomatic tightrope. It was impossible to protect 
the respective communities without risking his soldiers' lives by having them instigate 
or be drawn into violent incidents that would have international repercussions. 
With regard to the Spa agreement on coal deliveries, France would not recognise 
any linkage between Upper Silesia and reparations nor accept, as Lloyd George did, 
that the region's future was an integral part of the overall reparation question. 
Nevertheless, from the British and German Governments' point of view, the agreement 
reached at Spa in July placed a premium on the region's future stability and its 
continued coal production. Pursuing Lloyd George's appeasement policy even before 
Spa, the Foreign Office had interfered in the Commission's business by instructing 
Percival to oppose a proposal to bring the Upper Silesian import and export licences 
under their own control. 303 Ultimately, the Commission's shortcomings were exposed 
by the tensions which the Soviet-Polish War created within Upper Silesia. First was its 
slow response to the German riots in Katowice and then its troops withdrawal from the 
town. Then came the second Polish insurrection, which met with little or no resistance 
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except from the Sicherheitspolizei. This was followed by the sight of French troops 
openly fraternising with the insurgents. It had been this and the inclusion of certain 
clauses in the Bytom Agreement which Percival deemed had disadvantaged Germany, 
that had brought the growing differences within the Commission to a head. 
Before this, Percival had generally avoided expressing his misgivings and kept 
the lid on the complaints he had received from his officials about Le Rond and other 
senior French officials. But with a few notable exceptions, it cannot be said that the 
British officials sent to Upper Silesia approached their task with an open mind either. 
This may have been partly attributable to the quality and background of the people the 
Foreign Office selected to act for them. One British officer serving with the Allied 
Commission (who was never given to understatement) believed that his colleagues 
were a bunch of 'hopeless nonentities' and that Percival 'lacked determination and 
courage'. ' On the other hand', he wrote 'the French employed picked men in every 
department.... most notably General Le Rond'. 304 And, as we have noted, all the British 
officials with previous service in Germany were as openly sympathetic to the German 
Silesians as the French were to the Poles. The officer commanding the military mission 
in Warsaw claimed that he found the British members of the Commission in Upper 
Silesia so pro-German, they could never agree on anything with him. 305 
Finally, for the Foreign Office, the insurrection and Percival's increasingly 
pessimistic despatches appeared to signal yet another attempt by France to ensure its 
future security by destroying Germany and European economic recovery along with 
it. 306 London's then current irritation with Paris was Millerand's apparent evasiveness 
over attending another reparations conference in Geneva. 'O' For Curzon, the Foreign 
Office officials, and Lloyd George's still-powerful political advisers, there was a 
feeling that a line had to be drawn somewhere. If it was not, then Britain would be 
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continually dragged into these French-initiated manoeuvres to crush Germany. 
Threatening to withdraw their officials from the Commission and invalidate the 
plebiscite was to be the first of several British attempts to draw that line. 
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occupation in the Rhineland and the plebiscite areas - see ibid No. 54 p. 725 
Meeting ofthe Supreme Council 10 January 1920. 
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ChWer 2- Notes 
173 
95. PRO FO 371/8810 17 May 1923 Appendix C pp. 126-137 The Commission's 
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97. PRO FO 371/5909 C115809/92/18 Craig to Lindsay 14 May 1921. 
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104. Ibid, pp. 5-6 
105. PRO FO 371/8810 17 May 1923 p. 18. 
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120. Ibid, p. 27. 
121. PRO FO 371/5909 CI 15809/92/18 (Private letter) Craig to Lindsay 19 May 1921. 
ChWer 2- Notes 
175 
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and continued to co-operate within the Centre Party, both the Prussian Administration and 
later Wroclaws Bishop Kopp favoured Upper Silesia! s German-speaking minority. After 
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speakers were regarded as even less trustworthy. 
168. Rose, The Drama of Upper Silesia pp. 106-130. This gives a comprehensive outline of the 
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kept out of the pulpit. Ratti made a similar appeal the following year and issued an order 
prohibiting all priests ftorn participating in propaganda - see also Wambaugh Plebiscites 
Since the World War Vol. I p. 234. 
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Silesian clergy working towards or just hoping for a German or for a Polish victory, will 
never be known but he thought a reasonable guess was 75% for Germany. This figure and 
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and request that an Upper Silesian priest be appointed in his place. William Teeling, The 
Pope in Politics: The Life and Work ofPjus XI (London 1937) p. 66, notes how Ratti had 
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175. DBFP Vol. )U No. 5 p. 3 Count de Salis to Curzon II March 1920. 
176. PRO FO 371/4821 C13076/6121/18 Loraine to Curzon 2 December, 1920. Ratti's assistant 
M. Pellegrinetti speaking of their experience with Upper Silesian politics. 
177. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's DairY p. 370, p. 404, p. 408, p. 513-515, p. 524. p. 538-539. 
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Major Ottley. 
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apprehension about the'Kapp Putsch'taking place in Berlin. The top positions in Wroc4aw 
changed hands temporarily but no incidents occurred in Upper Silesia. 
184. DBFP Vol. XI, No. IIp. 12 Percival to Curzon 2 May 1920. 
185. PRO FO 608/16 Percival's Diary p34 23 March 1920. Le Rond warned Moltke against any 
future intervention by the German Government. Moltke confessed to being much upset by 
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carried it out. 
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Socialists, Communists, Zionists, and her neighbouring states. The Red Army would 
almost wipe Poland off the map again when a trade embargo was imposed by her 
neighbouring states during the most critical point in the Soviet-Polish War. In late 1920 
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187. PRO FO 371/4814 C2233/1621/18 Bourdillon to Wigrarn 21 July 1920. Enclosure: 
Memorandum by Major Ottley. Most of these arguments were taken from the section of 
the document entitled Methods and Programmes of the German and Polish Parties. 
188. Ibid. See also PRO F0371/4819 C9301/1621/18 23 September 1920, for Polish views on 
the actual economic situation in Germany and Upper Silesia (12 pages). 
189. PRO FO 371/5890 C4368/92/18 Percival to Curzon 23 February 192 1. Enclosure: 
Memorandum'A' Supplies to Consuming Districts After the Plebiscite. Here the 
Commission's Food Department pointed out that should the whole plebiscite area be 
transferred to Poland, with the exception of potatoes and sugar, that country was in no 
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promising a goat - see Wambaugh Plebiscites Since the World War Vol. I p. 229. 
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191. Ibid, PRO FO 371/4814 C2233/1621/18 Bourdillon to Wigram 21 July, 1920. 
Enclosure: Memorandum by Major Ottley. 
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Silesia formed the Oberschlesische Volkspartei. Its programme included self-government 
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autonomy to Upper Silesia after the plebiscite. See also, PRO FO 371 C9838/1621/18 
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agreement on Upper Silesian autonomy within the German Federation 'after violent 
discussion'. The main dispute was between the Centre Party, who hoped that they would 
control 'a federated Upper Silesia, and the nationalists who were opposed to any finiher 
diminution of Prussia! s territory. The Socialists were not enthusiastic but believed that it 
was necessary to help Germany to win the plebiscite. 
195. PRO FO 371/5916 C14724/92/18 20 July 1921 Memorandum by Major Ottley The 
Autononry Movement in Upper Silesia. Responding to his officials' minutes pointing out 
the problems of independent statehood, Curzon wrote that he did'not think the idea ought 
to be described as impractical'. See also DBFP Vol. XVI No. 194 pp. 218-219 Kilmarnock 
to Curzon 25 June 192 1. 
196. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Dia? y p. 68 I May 1920. 
197. This is the Feast of St. Stanislaw and celebrates the Polish Constitution of 179 1. Its 
introduction precipitated Poland's third and final partition in 1795. See also PRO FO 
890/16 Percival's Diary p. 136 and pp. 140-14 1. 
198. Ibid, pp. 68-69 2 May 1920. 
199. Aid, pp. 69-71 2 to 4 May 1920. Percival personally defused the situation at the Polish 
Consulate by taking German police into the premises to search for arms. Outside his office 
he witnessed a Pole being chased by two Germans. The Pole drew a handgun and shot one 
of his pursuers. Percival understood that the Gazeta Polska's premises in Opole had been 
sacked by'a German crowd of workmen and hooligans'. 
200. Ibid, p. 69 4 May 1920. 
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201. PRO FO 371/4814 C2233/1621/18 Bourdillon to Wigram 21 July 1920 Memorandum 
by Major Ottley. In districts where their support was stronger, the Poles retaliated by 
attacking German demonstrations and breaking up their public meetings. 
202. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p. 73 7 May 1920. The strike was held on 10 - 12 
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203. Ibid, p. 72 6 May 1920. 
204. Ottley's uncle, Sir Charles Ottley, a former Rear Admiral who had been Director of 
Naval Intelligence (1905-7) and the Naval Secretary to the Committee of Imperial 
Defence (1907-11), was Managing Director of Armstrong Whitworth - one of 
Britain's leading engineering companies. It had a holding in an Upper Silesian 
railway requirements company, commonly known as Oberdedorf, located in the 
industrial triangle. There is no evidence for supposing Major Ottley had contact with 
the German company but Ottley's near instant expertise on Upper Silesian matters 
does beg the question. When the Leagues line of partition had been accepted shortly 
after Major Ottley's death, Stepney Mile End's M. P, Sir Walter Preston, wrote to the 
Foreign Office on Armstrong Whitworth's behalf requesting an adjustment to the line 
to enable Oberdedorf s complete operation remain within German Silesia - see PRO 
FO 371/92/18 C22347/92/18 Sir Walter Preston M. P. to Under Secretary of State, 
Foreign Affairs 2 December, 192 1. 
205. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p. 92 27 May 1920. This incident occurred on 25 
May. It started with some Germans molesting a few French officers. A section of 
French chasseurs (infantrymen) arrived but the growing crowd demanded that they 
retire. The French district controller could not be located. Ottley was sent for and 
when he asked the troops to leave, he was cheered by the crowd which tried to carry 
him around the square on their shoulders. The Polish newspapers made much of 
Ottley's popularity with the Germans. 
206. Ibid, p. 96 29 May 1920. This incident occurred on 28 May. The subsequent 
investigation by a German magistrate blamed French soldiers for instigating the 
trouble by keeping company with German women -a source of great ftiction and the 
cause of numerous incidents (and killings) between Allied soldiers and local men. 
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referred to the Lomnitz Hotel incident and said that 'it was quite clear to him that 
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. They once again asked 
for Polish employment in the administration and 
the Sicherheitspolitzei's disbandment. 
207. Ibký p. 95 28 May 1920. 
208. lbid, pp. 131-132 24 June 1920. 
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209. Ibid, p. 141 1 July 1920. 
210. DBFP Vol. XI No. 18 pp. 23-27 12 June 1920: Extract from Notes by Mr. E. H. Carr 
on a Tour of Danzig [Gdansk], Warsaw and the Eastern Plebiscite Areas, 
211. Ibid. Just as Ottley was doing at this time, so Caff also pushed the idea of an 
independent Upper Silesia. Since he had only spent a few days in Upper Silesia, 
there can be little doubt that most of his impressions reflected Ottley's views. He met 
Ottley on 2 June and spent some time with him in Bytom - see PRO F0890/16 
Percival's Diary pp. 99-102 1-3 June 1920. 
212. PRO 371/3902 205318 Grahame (Paris) to Curzon 15 June 1920. This is a duplicate 
copy of Cares report. Crowe minuted that Mr-Cares well-known dislike of 
everything Polish makes it necessary to treat his observations with the utmost 
caution. He is a misleading guide'. Crookshank (Northern Dept) also notes Cares 
anti-Polish credentials. See also CCA HDLM Acc 72 Cor. E. H. Carr to H. M. 14 
June 1920; ihid Box 37 (Copy) H. M. to E. H. Carr 22 July 1920; and ihid Acc 72 
Cor. E. H. Carr to H. M. 23 July 1920. 
213. PRO F0890/16 Percival's Diary pp. 125-126 21 June 1920. The decision was 
arrived at after Le Rond successfully contrived to get Marinis to suggest that he go to 
Paris. To motivate Marinis he promised the Italian Commissioner that he could be 
the acting President of the Commission during his absence. A few days later, Le 
Rond was invited to Spa and then Paris. For Le Rond! s address to the Ambassadors' 
Conference on 22 July, 1920 - see DBFP Vol. M No. 23 pp. 30-34. 
214. Ibid. Percival only agreed with Le Rond's intention to raise the troop question in 
Paris after gaining a series of tortuous qualifications ensuring that the French 
Goverment would not use his name to pressurise London into sending troops - see 
ibid p. 125 21 June, 1920. 
215. The spate of confrontations across Upper Silesia suddenly abated in June. Le Rond 
told Percival and Marinis that he had taken strong measures with the Commanding 
Officers to deal with the indiscipline (Percival's Diary p. 116 14 June). This despite 
the French troops believing that the Commission was too soft with the Germans 
(Percival's Diary p. 113 16 June). 
216. Michael Palij The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance 1919-1921 (Toronto 1995) 
Chap. 8 pp. 80-91 'Me Genisis of the Polish - Soviet Russian War. This is a good 
analysis from the Ukrainian point of view. 
217. Ibid, pp. 70-76. 
218. Ibid, pp. 124-136 Chap. 2 The Soviet Offensive in Poland!. See also Norman 
Davies "ite Eagle Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War 1919-1920 (London 1972) for 
a complete account of the war. 
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219. Lesfiiewski, 'Three Insurrections: Upper Silesia 1919-192 F, Stachura (ed. ) Poland 
Between the Wars p. 26. 
220. CCA HDLM Acc72 Box 37 Nwnier to Headlam Morley 22 May 1920. Narnier 
was referring to his 'struggle with Polish Imperialisnf. 
221. Ibid, (Copy) Headlam Morley to Caff (Paris) 22 July 1920. 
222. Museum of Labour History [NEA, Manchester CA/ADM/25 The Council of 
Action Report ofthe Special Conference on Labour and the Russian-Polish War 
Friday 13 August, 1920 (24 Pages). See also ibid LPAC/Boxl/155 where a draft 
memorandum on the Russo-Polish War by the Labour Party Advisory Committee on 
International Relations pointed out that if it did not oppose the British Government 
helping Poland, then the alignment on the Left 'will be Communists against the war, 
Labour Party for if. Polish views were put to the Labour Party Executive in a letter 
by M. Niedzialkowski, the PSP General Secretary - ibid CA/For/ 87/1 16 August 
1920. However, Labour Party advisors dismissed them asdeserving no serious 
consideration! and claimed that'it would be absurd to take seriously the socialism 
and democracy of these [Polish] people'- see ibid CA/For/90i- L. G. Macfarlane's 
'Hands of Russia: British Labour and the Russo-Polish War 19201 in Past and 
Present No. 38 December 1967 pp. 126-152 provides an interesting account of events 
in Britain. This is only marred by its sketchy and not wholly accurate depiction of the 
related international politics and the military background to the war. 
223. J. M. McEwan (ed. ) The Riddell Diaries 1908-1923 (London, 1986) p. 319 22 July 
1920. 
224. IWM HHW2/44A /29 P. deB. Radcliffe to Wilson (London) 18/20 August 1920. 
This is a postscript not included in Jeffery-'s, Military Correspondence pp. 194-197. 
Radcliffe, Hankey and Lord DAbernon represented Britain on the inter-Allied 
mission to Warsaw led by General Weygand- 
225. Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War Vol. I Chapter III The Plebiscites in 
Allenstein and Marienwerdee p. 140 These plebiscites were held II July, 1920. She 
concluded that There can be no doubt that the Russian advance played an important 
role and discouraged the inhabitants with Polish sympathies.. I. 
226. CCA HUM Acc 72 Coff. Bourdillon to H. M. 21 July 1920. Bourdillon had 
travelled to Olsztyn to observe the organisation of the plebiscite there. 
227. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p. 178,21 July, 1920 
228. There were numerous instances of this. Interviewed by Percival (Percival's Diary, 
21 July) Lukaschek the leader of the Germans' Fereinigte FerbYnde propaganda 
campaign, predicted that in view of their present difficulties, the Poles would no 
doubt adopt the idea as their own. One week later (Percival's Diary, 7 August) von 
Moltke told Percival that Ottley backed the idea of an autonomous state in Upper 
Silesia. When the British Commissioner visited Ottley in Bytom later that day, Ottley 
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invited Percival to meet leading members of the Bund der Oberschlesier - Percival 
declined. 
229. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary pp. 208-210 8 August 1920. 
230. Ibid, p. 200 3 August 1920. 
231. ]bid, p. 203 5 August 1920. 
232. ]bid, p. 212 9 August 1920. 
233. Davies, White Eagle Red Star pp. 182-185. Each group was ready to exploit the situation in 
its own way, For example, Ludendorff offered to lead an army of liberation into Poland on 
condition that Poznania was returned to Germany. General Seeckt, commander of the 
Reichswehr, counted on Poland being swallowed up. The Spartacists hoped that it was the 
prelude to another German revolution. 
234. R. H. Haigh (et al) German-Soviet Relations in the Weimar Era (Aldershot, 1985) pp. 71- 
73. 
235. PRO FO 371/4814 C2943/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 28 July 1920. The railway 
authorities implemented Germany's prohibition on the transit of munitions to Poland 
immediately. At Kottbus they detached two wagons of arms and munitions from a French 
train travelling to Upper Silesia, claiming that they were intended for Poland. 
236. PRO FO 371/4815 C4091/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 16 August 1920 and 
ibid C4326/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 18 August 1920. 
237. DBFP Vol. VIII, No. 71 pp. 597-598 Meeting Held at the Villa Fraineuse 14 July 1920. 
238. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p. 202 4 August, 1920 
239. Ibid, p204 6 August 1920. 
240. Ibid, p. 213,10 August, 1920. These decrees were dated 25 July. The order prohibiting 
the export of munitions of war to Poland, included the blasting powder that the nearby 
Dombrowa mines relied upon, The Commission decided not to implement this because'it 
might get us into political difficulties. 
241. Ihid, p. 223 15 August 1920. PRO FO 371/ 4815 C4091/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 18 
August 1920. 
242. Ihid. 
243. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p. 224 16 August 1920. 
244. PRO F0371/4815 C4326/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 18 August, 1920. Though the 
Commission conceded internment, they refused to reply to the German note without 
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first consulting the Ambassadors' Conference. Obviously, Le Rond knew nothing 
about Foch! s idea for re-grouping the Polish Army in Silesia if defeated - although 
the Soviets apparently suspected this was the case. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary 
pp. 226-227 17 August 1920. 
245. Ibid, p. 227 17 August 1920. 
246. Ibid. See also PRO FO 371 /4815 C4710/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 18 August 
1920 and C4326/61/18/18 Percival to Curzon 18 August, 1920. 
247. Ibid, PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p. 226 17 August 1920. 
248. DBFP Vol. )U No. 26 p. 36-37 Percival to Curzon 18 August 1920. This report is a 
summary of the previous days events. But over this particular period Percival's Diary 
is more comprehensive and more illuminating. 
249. Wainbaugh Plebiscites Since World War p. 236. 
250. DBFP Vol. XI, No. 26 pp. 36-37 Percival to Curzon 18 August 1920. See PRO 
F0371/4816 C6229/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 8 September 1920. Enclosure: Lt. 
Col. Bond (District Controller, Lubliniec ) response to Captain Macpherson's 
resignation in which he notes that one cause of the disturbances was the Germans' 
belief that Warsaw had been captured. See also PRO FO 371/4816 Percival's Dia? y 
p. 229 18 August 1920. 
251. Ibid, pp. 232-234 19 August 1920. See also PRO FO 371/4816 C6030/1621/18 
Ottley to Percival 31 August 1920 Report on Disturbances' pp. 1-2. Ottley claimed 
that the insurrection around Katowice probably started before Korfanty had issued 
his proclamation and that he was simply following events. 
252. Paliji, The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance p. 128. This notes that the 17 August 
was the date that the Polish Provisional Revolutionary Committee had been given as 
the day Warsaw was expected to fall. Although alluded to, British documents fail to 
confirm any co-ordinated activity between the advancing Soviets' propagandists and 
the Independent Socialists in Upper Silesia. In earlier reports and in his diary, 
Percival anticipated disturbances by Spartacists/ Communists during the Soviets, 
advance into Poland. But Percival's German sources were now blaming most 
German nationalists' activities on the Independent Socialists. in the Commission, 
however, Percival still maintained that it was the Communists who were largely 
responsible for much of the trouble (Percival's Diary 19 August). He believed that 
the German's 'unpremeditated excesses' were a'spontaneous outburst of pent up 
feelings against the French and the Poles'(DBFP, Vol. XI, No. 31 p. 40). Percival 
excused this by claiming that the demonstrations and killings had occurred only 
because they'found a large measure of support among Communistic international 
elements'(DBFP Vol. M, No. 37 p. 50). 
253. DBFP Vol. M, No. 31 p. 44 Percival to Curzon 25 August 1920. 
254. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary pp. 234-235 19 August 1920. 
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255. PRO FO 371/4815 C5616 Derby (Paris) to Curzon 3 September 1920. Enclosure: 
Translation of Le Ronds report to the Ambassadors Conference 24 August 1920. 
When Percival's report to London (DBFP Vol. XI Chap. I No. 31 pp. 39-44) is 
compared with Le Rond's, the difference in emphasis is striking. Le Rond minimised 
the gravity of the situation whilst Percival exonerated the Germans and blamed the 
Polish Silesians and the French for all that had occurred. The Poles not only moved 
110 captured Sicherheitspolizei into Poland also returned 250 Jewish deserters from 
the Polish Army who had sought refuge in Upper Silesia. 
256. Lesn'iewski, 'Three Insurrections: Upper Silesia 1919-1921', Stachura, Peter (ed. ) 
Poland Between the Wars p. 27. 
257. DBFP Vol. )G No. 31 pp. 43-44 Percival to Curzon 25 August 1920. The demand 
was made to the Commission by the Polish labour leaders Rymer, Biniszkiewicz, 
Adamek, Rosanski and Pyrek as a condition for a return to work. 
258. PRO F0371/4815 C5002/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 28 August 1920. See also jbid 
C5661/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 31 August 1920, for a fuller explanation for the 
resignations, also Percival's assurance that the 'these resignations were the result of 
independent and not of concerted action, nor of course have these officers been 
prompted by me in any way'. Also DBFP Vol. 1, No. 35 pp. 4647 31 August, 1920. 
259. PRO FO 371/4816 C6225/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 8 September 1920. Major 
Perrys resignation statement. On 24 August, General Le Rond signed a decree 
disbanding the Sicherheitspolizei - see Wambaugh Vol. H, Document No. 76. 
260. Ibid, C6039/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 5 September 1920. Enclosure: Copy of 
Captain Macphersods resignation statement. 
26 1. Ibid, C6219/1621/18 Cassels to Percival 8 September, 1920. 
262. Ibid, C6222/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 8 September 1920. Major Ottley's 
resignation statement. 
263. PRO FO 371/4815 C5616/1621/18 Derby to Curzon 3 September, 1920. Enclosure: 
Translation of Le Rond! s report to the AmbassadoesConference, 24 August, 1920 
Refers (p. 5) to the Sicherheitspolizei's replacement by an Upper Silesian mixed 
police force, an action that Le Rond claimed had been deferred by the Bolshevik 
advance into Poland. 
264. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p. 255 27 August 1920 (Note By Colonel Tidbury). 
See also FO 371/4815 C5508/1621/18 Mnute by E. Phipps re. visit of Mr. Ottley to 
Foreign Office, 3 September 1920; FO 371/4816 C6089/1621/18 Hardinge re. visit 
of Polish minister 8 September1920; and F0371/4816 C6221/1621/18 Percival to 
Curzon 8 September 1920 Enclosure 1. 
265 PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p. 246 26 August 1920. The Germans refused to 
agree to each Burgerwehrs Polish/German mix being decided by the results of the 
November 1919 municipal elections, in which the Polish vote did well. 
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266. Ibid, p. 252 27 August, 1920. Percival records that although tensions remained 
high, the situation was a easier with over 75% of miners back at work. 
267. PRO FO 890/ 4816 C6089/6121/18 Ottley to Percival 31 August 1920. Report on 
events in Bytom since 17 August. On the evening of 25 August, Dr. Bloch (leader of 
the German Democratic Party) and Father Ulitzka (leader of the Centre Party) had 
explained the terms of the agreement reached with Korfanty to Ottley. He told them 
that he did not think the Commission would endorse them. 
268. Ibid, C6029/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 4 September 1920. Report of 
proceedings and Percival's views on the agreement and its clauses. 
269. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p. 259 29 August 1920. These deportations were 
not without opposition from local German Silesians. 
270. Wambaugh Plebiscites Since Vol. H, No. 77. See DBFP Vol. XI, No. 23 pp. 31-34. On 
22 July, Le Rond told the Conference of Ambassadors that; ' It only remains for us 
[the Commission] to convert the Sicherheitspolizei into government police. This will 
be done before August 15th. But in a later despatch, Percival notes that Le Rond 
had sent a telegram from Paris ordering that the transformation be postponed until he 
had returned to Opole and that orders had still not been given for it to go ahead when 
the insurrection broke out. See also PRO FO 371/4816 C6029/1621/18 Percival to 
Curzon 4 September 1920; and PRO FO 371/4816 C6039/1621/18 Percival to 
Curzon 6 September 1920, Enclosure: Captain Macpherson resignation statement 
confirms that there had been an early and secret recruitment of Poles for a Plebiscite 
Police force, but Vien the whole reformation of the Sicherheitspolice[sic] came to a 
standstill'. 
271. Ibid, C5661/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 31 August 1920. This lists the Bytom 
Agreements main clauses. 
272. DBFP Vol. )G, No. 46 pp. 56-65 Percival to Curzon 14 September 1920. Contains 
Percival's considered view of the causes of the insurrection and his recommendations 
on reorganising the Commission. 
273. PRO FO 371/4816 C5700/1621/18 (Private letter) Percival to Wigrain (London) I 
September 1920. Condemns Le Rond and offers to resign'if by so doing I shall not 
be letting you down'. See also PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Dia? y, p. 239 21 August 
1920, a record of the conversation that Percival had with Marinis that day, revealing 
that he had been talking about resigning for some time. This is interesting because 
this had occurred just a few days before the four British district controllers resigned. 
274. DBFP Vol. VII pp. 422-648 Proceedings ofthe Conference at Spa (5-16 July 1920) 
passim for details of the coal delivery negotiations. Germany had failed to maintain 
deliveries and cited the Plebiscite Commission's action in taking control of Upper 
Silesia! s coal distribution as one of the reasons for this. 
275. PRO FO 371/4815 C4741/1621/18 23 August 1920. Copy of Note handed to Peace 
Delegation in Paris by German Charge d'Affairs. Wigram, in temporary charge of 
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the Central department was of the opinion that; 'It is most improbable that the 
German Government encouraged these disturbances ... By such actions the Germans 
would be risking their Spa obligations, as well as making it likely that their 
remaining officials would be expelled from the plebiscite area, which they naturally 
wish to avoid. 
276. DBFP Vol. XI No. 39 p. 51 Derby to Curzon 6 September 1920. There is no doubt 
that many of the Polish insurgents'arms were supplied from across the Polish border 
and were returned there. As a result of the brutality displayed by the Germans in 
August 1919 the Poles and, importantly, the Anny's officer corps, were over- 
whelmingly with the Silesian Poles. There was little that the politicians could do to 
stop covert assistance - even if they had wanted to. But although (like the German 
officer corps), the Polish military authorities and POW were a law unto themselves, 
the insurrection in August 1920 occurred when all Poland! s military resources and its 
attention were concentrated on a fight for its own survival. The Silesian Poles again 
fought their own battle and the German claims that regular Polish soldiers were 
participating in the insurrection (ibid No. 26 pp. 37-38 22 August, 1920) had to be 
retracted (ibid No. 31 pp. 39-44 25 August, 1920). 
277. PRO FO 371/4816 C5628/4621/18 Kilmarnock to Curzon 31 August 1920. 
Enclosure: Report by Captain Warburton of the British Military Mission on Meeting 
ofLeague of Upper Silesians, Berlin, Lustgarten, 29 August, 1920. The drawing 
represented the commonly-held perception amongst Germans that Poles were 
covered in lice and fleas. Other examples of slogans given were Ober Schlesien 
bleibt Deutsch (Upper Silesia stays German), and mit Korfanty's kap lasst ans in Rub 
(Korfanty's head is slow and dreaming). 
278. DBFP Vol. )U No. 33 p. 45 Kilmarnock to Curzon 31 August 1920. The meeting 
was on 30 August. Simson also claimed that the German supporters had been 
tefforised into signing the Bytom Agreement without consulting their Government 
and that they much regretted their action. 
279. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p. 267 3 September 1920. The trouble was at the 
Prinzengrube and the Heinrichgluckgrube mines. The representatives requesting that 
force to be used to restore order were Pistorius, Dr. Ebling, Hucker and Arndt. For 
a constructive and enlightened view of the miners' conditions of work see PRO FO 
371/4815 C5010/1621/18 by Mr. Craig (Director Food Department) 27 August 1920. 
280. PRO FO 371/4817 C6874/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 17 September 1920. 
281. PRO FO 371/4816 C6029/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 4 September 1920. 
282. Ibid. This seems reasonable, but Percival's estimate of a 70,000 strong Polish Army 
(Percival's Diary p. 238 29 August), also his reports to London depicting the Polish 
insurgents' grip on the country, means that his reason for the Poles compromising, 
because they are aware of the disapproval of the Italian and British sections of the 
commission and feared its consequences if they did not make some show of being 
desirous of putting an end to their reign of terror, ' does not bear objective analysis. 
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283. PRO FO 371/4816 C5700/1621/18 Percival to Wigram I September 1920. 
284. DBFP Vol. )U No. 37 pp. 48-50 Percival to Curzon 5 September 1920. Several 
entries in Percival's diary refer to this. On 20 July (Percival's Diary p. 175), he noted 
that certain papers were missing and that he had been aware for some time that 
information in the possession of the British Mission was 'leaking out. At a meeting 
of the Commission on 13 August (Percival's Diary p. 219), Marinis brought the 
definite charge thattwo women at Rybnik had received instructions from a French 
agent named [left blank] to spy on Colonel Pisenti and ascertain how he spent his 
time and also whether he had any pro-German tendencies etc'. 
285 PRO FO 371/4816 C5700/1621/18 Cover minute by S. P. Waterlow 7 September 
1920 commenting on Percival's offer to resign. He suggests that 'we ought seriously 
to consider whether we should not do so well either to press for a radical re- 
organisation of the Commission or to threaten to withdraw our participatiod. 
286. Ibid, C5930/1621/18 Nfinute by S. P. Waterlow 10 September 1920. 
287. Ibid, C5757/1821/18 Percival to Curzon 6 September 1920. Although the Foreign 
Office had informed the French Foreign Iýfinister about them privately, Percival had 
not informed the Commission's President of the resignations, Le Rond demanded 
that Ottley, Perry and Cassells cease to function immediately but Percivalrefused and 
had asked London for instructions. 
288. DBFP Vol. XI, No. 38 p. 51 Derby to Curzon 6 September 1920. 
289. Ibid, No. 39 pp. 51-52 Derby to Curzon 8 September 1920. see also Randolph S 
Churchill, Lord Derby. King ofLancashire (London 1959) p. 379. The author notes 
that over the years Derby had frequent brushes with Curzon and that there was a 
latent antipathy between them. However, they did not let it interfere with their work. 
290. PRO FO 371/4816 C5930/1621/18 Cover minute (5 pages) by S. p. waterlow 10 
September 1920. Waterlow thought the French military commander as culpable as 
Le Rond: I cannot resist the conclusion that the French have throughout displayed, 
not merely political insincerity but military incompetence'. 
291. Ibid. 
292. DBFP Vol. M No. 42 pp. 55-56 Curzon to Derby 13 September 1920. A request 
for Italian support was sent to Rome the same day - DBFP VoDG No. 43 p. 55. 
On 9 September, the Italian newspaper the Corriere DItalia discussed the Silesian 
situation in an article sent from Berlin. Its author thought England was cunningly 
'creating an atmosphere favourable to her prestige in Germany'- see PRO FO 
371/4817 C6400/1621/18 9 September 1920. 
293. PRO FO 371/4816 C6221/1621/18 Cover Mnute by S. P. Waterlow dated 15 
September, 1920. Reviewing the statements Waterlow felt thatBritish officers do 
not use such language until their endurance has been tried to its utmost limits'. But 
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Crowe well knew that the Commission in Upper Silesia only had half the troops that 
it should have had. Crowe always retained a sceptical attitude over the worth of 
appeasing Gennany. So much that when he was at the Peace Conference, Lloyd 
George became displeased with him because he appeared to be unduly anti-German 
in negotiations - see R. S. Churchill, Lord Derby p. 379. 
294. PRO FO 371/4816 C6525/1621/18 Minute by S. P. Waterlow on 17 September 1920 
(with reference to DBFP Vol. XI No. 39 pp. 51-52 Derby to Curzon 8 September 
1920). Because there were no records except the decrees that were published, 
Percival could never pin the French down to anything. See PRO FO 371/4816 
C6221/1621/18 Cover Minutes by Crowe and Hardinge. Reviewing the officers' 
resignations, Hardinge blamed Percival for allowing the situation to have developed. 
295. DBFP Vol. XI, No. 46 pp. 58-65 Percival to Curzon 14 September 1920. This 
despatch contains a long rambling repetition of details previously provided but it is 
expressed in a manner which is increasingly hostile to the Poles. When this report 
was dispatched Percival had been ill for several days (Percival's Diary p. 295 15 
September) during which time he had received notification from London that he was 
being sacrificed to help them to replace Le Rond - see DBFP Vol. XI p. 54 Note 2. 
Percival's recommendations were that: 
1. There be an equal distribution of districts between the Italian, French and 
British contingents. 
2. Control of the police be removed from the Commission's French-controlled 
Military Department and be put under a special department commanded by 
British officers. 
3. The establishment of an Allied Secretariat-General. 
4. Control of the industrial district to be divided amongst the three contingents. 
[The first three were implemented] 
PRO FO 371/4816 C6560/1621/18 Minute by S. P. Waterlow (to Percival's above 
despatch) written on 18 September 1920, 
296. PRO FO 371/4816 C6560/1621/18 Minute by S. P. Waterlow to Percival's despatch 
DBFP Vol. Xl No. 46 pp. 56-65. 
297. DBFP Vol. 3U No. 49 pp. 67-69 Curzon to Derby 18 September 1920. The main 
charges against the Commission were yielding to organised demonstrations and 
failing to provide both populations with protection. There were also complaints 
about the French troops, a long indictment about Le Rond! s alleged deficiencies, 
including his domination of the administration. In addition to Percival's proposals 
(above) the administration of the recommended Allied Secretariat General was also 
specified in great detail, as were procedures for meetings, etc. There was also a 
proposal to reform the Secret Service and another demanding an audit of the 
Commission's finances. 
298. DBFP Vol. XI No. 47 p. 66 Derby to Curzon 16 September 1920. 
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299. PRO FO 371/4816 C6525/621/18 Curzon to Percival 18 September 1920 and PRO FO 
371/4817 C6688/1621/18 Craig to Curzon 18 September 1920. Craig reports that Percival 
is unfit to travel. See also PRO FO 608/16 Percival's Diary p. 295,15 September 1920 
which records that he has been'laid up'since Saturday II September. The first indications 
of his breakdown occur in his diary on 5 September. 
300. IWM HHW2/313/37a Derby to Sir Henry Wilson 12 October 1920. 
301 Though many British trade unionists and socialists held romantic notions about the nature 
of the Russian revolution, almost all were opposed to non-constitutional changes. This 
explains why Lloyd George and his ministers 'Red Scare' tactics raised fears throughout the 
traditionally conservative British society. The great drawback was that, however illusory 
the danger, the tactic stoked disproportionate fears within Lloyd George's Conservative 
coalition partners and amongst the reactionary elements in his Cabinet. Amongst the 
Coalition's back-benches there was a rapidly developing 'Retreat to Empire' mentality. 
They aspired to closer economic trading links within the Empire as a means of competing 
with the United States. Given this, and also being held responsible by the British liberals 
and socialists for allegedly *ustifiably harsh peace terms, Lloyd George had little to lose 
and much to gain by demonstrating that British interests came first and that the Peace 
Treaty's terms and conditions were not carved in stone. 
302. PRO F0890/16 Percival's Diary pp. 175-179 21 July 1920. After his dismissal as Rybnik's 
Landrat, Dr. Lukaschek gradually revealed himself to be the power behind Urbanek and 
eventually became the acknowledged leader of the German Silesians. In July, when 
Percival was successfully intervening to stop his exile, Lukaschek told Percival that the 
agitation had been useful at first but was now against German interests therefore, 'he and 
those with him had taken steps to put a stop to it. 
303. DBFP Vol. XI No-7 p. 6 Curzon to Percival 13 April 1920. 
304. Graham Seton Hutchison, Footslogger: An Autobiography (Plymouth 1933) pp. 276-277. 
305. Sir Adrian Carton De Wiart, Happy Odyssey: The Memoirs ofLieutenant-General Sir 
Adrian Carton De Wiart (London 1950) pp. 119-120. 
306. Lloyd George could not regard Germany as a potential aggressor and believed that the 
French were being ridiculous in their fears. When the Anglo-American guarantee to France 
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Chapter 3 
The Reorganised Commission, the 
'Outvoting' Regulations and the Plebiscite. 
On 9 October, 1920, Derby telegraphed Percival to inform him that the Ambassadors' 
Conference had negotiated a compromise agreement giving the British an increased 
influence in the Upper Silesian Commission. The Commission's administrative 
procedures were to be revised, control of Upper Silesia's towns and districts was to be 
equalised between the three Allies and, to compensate for the British military deficit, 
British officers were to be introduced into the new police militia replacing the 
Sicherheitspolizei. The French Government had refused to remove Le Rond, but he 
had warned that his rights as the Commission's President were no greater than those of 
the other two commissioners. Derby's message ended with a reminder to the British 
Commissioner that since the Commission's decision were taken by majority vote 'it 
should therefore be possible for you and your Italian colleagues to carry such ftirther 
reforms ... as you consider 
desirable'. ' Two weeks later Percival informed the Foreign 
Office that Le Rond had substantially accepted the decisions taken in Paris and the 
solutions to the questions which the Conference of Ambassadors had left the 
Commission to resolve by itself He went on to observe 
that in consequence of this attitude on the part of General Le Rond, the 
business of the Commission is at present proceeding with a smoothness which 
was often absent from its proceedings (under his presidency) during the past 
four or five months. 2 
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The following chapter examines the substance of this new co-operation and the 
reorganisation's effectiveness in increasing British influence within the Commission. 
And because it provides a stark illustration of the British Government's motivation 
and its increasingly strong support for Germany's position on the Upper Silesian issue, 
a short account of the international debate surrounding the Commission's attempts to 
establish a date for holding the plebiscite and finalising its voting regulations, is also 
included. It also investigates the background to the dispatch of four British battalions 
to Upper Silesia prior to the plebiscite vote (held on 20 March 192 1), and outlines the 
issues surrounding the Polish campaign to deter thousands of non-resident German 
'outvoters' from travelling to Upper Silesia. The effect of these non-residents' votes 
on the plebiscite outcome is considered by a statistical analysis of 1,545 towns, 
communes and Gutsbezirke (manorial estates) participating in the plebiscite .3 The 
reactions to the result in London, Berlin, Warsaw and Upper Silesia are examined and 
the implications of voting and the factors influencing it, are analysed. After discussing 
the plebiscite's historiography, the chapter concludes with an outline of the situation 
prior to the outbreak of Upper Silesia's third and most dramatic insurrection, which 
commenced on the evening of 2 May 192 1. 
When Le Rond had met the Allied Ambassadors in Paris on 21 September 1920, 
the strength of his opening presentation had been such that, afterwards, the Italian and 
American Ambassadors told Derby that they could not support a call to remove the 
French Commissioner. 4 As a consequence, Derby suggested a compromise proposal to 
the Foreign Office which Curzon agreed could be 'held in reserve' until he had cross- 
examined Le Rond. 5 However, realising the French negotiators were unlikely to agree 
to Le Rond's removal, Derby (assisted by Ottley and Bourdillon), negotiated directly 
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with their Foreign Affairs Ministry and reached a settlement which was endorsed by 
the Ambassadors' Conference. The British Government's approval was readily 
forthcoming and the Foreign Office appeared pleased with the outcome. Hardinge 
wrote that 'it was impossible to maintain our original demand. French amour propre 
would never have sanctioned General Le Rond's withdrawal. Our control is 
6 
considerably increased by the new scheme'. This view of Derby's compromise was 
not universally shared. Ottley, now retained in the Foreign Office as an expert on 
Upper Silesia, attacked it. He noted Derby's failure to alter the preponderance of 
French officials who were serving with the Commission and complained that the 
concession on the police (by the inclusion of twelve British officers) had been 
neutralised by the new force being placed under the Commission's French--controlled 
Interior Department .7 These concerns about the 
British climb-down were ignored, but 
Le Rond's continuing tenure as President did raise another problem. Despite Percival's 
severe nervous breakdown and the question that had been raised about his competence, 
British amourpropre required that the current British Commissioner should also 
continue in office. 
On 23 October Percival had returned from convalescence in the Czech Riesen- 
gebirge mountain area which was about a four hour drive from Opole. 8 Le Rond had 
returned from Paris four days earlier. 9 During Percival's absence, the Foreign Office 
had requested that he return to London for some guidance as to his future procedure 
under the new regime. 10 However, a revitalised Percival postponed his journey until 
after the Commission had completed discussing the matters that the Ambassadors' 
Conference had assigned to them. " During these talks Le Rond accepted almost all of 
the British proposals. Nnutes; of all the meetings would be kept, communications 
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with the Commission would be widely distributed, and the Commission's Secretariat 
would now be staffed by British and Italian officials, as well as the French ones. All 
three nationalities would also be represented in the new External Affairs Department 
being established to deal with the ambassadors and consuls in Opole. The sticking 
point was over distributing the towns and districts between the Allied district 
controllers. 12 After several days of discussions it was agreed to change the current 
system whereby each district controller had two assistants of his own nationality, to a 
system whereby each district controller would be given one assistant from each of the 
other two nationalities. Percival welcomed this because it secured a British presence in 
every district. However, he did anticipate that it might prove unpopular with the 
district controllers and that some assistant controllers might not be willing to serve 
under these conditions. 13 In fact, immediately the word got out, Colonel Pepys 
Cockerell, Ottley's replacement at Bytom Land, sent Percival a seven page letter 
objecting to the arrangement, citing as his reasons, 'language difficulties, lack of 
knowledge of Kreis affairs by officers from other Krieses, social reasons, effect on 
subordinate staff, and reference to superior authority. 14 Despite this objection, 
Percival left for London in a much more optimistic fi-ame of mind than prior to the 
reorganisation. 
At the Foreign Office, the first problem Percival and Waterlow tackled was the 
officers' resignations. They decided to let Ottley go to the Foreign Office, Macpherson 
and Cassells were asked to withdraw their resignations, which they did. 15 Percival was 
told to impress on his officials that their dual loyalty (to Percival and to the Head of 
their Department) should not cause any friction. Waterlow also expressed concern 
about Percival's health, telling him that if he found 'it necessary to take things easy at 
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any time', then a new deputy could be sent out. 16 He noted that the Foreign Office had 
'nothing whatever against Bourdillon' and wanted him retained by the Commission, 
nevertheless, they felt that he was not the right man to take control should Percival 
-) 17 experience another 'physical breakdown... in the stressful times ahead . One of the 
most important questions addressed was the date of the plebiscite. Percival was 
reminded that Germany's total reparations liability could not be fixed until the 
plebiscite result was known. And on this'hung 'the economic reconstruction of Europe 
and the tranquillity of the world'. He must, therefore, do 'everything possible to 
expedite the taking of the vote'. Waterlow's own estimate was that it could be done 
within 100 days and he promised Percival that the Foreign Office would do all it could 
to ease his path. 18 Regarding the Commission's re-organisation, Percival was advised 
that he should demonstrate the 'practical reality' of the changed circumstances to Le 
Rond by forcing Korfanty's expulsion from Upper Silesia. 19 Summarising the 
discussions, Waterlow concluded in a letter to Percival that although he would have 
felt happier had Percival rested another month, it was important that he lost no time in 
returning to Upper Silesia 'in order to supervise personally the starting of the new 
em 
20 
However, Percival had barely left London when Waterlow compiled a minute for 
his superiors highlighting the British Commissioner's shortcomings and urging that he 
be replaced. Arguing that Upper Silesia was a crucial factor in European politics and 
that 'even peace or war, may depend on the personality of the British Commissioner', 
Waterlow told them that Britain was 'represented there by an officer in whom we 
cannot have unbounded confidence. It was clear that Colonel Percival had let his staff 
get out of hand and that the majority of them had little or no confidence in him. In 
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Waterlow's opinion, the only solution was to replace him with a trained 
administrator. 2' This burst of candour was inspired by Waterlow learning that Colonel 
Tallents, the Head of the Baltic Mission, might be available to take Percival's place. 
Nevertheless, the words serve to illustrate that Percival was sent back to Upper Silesia 
despite strong Foreign Office misgivings about his inept handling of inter-Allied 
diplomacy and the evidence of his poor management skills - all of which had no doubt 
contributed to his nervous condition. Apart from British amourpropre, Percival's 
retention perhaps also indicates the problem of the British Government in finding 
suitably qualified people to fill these highly politicised, short-term posts thrown up in 
unfamiliar territory, by the Central Powers' collapse and subsequent Peace Treaties. 
That said, by the end of 1920, Britain's short post-war economic boom was over and 
with jobs at a premium, the Foreign Office experienced little difficulty recruiting the 
additional number ofjunior officials which the Commission's reorganisation entailed 
- even at the reduced rates of pay British officials had received since September. 
22 
Between 40 and 50 recently demobilised, generally well-connected officers 
were interviewed to fill positions with the Commission's new police force and 
increase the number of British assistant district controllers. 23 This recruitment process 
took place at the Foreign Office and was conducted by Ottley and Captain G. S. 
Hutchison, Percival's new aide-de-camp, - 
24 All applicants were questioned on their 
ability to communicate both in German and French. Derby had requested that an effort 
be made to recruit German speakers, with any shortfall made up from candidates who 
spoke only French. 25 Out of the 27 officers selected, 23 were classified as fluent 
German speakers, with a dozen of them classified as fluent in both languages. Eight 
officers speaking both German and French were selected as district controllers. The 
Chapter 3 
199 
remainder, plus four more who were classified as only fluent in French, were given 
posts either with the police or elsewhere in the Commission, where vacancies existed 
due to some of the original officials having departed on health grounds or for domestic 
reasons. 26 Waterlow was impressed by the 'surprisingly high' standard of the officers 
recruited, at the same time he regretted the fact that for Britain to 'have so many men 
of this calibre out of work and without prospects' was 'deplorable however 
satisfactory the result from our point of view'. 27 In his autobiography, however, 
Hutchison agreed that perhaps too much emphasis had been placed on language skills 
and not enough on the officers' personal qualities. 28 It would be reasonable to 
surmise, however, that Ottley and Hutchison selected officers in their own particular 
image. 
By 24 November, the Commission's new recruits had arrived in Upper Silesia 
where Percival began to test the new concorde by attempting to set a plebiscite date 
and force Korfanty's expulsion from the region. 29 Yet, contrary to Derby's intention, 
with so many political, economic and financial outcomes for the respective powers 
now riding on the plebiscite, every major difference between the Commissioners 
quickly became a subject for direct negotiations between their governments. ' Another 
reason for this move towards inter-governmental negotiation was the intense lobbying 
by Berlin and Warsaw. Allegations and counter-allegations, reports of coups and 
counter-coups, and warnings of invasions and wars flooded into the Foreign Office 
from every source of official interest .31 Adding to this paper stream was the output of 
the extensive, well-organised, international network of propaganda agencies which the 
Germans had maintained and even increased since the War. Foreign Office officials 
were inundated with letters and petitions from all parts of Germany and from Germans 
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32 living in ex-neutral countries such as Holland, Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden. 
From Lower Silesia a 'Scotch shipmaster's daughter from Montrose, Scotland', wrote 
to Lloyd George begging him to help 'the thousands of poor Germans' in Upper 
Silesia being shot down in the streets by Poles, who were allegedly plundering their 
homes while French soldiers looked on. 33 Waterlow was certainly impressed by the 
response: 'The Germans are amazing, someone turns the handle and they all act like 
34 machines'. But apart from the Polish Silesians fearing a German coup in Upper 
Silesia and the Germans warning of another insurrection or even an invasion by 
Poland, it is clear that the issue driving most lobbying activity at this time was the 
&outvoting' question. 
In Plebiscites Since The World War, Sara Wambaugh provides an extensive and 
detailed account of how the plebiscite was organised . 
35 Papers dealing with the non- 
residents or 'ourvoters' in published British documents provide an equally 
comprehensive coverage of this subject. 36 For our purpose it is sufficient to note that 
the Peace Conference had established that the plebiscite vote would be counted by 
communes and that, even if they now lived elsewhere, anyone born in Upper Silesia 
was free to participate. 37 Details about how and when these non-residents would vote, 
the date of the plebiscite, and related regulations such as the residential qualifications 
necessary for recent migrants to the area to vote, had been left for the Commission to 
sort out. The Commission had set-up a sub-committee on 22 June 1920 to work out 
these rules and make arrangements for holding the plebiscite . 
3" At a meeting in Paris 
during July, Le Rond had told the Ambassadors that the Commission had been 
considering holding the plebiscite that autumn . 
39 But even if this sub-committee's 
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work had not been interrupted by the insurrection, it remains doubtful whether they 
could have even drawn up the voting regulations by then. 
The reason is that both Germans and Poles were already questioning the most 
fundamental provisions of the plebiscite. Hatzfeldt had drawn Percival's attention to 
the anomalies inherent in counting the vote by communes and Korfanty had forwarded 
proposals to the Commissioners 'to assist them' in drawing up the regulations. Early in 
August 1920, before the insurrection later that month, the Commissioners had learnt 
that the Silesian Poles were planning demonstrations demanding changes to the Peace 
Treaty's articles on non-residents' voting. 40 This resulted from the Polish experience 
with the East Prussian plebiscites. There, they had discovered that the vast majority of 
outvoters were German supporters. They now feared a similarly disproportionate ratio 
of German outvoters to Polish ones would appear in Upper Silesia . 
41 To the Poles, 
these East Prussian plebiscites had demonstrated Germany's ability to fund and 
oTganise their support whilst simultaneously inhibiting any likely sources of Polish 
support elsewhere in Germany. In a memorandum sent to the British Foreign Office on 
19 September, the Polish Government argued that because of inconsistencies in the 
42 Treaty articles the outvoting provisions for Upper Silesia should be abolished. Four 
days later the Polish Foreign Nfinister, Prince Sapieha, repeated this request to the 
British Nfinster in Warsaw - claiming that a large influx of outvoters into East Prussia 
before the plebiscites had led 'to [civil] disturbances and a vote by no means reflecting 
the true wishes of the population'. 43 Asked to comment, Percival told the Foreign 
Office that the outvoting question 'would play a part of so much importance in the 
plebiscite' that it should be submitted to the Conference of Ambassadors for their 
interpretation. Estimating the outvoters could comprise as much as twenty per cent of 
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the total votes cast, he forecast that their arrival in communes currently enjoying small 
majorities in favour of Poland, could 'turn the scale in favour of Germany'. 44 
Outvoting thus became a highly contentious issue, but the Poles were over- 
looking the inconvenient fact that the provisions for this were the indirect result of 
their own request for non-resident voting to be included in the East Prussian 
plebiscites. It was incorporated in the Upper Silesian Plebiscite Articles by accident 
when in the last minute rush to include provision for an Upper Silesian plebiscite in 
the Peace Treaty, the Chairman of the Eastern Frontiers Committee (General Le 
Rond), sought to save time by proposing that the East Prussian Plebiscite Articles be 
duplicated for Upper Silesia. Headlam Morley, the Committee's British representative 
later recalled that this was carried out with practically no discussion. 45 However, once 
accepted, they became an integral part of the settlement and, on observing Polish 
attempts to scrap them, Berlin quite correctly pointed out that deviation from its 
provisions 'would be a manifest breach of the Treaty of Peace'. 46 Sensing that this 
question might delay the plebiscite and consequently the fixing of the amount of 
Germany's total reparations, the Foreign Office instructed Derby to press the 
Ambassadors' Conference to decide the matter. 47 Another dimension was added to this 
when Derby received a telegram from Opole advising him that as a result of the unrest 
amongst Silesia's Polish-supporters over the inclusion of outvoters, the three Upper 
Silesian Commissioners were demanding that military reinforcements be sent there. 48 
On 18 November, the Ambassadors considered the question of the possible 
arrival of 300,000 outvoters in Upper Silesia and the necessity for more troops. The 
French argued that this could result in civil war and supported by Foch, they declared 
that they were only prepared to accept the consequences of giving outvoters the right 
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to vote if the Commission's military force was increased to 60,000 men. 49 Derby later 
reported to Curzon that the French position 'was to refuse to accept responsibility for 
the maintenance of order unless the Treaty of Versailles was modified in such a way as 
to exclude the outvoters'. But in the opinion of Derby and of the Italian Ambassador, 
to exclude the outvoters, was contrary to the Treaty and could not be countenanced. 
Derby warned Curzon that the Ambassadors' Conference would be referring the 
matter to the Allied Governments to resolve. -50 He felt that there were just two 
alternatives: the British must 'either take their share in the military responsibility 
involved in sending troops to Upper Silesia or abandon the plebiscite entirely' . 
51 
Discussing the French attempt to have the outvoters excluded, Crowe told the 
Italian Ambassador to Britain that he thought that the question 'was assuming very 
52 
grave proportions'. An attempt by Waterlow to involve the Rhine Army came to 
nothing; its Commander in Chief claimed that its current strength (12,000 men) was 
insufficient to permit a detachment to Silesia. Crowe also dismissed Wateflow's 
proposal that the United States be asked to send its Silesian Plebiscite Division (which 
was still located on the Rhine). 53 From Berlin, D'Abemon (the British Ambassador) 
made some positive suggestions. The German outvoters could vote at their place of 
residence or at certain other fixed points in Germany. Or the plebiscite could be held 
in different parts of Upper Silesia over a comparatively wide space of time, thus 
obviating the necessity for the estimated 300,000 outvoters arriving together. ' Crowe 
and Waterlow could see 'immense practical difficulties' with D'Abernon's proposals 
but recommended that, if the French would consider them, Curzon might instruct 
Derby to submit them to the Ambassadors' Conference. Whatever pressures the Poles 
and the French applied the view of the Italian and British Governments was that non- 
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residents born in Upper Silesia were entitled to vote. It was the duty of the Allied 
signatories to the Peace Treaty, especially France, Britain, Italy and Poland, 'to try to 
arrange either for the place, or the time, or the duration of the voting that would best 
55 secure a peaceful result'. 
The issue was further complicated by the Foreign Office's attempts to have 
Korfanty expelled. Driven by Percival's and Ottley's accounts of Korfanty's alleged 
activities and by reports received from British diplomats in Berlin, the Foreign Office 
had come to believe that by removing someone from the Polish leadership, order 
might be restored in Upper Silesia. London was also convinced that had Le Rond put 
down the recent Polish disturbances 'with greater severity', then the Poles would not 
now be demanding the abolition of the outvoting provisions. 56 Waterlow's earlier 
instruction to Percival to have Korfanty expelled was a manifestation of this policy. 57 
However, Derby had already rejected an instruction from London for the 
58 Ambassadors' Conference to secure Korfanty's recall . 
The pretext for that request by 
London had been the 'interception' of a fairly innocuous German telegram alleging 
that Korfanty headed a spy ring known as the Polska Obrona G6rnolonska (Defenders 
of Polish Upper Silesia) with threads extending to Wrochaw, Berlin and the Rhine. 59 
Derby claimed that the French would refuse to accept such biased evidence. He 
advised that Percival should gather the evidence of Korfanty's activities himself and 
then submit it through the Commission to the Ambassadors in Paris. ' Resulting from 
this instruction, the outvoting question and the decision to expel Korfanty became 
entwined when, at a public meeting held at the Hotel Baginsky in Olenso on 23 
November, Korfanty made a speech aimed at deterring 'outvoters' from travelling to 
Upper Silesia. 61 
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On learning this, Percival visited Olenso the following day and took statements 
from witnesses. On returning to Opole, he asked the Commission to take steps to expel 
Korfanty. However, since the Germans had already published similar demands over 
the speech, an element of collusion was inevitably suspected. Le Rond, of course, 
opposed this action, not just because the translators of the speech were Germans who 
had infiltrated the audience (after all Korfanty wanted the speech to be reported in 
Germany), but because the expulsion might instigate disturbances worse than those 
experienced in August 1920. Crucially, because of this, Marinis agreed with Le Rond, 
leaving Percival in the minority. 62 Two weeks later when Percival once again pressed 
the matter of Korfanty's expulsion, Le Rond and Marinis suggested that he ask the 
Foreign Office to approach Warsaw on the matter. 63 London had already tried but had 
been warned by the Polish Chargi dAffaires, Jan Ciechanowski, that 'Korfanty's 
removal was impossible and that it would do more harm than good', so Percival's 
request was refused. 64 Nevertheless, Waterlow continued to advise his superiors that 
Korfanty's expulsion was the only gesture strong enough to reassure the Germans that 
the Commission meant to act impartially in the future. 63 Crowe also continued to 
endorse this course of action. Percival was instructed to reintroduce his proposal to the 
Commission and, if again placed in the minority, to have the question referred to the 
Ambassadors in Paris. 66 Amidst these exchanges over Korfanty's future, the crisis of 
the outvoteTs' vis 6 vis Upper Silesia's security concerns, was developing apace. 
In late November, Ciechanowski surprised Waterlow with a 'compromise' 
proposal. Though wanting the numbers of outvoters limited to those with a genuine 
(though undefined) interest in Upper Silesia, Warsaw was suggesting that the 
outvoters might record their votes a few days after the Upper Silesian resident groups 
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had voted in the plebiscite. 67 When the German Government learned of this and of 
another Polish suggestion made to the Ambassadors in Paris, they protested to the 
Foreign Office. Displaying what can only be described as uncharacteristic German 
enthusiasm for the Versailles settlement, they again demanded nothing short of full 
compliance with the Peace Treaty. 68 At a meeting held in London the following day 
(27 November), the British and French Prime Nfinisters discussed the problem. 
The new French Premier was Jean-Claude Leygues. 69 After alluding to Foch's 
demand for 60,000 troops should 300,000 outvoters arrive en masse in Silesia, he 
admitted that the Allied manpower constraints made this impossible. Instead, he 
repeated Ciechanowski's proposal that the outvoters arrive and cast their votes in 
Upper Silesia 'ten days or a fortnight ' after the residents had voted. 70 Acknowledging 
French security concerns, Lloyd George said he was prepared to discuss with 
Churchill whether some battalions could be sent from the Rhine. At the same time he 
could not resist pointing out that if the Supreme Council had ordered that any trouble- 
makers in Upper Silesia would be shot immediately, the present number of troops 
would have been adequate. Returning to one of his favourite Peace Conference 
themes, Lloyd George reminded the meeting that 
whether Silesia went to Germany or to Poland was a matter in which the Allies 
were financially interested, inasmuch as if the result of the plebiscite gave 
Silesia to Poland, the Allies would have to face the loss of billions of francs in 
reparations. 71 
Addressing Germany's plea that Upper Silesia's transfer to Poland would affect her 
capacity to pay reparations, the British Prime Minister said that whilst continuing to 
act impartially, France and Britain should not go out of their way to facilitate likely 
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financial losses to themselves. Taking up Leygues' point that the thousands of likely 
Polish supporters resident in the United States could not return to vote, Curzon put 
forward D'Abernon's proposal whereby the outvoters could cast their ballots in 
Germany. Citing Cologne as one example of a suitable location from which they could 
supervise the vote, he explained that this would help them because, 'it would certainly 
be easier for them to get to Cologne than go to Upper Silesia. Although it is unclear 
how this was meant to assist the potential Polish supporters in the United States, 
Leygues evidently thought that outvoting in Cologne was an original idea and the 
meeting agreed to put this proposal to the Polish and German Governments. Should 
they find it unacceptable, then a French formula would be adopted, whereby the 
residents would vote one day and the oulvoters ten, twelve or fourteen days later. 72 
73 
This decision was telegraphed to Percival . Lloyd George sent notes to the 
German and Polish Governments and Curzon instructed the British representatives in 
Berlin and Warsaw to sell the idea to the respective governments. 74 But, as one British 
diplomat had previously observed, the plebiscites had only 'served to keep alive the 
hatred and distrust which the Germans and Poles felt for one another' . 
75 Both sides 
rejected D'Abernon's idea and Germany would later refuse to accept the French 
76 Government's alternative. D'Abernon thought that Germany's rejection might be 
attributed to Cologne affording too many ex-Upper Silesian miners (who were 
employed in large numbers in the Ruhr area) a chance to vote. But he also noted that a 
minor reason might be the impetus he believed was coming from the national 
organisation now mobilising German outvoters for the journey to Silesia. 
Ostensibly, the Deutscher Schutzbund (German Defence League) was 
organising special concerts, theatrical performances and street collections, to raise 
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funds to send German outvoters to Upper Silesia but, in reality, its task was to raise the 
public's awareness and to find as many outvoters as possible. It might also be added 
that, in their dealings over Upper Silesia, successive German Governments were 
finding themselves handling a subject where there was a rare political consensus. 
Measures aimed at retaining the territory were supported by almost every shade of 
German political opinion -a rare thing at that time. 
77 Curzon, however, found the 
Germans' rejection incomprehensible and D'Abernon described them as 'a difficult 
people to help'. 78 Apart from the Deutscher Schutzbund activities, the German 
public's understanding of outvoting and the Upper Silesian issue was derived from the 
German national press. This claimed that all of the various solutions being offered 
emanated from the French - something which immediately put the German public on 
their guard. As for the German Government, any delay to the plebiscite suited Berlin. 
Although the situation would later change, after the Spa Conference of July 1920 any 
delay in the Upper Silesian plebiscite had appeared to effectively postpone the 
reparations 'day of reckoning'. For every Weimar Cabinet, no matter what its declared 
intention, its ultimate aim was to avoid paying reparations and to revise the hated 
'Versailles Diktat'. Disagreements stoked up within the Entente served as irritants for 
Germany to exploit to this end. It was also the case that despite spending vast sums of 
money and making great efforts to turn the situation in Upper Silesia around, the 
Germans still felt themselves to be in a weak political situation and were not yet 
confident of winning the plebiscite. 79 
Polish objections to the outvoting taking place in Cologne were also understandable. 
They were suspicious because it had been Lloyd George who had communicated the 
proposal to them. But they also genuinely believed that holding outvoting in Germany 
Chapter 3 
210 
would facilitate more of the fraudulent practices which they suspected the Germans 
had employed in East Prussia. 80 Nevertheless, balancing Poland's desire for a 
reduction in the number of outvoters was the parlous state of the Polish economy. This 
was being aggravated by an unofficial trade boycott organised by the German Finance 
Ministry. Everyone affected believed that it would remain in place until Upper 
Silesia's fate had been decided . 
81 The rapidly depreciating Polish mark (whose decline 
PomaA bankers believed was being intentionally accelerated by the German Treasury 
collecting and dumping Polish marks on the Berlin exchange) was causing imported 
goods, such as their Allied coal quota from Upper Silesia, to be increasingly 
expensive. If the Silesian mines became Polish, this was one area of foreign currency 
outflow that could be reversed. 82 Therefore, for this and other economic reasons, the 
Polish Government, like Britain, required an early plebiscite. In an interview given to 
the Polish press, Sapieha moreover explained that Poland's economic interests were 
being damaged by lack of confidence in Poland abroad, if some of the Great Powers 
did not want not want Upper Silesia to go to Poland, this was largely due to the 
Powers' uncertainty over whether Poland was capable of administering it. 83 In a bid to 
maintain Polish credibility with the Powers, Sapieha set about defusing the outvoter 
question by pressurising Korfanty to tone down the Polish Silesians' campaign against 
them. 84 Meantime, Le Rond, as an alternative to the rejected proposals, resurrected an 
earlier Polish idea whereby voting in Upper Silesia could be conducted sequentially by 
zones. 85 Despite this more positive approach on the part of the Poles and the French, 
Percival was able to report on 23 December that (in accordance with Foreign Office 
instructions) his proposal to have Korfanty expelled had finally been submitted to the 
Conference of Ambassadors. 86 
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From Paris, Hardinge, now the British Ambassador in France, had already 
warned the Foreign Office that expelling Korfanty would be strongly opposed by the 
French and not supported by the other ambassadors. He anticipated that the French 
would argue that because Britain had no troops in Upper Silesia, this disqualified them 
from 'dictating measures' endangering the lives of French and Italian soldiers. 87 To 
give himself some political leverage Hardinge had asked London for permission to 
once again threaten a British withdrawal from the Commission. " Curzon had refused a 
previous request on this, but Hardinge pointed out that no matter what arguments he 
deployed, it would take political pressure to force France to support Korfanty's 
expulsion . 
89 From Warsaw, Sapieha had also questioned the advisability of Britain 
proceeding with the expulsion of someone who had been an elected member of the 
Reichstag for twenty years; he emphasised the 'very grave situation' that it might 
create in the plebiscite area. 90 Faced with the possibility of Britain having to withdraw 
from Upper Silesia if it could not force its will on the French, Foreign Office officials 
urged caution. 91 It was Crowe, now the Permanent Under Secretary, who contrived a 
suitably diplomatic nuance acceptable to Curzon. Hardinge was authorised to make 
'qualified threats' to the French about Britain 'seriously considering' withdrawing 
from the Commission should Korfanty fail to modify his campaign against the 
outvoters. 92 But no sooner had this problem been overcome when later that same day, 
Curzon was reminded by the French Chargd dAffaires of Lloyd George's earlier half- 
promise to reinforce the inter-Allied military force in Upper Silesia. " 
All of these Upper Silesian problems were discussed at a Cabinet meeting in 
Downing Street on 30 December 1920. Like the Foreign Office, the Cabinet members 
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also baulked at withdrawing from the Commission and over-rode the Army Council's 
continuing objections to sending troops to Upper Silesia- They agreed 
that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should be authorised, as a last 
resort, to state that the British Government would be willing to send a force not 
exceeding 4 battalions (of 500 men each) from the Army of Occupation of the 
Rhine to reinforce the Allied Army of Occupation in Silesia until the 
completion of the plebiscite. 94 
Curzon advised Hardinge of this decision privately, asking him to keep it confidential 
and not to use it in his negotiations. 95 However, after talking to the Quai d'Orsay and 
then canvassing the opinions of the other ambassadors in Paris, Hardinge came to the 
conclusion that expelling Korfanty was both inadvisable and not worth pursuing. On 
10 January 192 1, just two days before Percival's demand for Korfanty's expulsion was 
due to be discussed by the Conference of Ambassadors, Curzon received a note from 
Hardinge reporting Britain's isolation on the issue. Hardinge suggested that this was 
due in part to the Polish Government having kept Korfanty quiet for well over a month 
and by news that Korfanty himself was running a poster campaign urging maintenance 
of public order - adding by way of a rebuke, that these were factors 'of which we 
apparently have no knowledge'. Under these circumstances and because of the threat 
of disturbances should any attempt be made to remove the Polish leader, Hardinge 
'thought it desirable to adjourn the question for more mature consideration' . 
95 Curzon 
duly minuted that 'the Korfanty proposal' had been dropped. % 
The Foreign Office's inability to have Korfanty expelled illustrated the British 
Government's actual weakness over Upper Silesia. The Foreign Office was well aware 
of the manner in which the absence of British troops marginalised the Commission's 
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97 British contingent and their Commissioner's influence over events there. Of course, 
this lack of influence was entirely of the British Government's own making. However, 
as the Cabinet, the Foreign Office, Derby, and even Hardinge (who had been one of 
the officials most determined to remove Korfanty), had discovered, with nothing to 
offer or to withhold, the British were prisoners of the French. They were trapped 
because the only political pressure they were able to exercise (withdrawal from the 
inter-Allied Commission) was far too drastic a manoeuvre for a Power committed to 
maintaining the Versailles Treaty to contemplate. But because it now provided them 
with political options, the one positive outcome of the Foreign Office's attempt to 
expel Korfanty was the Cabinet's decision to hold some British troops in reserve for 
policing the plebiscite. And it was this, which helped to shape the outcome of the 
outvoting dispute when it was finally settled in February 192 1. 
Before this, in parallel with the outvoting crisis and British attempts to expel 
Korfanty, Cardinal Bertram had made one final bid to reassert his authority over the 
Upper Silesian portion of his diocese. The appointment of Achille Ratti, the Vatican's 
Papal Nuncio to Poland as its Alto Commissario Ecclesiastico for all of the plebiscite 
areas, offended Bertram by implying that he was incapable of exercising impartiality 
in Upper Silesia. The Cardinal was also fi-ustrated over the Polish misrepresentation 
that the Vatican had removed Upper Silesia from his ecclesiastical jurisdiction. " This 
belief was reinforced by the Commission's refusal to permit Bertram entry into the 
plebiscite area. The Commission feared his presence might provoke demonstrations of 
support and counter-demonstrations by the Polish campaign. 99 Germany's Foreign 
Office asked the Vatican to confirm that Bertram remained the ecclesiastical authority 
for Upper Silesia. 100 Shortly after he had arrived, the German press started criticising 
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Ratti, accusing him of partiality towards the Polish cause. To many German critics, his 
presence in Warsaw during the Red Army's advance on the city and the Polish victory 
at its gates, confirmed this. Another factor was his failure to silence the minority 
Polish-supporting Upper Silesian clergy and the visiting clerics (particularly from 
Polish religious orders), who were entering the region and speaking in support of 
Poland. Yet Ratti was also receiving criticism in Polish Silesian papers such as the 
Gazetta Polska in Opole and the Sztandar Polski in Gliwice for not supporting the 
Polish cause. 101 Stehlin notes that Ratti himself appeared to be the only person who 
believed he was in Upper Silesia solely to represent the Church's interests, act 
impartially and not identify himself with any party. 102 
At a meeting between members of the Upper Silesian clergy in Bytom on 5 
October, no consensus was reached on a proposal by German-supporting clergy to stop 
visiting priests or other clerical visitors from delivering public speeches without the 
local parish priest's approval. The reason advanced was to prevent the local priest's 
authority being undermined. But because the vast majority (about 75%), of the parish 
priests were German supporters, agreeing to this would obviously have inhibited the 
Polish campaign. In some plebiscite districts it was only a solitary Polish-supporting 
parish priest, a visiting cleric, or a curate who provided the Polish campaign with any 
intellectual credibility. The minority Polish supporters were, therefore, unwilling to 
renounce their right to invite priests in from outside the diocese. Hatzfeldt, Berlin's 
representative with the Commission, wrote to the German Foreign Office requesting 
that Germany seek the Vatican's help in banning the entry of foreign priests into 
Upper Silesia. 103 German-supporting Upper Silesian priests also organised petitions 
and named the offending visiting priests. These were forwarded to Wroolaw where, on 
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13 October, Bertram learned that his jurisdiction over the plebiscite area had been 
reconfirmed and that the Vatican had asked London to use its influence to have his 
exclusion from Upper Silesia revoked. 104 But despite Percival's instructions and 
clarification of the ecclesiastical situation, the Commission failed to give way. 
Bertram had come to believe that Ratti was not supporting him vAth sufficient 
energy. Early in November 1920, paying what proved to be his last visit to Wroclaw, 
Ratti had found Bertram quite obdurate when he advanced yet one more compromise 
proposal over the Commission's ban,. After Ratti's departure, Bertram acted. Armed 
with the petitions, the lists of 'foreign' priests and a guarded reply from Gasparri, the 
Papal Secretary of State, confirmed that, since Bertram's jurisdiction extended over 
the whole of the Wroclaw diocese, there could be 'no obstacle from the side of the 
Apostolic See' to the Cardinal restricting his clergy's 'too free interference in 
politics'. 105 Using Gasparri's statement to claim that his action resulted from 'careful 
negotiations' with the Vatican and that it had only been taken with 'the approval of the 
Holy See', Bertram published his controversial edict of 5 November, 1920.106 This was 
more or less the proposal advanced by the German-supporting clergy at Bytom exactly 
one month earlier. Because all parish priests appointed in Upper Silesia since the 
Kulturkampfhad been politically vetted, the edict's first and most crucial clause gave 
the game away. 
All priests and clergy, of whatever nationality or language, in the Upper 
Silesian plebiscite area, are strictly forbidden to take part in political 
demonstrations, or to make any political or other speeches, without the express 
permission ofthe competent parish priest. 107 (my italics) 
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The second clause empowered individual parish priests to prohibit visiting clergy from 
making speeches or participating in demonstrations. 108 Thus the edict struck at the 
Polish cause and the reaction was both predictable and furious. 
Because the Polish campaign leaders had exaggerated his ecclesiastical 
authority in the plebiscite area, the Polish outcry was directed at Ratti. His critics 
turned on him, asserting that Bertram could not have issued such an edict without 
Ratti's knowledge or permission. Asked to inquire, the British Legation in Warsaw, 
after consulting Ratti's office, reported that Ratti knew nothing about the edict, let 
alone 'the nature of the special Papal authority to which Bertram had alluded to'. In 
Warsaw, the temporary British Minister, Percy Loraine, described the 'intense 
irritation' provoked by the edict amongst the Polish public. In response to demands by 
the socialists in the Sejm that diplomatic relations with the Vatican be severed, 
Sapieha, on 30 November, told them that a strong protest had been sent to Ratti and 
another one to the Commission in Opole. He informed the SqJm that Poland's Minister 
at the Vatican had been instructed to insist on the edict's withdrawal, demand that the 
plebiscite area be removed from Bertram's jurisdiction, and that a special 
administrator be appointed to run that part of his diocese. 109 
The Polish episcopate also appealed to the Pope pointing out that 'putting so 
much power into the hands of the predominately German parish priests did grave 
injury to Poland'. They sent the Bishop of Krakow and the Armenian-rite Archbishop 
of Lwow to Rome to inform the Pope about the true position. '10 However, a German 
memorandum had already been submitted to the Vatican asking the Pope to support 
their just demands and preserve the Church's neutrality over the plebiscite. ' 11 In 
December the Vatican calmed the situation by appointing a Commissario Apostolico, 
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to the area. Campbell notes that this decision was taken on 10 December, after 
Gasparri had interviewed Rudolf Steinmann, Bertram's representative in Rome. 
Reporting back to Bertram, Steinmann welcomed the decision as having effectively 
eliminated Ratti's authority in Upper Silesia: a positive measure that he believed 
greatly assisted the German campaign. Three months later, Ratti was also relieved of 
his duties in Poland and appointed Archbishop of Milan. 112 
On their arrival in Rome, the Polish bishops had been presented with another 
version of the same story. Gasparri had explained that on learning of the true situation 
in Upper Silesia, the Pope had acknowledged that the Polish bishops' fears were well 
founded. Therefore, to prevent Bertram's edict from disadvantaging the Polish 
Silesians, Monsignor Ogno Serra, the Vatican's Chargi d'Affaires in Vienna, had 
already been sent to Opole with instructions to enforce political neutrality on the 
clergy there. 113 Ogno had been instructed to reside in Opole until after the plebiscite 
had been decided. Just after his arrival, he issued what was, in fact, a Vatican decree, 
forbidding all Upper Silesian and visiting clerics from involving themselves in any 
form of political agitation. 
While this appeared less damaging to the Polish cause than Bertram's decree, it 
was no real improvement. The Polish campaign required their priests' articulation far 
more than the German campaign relied upon active clerical support. Therefore the 
Poles had good reason to feel Ogno's decree continued to disadvantage them. 114 The 
Polish demands to remove Upper Silesia from the Wroclaw diocese had also been 
ignored, with the Vatican again reaffirming Bertram's jurisdiction in Upper Silesia. 
However, Stehlin notes that in exchange for this, the Vatican asked Bertram to defer 
his visit to the plebiscite area. 115 Gasparri also thought Bertram at fault over the edict's 
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phrasing. He believed that 'this harmed Germany's chances in the election' because 
the Polish campaigners were now using it as proof that the Church's ecclesiastical 
administrators were biased and that only a Polish hierarchy would treat Polish- 
speaking Catholics fairly. He also reprimanded Bertram for unnecessarily stating that 
he had Papal authorisation for his edict because this had brought about attacks on 
Rome as well as on Wroc4aw. 116 
Stehlin also highlights the fact that Gasparri generally supported the German 
clergy. He accepted their argument for retaining the maximum number of Catholics in 
the country. He wanted to negotiate a Concordat with Berlin, therefore the two million 
Catholics in Protestant Germany were worth far more there, rather than relocated in an 
already overwhelmingly Catholic Poland. Gasparri also had 'grave doubts' about 
supporting an 'overtly aggressive Poland, embroiled in unwise, ultra-nationalistic 
policies and territorial disputes with Russia, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Germany, 
with the unrest in Silesia part of this aggressive strategy'. ' 18 It has to be said that this 
was a gross distortion of Poland's position because when the Peace Conference closed, 
the only Polish frontier that it had defined had been the German border - and even that 
was subject to plebiscites. Most of the other Polish frontiers had been left an open 
question because neither Britain, France nor the United States would recognise the 
Bolshevik regime - ultimately leaving the ex-Tsarist Russian border states, including 
the Poles, to their own devices. Nevertheless, with France also reopening diplomatic 
relations with the Vatican, Upper Silesia provides a good illustration of the subtle 
considerations, the hard choices, or the very delicate balances which the Catholic 
Church very often had to strike between its members' competing national interests. 
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Ogno's reports to Gasparri were generally sympathetic to the Germans. In 
January 1921 he obtained the Vatican's permission to discipline several clerics who 
were openly supporting the Polish campaign. " 9 This was a bonus for German 
diplomacy. They had expected Ogno to incline towards the Poles and the French. In 
February, learning of an attempt by the Polish episcopate to have his decree revoked, 
Ogno enlisted Percival's aid to forestall them. 120 By acting immediately, the British 
representative at the Vatican, Count John De Salis (supported by yet another flurry of 
German diplomatic activity), ensured that the clerical restrictions remained in place 
until the plebiscite was held on 20 March - by which time, in Percival's words, 
'moderation had been forced on both sides of the clergy'. 12 , 
The diplomatic battle to stop the minority Polish-supporting Catholic clergy 
campaigning for Poland had clearly been won by Wroctaw and Berlin. The German 
politicians and clergy held the levers of power, therefore the odds were always in their 
favour. Percival had only supported the ban on Bertram from entering Upper Silesia 
because Ratti had led him to believe that it was the Pope's wish. 122 Once Prince 
Hatzfeldt, the German Government's representative to the Commission, had told him 
otherwise, he ended his opposition to Bertram's entry. 123 However, leaving aside 
Bertram's machinations and Ratti's efforts to maintain the clerical status quo, any 
attempt to keep what was, both in Poland and in Upper Silesia, a politicised Church 
out of the plebiscite debate, was doomed to fitilure. And whatever decrees or edicts 
were circulated there was no escaping the fact that priests possessing strongly held 
views and having local authority, would always be able to 'guide' their congregations. 
This does not mean that parishioners would be persuaded away from strongly held 
positions of their own, but that no matter what edicts were issued, priests in Upper 
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Silesia would certainly have been in a position to influence the more simple and less 
nationally committed members of a parish. 124 Despite Korfanty's campaign slogan 
'Catholic equals Pole', denied outside clerical help to redress the existing clerical 
political balance, the Polish Upper Silesian campaign received no support ftom the 
Catholic Church. 125 With Gasparri's guarded support for Bertram, the 'neutrality' that 
was imposed only worked to Germany's advantage. 126 
But if the Church was determined to concern itself only with temporal affairs, 
then the French officials with the Commission were equally determined to assist the 
Poles with their own form of secular assistance. This provided the new British officials 
with their first experience of one new aspect of inter-Allied diplomacy at Commission 
level. With every French district controller now having a British assistant district 
controller, Percival hoped that this would enable him to keep French activity, or lack 
of it, under wider surveillance. The British police officers also helped him to build the 
bigger picture. Soon Percival was reporting increased seizures of Polish arms, often 
directly due to the work of British officers. Some British officers had, moreover, made 
complaints about the French controllers placing difficulties in their way, and others 
suggested that their French colleagues were forewarning the Poles about the intended 
police searches. 127 That said, not all of the new British officials, nor all of the longer- 
serving ones, were quite as diligent in their duties. 
In December 1920, after it became public that British officials had been 
disparaging Poland's ability to run Upper Silesia's industries should they acquire 
them, Percival circulated a confidential memorandum reminding British officials of 
the necessity to maintain an impartial attitude. 128 In early January 1921 he cleared out 
several British officials whom he suspected of 'behaving in an unbecoming manner'. 
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Allegations against them included boisterous behaviour in restaurants (in one instance, 
firing a revolver); being seen in public places with 'women of doubtful character'; 
remaining in bed until mid-day instead of attending work; and general incompatibility 
with other members of the Commission. One of the new arrivals had accidentally shot 
himself 129 This picture of their behaviour provides a stark, though welcome, contrast 
to the impression of general aloofness that the Foreign Office's published documents 
convey of the British officials in Upper Silesia. 130 However, despite the Commission's 
reorganisation, the gulf between members of the British and French contingents 
remained. In the new Police Command, the senior British official, Major Keatinge, 
found himself quickly marginalised. Then a French attempt to supplant the British 
representative on the sub-committee drawing up the plebiscite regulations was aborted 
only after Percival threatened to boycott the Commission's meetings if the proposal 
was not dropped. 131 Ironically, this sub-committee was the one area where there had 
been some accord between the Allies. By 2 January, Percival was able to report that, 
with the exception of the voting procedure and the method of counting being finalised, 
the plebiscite regulations were now complete. 132 
Apart from the outvoting question and negotiations over whether or not the 
Gutsbezirke should be treated as communes, the plebiscite regulations were arrived at 
fairly harmoniously. The Gutsbezirke (manorial estates) were the numerically smallest 
communal units after the towns and the Landgemeinden (rural communes). The 1912 
Gemeindelexikon listed 792 Gutsbezirke, of which 389 had less than 100 inhabitants. 
However, these Gutsbezirke were important not because of their total population (only 
some 158,000), but because they comprised roughly half of Upper Silesia's territory. 
Therefore, with Upper Silesia's partition depending on the result of the vote within 
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each commune, the voting status of the Gutsbezirke units was of vital importance. 133 
The Poles feared that because the German landowners, their agents and the priests 
enjoyed a near feudal authority within them, they would compel the Polish inhabitants 
to vote as the German landlords wished - voting secrecy being a near impossibility 
with such a limited electorate. They wanted the Gutsbezirke merged into the adjacent 
communes, where they hoped that there would be sufficient Polish majorities to absorb 
them. The Germans naturally wanted them to vote separately and because he believed 
in the justice of their case, Percival argued for them in the Commission. But Le Rond 
steadfastly opposed this. Therefore, to avoid any fiulher delay to the plebiscite by 
involving the Ambassadors' Conference, Percival accepted a compromise whereby 
Gutsbezirke containing less than 101 inhabitants were merged into adjacent polling 
communes - the remainder voting separately. 
134 
Another important issue overcome was the establishment of a qualifying period 
entitling recent immigrants, now resident in Upper Silesia, to vote. The French argued 
for 1900 (the date favoured by the Poles), because that was when the Prussians had 
increased anti-Polish measures in the eastern provinces. The British wanted a vote for 
everyone who had arrived prior to 1914 (the date favouTed by the Germans). After 
attempting to gain a compromise on 1908, Percival settled for I January 1904, a date 
chosen on the grounds that it coincided with several Prussian decrees preventing 
Polish workmen from the Russian and Austrian partitions from obtaining any form of 
domicile in Upper Silesia. 135 In accepting this date, Percival conceded that the 
Germans had gained some advantage from the outvoting clauses and he felt that this 
redressed the balance to an extent because, in his estimation, this measure disqualified 
some 50,000 German immigrants from voting. 136 This was not an insignificant figure 
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because, by late January, German plebiscite organisations; were desperate for more 
time to register out-voters. In early February, Lord D'Abernon received a letter from 
one of the region's leading landowners, the Prince of Pless, revealing that, as a result 
of the Polish campaign against the Heimatstreur (the people born in the country but 
living outside it), instead of receiving the anticipated 250,000 to 300,000 applications 
to travel to Upper Silesia, the Schutzbund had received just 170,000. He claimed that 
the outvoter numbers would be increased only by the deployment of British troops in 
Upper Silesia and having the residents and outvoters voting there simultaneously. 137 
Hadffeldt, von Moltke and the local German leaders, had been studiously cultivating 
Percival and Marinis on this, and they had already advocated this course of action to 
London and Rome. 138 After reading Percival's reports, Lord Hardinge suggested that 
should Britain definitely decide to send four battalions of troops to Upper Silesia, this 
could be made conditional on Britain getting its way over the out-voting question. 1 39 
On 7 February, Curzon authorised Hardinge to reopen the question on this basis. 140 
Le Rond had once again requested an increase in the Commission's security 
forces. This meant the question of troops was already on the agenda for a meeting of 
the Ambassadors in February. It was, therefore, an opportune moment for the British 
to raise the outvoting question and they indicated that, should the French Government 
accept the views of the British and Italian Commissioners on this, then they 'might 
possibly be induced to send troops not exceeding four battalions'. 141 When the 
Ambassadors' Conference met on 17 February, on Curzon's instructions, Hardinge 
made this into a definite proposal 'provided that the French Government agreed to 
alter the voting system so as to enable outvoters and residents to vote simultaneously'. 
Foch declared that if the Conference agreed to this they would require 45,000 troops. 
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Despite the French appeals for Britain to send the troops unconditionally, Hardinge 
stuck to his guns. After the meeting, he recommended to Curzon that he raise the 
proposal at the Supreme Council's next meeting. 142 
This met in London a few days later and it was a lively affair. 113 Curzon put the 
British case for holding the vote on a single day. The Italian Foreign Minister, Count 
Sforza, announced that 2,000 Italian troops were being sent. 144 But the French would 
not give way. Their opposition provoked Lloyd George's fighting spirit. After first 
questioning Le Rond's impartiality and reiterating his previous arguments about it not 
being in the Allies' financial interest for Upper Silesia to be awarded to Poland, he 
declared that it was only by holding the plebiscite honestly and quickly, that the Peace 
Treaty could be prevented from becoming a 'discredited document'. 145 The new 
French Prime Minister, Aristide Briand, pointed out that the French Government was 
maintaining 13,000 troops in Upper Silesia, therefore he had special responsibility in 
this. He also thought it a serious matter that Germany should learn that her obstructive 
tactics had divided the Allies. Britain's attitude would only encourage fresh German 
demands. But Lloyd George dismissed this. He believed that the Allies were 'morally 
strengthened' by the acceptance of 'Germany's just demands. He took issue with 
Briand over the wider political question dividing the Allies, namely, whether the view 
was to prevail that wherever an ally assumed greater responsibility in an area, then that 
ally's will should prevail over the other allies. This, he believed, was a question even 
more serious than the plebiscite in Upper Silesia and 'if the division of responsibility 
was to be on lines of that kind, then there would be an end to the alliance'. 146 
Provoking a crisis by painting a dramatically stark alternative was a negotiating 
technique well practised by the British Prime Minister. Reminding the French that the 
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Germans were about to come to London, he demanded to know where the French 
Government stood on the matter. 147 Briand caved in, conceding that should the 
Conference take a decision then 'France would bow to it'. Lloyd George had taken 
France to the brink, but the French had not jumped. 148 The plebiscite would now take 
place on 20 March 1921 - something that the Polish Sejm had advocated. 149 The 
outvoters and residents would vote together in Upper Silesia with the despatch of four 
battalions of British troops addressing any threat that this posed to law and order. 150 
The Germans naturally welcomed another Lloyd George success. D'Abernon ventured 
151 to hope that they might now be more accommodating regarding reparations. 
In Poland, however, there was strong condemnation of the Allied decision. 152 
Newspaper articles, posters and films had been fanning Polish public opinion, and the 
plebiscite support organisations' activities never permitted interest in Upper Silesia to 
subside. 153 In an atmosphere of heightened national awareness, the Allied decision was 
seen as a concession to Germany if for no good reason other than the Germans had 
wanted it. Aware that Britain had pushed for simultaneous voting on Germany's 
behalf, the Allied decision was regarded as another in a long line of rebuffs in the 
British Prime Nfinister's hands and part of the international bargaining going on under 
the cover of the plebiscite. In Warsaw the French and Italians tried to distance 
themselves from it. The WaTsaw-published Journal de Pologne claimed that Bfiand 
had only given his consent to the decision to preserve the solidarity of the Entente. ' -4 
And although Sforza had supported the decision, in Warsaw his Minister denied Italian 
responsibility. 155 However, the Poles distrusted the Italians, and it was rumoured that 
in exchange for Germany not opposing Italy's claim on the South Tyrol, the Italians 
were supporting the Germans over Upper Silesia. 1-`ý6 Regarding Germany's success in 
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coupling reparations to the plebiscite (something not anticipated by the Peace Treaty), 
the Poles could claim that Lloyd George was overlooking their Government's proposal 
to compensate the Allies should Poland win the Upper Silesian coalfields. ' 57 
Though the Poles wanted good relations with Britain, since 1918 they had 
learned to expect nothing but disapproval. Loraine explained to Curzon that the 
considerable unpopularity of the British in Warsaw was due to perceived British anti- 
Polish bias over questions such as East Galicia, Upper Silesia, Gdansk, and Wilno. 
Lloyd George urging the Soviet peace terms on them, when the Bolsheviks were 
advancing on Warsaw in August 1920, had not helped either. 158 In January 192 1, 
Curzon had a Supreme Council meeting in Paris rescheduled to avoid encountering 
Pilsudski. 159 And when Pitsudski finally paid a state visit to Paris in early February, 
Britain indicated its disapproval -a snub which did not go down well in Poland. 160 
Sapieha, who had been in Paris with Pilsudski, visited Britain instead. But during the 
talks, which were quite cordial, he failed to detect any sign that Britain was moving to 
support simultaneous voting in Upper Silesia. 161 In fact, Upper Silesia barely received 
a mention. 162 Therefore, when news about the ou(voters voting with the residents in 
Upper Silesia reached Warsaw, Sapieha, an Anglophile, was unfairly blamed for the 
decision and suffered bitter political and personal attacks, including accusations about 
his inept representation of the country abroad. After attacking him, one Polish 
newspaper demanded a more energetic and vigorous Foreign Minister 
in order to convince Mr. Lloyd George that he has played too long on the 
strings of Polish patience and pliability. Public opinion in England and Italy 
must learn that Poland is to the very highest extent aroused and indignant at the 
injury which had been done to her. 163 
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Commenting on the decision to send four British battalions to Upper Silesia, one 
government news-sheet asked if they would 'belong to that model troop known in 
Ireland as the Black and TansT. 164 
When the War Office first learned that Curzon had agreed to send British troops 
to Upper Silesia (7 February), the news caused some confusion. Churchill, still the 
Secretary of State for War, told the Army Council he knew nothing about the troops 
being sent. On 15 February he asked the Foreign Office 'to suspend action pending 
further reference to the Cabinet' . 
165 It was true that the Army Council had already 
rejected a request to send troops. That had been on 27 December 1920, but just three 
days later both Churchill and the CIGS, Sir Henry Wilson, had attended the Cabinet 
meeting which had over-ridden their objections and made the battalions available. 166 
During a meeting in Paris in January, Curzon had asked Wilson to dissuade Foch from 
replacing any of the British troops (that might be sent to Upper Silesia) in the Cologne 
area with French ones. The British feared that the arrival of French troops, especially 
those from their colonies, in a British-occupied area, would be disastrous on their 
relations with the local population. The decision to send the British troops was finally 
taken on 21 February and the War Office sent an officer to Paris to make arrangements 
for their transportation. 167 The following day, the Commission in Opole notified 
General Gratier, the inter-Allied military commander, that four British battalions 
(amounting to102 officers and 2,157 men), would be arriving to reinforce the French 
and Italian Units. 169 Wilson knew nothing of this until Foch visited him at his London 
home on 28 February. He had been on holiday with his wife, first at Biarritz and then 
in Madrid, throughout the whole month. C. E. Calwell, Wilson's first biographer, notes 
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that he was 'much put out', on learning that the Foreign Office had finally got their 
hands on the four battalions. 169 
Although ultimately under the inter-Allied military control structure, the 
British Brigade's participation was conditional on its units remaining under a unified 
British Command. 170 The plan was to locate them in the north of the plebiscite area - 
mostly poorly drained, flat, open land, with lakes, dense forests, and a long, open 
border with Poland. When he surveyed the terrain, the British Commander, Colonel 
Arthur Wauchope of the 2nd Battalion Black Watch, thought that Silesia appeared as 
flat as 'Flanders, Mesopotamia, the coast of Palestine and Egypt, the Delta of Egypt, 
71 
and the banks of the Rhine', places his battalion had served over the past six years. 1 
The three other battalions under Wauchope's command were the V Battalion 
Middlesex, the 1" Battalion Royal Sussex, and the 2nd Battalion Royal West Kent. 173 
Each Battalion was below the accepted 600 man establishment. The Sussex and the 
West Kent Battalions each had 550 men, but the Middlesex and the Black Watch 
Battalions had under 3 50 men respectively. 174 To ease travel to the outlying districts 
and provide proper mobility in the event of disturbances there, Percival wisely advised 
the Rhine Army to equip the force with plenty of light motor transport vehicles. 175 He 
also recommended they bring crockery and table linen for the officers' messes and, 
because venereal disease was prevalent, they should ensure 'adequate precautionary 
measures'. 176 
Edmonds records Wauchope and the advance party leaving Cologne on 28 February 
and arriving in Opole on 6 March. The main party arrived on 8 March - only twelve days 
bef th I biSCi . 
177 ore ePe te Whilst they had travelled through unoccupied Germany, their 
ammunition was withdrawn and labels declaring them to be 'Transport Under the Peace 
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Treaty', were affixed to their railway carriages. At every stop German security police 
guarded them. The soldiers noted that as they crossed through Germany there were no signs 
of civil unrest; on the contrary, everyone 'appeared to be set on regaining what they had 
lost through the war; every factory chimney emitted smoke, and there was scarcely a piece 
of uncultivated ground to be seen'. It was only on reaching Opole that they started 
witnessing degrees of poverty approaching that which Germany had pleaded since the 
Armistice. There, during a break in the journey, the Battalion's Pipes and Drums provided 
an impromptu performance on the station platform, 'much to the apparent amazement and 
delight of the natives'; and when the train pulled out bound for Lubliniec, where the Black 
Watch were to be quartered, children ran alongside the carriages calling aloud for more of 
the 'biskwee and cigarettes' that the soldiers had been throwing out to them. 1 78 Finding no 
suitable building in Lubliniec, the Brigade H. Q. was established outside the town. 179 The 
2nd Black Watch remained there, in barracks vacated by the French. The I" Middlesex were 
split between Lubliniec; and nearby Olenso. Three companies of the I' Sussex went to 
Tamowski Gory and the fourth was sent down to Bytom. The main body of the West Kents 
went to Kluczbork with one company detached to Pokoj (Carlsruhe), north of opole. 180 
Amongst the officers with the force was Lieut. Colonel A. Wavell, a figure of interest in his 
own right. Second in Command of the Black Watch in Upper Silesia, in 1913 he had 
become the only future British Field Marshal ever to have been imprisoned in the Warsaw 
Citadel. 181 
At Herby, and other road crossings into Poland, British troops checked passports 
and issued ration cards. Small detachments were stationed in villages such as Wozniki 
(Woischnik), already troubled by fighting between the local Poles and Germans. Armed 
parties attempting to cross the frontier were arrested and disarmed. To reinforce the British 
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presence, foot patrols were sent out on long marches around the villages. Because of the 
delicate political situation, fraternisation with Poles and Germans was 'limited to what was 
necessary for common civility'. When off-duty, the British troops were confined to their 
barracks. After a week of this activity, on 17 March, Wauchope informed Gratier that he 
found that 'the conduct of the inhabitants in my area is at present extremely good' and did 
not think serious disturbances likely. 182 
Although there had been an escalation both in violence and rhetoric prior to the 
British troops' arrival, Polish Government appeals to the Polish Silesians through Korfanty 
had helped to quieten the situation. 183 These had been necessary because, prior to the Allied 
decision to hold simultaneous voting, a second wave of protests against outvoting had 
occurred. In Polish-dominated communes, councils there passed resolutions declaring that 
the outvoters were terrorists distorting the plebiscite result. 184 The Polish Government 
claimed it would not accept responsibility for any consequences arising from the Allied 
decision to hold simultaneous voting. Though Percival failed to find evidence implicating 
Korfanty in the renewed protest, he was sure that it was the Polish Plebiscite Commissariat 
which was behind it. '85 However, from its headquarters in Bytom, Korfanty welcomed 20 
March as the date when Upper Silesia's soil 'would be returned to its legitimate owner'. 
Declaring that the rejoicing in the German press was premature, he called upon all Upper 
Silesians 
to remain calm, to maintain public order, to preserve discipline and dignity .... and 
not to fall into the traps of the enemy who is endeavouring to falsify the true 
expression of the will of the people through corruption, terror and abuse of 
power. 
186 
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Table 4 
Provisional List of Voters February 22 1921 1" 
Districts/ 
Towns 
Residents Outvoters Immigrants Total 
Voters 
Percentage 
Outvoters 
Bytom 133,596 13,347 5,776 152,719 8.7% 
Gliwice 32,37 6,112 3,516 41,865 14.5% 
Strzelce 38,324 7,319 765 46,410 15.80/4 
Katowice 110,599 111666 4,386 126,651 9.2u/o 
Krowleska 
Huts 
37,436 4,904 1,920 44,260 11.1% 
Kozle 65,110 20,408 2,111 87,629 23.3% 
K-lumbork 25,693 15,478 2,041 43,21 35.8% 
Cvlubczyce 42,786 22,112 1,929 66,827 33% 
Lubliniec 24,782 4478 403 29,663 15.1% 
Opole 14,793 5ý, 486 2,619 22,898 24% 
Opole Land 62,616 17,343 11706 811665 2L r1c 
Pszcyna 65,794 5,991 1,256 73,041 8. r1o 
Radbom 55,526 12,058 3,051 70,065 170/a 
Olenso 25,967 8,711 612 35,290 24.7% 
Rybnik 69,583 9,118 1,747 80,448 11.3% 
Tarnowski 
Gory 
39,629 4,459 1,054 45,142 9.90/0 
Toszecko- 
Gliwicki 
41,000 est. 5,000 1,000 47,000 10.60/a 
Zabrze 79,353 7,892 2,795 90,040 8.80/0 
Totals 964,824 181,882 38,689 1,185,395 15.3% 
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Perhaps the voting lists were giving Korfanty grounds for optimism. Table 4 indicates that 
the Polish campaign had so far restricted the registered outvoters to just under 182,000. The 
list was later revised but only a further 10,000 outvoters found their way on to it. 
With the plebiscite being measured by the number of communes (or what 
might be more accurately described as 'voting units') won or lost, for Poland the good 
news was that the proportion of outvoters to residents was greatest in the rural districts 
already overwhelmingly German. 188 This was especially the case in Glubczyce and 
Kluczbork - the two districts where the Council of Four permitted German-populated 
land to be added to the original plebiscite area (see Chapter 1). '89 However, as we 
will see, Polish confidence was misplaced. Pouring outvoters into these areas would 
not add to the number of communes Germany would win there. But by increasing their 
total vote, the Schutzbund paved the way for Germany to attempt to claim the whole 
plebiscite area on the grounds that they had 'won' the overall numerical vote. How the 
Germans' manipulated the plebiscite outvoter regulations is well illustrated by the 
Gutsbezirke Staro9cin's (Sterzendorf) electoral figures. Staroicin was one of several 
small NamyslOW communities added to Kluczbork. Its 61 resident and eight migrant 
voters were joined on the electoral register by 435 German outvoters (see Addendum, 
Annex 1). 190 Further study of the electoral list reveals that this form of electoral abuse 
was commonplace, especially in the German districts the Polish campaign left either 
uncontested or, due to insufficient support, were unable to monitor effectively. 191 
It was in the south and east, where the workforce was industrialised, that the 
Polish-supporters had higher hopes for a favourable outcome. The proportion of 
German outvoters, in the industrial districts was lower than in the rural communes. 
This applied to the Poles as well. It was not that recent migration from the industrial 
Chapter 3 
234 
districts had been any less than from the rural areas, but rather that fewer of the people 
who moved away into industrial jobs elsewhere, had the determination, opportunity, or 
even the encouragement to register to vote in the plebiscite, let alone the means to 
return. Apart from the many thousands in the USA, the most likely Polish-supporting 
migrants from Silesia were working as miners and labourers in Germany. Wambaugh 
notes that there, German employers, especially those in the Ruhr, and German officials 
everywhere, allegedly discouraged these groups of Polish Upper Silesians from 
registering to vote. 192 On the other hand, for many potential German outvoters, there is 
little doubt that the Polish campaign against outvoting (aided by the demonising of 
Korfanty and atrocity stories in the German press) 1xightened-off many Germans 
who might otherwise have participated. As we will also see, however, Upper Silesia's 
socio-political cleavage, as reflected in the result of the plebiscite, was such that in 
each town, commune, and Gutsbezirke, one party tended to be supported to the near 
total exclusion of the other. In other words, the towns and villages tended to be either 
wholly 'German' or 'Polish' - adjectives Allied personnel had been associating with 
Upper Silesian place-names from the moment that they had arrived there. 
After reviewing the outvoting returns (see Table 5 and Table 6), Bourdillon 
wrote an unofficial summary for Waterlow on the likely outcome of the plebiscite and 
on problems that might be anticipated. He reported that there was a general acceptance 
that Kluczbork, the districts west of the Oder and all of the towns would vote for 
Germany; Rybnik, that Pszczyna and Lubliniec, and also Bytom Land and Katowice 
Land would vote for Poland; and that Tarnowski, Zabrze, and Toszecko-Gliwicki were 
likely to be split. He believed that the outcome in Olenso, Strzelce and the Opole 
Landkreise still remained uncertain. The pro-Polish element was strongest in the east, 
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Table 5: Finalised List of Registered Voters in Towns 20 March 1921196 
Towns Residents Outvoters Immigrants Total Percentage 
Outvoters 
Bytom 34,796 5,464 2,730 12.7% 
_ --- 
Gliwice 32,381 6, 32559 41,94 14.3% 
Glubczyce 5,772 31943 656 10,371 380/6 
KietrL 1,826 11108 109 3,043 36.4% 
Baborow 1,479 663 39 2,181 30.4% 
Katowice 22,556 3,562 2,712 28,830 12.3% 
Mystowice 8,327 720 10,908 1 r/O 
10uczbork 4,733 2,478 706 7,917 31.2% 
_ Byczna 
Wolczyn 
1,121 
1,536 
985 
1,056 
105 
177 
2,211 
2,769 
44.5% 
37.8% 
Kozfe 3,214 1,477 320 5,011 29.4% 
Glogowek 3,220 1,885 229 5,334 35.3% 
Krolewsks 
Huta * 
37,436 4,674 1,942 44,052 10.6% 
Lublinec 2,261 796 130 3,187 25% 
Dobrodzien 1,553 547 40 2,140 26% 
Womild 647 190 - 934 22.8% 
Opole 14,890 5,531 2,509 22,930 24.1% 
Krapkowice 1,716 725 85 2,526 28.7% 
Pszczyna 2,771 982 190 3,933 25% 
Bierun Stary 11327 116 12 1,455 9% 
Afikolow 4,742 885 158 5,785 15.3% 
Radborz 17,647 5,836 1,853 25,336 23% 
Olenso 2,805 1,003 159 3,966 25.3% 
Gorzow! %ski 546 465 52 1,063 43.7% 
Rybnik 5494 1.080 349 6923 15.60/6 
Wadislaw 1: 804 557 74 2,435 22.90/c 
Zory * 2,617 776 70 3,463 22.4% 
Tarnowski 
Gory * 
6,618 1,850 585 9,053 20.41/o 
Miastecko 1,089 125 10 1,224 10.2% 
Toszek 1,031 511 68 1,610 31.7% 
Pysknowice 2,812 625 110 3,547 17. &Yo_ 
Sonicowice 56 __151 
5 
___M 
I 
i 
Total 1 231.536 57,916 20,452 309,73- 187% 
*Industrial Area and Coalfields 
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Table 6 
Finalised, Lists of Registered Voters Overall 20 March 1921 I'll 
Districts Residents Outvoters Immigrants Total Percentage 
Outvoters 
Bytom 133,578 13,288 5,869 152.725 8.7% 
Gliwice 32,581 62009 33559 411949 14.3% 
Stmelce 38,381 7,399 768 46,548 15.9% 
Katowicc 129,880 14,474 6,816 1511170 9.6% 
Krelewska 37,436 4,674 11942 44,052 10.6% 
Buta * 
Kozle 65,409 20,465 2,101 87,975 23.3% 
Kluczbork 29,915 18,283 2,011 46,209 39.6% 
G#ubczyce 42,686 22,090 1,921 66.697 33.1% 
Lubliniec 24,999 4,751 421 29,991 19.90/0 
Opole 14,890 5,931 2,509 22.930 24.1% 
Opole Land 63,183 17,820 12712 82,715 21.5% 
Pszczvna 66,157 6,402 1,264 73,823 8.7% 
Radborz 54,802 13,465 22977 71.244 18.9% 
Olenso 26,190 9,167 620 35,977 
_25.5% 
Rybnik 701265 101047 2.003 82.412 12.2% 
Tarnowski 40,123 4,362 1,076 45,561 9.26% 
Gory * 
Toszecko- 42,371 5,138 642 48,153 10.7% 
Gliwicki 
Zabre 79,934 8.008 2.851 1 90.793 8.8% 
Total 988,580 191,183 41,07 1 1,220,8371 16% 
- Industrial Area and Coalfields. 
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gradually thinning away towards the west, thus giving 'a line which could afford a 
193 basis for a satisfactory division of the country' . The 
industrial triangle, however, 
posed a real problem with towns such as Katowice likely to be cut off from the 
territory that would probably be voting to rejoin Germany. But apart from these 
'important German islands', even worse might occur. Should the Toszecko-Gliwicki 
Kreis show a Polish majority, Bourdillon feared that the whole industrial triangle 
might 'be cut off from what one might call the German mainland'. 194 Bourdillon 
suggested that if this did occur, then allocating the territory simply by commune would 
need to be modified to take account of the size of the numerical majority. If not, then, 
as a result of ten or twelve villages to the west of the industrial triangle voting for 
Poland, several industrial towns voting for Germany by large majorities might have to 
be incorporated into Poland. 195 
Though Bourdillon made a great play about the towns, it should be noted that 
many of the industrial area's communes had much larger electorates than some of the 
smaller towns. 197 Commenting on Bourdillon's voting scenarios, Waterlow minuted 
that the difficulties he described would undoubtedly require the Supreme Council's 
intervention. More worrying for the Poles, he added (and Crowe and Curzon initialed 
without dissent), 'that it must not be supposed that the voting will by itself decide 
anything of importance'. 198 
Forwarded a copy of Bourdillon's report, William Max Muller, the new British 
Minister in Warsaw, took exception to what he regarded as its inherent partiality. Writing 
to the Foreign Office privately, he complained that, whereas it did not seem to matter if 
Germany absorbed 'small Polish islands' of voters, the same criteria did not seem to apply 
to 'small German islands' near the Polish frontier. Also, Bourdillon's references to a 
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revival of Polish terrorism were not balanced by any mention of the German terrorism that 
had also occurred. Max Muller added 
I may be doing Mr. Bourdillon an injustice, in part due to the impression I gathered 
at the F[oreign] O[ffice] even before I came out here that the members of our 
Commission in Upper Silesia were inclined unduly to favour the cause of our 
former enemies, an attitude which may in part be ascribed to a natural desire to 
counteract the French tendency to go to the opposite extreme. 199 
The remainder of Max Muller's long letter was a plea for improved Anglo-Polish relations. 
Max Muller said that, like his predecessors, he found great difficulty giving a satisfactory 
reply as to why Britain constantly opposed Polish aspirations. When he raised the ethnicity 
argument, they asked him 'why were the Czechs allowed to absorb Poles, Ruthenians, 
Slovaks, and GermansT. At Cieszyn, the Czechs' economic needs had over-ridden Polish 
numerical preponderance, yet, at Gdansk, Germany's ethnographic argument over-rode 
Poland's economic needs. He thought it vital that the final decision on Upper Silesia should 
be impartial but, in saying that, he did not believe that Britain had to favour Germany 
unduly. Poland's difficulties, 'flanked as she is by Russian chaos and by a Germany 
apparently resolved to bring her into something like industrial bondage', were immense. 
The Poles required help, but realised that the French were unlikely to be useful either 
politically or financially. Britain could help in reconstructing the country but, the hfinister 
cautioned, 'unless we do something to destroy the legend that the policy of H. M.. 
Government is anti-Polish', then Britain would find itself heavily handicapped when doing 
business there. This plea for an alternative British policy towards Poland was written just 
three days before the plebiscite. 200 
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After the August 1920 insurrection, the Germans' campaign for Upper Silesia had, 
in the words of T. Hunt Tooley, taken 'on an urgency resulting in the kind of controlled 
panic that loosened purse strings and inhibitions'. 201 Money poured into all the legitimate 
and the clandestine bodies working for a German victory. Though the full amount spent can 
never be established, Tooley estimates that over three years, Germany spent well over one 
billion marks [DO0,000,000] to win the plebiscite. 202 Backed by this spending, with the 
Church under control, a vicarious victory on outvoting, and news that British troops would 
soon be arriving, the Germans had every reason to be confident of winning a sizeable 
majority. 203 But, Tooley also notes that they were not 'so naive as to think that winning the 
vote would necessarily preserve their control of the region' . 
204 It was the German Foreign 
Office which now handled the Government's input to the plebiscite campaign. And it was 
there that Upper Silesia's future became even more intertwined with the conduct of 
Germany's reparation policy. At a conference held in London on I March, where some 
aspects of these reparation claims were once again discussed, the British were disappointed 
by another display of German intransigence on this issue. 205 On 8 March, the day before the 
first groups of outvoters started travelling to Upper Silesia, the French, Belgians and British 
retaliated by occupying towns in the Rhineland. 206 In the wake of this action, the German 
Ambassador in Paris informed Berlin that 
in light of the friction that had now developed between Germany and the Allies over 
the reparations proposals, it would no longer be easy for England and Italy - even 
with a favourable plebiscite result - to secure all of Upper Silesia for Germany. 207 
The new expectation was that 'the Allies would hold Upper Silesia as a deposit for 
reparations'. 
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This ftiction, however, did not inhibit the German Foreign Office from conducting 
intensive lobbying in Opole, London, and Paris over acts of 'Polish terrorism'- mainly in 
Pless, Rybnik, and Katowice. 2013 Conversely, London also received reports from the Polish 
Legation and from Warsaw about German violence and preparations to invade Upper 
Silesia. 209 Percival reported that large quantities of arms (mainly German) continued to be 
confiscated, that armed civilians had freed political prisoners 'of German sympathy' from 
Kozle prison, and that a British officer's car had been shot at and a German police officer 
passenger seriously wounded .2 
10 Nevertheless, even Percival felt that many of the German 
complaints were exaggerated. Regarding the reports of a German invasion, British officers 
in the Olenso-Lubliniec area were also reporting 'that the Poles intended to invade Upper 
Silesia in the next few days'. Percival himself was certain that Sokol societies were being 
armed and undergoing military training on the Polish side of the frontier but, despite both 
sides being in a position to start a rising, he thought neither would 'take the first step 
without serious provocation'. 211 In fact, almost all participating organisations appealed to 
the Upper Silesians not to disrupt the plebiscite. Addressing fears that the outvoters would 
act as an invading army, the Commission introduced various measures designed to reassure 
the PoleS. 212 The outvoters' arrival was to be spread over twelve days. On arriving in Upper 
Silesia they and their trains would be searched for weapons. After this, they would be 
conveyed directly to their individual voting areas. Concentrations of outvoters would occur 
in the larger towns, but there, troops would be available to maintain order. To help with 
this, the Commission had also restricted the sale of alcohol and banned outdoor assemblies. 
And from 8 March, entry into the plebiscite area was to be closed to all except qualified 
voters with tickets from the election committees. 204 
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The German authorities also played their part by displaying posters and placards in 
the principal German stations on the routes into Upper Silesia. These warned outvoters that, 
whilst there, they should avoid making any provocative gestures, such as singing patriotic 
213 songs. That said, Wambaugh describes how, inspired by the wave of German patriotism 
generated by the Allied occupation of the Rhineland towns, the outvoters' rail journeys 
became 'a triumphal progress, bands playing and flags waving at every station'. Travelling 
gratis, many had not been there for decades, whilst others had left so young, they had no 
memories at all. Some were old, others were crippled, and a few were in the later stages of 
confinement . 
214 The reception arrangements were excellent. On arriving at the main rail 
depots, outvoters were greeted by welcoming crowds. 3chutzbund officials and volunteers 
directed them to their pre-arranged accommodation where they would stay up to twelve 
days. These outvoters not only delivered crucially important German votes. The well- 
organised manner of their arrival also boosted the local German supporters' morale. 215 But 
because all categories of votes were counted together without distinction, there is no record 
of the number of outvoters who travelled and cast their ballot. Consequently, there is a 
divergence amongst historians about how many outvoters actually voted. 
To strengthen their respective arguments, historians sympathetic to Poland have 
tended to place the number of outvoters near the registered total of 191,183, whilst those 
favouring a German interpretation of events have usually minimised their numbers. 217 The 
Commission's British-run, communications department which co-ordinated the movements 
of the 280 special trains used to transport the outvoters, put the number of outvoters at over 
200,000 -a figure exceeding the total numbeer of outvoters registered .2 
18 Tooley advances 
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the more precise claim that 79% (151,034) of the registered outvoters, made the tri P. 2 '9 This 
figure is similar to Sarah Wambaugh's estimate of 'more than 150,000' . 
220 But simple 
arithmetic requires that, even had every registered resident and immigrant voter living in 
Upper Silesia cast a vote (1,029,654), then to balance the overall total number of plebiscite 
votes (1,190,533), then at least 84% (160,879) of the total registered outvoters must have 
participated. The overall turn out was 97.5% but it is unlikely that every vote registered in 
the immigrant and resident categories was used. On this assumption, this thesis calculates 
that 97.6% (186,603) of the total registered outvoters cast their votes in the plebiscite. 221 
With the outvoters arriving and Upper Silesia tense but secured, the way was clear 
for the vote to take place. In Warsaw, the Sejm's adoption of the new Polish Constitution 
on 17 March and the news of the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Peace Treaty at Riga the 
following day, inspired the Polish Prime Minister, Wincenty Witos, to declare 'that the 
Polish population of Upper Silesia could now cast their votes knowing that they were 
voting for a country secure at home and abroad' . 
222 But in Berlin, protests about 'Polish 
terrorism' continued to be delivered to Allied Representatives until late into the evening 
preceding the vote. 223 To the surprise and relief of all concerned, the following day turned 
out to be, in Percival's words, 'one of the quietest days experienced in Upper Silesia since 
224 August 1920'. It was a Sunday and in some areas an almost holiday atmosphere 
prevailed. Expecting to find trouble in the industrial districts, the only crowds a British 
journalist could find 'were around some French tanks and at Post Offices in search of 
plebiscite stamps ',. 225 As the votes began to be counted, it became clear that (as Bourdillon 
had predicted), the voting units to the west of the Oder had voted for Germany, while those 
around the industrial area had generally opted for Poland. However, there was no clear 
outcome across the industrial area's patchwork of towns, communes and Gutsbezirke. Out 
Chapter 3 
243 
of the 1,545 voting units, 55.5% (845) had voted for Germany and 44.4% (700) for Poland. 
Table 7 breaks down this result by towns, communes and Gutsbezirke. But in the ensuing 
battle of statistics, it was the total of 707,392 votes (59.6%) cast for Germany and 479,358 
(40.4%) for Poland that was seized on by Germany and Britain and through their news 
agencies, broadcast to the world - see Table 8 for a numerical breakdown by district. 227 
According to the Peace Treaty, the inter-Allied Commission was to make a 
recommendation to the Supreme Council on Upper Silesia's disposal. President Ebert 
immediately published a proclamation claiming the whole plebiscite area for Germany. "9 
And when the British Cabinet met on 22 March, they instructed Percival that he must not 
award any part of Upper Silesia to Poland. 230 Marinis informed the Italian Foreign Ministry 
that he would support his British colleague but failing an instruction to this effect, he would 
be disposed to let Poland have certain narrowly circumscribed districts on the south east of 
the plebiscite area . 
23 1 Needless to say the Poles did not view the results in the same light. 
Like the French, they focussed not on the huge German majorities in the uncontested west, 
but on the number of communes won in the south east and the Polish victories in the mixed 
communities in and around the industrial area. 232 
There can be no doubt about which interpretation was correct. Allocating the whole 
territory by majority vote would have constituted a breach of the Peace Treaty. 233 The 
addition of part of Namysl6w and the southern part of Ghibczyce (overwhelmingly German 
territory and not claimed by the Poles), to the original plebiscite area, and then including 
their populations and non-residents in the vote, was alone enough to undermine any 
interpretation of the plebiscite based on the overall vote. 234 Although significant to persons 
unfamiliar with the decisions taken in Paris regarding the plebiscite vote, technically the 
total vote was irrelevant to such an extent that the plebiscite area's western boundary could 
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Table 7 
Result of Plebiscite by Voting Units Won 20 March 1921226 
District 
Polish 
Towns 
German 
Towns 
Polish 
Communes 
German 
Communes 
Polish 
Gutsbe- 
zirke 
German 
Gutsbe- 
zirke 
Probable 
German 
Gains 
Through 
Outvoting 
Bytom 1 21 7 3 
Gliwice I - - - - 
Strzelce 3 61 27 19 21 14 
Katowice * 1 18 6 13 2 3 
Krolewska 
HUM * 
I - - - - 
Kode 2 21 147 2 51 13 
Kluczbork 3 - 76 35 
Glubczyce 3 85 8 
Lubliniec 1 2 41 25 10 20 11 
Opole I - - 
-Opole 
Land - 1 27 107 - 14 25 
Pszczyna 1 2 89 4 27 6 2 
RaciborL - 1 40 35 5 25 7 
Olenso 2 29 42 1 35 17 
Rybnik 3 102 8 24 6 4 
Tarnowski 
Gory * 
1 1 33 2 9 6 1 
Toszecko 
Gliwicki 
3 90 10 1 0 5 
Zabrze 3 1 1 
Totals 3 31 593 594 114 230 106 
* Industrial Area and Coalfields 
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Table 8 
Numerical Result of Plebiscite by Districts 20 March 1921228 
Districts 
Total 
Excluding 
Spoilt 
Votes 
Poland Germany 
Voting 
Share 
Poland 
Voting 
Share 
Germany 
Percentage 
Registered 
Outvoters 
(Number of 
Outvoters) 
Bytom 146,689_ 73,122 73,567 49.8% 50.2% 9% 
Gliwice 40,587 8,558 32,029 21.1% 78.9% 14.8% 
(6, 
Strzelce 45,461 23,046 22415 50. 'PYO - 49.3% 16.2% 
(7,399) 
. 
Katowice * 145,685 70,019 75,666 48.1% 5I. Wo 9.9% 
(14,474) 
Krolewska 
Huts * 
42,628 10,764 31,864 25.3% 74.7% 11% 
(4.674) 
Kozle 86,183 16,707 69,476 19.4% 80.6% 23.7% 
(20,4 
Kluczbork 45,108 1,785 43,323 4% 96% 40.5% 
(18,283) 
Glubczyce 65,387 295 65,128 . 4% 99.6% 33.8% 
(22,090) 
Lubliniec 29,132 13,679 151453 47% 53% 15.7% 
(4,751) 
Opole 21,914 1,098 20,816 5% 95% 27% 
(5,931) 
Opole Land 80,888 24.726 56,170 30.6% 69.4% 22% 
(17 82 
Pszczyna 72,053 53,378 18,675 74.1% 25.9% 8.9% 
(6,402) 
Raciborz 69,385 201745 48,640 29.9% 70.1% 19.4% 
(J3,465) 
Olenso 35,007 11,150 31.9% 68.1% 26% 
(9,167) 
Rybnik 80,266 52,347 65.2% 34.80/a 12.5% 
(10,047) 
Tarnowski 
Gory * 
44,590 27,513 17,077 61.70/a 38.3% 9.8% 
(4,362) 
Toszecko- 
Gliwicki 
47,296 27,198 20,098 57.5% 42.5% 10.8% 
(5,138) 
Zabrze * 88.493 43.264 45.219 9% 
Sub Total 1,186,658 (8,008) 
! ý02&ed Votes ý+3 875 
Totals 1,190,533 479,358 707,392 40.4% 59.6% 16% 
1 1 , (191,183) 
* Industrial Area and Coalfields 
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equally have been at Leipzig, Dresden or even Berlin. 235 What counted was the Polish vote 
and, more importantly, its location. Therefore, despite the British Cabinet's initial reaction 
to the results, after a closer analysis of the outcome, caution began to prevail. It became 
clear that, in addition to Poland winning Upper Silesia's vital coal fields in Pszczyna and 
Rybnik, the German vote in the industrial area was confined to four large towns, with most 
of the surrounding communes from which the towns drew their labour, voting for 
poland. 236 From the British policy-makers' point of view, what was even worse, was that 
Bourdillon's fears about 'ten or twelve villages' in the rural district of Toszecko-Gliwicki 
rejecting Germany had been realised, and the industrial triangle had been isolated from the 
solid German-voting regions to the west. 237 
Waterlow suggested the British Government's 'extreme position' might be turned 
to an advantage by intimating to the German Government that British support for their 
claim to the whole of Upper Silesia depended upon Germany producing 'new and 
acceptable proposals about reparation'. Rejecting this, Crowe, the only Foreign Office 
official familiar with all aspects of the plebiscite negotiations in Paris, warned Curzon that: 
We must remember, as regards the territorial arrangements to be made as a result of 
the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, that the French will be in a strong position if they 
maintain that the treaty, by expressly stipulating for a frontier line to be laid down 
in pursuance of the vote by communes, clearly contemplates a division of the 
239 
territory. 
Curzon agreed that it would be difficult to implement the Cabinet's decision and explained 
that instructions to Percival to recognise the German claim to the whole of Upper Silesia 
had 'merely indicated the trend of British policy '. He wanted to 'abstain from any action 
which might make the French even more SUSPiCiOUS'. 240 But, where Poland or France was 
Chapter 3 
247 
concerned, Curzon's views counted for little with Lloyd George - the man who mattered, 
D'Abernon, who had been on leave, had visited Downing Street on 22 March where he had 
learned that the Cabinet had recommended returning Upper Silesia to Germany. Lloyd 
George told him then that partition would be sanctioned only if it was unavoidable because; 
'We are all interested in German prosperity and the Poles could make nothing of this or any 
other country'. 241 Perhaps a hint of the line D'Abernon was to take to solve the reparations 
impasse with Berlin? 
There, as the first trainloads of outvoters were returning, Kilmarnock was noting 
that there was some disappointment amongst the 'well-informed circles' that had expected 
Germany's share of the vote to be much higher. Nevertheless, the sense of euphoria 
continued in the German press and no reappraisal of the results had occurred. it was 
evident, wrote Kilmarnock, that the Government was systematically priming 'the man in 
the street' to expect all of Upper Silesia to be returned. Assertions that Polish terrorism had 
prevented Germans from voting, reappeared in the press but the Independent Socialist's 
newspaper, the Freiheit, was the only German source which admitted a large proportion of 
Upper Silesia's industrial district had voted against Gerrnany - see Tables 9 and 10.242 In a 
succinct analysis of the international position, Wambaugh observed that this inconvenient 
fact was also being overlooked in Britain and Italy. Leading newspapers there were also 
arguing that Europe's economic interests would suffer if any part of Upper Silesia went to 
poland. 243 With the British press and many politicians presenting the plebiscite results in 
this manner, and the German Government conducting an energetic campaign to promote 
their claim at home and abroad, it is understandable why, even today, most English- 
language historiography perpetuates the myth that Germany had 'won' the plebiscite in 
Upper Silesia. 244 
Chapter 3 
248 
Table 9 
Result of Plebiscite by Voting Units Won 20 March 1921 
(Industrial Areas and Coalfields only) 238 
Districts 
Towns 
Poland 
Towns 
Germany 
Communes 
Poland 
Communes 
Germany 
Gubbe- 
zirke 
Poland 
Gutybe. 
zirke 
Germany 
Probable 
German 
Gains 
Through 
Outvoter 
Bytom - 2 21 7 3 
Gliwice - I - - 
Katowice - 1 18 6 13 2 3 
Krolewska 
Huta 
- I - - - 
Pszczyna 1 2 89 8 27 6 2 
RYbnik - 3 102 8 24 6 4 
Tarnowsld 
Gory I 
1 1 
II 
33 2 9 6 1 
Zabrze 11 3 3 1 1 
ý 
Totals 2 11 274 30 76 21 14 
For Poland in Industrial Area = 352 Voting Units Comprising I Town 
For Germany in Industrial Area = 62 Voting Units 11 Communes 
2 Gutsbedrki 
For Poland in Industrial Area = 338,957 Votes 
For Germany in Industrial Area = 322,009 Votes (including German 57,264** outvoters) 
** 67,264 Registered Outvoters 
less 10. Polish Outvoters 
= 57.264 German Outvoters 
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Table 10 
Numerical Result of Plebiscite by Districts 20 March 1921 
(Industrial Area and Coalfields only) 245 
District 
Total 
Excluding 
Spoilt 
Votes 
Poland Germany 
Votin 
sun 
Poland 
Voting 
Share 
Germany 
% Share 
Registered 
Outvoters 
(Number of) 
_Bytom 
146,689 73,122 73,567 49.8% 50.2% 9% 
(13,288) 
Gliwice 40,587 8,558 32,039 21.1% 79.9% 14.9% 
(6,009) 
Katowice 145,685 70,019 75,666 48.1% 51.9% 9.9% 
(14., 474) 
Krolewska 
Ruta 
42,628 10,764 31,864 25.3% 74.7% 11% 
(4,674) 
Pszczyna 72,053 53,378 18,675 74.1% 25.9% 8,9% 
(6,402) 
Rybnik 80,266 52,347 27,919 65.2% 34.8% 12.5% 
(10,047) 
Tarnowski 
Gory 
44,590 27,513 17,077 61.7% 38.3% 9.8% 
(4,362) 
Zabrze ý88468 42,256 4 
=5 51.1 9% 
(8,008) 
Total 1 660,916 338,957* 322-)09** 51.3% 4&7% 67,264 
1 Outvoters 
* 70.7 % of the total Polish plebiscite vote. 
** 45.5% of the total German plebiscite vote. 
Outvoters = 10.1 % of the Industrial Area and Coalfields' vote. 
Outvoters = 23.4% of the remaining plebiscite districts. 
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However, an interpretation of the first plebiscite results received in Warsaw 
246 
appeared to indicate a favourable outcome for Poland . Newspapers encouraged the idea 
and soon Warsaw's streets were crowded with processions, cheering crowds and public 
rejoicing. When the outcome turned out to be worse than they had expected, the Polish 
public's attention concentrated on the industrial district. They hoped that there, the meaning 
and intent of the Treaty plus the number of Polish votes in eastern, south-eastern, and 
247 
central districts, would secure the entire district for Poland . Realising Germany was 
manoeuvring to obtain all of Upper Silesia, the Polish commentators reassured their readers 
'that the total number of votes counts for nothing'. 248 Excellent and extensive analysis of 
the voting results can be found in works by Tooley, Komarnicki, and Blanke. But, like the 
various permutations that were formulated by the Commissioners and by the Allied 
officials in a bid to match their policy objectives, without exception, all of these expositions 
have centred on which Upper Silesian districts constitute the industrial area and the coal- 
fields. 249 There is little point in duplicating them or reiterating the German claim to the 
whole region, as discussed above. Instead, this thesis has concentrated on establishing the 
real contribution which outvoting made to the plebiscite's outcome and refers the reader to 
Addendum 1, Annex 1- Analysis of Outvoting Effect on Each Voting Unit - Data and 
Statistics. 
Apart from questioning whether persons who had little interest in Upper Silesia 
should vote on its future, the Polish campaign's objection to outvoting had rested on the 
outvoters' potential to create violence. However, due to the manner in which the outvoters 
were handled and the plebiscite itself, these fears proved groundless. After the plebiscite, 
however, apart from speculating about what the Supreme Council's decision would be, the 
question being asked was why the majority of what appeared to be an overwhelmingly 
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ethnic Polish population, had refused to join the reborn Polish Republic? At this populist 
level, questions about what constituted Upper Silesian national identity (addressed by 
Tooley and Blanke), were ignored. 250 Instead, the Polish nationalists and succeeding 
generations of Poles have tended to blame the machinations of Britain and Germany and 
the large influx of German outvoters for Poland's failure to win a greater share area of the 
vote. However, after examining the outcome of voting in each of the 1,545 Gutsbezirke, 
communes and towns listed in the official results, it would appear Germany probably 
gained only an additional 106 (6.8%) of the plebiscite area's 1,545 voting units through the 
support of its outvoters. In the vital industrial area and in the coalfields, where the 
percentage of registered outvoters was just 9.8% (compared with an average of 16% across 
the whole plebiscite area), Germany probably gained at most only fourteen voting units - 
comprising one small town (Myslowice), eleven communes, and two Gutsbezirke or 3.4% 
of that area's 414 voting units. 
Rather like the votes for Poland, outvoting's importance lay in its size and location. 
As we have noted, for various reasons, the tendency was for the outvoters to reinforce 
existing majorities, Therefore, in districts such as Pszczyna, Rybnik, Katowice Land, 
Kluczbork, and Glubczyce, which already had overwhelmingly Polish or German 
majorities, outvoting had little or no impact on the result. This phenomenon explains why 
the effect of the often quoted '10,000 Polish outvoters' who, if they existed, would in all 
probability have voted in almost totally Polish-supporting communes, can be discounted 
251 from our calculations. In terms of territory won and lost (as opposed to the numbers of 
towns, communes and Gutsbezirke), outvoting did have an impact in Strzelce, Olenso and 
Lubliniec, three of the agricultural Kreis laying to the west and to the north of the industrial 
area. When measuring and discussing the plebiscite results, politicians and officials found 
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I PUNCH, OR THE LONDON CHAIVARI. -MAscm 30.1921,1 
Tmxks Anus (4m plibiwito ingy in Uffm Sgwi4 " WHAT ARE YOU GJRDUSINO ABOUT. JZM? IOU ME TOP OF TUB BLINKIZN* POL4 APM"f YOU ? BIT OF A HAUL FOR TUB IfATHMMARW 
GUMU. -ACE, YES. 31CT NOW SAVE WE OF 01011 BEST R&PAKATIONS-EVADINO IM0083 
DEPSIVED BEE. %. - 
10. The Bitters of Victory (Punch, 30 March 1921) 
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The Kreis was a handy-sized administrative unit for them to conceptualise, in nwnerical 
terms, Depending on who had the numerical majority within them, they would refer to the 
Kreis or district as being either Polish or German. This worked against the Poles because in 
the Kreise surrounding the industrial triangle, apart from giving the Germans a majority in 
Lubliniec, outvoting also minimised the bare numerical majorities that the Poles had 
obtained in Strzelce, Tarnowski Gory, and Toszecko-Gliwicki. And in the industrial area, 
as well as exaggerating German majorities in the towns, outvoters helped the Germans to 
6 gain' the districts of Zabrze, Katowice, and Bytom. 
The overall conclusion can only be that the outvoter effect in tenns of winning or 
losing individual towns, communes, and Gutsbezirke within Upper Silesia's industrialised 
areas was far less significant than that suggested by their 25.5% share of the total German 
vote. However, the German outvoters had a considerable effect on what turned out to be the 
psychologically important (though theoretically irrelevant) numerical voting figures when 
extended to, first, the Kreis, and then the whole plebiscite area. 252 This became by far the 
most influential component in deciding the final line of partition. That settlement, as Prince 
Sapieha told Max Muller, 'cast a heavy responsibility on the shoulders of the inter-Allied 
Commission and ultimately of the Allied Governments'. 253 
After the outvoters, had departed, as we have indicated, for Polish supporters there 
was no disguising the fact that thousands of ethnic Poles had voted to remain in Germany. 
'Why so many did', wrote W. J. Rose in 1936, 'would never be known" . 
25' But since then 
several scholars, most notably Rosenthal and Zielinski, have attempted answers, the most 
convincing of which are material considerations. The German campaign's central theme 
had been economic continuity and their leaders' concern for the well being of the whole 
population. Rosenthal argues that, OVeT the centuries, Upper Silesians had always been 
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unconcerned with national identity and were more apt to follow their economic and their 
political intereStS. 255 Stimulated by Keynes' comments in The Economic Consequences of 
Peace, both the Germans and the Poles had been compiling, publishing and circulating 
books and articles full of economic statistics and forecasts about Upper Silesia's future. 256 
These sophisticated arguments aimed to influence the policy-makers and were far beyond 
the mass of non-assimilated Polish-speaking Silesians who had now cast their votes for 
Germany. Their economic concerns had been addressed by the many local newspapers, 
almost all of which were subsidised by the German campaign. 257 These were readily 
accessible and comprehensible, issuing incessant warnings to the population about job 
security, aspects of social insurance, the continuity of their pensions and so forth, should 
the country become part of Poland. 
All arguments were designed to make every Upper Silesian feel that they had 'a 
stake in the German status quo2.258 The Prussian and Federal German Governments had 
both made funds available to support conununity projects and to compensate people 
materially affected by the recent insurrection. Several of their new taxes and many of the 
rises in the existing ones, had not been extended to Upper Silesia, and a 500 million mark 
fund to repair war-damaged areas in the German borderlands (half of which, it was 
promised, earmarked for Silesia), had also been announced. 259 If we add to these economic 
incentives, the continual pressure from all of the other sources, such as German industry, 
the feudal landowners, their agents, most of the Catholic clergy, the Centre Party, and the 
Prussian administrators and officials which the Commission had retained in office, also 
urging a vote for Germany, it is only then that we can begin to grasp the enormous leap of 
faith that had been made by the Upper Silesians who had voted for Poland. 260 For, despite 
the Polish Prime Mnister's eve-of-poll remarks about Poland's new constitution and the 
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recently established security on its eastern borders, there could be no rational economic 
comparison made between an apparently economically recovering Germany and Poland 
which, despite Witos's claims of normality, was plagued by epidemics, threatened by 
famine, suffering from a severe spiralling inflation, and still possessing a war-time 
economy geared to the military requirements of its continuing confrontations with 
neighbouring states. Forced to make such a choice, the fact that Poland won 46.5% of 
Upper Silesia's residential vote, perhaps said more about the alienation that had been 
engendered by the Prussian authorities amongst sections of the Polish-speaking Upper 
Silesians over the past fifty years, than it did about the failure of the Polish campaign to 
win over more non-assimilated Upper Silesians to their cause. However, these soon became 
only points of academic interest when, ignoring the Polish majorities in the border districts, 
Ebert published a proclamation claiming the whole plebiscite area for Germany. This had 
brought bands of Poles on to the streets of Katowice and Bytom and the 'truce' between the 
contending parties broke down. 261 
Travelling down from Lubliniec, two companies of the Black Watch went quickly 
into action in Bytom when seven Germans, including six policeman, were killed at the 
mining village of Karp (Karf) after being attacked by a Polish armed band. 262 German 
customs officials in Myslowice fled for their lives when set upon by Polish crowds armed 
with sticks. The disorder quickly spread into Krolewska Huta, Pszczyna and then Rybnik. 
The Commission declared a 'state of siege' and sent reinforcements including troops from 
the Royal Sussex Regiment, to implement it. 263 Percival reported that in the outlying areas, 
'many hundreds of Germans' had been beaten and forced to leave their homes'. They could 
not be protected by the Commission's new mixed police force. This had been largely 
ineffective because German members had 'been forced or persuaded to leave their posts'. 
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Hundreds of refugees had crowded into the towns (where German voters were in the 
majority), most notably Katowice, Bytom, Gliwice. Nikolow, and Pszczyna. However, he 
added, the worst of the disturbances had subsided around 26 March and by the end of 
month the violence had diminished everywhere. 264 Percival believed the disturbances had 
reflected the mood of the population in these areas. 
Rough and ill disciplined, they have both the cruelty and cowardice of those 
accustomed to live in gangs. They are plentiftdly equipped with arms, and living, as 
they do, in a frontier zone they can obtain as many more as they wish. They are 
bitterly influenced against everything German and are liable, on the slightest 
pretext, to wreak vengeance on any unprotected Germans they find at their 
Mercy. 265 
One effect of this show of force may have been to persuade Percival that, in addition 
to complying with London's recent suggestion that he recommend Rybnik and Pszczyna be 
granted to the Poles, he ought also to follow Marinis and suggest that 'the eastern fringe of 
266 Kreise Bytom and Katowice' should also be awarded to Poland. But if it took a violent 
Polish reaction to wring this concession from the British and Italian Commissioners, the 
lesson would not have been lost on the leaders of the Polish campaign. This did not bode 
well for any line of partition that the Commission recommended, should it leave thousands 
of Polish-supporters still inside Germany. 
In Britain, meanwhile, industrial confrontation was threatening yet again. The War 
Office's reaction was the mobilisation of reservists and recall of all military units within 
reach. This included the British troops in Upper Silesia. Within a few days of receiving 
their orders all four British battalions had departed . 
267 Their hasty departure not only 
undermined Percival's recently found authority in Upper Silesia but ftniher weakened 
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British influence. It also removed the only near-certain military opposition in the way of a 
third Polish insurrection - something which the Polish para-militarist had been urging on 
Korfanty since the plebiscite, but which he had been successfully resisting up to that point. 
However, this was something far removed from Wilson and the War Council's concerns. 
Having failed to reach agreement with the mining unions on their wages and conditions 
before the war-time nationalisation of the mines ended on 31 March, the mine owners 
began to 'lock-out' their employees. The spectre of a Triple Alliance strike leading to 
revolution once again raised its head amongst the military leaders, some Government 
members, their supporters and certain groups across the country. Although the question of 
whether the railwaymen and the other transport workers would strike in sympathy had not 
yet been decided, the CIGS had acted. And when Lloyd George questioned recalling the 
troops from Upper Silesia, Wilson, still determined to avoid entanglements outside the 
Empire, replied by asking him whether 'he wanted to be Prime Nfinister of England or of 
Upper Silesia? 1268 Seizing the opportunity presented by the divisions within and between 
the three unions involved, Lloyd George eventually called their blUff269 But when the 
strike collapsed on 15 April (Black Friday), the British troops did not return to Upper 
Silesia. It was once again left to the French and Italians to handle a situation that was 
becoming increasingly tense as the parties awaited the Commission's recommendations. 
In a message to the Polish-voters on the day following the plebiscite, Korfanty had 
congratulated them on 'bursting their bonds of enslavement to Prussia' but he had also 
reminded them that the struggle was not yet over. They were entering a crucially important 
period of diplomatic struggle and international negotiations. Until the boundaries had been 
determined he asked them to maintain their national unity and continue to suppress any 
party-political divergences. 270 Similar sentiments prevailed amongst the Germans. 
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Throughout Germany the press continued to assert the Germans' right to the whole of 
Upper Silesia. In Opole, however, Hatzfeldt, the German representative, conceded to 
Percival that he would not be surprised if the Pszczyna and Rybnik Kreise were allotted to 
Poland. 271 In Berlin D'Abernon also observed the prevalence of this 'concessionary' 
thinking, and agreed that these two particular districts should go to Poland. 272 The only 
dissenting voice came from Max Muller who wanted much more to be done for Poland. He 
suggested that Britain should demonstrate that it genuinely cared about Europe's general 
welfare by helping to establish an economically strong Poland. This could be done by 
supporting a modified Polish claim to the parts of the district lying closest to the Polish 
frontier - enabling Poland to finance its own reconstruction from the profits generated by 
its Upper Silesian industries. 273 Any such ideas were anathema to Major Ottley. A stream 
of increasingly robust reports and memoranda contesting all Polish claims outwith 
Pszczyna and Rybnik, streamed from Ottley's pen. 274 But even before Ottley had time to 
comment on Max Muller's proposal, on 3 April Curzon had given his approval to the 
substance of Percival's recommendations on Upper Silesia. Hatzfeldt's warning, that Polish 
resentment over the decision, when it came, would spark another Polish rising in Upper 
Silesia, possibly leading to war between Germany and Poland, was not considered. 275 
Referring to a suggestion from the Italians that some territory in the east of the industrial 
triangle be granted to Poland, the Foreign Office sent Percival a telegram confirming that 
Suggested compromise (i. e. allocation of Pless [Pszczynal & Rybnik to Poland 
together with such strips of territory on eastern border as may be necessary) seems 
on the whole fairest solution. You are therefore authorised to support your Italian 
colleague in recommending thiS. 276 
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The British hoped the Commission's recommendation would be unanimous and 
delivered in time for a Supreme Council meeting scheduled to start on I May. This meant 
that whatever the French Government instructed Le Rond to recommend to the Supreme 
Council would be decisive. A French Senate discussion on foreign affairs held on 6 April 
gave some indication. Briand insisted that to think that Germany would be less able to pay 
reparations if deprived of Upper Silesia's industry was a fallacy. And, from the floor of the 
Senate, in an oblique reference to Lloyd George, the French leader was urged to prevent 
Germany using the plebiscite results to extract concessions on reparations 'which 
some ... might be more ready to grant than Monsieur Briand'. 
277 Notes sent to Percival from 
London urging that the Commission complete its report, implied that this was just what the 
British were planning to do . 
278 But when Percival reported that Le Rond intended that the 
whole industrial area should go to the Poles, with Poland becoming responsible for paying 
a proportionate share of the German reparations (an obvious French sop to Lloyd George's 
continued preoccupation with their possible loss), the receipt of an unanimous report from 
the Commissioners was unlikely. Instead, Percival was instructed to prepare a majority 
report on the basis agreed with Marinis. 279 
Though no such principle as the indivisibility of Upper Silesia is to be found in the 
Peace Treaty, significantly, in view of future events, not one of the three Commissioners 
(nor the Powers that they represented), desired that its industrial area should be 
partitioned. 280 Even Le Rond, supporting his recommendations with powerful argument, 
proffered solutions to Lloyd George's concerns regarding possible loss of reparations if this 
occurred. After first recommending that the whole industrial area should be awarded to 
Poland, he proposed that an inter-Allied economic organisation be established to supervise 
the area's continued economic output, enabling them to levy a share of Germany's 
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reparations from Poland . 
281 And far from interpreting the plebiscite results as the confusing 
mass of towns, communes and Gutsbezirke with mixed preferences, as described by 
Percival and Marinis, Le Rond felt that the results had produced two clear distinct blocks of 
282 different populations, the limits of which he believed ought to define the new frontier. 
The area he wanted to allot to Poland encompassed the territory that the Poles had 
originafly claimed in Paris - before the Peace Conference's Polish Committee's over- 
283 
generous experts extended it into what was indisputably German land. Le Rond admitted 
the Germans' skill in exploiting Upper Silesia's resources in the past. However, there were 
now profound national differences separating the Polish miners ftom their German 
managers. The Allies could not ask workers who had tasted freedom under the 
Commission's rule to accept German subjection again. They were now organised and 
conscious, and having learned how the industrial area had voted, the vast majority believed 
that they had actually won their independence. Should the Allies try forcing them back into 
Germany, Le Rond predicted that this could very well provoke yet another insurrection. 
This in turn, could have 'lamentable consequences for European economy.... and be 
284 dangerous for the peace of Centnd Europe' Such considerations, however, were left 
unbroached by Percival and Marinis. 
Like Le Rond, both Percival and Marinis were both ultimately acting under their 
superiors' instructions. They were, therefore, especially preoccupied with protecting 
German capital investment in Upper Silesia and encouraging a slArift return to pre-war 
levels of coal production and industrial output. Above all, the British wanted to avoid 
placing German voters in Poland - although, as Max Muller pointed out in his complaint 
about Bourdillon, the converse did not appear to apply. 285 The implication was that the 
Polish majority in most areas claimed by the Poles 'was composed of the lowest and most 
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ignorant elements of the population' and, therefore, did not really count. 286 Almost to a 
man, British and Italian officials were sceptical about Poland's capacity to run Upper 
Silesia's industries. Many years of propaganda by the partitioning powers and the strong 
social-Darwinian philosophy prevailing within the strata of British society from which 
British officers were drawn (reinforced by military training), had conditioned them to 
regard Poland's long years of partition as something which the Poles had brought upon 
themselves. This was seen as due to some weakness of national character - including an 
inherent incapacity to administer themselves. These were, of course, classic excuses for 
unfettered imperialism. To this way of thinking, only 'strong' nations were capable of 
industrialisation, therefore deficiencies in the Polish character obviously meant that they 
were incapable of industrial organisation. This meant that should the industrial area go to 
Poland, German capital and technological expertise would have to be replaced by someone, 
and that someone appeared to be France. Percival had already been alerting the Foreign 
Office about Franco-Polish discussions on joint ventures. 287 
The British line duly conceded the Rybnik and Pszczyna districts to Poland whilst 
sacrificing most of the Polish voters to Germany - see Map 4. The Italian line was similar 
to the British one, but the Italian Foreign Nfinister, Count Szforza, with the sort of typically 
confusing gesture that then characterised Italian diplomacy, would soon suggest a more 
generous settlement for the Poles (conceding large areas of the industrial triangle). 2" The 
Commissioners signed the report on 30 April, but Whilst it was being rushed to the various 
capital cities (Le Rond went with it to Paris), the British and Italian recommendations were 
leaked and published in Korfanty's newspaper, the Grenzzeitung, the following day. 
Fearing that their wishes were about to be disregarded, the Polish miners immediately 
responded to fresh calls for a general strike. On the evening of 2 May, as the Commission's 
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recommendations arrived in London, the third and most serious of the Polish insurrection, 
broke out in Upper Silesia. 289 
Summaa 
Surveying the period leading up to Upper Silesia's third and final insuffection, it would be 
fair to say that a developing modus vivendi had permitted the existence of more reasonable 
inter-personal relations between the Commissioners, at the same time recognising where 
each others' sympathies and aims lay. Whilst the Commission's reorganisation provided 
Percival with increased sources of information, it never altered Le Rond's tendency to 
regard his British and Italian colleagues as anything other than junior board-members 
whose eccentricities had to be accommodated. Interviewed by the press, he scarcely 
mentioned them. Colonel Repington has also recorded Le Rond's tendency to credit 
himself with every achievement - even the excellent German outvoting organisation. " 
After his London interviews with Waterlow in November 1920, Percival found his role 
much more comfortable. He appears to have been much happier following London's orders 
and reporting back, than he ever was during his initial period as Commissioner, when he 
was constantly agonising over whether or not to confront Le Rond. Therefore, in a sense, 
we can say that relations between the Commissioners did improve during this period but 
only because the contentious issues were now being referred to the Ambassadors in Paris 
and to the Supreme Council where, aided by the odd compromise, Lloyd George's 
negotiating skills invariably carried the day. 
However, without Lloyd George, at this level of diplomacy the Foreign Office itself 
achieved little in the way of influencing events within Upper Silesia. For example, when 
they had sought a confrontation with France over Le Rond's presidency and Korfanty's 
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expulsion, the officials had to climb down when forced to think through the implications 
that threatening to withdraw the British contingent from Upper Silesia would hold for 
international affairs. It was not until they addressed the French Government's real fears 
over the security of their forces in Upper Silesia (should 300,000 outvoters arrive en bloc) 
that Britain managed to make progress on the outvoter question. After all, it had been the 
British military default that had placed the French and Italian troops in such a vulnerable 
position. A half-promise by Lloyd George to send a few British troops immediately brought 
about indirect pressure on Korfanty to end his campaign against the outvoters. And 
Percival's contention that thousands of outvoters could travel into Upper Silesia quite 
safely and vote alongside the residents there, was accepted by France the moment Curzon 
was able to confirm the British commitment to send the four battalions of troops from the 
Rhine to Upper Silesia - though this met Wilson's opposition as soon as he found out. 
The Germans never failed to utilise any source of support that could be mustered 
over Upper Silesia or to exploit the divisions within the Entente. Their Foreign Ministry 
was guilty of using Upper Silesia to delay the final reparation demand, though it did 
overplay its hand at the London Conference on I March. Once the plebiscite results were 
known, Germany's attempt to retain the whole plebiscite area by placing an emphasis on 
the overall numerical majority it had been gifted, was so successftd that today many, if not 
most, Western historians continue to perpetuate the myth that the Poles had unjustifiably 
deprived Germany of territory in Upper Silesia in 192 1. In this the German cause has been 
greatly aided and historians misled by Lloyd George's pronouncements on the subject in 
the House of Commons - although in Lloyd George's case he quite possibly believed the 
distortion he was perpetuating. Warsaw never had any intention of being drawn into a war 
with Germany over Upper Silesia, but what the Polish Government wanted and what the 
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Polish militarists did very often diverged. A similar story existed in Germany where the 
situation was ftirther complicated by differences between the Prussian and Federal German 
goverrunents over the handling of Upper Silesia. Once the Bolshevik threat had receded in 
Poland, much clandestine military support flowed to the Upper Silesian POW units that 
traversed the border. Fearing a pre-emptive Polish strike there prior to the plebiscite, the 
Finance Minister, Joseph Wirth, working through the Reichswehr, had resumed Federal 
funding to Freikorps units. Wirth intended using them in Upper Silesia if there was a para- 
military insurrection. General von Seeckt, the Reichswehr's Commander in Chief, intended 
using them there only if Polish troops invaded Upper Silesia. Illicit German weapons also 
flowed into the region but with the French military concentrating on finding them, the arms 
were being discovered at such an embarrassing rate that Hatzfeldt wrote to Berlin in early 
March pointing out 'that such activities only worked against the German cause in pariSi. 291 
In these months the outvoter question was also a particularly contentious topic, and 
it has remained so to this day. The outvoters had a right to vote, but had the plebiscite's 
outcome not been distorted by re-focussing on the numerical result, their contribution 
would have been minimal. This was because the vast majority were concentrated in the 
German-dominated towns and in rural areas already possessing huge German majorities. 
The statistical analysis indicates that only 12,742 or just 7% of the total numbeT of GeTman 
outvoters made a difference in a handful of towns, communes and Gutsbezirke. However, 
without the Polish campaign's own anti-outvoter campaign, aided by German press stories 
about Polish atrocities, discouraging many thousands more, the outcome might have been a 
different. This was because Upper Silesia's partition (see Chapter 5) was finally calculated 
on a numerical basis (a ratio of territory to total votes gained), rather than, as the Treaty had 
required, by the number of the towns, communes and Gutsbezirke won. Therefore every 
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one of the estimated 186,000 votes cast by the German outvoters (who formed a staggering 
25.5% of the total Germans vote) did make a difference. 
It was the interpretation of the plebiscite results and the reactions in the various 
capitals, especially London and Berlin, which brought about the third insurrection when it 
broke out in May 192 1. The recommendations advanced by the three Commissioners were 
predictable in the extreme. However, it is unlikely that they would have been any different 
even without 'guidance' from their respective Foreign Offices. As for the British Cabinet's 
recommendation that the whole plebiscite area should go to Germany - this can only be 
attributed to the ministers' ignorance of the Peace Treaty's related provisions and Lloyd 
George's advice from the chair. This was later corrected by the British Foreign Office, but 
even amongst the officials there, the impetus was towards granting Germany as much 
territory as possible. For many Polish Silesians witnessing the political intrigues and trade- 
offs that were taking place over their future, what still rankled with many was having 
allowed themselves to have been persuaded by Korfanty into trusting international 
diplomacy in early 1919, instead of following Poznania's example in 'casting of her 
Prussian shackles' by force. For the miners in Bytom Land, Katowice Land and elsewhere 
in the industrial triangle who had voted for Poland, the recommendations of the British and 
Italian Commissioners proved that the diplomatic path had failed them. They now faced the 
return of their Prussian oppressors, having believed that they had voted them away. The 
more headstrong Polish Silesians leaders pointed to the gains of the August 1920 
insurrection. They knew that they had the sympathy of French soldiers, that there were also 
Poles in the plebiscite police force, and that the only part of the inter-Allied force likely to 
oppose them (the 2,000 British troops) had been sent home. By rising up united as one 
people in areas of Upper Silesia where they formed the majority population, the Polish 
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supporters now hoped to display to the world their determination to govern themselves and 
demonstrate their ability to do so. 
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78. DBFP Vol. )U No. 95 pp. 118-119 Hardinge to Curzon 2 December 1920. Curzon 
minuted on this message'We know the Poles would object to our proposal. What 
astonishes me is that the Germans appear to object equally'. 
79. DBFP Vol. M, No. 99 pp. 122-123, D'Abernon to Curzon 6 December 1920. See 
also ibid No. 108 Sthamer to Curzon 14 December 1920. The Germans proposed 
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80. Ibhý No. 100 pp. 123-124 Ciechanowski to Curzon 9 December 1920; and ibid 
No. 102 pp. 125-127 Loraine to Curzon 9 December 1920. When discussing the 
Polish rejection with Loraine, Sapieha pointed out that if voting at Cologne had 
been granted he would not have been able to resist the demand for other voting 
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81. PRO FO 371/5414 N2527/55 Loraine to Curzon 14 November 1920. See also 
ibid N3387/2527/55 D'Abemon to Curzon 24 November 1920. D'Abemon 
reports that Thelwell (the British Embassy's Commercial Secretary) assured him 
that no boycott of Polish trade was underway. But D'Abemon thought that the 
Poles were in any case 'unconstitutionally unfitted for the controversial discussion 
of the innumerable details which compose a modem commercial arrangement'. 
82. PRO FO 371/5399 N43523/236/55 Loraine to Curzon 14 December 1920 for 
Loraine's interview with the newly appointed Finance Minister, Jan Steczowski 
who told Loraine that the Polish mark was being depreciated for propaganda 
purposes in Upper Silesia. See FO 371/ 6814 N778/117/55 Loraine to Curzon 
10 January 192 1, Enclosure: Report by Kimens (Commercial Secretary) on visit to 
Poznag. Also F0371/5399 N3382/236/55 Loraine to Curzon 25 November 1920, 
Enclosure 1: Summary of an expose presented 8 November by M. Ladislas Grabski 
formerly Minister of Finance, on 'The Economic Programme of the Polish 
GovernmeW 
83. Ibid, N3815/236/55 Loraine to Curzon 23 December 1920. 
84. DBFP Vol. XI No. 116 p. 139 Loraine to Curzon 23 December 1920. Sapieha told 
Loraine that he had again written to Korfanty to urge him to keep quiet and abstain 
from any indiscretions. Sapieha was also under pressure from the French to quieten 
Korfanty down. Crowe was told on II December, that the French Government had 
been urging Warsaw that Korfanty must moderate his attitude on Upper Silesia 
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because this appeared preferable to recalling him and giving the Germans an 
advantage - see ibid No. 106 pp129-130 Conversation between Crowe and 
Gambon, Foreign Office, II December, 1920. 
85. PRO FO 371/4823 C14736/18 Percival to Curzon 28 December 1920. This zonal 
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Feronce to Curzon 26 November, 1920. 
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accede to Percival's demand that it be submitted to the Conference of Ambassadors 
- see ibid No. 113 pp. 137-138 17 December 1920. And although Le Rond and 
Marinis had now agreed to allow Percival's appeal to the Ambassadors, they were 
still united in rejecting his demand to expel Korfanty. 
87. Ibid, No. 107 pp. 130-131 Hardinge to Curzon 14 December 1920. He ended 
with the sentence 'I venture to express the strong hope that I shall not be instructed 
to use any threat which His Majesty's Government are not in the last resort 
prepared to execute'. 
88. Ibid, No. 119 pp. 141-142 Hardinge to Curzon 24 December 1920. 
89. Ibid, No. 112 pp. 135-137 Curzon to Hardinge 17 December 1920. If the talks 
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the matter of Britain's withdrawal back to the British Government so that their 
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pp. 141-142 Hardinge to Curzon 24 December 1920. 
90. Ibid, No. 121 p. 143 Curzon to Hardinge (Confidential) 29 December 1920. 
91. PRO FO 371/4823 C14725 /1621/18. This is an unpublished minute to DBFP 
Vol. XI, No. 119 pp. 141-142 Hardinge to Curzon 24 December, 1920. 
92. Ibid, No. 116 p. 139 Loraine to Curzon 23 December 1920. 
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94. HLRO, Bonar Law Papers, Box90/Fld. 2/Cab. 80(20) Cabinet Conclusions 30 
December, 1920. This decision was taken in the context of a general discussion on 
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95. Ibid, No. 128 pp. 150-151 Hardinge to Curzon 10 January 1921. Hardinge quoted 
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96. ]bid. p. 150 Note 1. See also PRO F0371/8810 17 May 1923 pp. 3841, The 
Activities of M. Korfanty and Proposalfor His Expulsion. 
97. PRO FO 371/4819 C9789/1621/18 25 October 1920 Minute by Ottley entitled 
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102. Stehlin, Weimar and the Vatican p. 123 
103. IM4 p. 116 
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105 PRO F0371/4822 C 1207/92/18 Loraine to Curzon 13 January 192 1, Enclosure 1. 
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108. Ibid 
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110. Ibid See also PRO FO 371/5 887 C 1207/92/18 Loraine to Curzon 13 January 
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Stehlin, Weimar and the Vatican pp. 124-125. 
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115. Stehlin, Weimar and the Vatican p. 126. 
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117. Ibid, p. 126. 
118. Ibid 
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120. PRO FO 371/5889 V3685/92/18 Percival to Curzon 20 February 1921. The 
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124. Wozniak, 'Blut, Erz, Kohle'p. 330. See also Stehlin, Weimar and the Vatican p. 121 
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126. Stehlin, Weimar and the Vatican p. 126. 
127. DBFP Vol. Xl No. 143 pp. 162-163 Percival to Curzon 26 January 192 1. 
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132. DBFP Vol. XI No. 125 pp. 148-149 Percival to Curzon 2 January 192 1. 
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371/4822 C13675/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 8 December1920, Appendix A 
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plebiscite. 
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think that the time has come to exercise that power. See also PRO FO 371/5889 
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142. Ibid, No. 149 p. 179 Curzon to Cheetham 12 February 192 1; and ibid No. 151 
pp. 180-181 Hardinge to Curzon 17 February 192 1. 
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144. Ihid, p143. Le Rond asked for 6,000 troops. See also ibid p. 146. 
145. Ibid, p. 143-145. Lloyd George said'General Le Rond was a very able man, who 
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difficulty, and might in the near future have to face even more troubles'. 
146. Ibid. 
147. lbid, pp. 145-146. 
148. Ibid 
149. PRO FO 371/6817 N2667/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 24 February 192 1. The 
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had feared that the plebiscite was to be delayed by the outvoting issue. Max Muller 
had arrived on 27 January 192 1, to take over from Rumbold who had left Warsaw 
two months earlier. 
150 DBFP Vol. XV No. 16 p147 London Meeting ofAllied Representatives 21 February 
1921 
151. DBFP Vol. XI, No. 144 p. 183 D'Abernon to Curzon 23 February 192 1. 
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Lloyd George - see PRO FO 371/6817 N2557/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon, 17 
February 192 1. See also jbid No. 156 p. 184 Percival to Curzon 23 February, 
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German circles'and that the following day, Prince Czartoryski (one of the Polish 
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153. PRO FO 371/6817 N2024/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 10 February 192 1. 
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FO 688/10/50 No. 140 (Draft) Max Muller to Curzon 2 March 192 1. Max Muller 
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154. PRO F0371/6817 N2567/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 24 February 1921. 
155. PRO F0371/5890 C4375/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 28 February 192 1. 
156. PRO F0371/5890 N3380/191/55 Loraine to Curzon 25 November 1920. 
157. PRO F0371/5887 C 1604/92/18 Loraine to Curzon 24 January 192 1. If 
successful, the Polish Government had pledged to create an Allied-controlled 
coal monopoly paying a percentage of the profits into the Allied reparation fund - 
see also DBFP Vol. XI No. 133 pp. 153-154. 
158. DBFP Vol. XI No. 679 pp. 703 -704 Loraine to Curzon 3 January 192 1. 
159 Ibid, minute by Curzon: 'Indeed, we are arranging the next meeting of the 
Supreme Council in Paris for Jan. 19 - expressly so as to miss meeting the 
Marshal who is to leave Paris the preceding day'. However, Pilsudski's visit to 
Paris was held-over until early February. 
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161. DBFP Vol. XI No. 691 pp. 719-722 Curzon to Max Muller 16 February 192 1. 
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to 17 after accompanying Pilsudski on his state visit to Paris 3-4 February, See 
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Sapieha's Visit 18 February 1921. 
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166. PRO FO 371/4823 C14782/1621/18 Creedy to Foreign Office 27 December 1920. 
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Britishtroops. See Jeffery The Military Correspondence pp. 209-210 Wilsonto 
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167. PRO FO 371/5890 C3293/92/18 War Office to Foreign Office 15 February 192 1. 
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necessary to avoid riots'. See ibid C3417/92/18 Memorandum by Waterlow 15 
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168. Archive Panstowe w Opole [Opople Archives APWO] Numer Zespola: 46 
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numbers and function see APWO 46/73 pp. 8-9 Military Director to Commander 
Forces Upper Silesia 25 February, 192 1. See also Edmonds, The Occupation of 
the Rhineland 1918-1919 p. 219. 
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170. HLRO Bonar Law papers Box9O/Fld. 2/Cab. 80 (20) Cabinet Conclusion 30 
December 1920. The Cabinet agreed that; 'While this force would come under the 
control of the President of the Plebiscite Commission, arrangements should be 
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171. APWO 46/73 pp. 12-13 Mlitary Director to Commander Forces Upper Silesia 28 
February 192 1. This identified the four Rhine Army battalions and detailed where 
each would be stationed. 
172. Black Watch Museum [BWM], Balhousie Castle, Perth, 05.355.486 (411)42 The 
Red Hackle: The Black Watch Quarterly Vol. I No. 2 July 1921 p. 16 
173. Edmonds, The Occupation p. 220. 
174. APWO 46/73 pp. 8-9 Military Director to Commander Forces Upper Silesia 25 
February 192 1. See also BWM , Black Watch Archive [B. W. Arch. ] 0069 Historical Record, 2nd Battalion Black Watch 1909-1939. 
175. PRO FO 371/5890 C3792/92/18 Percival to Rhine Army 22 February 1921. This 
also provides logistical information regarding catering facilities, and warns about 
the very limited possibility of local procurement. 
176. Ibid, C4083/92/18 Percival to Rhine Army 24 February 192 1. Recommends 'that 
a Staff officer of field rank be attached to the Staff of French Commander in Chief, 
General Jules Gratiee. Major A. D. C. Krook, 2nd Battalion Black Watch, was 
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0069 Historical Record 2nd Battalion March 192 1. 
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Colonel C. J. Steavenson. 
178. BWM 05.355.486. (411042 The Red Hackle Vol. 1, No. 2 July 1921 p. 6). Article by 
Sergeant Erskine, The Second Battalion in Silesia. This, and also the Regimental 
Record, records that the three day j oumey was comfortable and greatly assisted by 
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179. APWO 46/73 pp. 114-115 Wauchope to General Gratier II March, 192 1. 
Answering why he had located his headquarters in a Schloss outside the town, 
Wauchope explained to Gratier that there were no suitable houses in Lubliniec 
because some 45 officers were already billeted there. There is an account of the 
British H. Q. and the troop's activities in C. C. Repington's After the War (London 
1928) pp. 93-94. After a promising Army career curtailed by social scandal, during 
the war he was a renowned, if sometimes controversial, journalist. 
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182. APWO 46/73 pp. 131-132 Wauchope to Gratier 17 March 192 1. Wauchope 
requested a copy of the Scheinefor General Defence should serious disturbances 
arise. When it arrived, he raised several points of concern, especially over the 
reserves that would be available and the difficulty that he would have maintaining 
communications with Opole, all problems experienced by the French and Italian 
troops and the officials when the third Polish insurrection broke out in May - see 
APWO 46/73 p. 150 Wauchope to Gratier 30 March 192 1. 
183. PRO FO 371/5890 C4128/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 25 February 1921. 
184. DBFP Vol. Xl No. 150 ppI 79-180 Percival to Curzon 15 February 192 1. 
185. PRO FO 371/5 889 C375 8/92/18 Percival to Curzon 16 February 192 1. 
186. PRO FO 371/5 890 C4128/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 25 February 192 1. 
See also ibid C4409/92/18 Percival to Curzon I March 1921 in which Percival 
agrees with Max Muller's view (DBFP Vol. XI No. 160 p. 188) that the Poles had 
welcomed 20 March as the date for the plebiscite. 
187. Ibid, C4367/92/18 Percival to Curzon 23 February 1921. The table based on 
an enclosure giving lists of numbers provisionally registered for the plebiscite by 
February 192 1. 
188. Ibid. 
189. Link (ed. ) Deliberations of the Council Vol. 2 p. 392 and p. 422 The area added on 
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(Namslau) added to Kluczbork, consisted of 13 communes and 3 Gutsbezirke - 
taken from the Official Breakdown of the Plebiscite Results PRO FO 371/5895 
C7462/92/18 24 April 1921. See Chapter One of this thesis. 
190. PRO FO 371/5 895 C7462/92/18 24 April 192 1. A list of results is also given in the 
Encyklopaedia Powstarf,! ýIqskich (Opole 1982) Aneks 1, pp. 677-705. Also 
Oficjalne Wyniki Plebiscytu Gornoslaskiego from the Gazeta Urzedowa Gornego 
Slasko Nr 21 z7V 192 1, Opole. 
191. PRO FO 371/8810 17 May 1923 p. 52. Bourdillon notes that with six exceptions, 
in the whole district of Glubczyce (which was to be attributed to Czechoslovakia if 
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election committees. The Poles made similar allegations about the number of 
outvoters in other rural areas - see PRO FO 371/5903 C 10520/92/18 21 May 192 1, 
192. Wambaugh, Plebiscite Since pp. 244-247. This contains a summary of the 
regulating structure and voting registration procedures. German outvoters in Poland 
were to apply to the office in Pozn4 the Poles in Germany to a similar office in 
Berlin. But Wambaugh records that the Poles claimed that they were not permitted 
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would have dared to travel on a ticket issued by it. 
193. PRO FO 371/5 891 C5451/92/18 Bourdillon to Waterlow 9 March 192 1. 
194. Ibid. 
195. Ibid. 
196. PRO FO 371/5895 C7462/92/18 24 April 1921. See also EncyHopedia Powstan" 
.1 S19skich, Aneks 1, pp. 677-705. A German report commissioned by the Economics 
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371/5899 C9825/92/18 Geisenheimar to Major Clarke 2 May 1921. 
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Chapter 4 
Political and Military Responses 
To The 
Third Insurrection 
After witnessing the reaction to the plebiscite results in Berlin, London and Rome, the 
Polish Silesians decided that they had to demonstrate their determination to reject the re- 
imposition of German rule. Even Korfanty, who had always opposed the use of force, 
supported this. Plans for another insurrection, this time instigated by them, were drawn up. 
Some elements within the Polish Government tacitly approved the action; Poland's 
political leaders did not. Nevertheless, within one month the Polish Military Organisation 
(POW) had all the necessary logistic support in place. ' The decision to go ahead with the 
insurrection was taken only after the Polish Commissariat had learned the outline of the 
2 Commissioners' different recommendations to the Supreme Council. The insurrection 
brought the Upper Silesian question to a head. From being pawns in a political device to 
ensure a German signature on the Peace Treaty, the Polish Upper Silesians were now 
challenging the Allies' right to dispose of them as they saw fit. 
The chapter describes the course of this, the third and final insurrection. This 
was the most serious of the three insurrections occurring in Upper Silesia between 1919 
and 192 1, not least because of the serious differences that had been developing between 
the Entente partners regarding their future relations with Germany. Unlike the previous 
two insurrections which had been exercises in self-defence, this third insurrection was a 
direct challenge to the Commission's authority. How the Commission responded to this 
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challenge is examined and the experiences and reactions of some of the Commission's 
British officials during this period are recorded. The British Government's response to 
the changed situation and the overall effect of these developments on the European 
political situation, are analysed. The chapter also details the political and military 
responses by Berlin and Warsaw and examines the background to the return of British 
troops to Upper Silesia. Their significant contribution towards stabilising the region, 
also the role of Sir Harold Stuart, the new British Commissioner, in facilitating and 
executing the political and military initiatives leading to the successful resolution of the 
crisis, are also examined. 
When the Conunissioners' divergent recommendations on the lines of partition 
were leaked to him, Korfanty published them in a special I May edition of the German- 
language Oberschlesisiche Grenzzeitung. Entitled The Diplomats have Spoken, this article 
alleged that only the Rybnik, Pszczyna and a small unimportant part of the Katowice 
districts had been assigned to Poland. The Commission issued a denial. The following 
day, the refusal of the German proprietors of a Gliwice mine to grant the Commission's 
request to re-employ 200 dismissed miners became the pretext for a general strike. It was 
supported by almost every coal miner and by some of the iron and zinc miners. The 
Commissioners decided to introduce martial law, but later that same evening (2/3 May), 
trained, and well-armed bands of Polish Silesians began crossing the Polish frontier to join 
forces with the local POW units which had risen in villages in the coal fields and in the 
industrial area. No uniformed Polish troops were committed although volunteers had been 
given leave to participate. They helped add a degree of competence to the insurgent forces 
and they advanced quickly, bypassing any obstructions, leaving them to be dealt with 
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10a. Sir Harold Stuart (by Heather Soutar) 
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later. All efforts were directed at occupying as much territory as possible. Within hours 
they controlled the Rybnik and Pszczyna districts as well as Bytom and several other 
towns in the industrial area. Roadblocks were established around the larger towns, and the 
rail bridges connecting eastern Upper Silesia with Czechoslovakia and Germany were 
systematically demolished. By mid-day on 3 May (Polish National Day), around 60,000 
Polish irregulars were advancing out from the industrial area towards the solidly German 
voting areas to the north and to the west of the Oder. 3 
The Commission's military response was to avoid confrontation. They did this by 
withdrawing their forces from the rural areas and concentrating them in the towns. This 
was where most of the German population lived and the decision probably prevented 
wholesale slaughter. 4 The Commission was in complete agreement about the insurrection 
having to be suppressed. It was aided in reaching this decision by Le Rond's absence in 
Paris - something which convinced Percival that Le Rond had known that the insurrection 
had been about to occur. His deputy, Ponset, backed up by instructions from Paris, took a 
firm line. A French tank drove the insurgents from Katowice while troops cleared 
.5 -f Myslowice and Tarnowski Gory Twenty ive Italians were reported killed and 34 
wounded in fighting at Rybnik. At Strzelce the British District Controller, Colonel Bond, 
had French artillery attack the insurgents in the surrounding woods and captured some of 
them. 6 
But this was a very different situation from the August 1920 insurrection. This time 
the Polish insurgents were highly organised and most (though not all) of their movements 
were characterised with the stamp of military efficiency. There were far fewer French and 
Italian troops in Upper Silesia now, and the plebiscite police force (whose predecessor, the 
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Sicherheitspolzei, had offered the most resistance in 1920) had been reduced to less than 
half its normal strength. This was because, in the occupied areas, the Polish members of 
this mixed militia had disarmed their German colleagues and then deserted en masse to the 
Polish side. 7 Conversely, in unoccupied areas such as Kluczbork, German members of the 
plebiscite police disarmed their Polish colleagues and sent them down to Lower Silesia as 
8 prisoners. Fully alive to the gravity of the international crisis the insurrection had created, 
the Polish Government distanced itself from the conflict. It dismissed Korfanty from his 
post as Plebiscite Commissar, banned the recruitment of volunteers in Poland, and ordered 
the closure of the frontier. 9 Korfanty stopped proclaiming the spontaneous nature of the 
uprising and instead confirmed that he had taken charge of it 'to prevent anarchy 
occurring'. 10 
Behind Korfanty's announcement was a fear that his political control over events 
was slipping away. The Naradowa Demokracja element in Upper Silesia's political 
leadership well understood that the Polish movement was also an outlet for the region's 
social and industrial tensions. This support was not Bolshevik, but Korfanty had always 
been nervous about an extreme socialist movement of some sorts developing out of an 
insurrection. Within a few days the insurgents' militarists had seized the strategically 
important Gora 9w. Anny (Annaberg) and their para-military units were attempting to 
cross the Oder and enter what the plebiscite vote had revealed was solidly German 
territory. " However, as much to circumscribe the insurgents' own military action as to 
stake Poland's claim to it, Korfanty limited the territory to be occupied to that which could 
only be interpreted as Polish - see Map 4 (p. 262). This western boundary, or what would 
become known as 'the Korfanty line', followed the Oder to just south of Opole, veered 
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north-east past Dobrodzien and joined the Polish frontier north of Olenso. 12 The plan was 
to occupy and administer the land to the east until the emergency had ended. 13 Meanwhile, 
over the next two weeks, thousands of German volunteers from across the Reich raced to 
the region to support the German Silesian Orgesch (volunteer civil guards) in their 
struggle to contain and then expel the insurgents. 14 
These German reinforcements included student battalions, the Jungdeutsche 
Orden, and many other supposedly dissolved Freikorps units that were now illegal under 
the Peace Treaty's provisions. They included the Rossbach Stw7nabteilung, which was 
already 4,000 strong, Heydebreck's Wehrwolfe, the BavaTian Oberland and the Heinz 
Sturmabteilung. 15 Waite quoted one Freikorps leader who described the atmosphere as 
rather like a gathering of the clans. 
We got out at Namslau and a defense battalion was formed... the Jungdeutsche 
were there, the Stahlhelm, Rossbachers, Baltikumers, Landesjdger, Kapp- 
Putschists... It seemed to me that I knew about every third man from the battles of 
the German post-war period. 16 
The nucleus of some of these units had been in place for months. They had been funded 
by the Wrociaw Zentrale, local representatives of the Prussian Swatskommissar and the 
German Foreign Office (with Federal Finance Mnister, Josef Wirth's approval). 17 After 
the Kapp Putsch, the Freikorps units had been employed to repress the Spartacist rising in 
the Ruhr. This had been done with great brutality - no prisoners being taken and the 
wounded executed. Other ex-Freikorps members had been serving in Upper Silesia since 
before the plebiscite as member's of Hauensteins's 'Special Police' - the much more 
ruthlessly efficient German Silesian equivalent of the Polish Bojwka. Hauenstein later put 
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the number of murders they had carried out in Upper Silesia at 'about 200 people'. ' tWhen 
the Nazis later made it a practice to claim the Freikorpsampfers victories as their own, 
many Landsnecht (Freebooters) 'graduating' to the Nazi movement, found their service in 
Upper Silesia - more than any other post-war intervention - highly regarded as symbolic 
of 'sincere and unselfish patriotism'. 19 
The Reichswehr also gave money, arms and equipment to the volunteers. 20 
Although the German Government did consider using Reichswehr units such as the 7th 
Infantry Regiment, located at Brzeg (Brieg), against the insurgents, it was deterred by the 
Peace Treaty and an Allied threat (including the British) to occupy the Ruhr. " However, 
less than 24 hours after the insurrection had started, the German Government did offer the 
Plebiscite Commission police assistance and repeated the offer two days later. Both offers 
were rejected. 22 Reichswehr border patrols and their presence on and around the plebiscite 
area demarcation line were intensified. The main forces, however, remained in their 
barracks. Nevertheless, this did not stop Reichswehr soldiers handing their arms over to 
the volunteers or enlisting in Freikorps units themselves. 23 Here we should note that the 
Allied threat to occupy the Ruhr had not only inhibited the Reichswehr's intervention in 
Upper Silesia, but also prevented France ftom sending reinforcements to Upper Silesia 
from the Rhine. It had also given the War Office yet another excuse to avoid returning the 
four British battalions withdrawn early in April. Whether by coincidence or by informed 
choice, the Polish Silesians could not have chosen a more propitious moment to mount the 
insurrection. 
On 30 April Briand informed Lloyd George that due to Germany's failure to make 
a satisfactory reparations offer, France would commence occupying the Ruhr on 2 May. 24 
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To prevent this and gain time to manoeuvre, the British Prime Minister persuaded the 
French to suspend their plans and allow an ultimatum embodying a new schedule of 
payments to be drawn up and despatched to Berlin. By so doing, Lloyd George seized the 
initiative from France. On 5 May, the London Schedule of Payments and the Allies 
ultimatum was received in Berlin. If it was not accepted within six days Britain would 
participate in occupying the Ruhr . 
25 To do so, the Allies had to maintain their already 
over-stretched Rhineland military forces on standby until either the Germans complied or 
they were forced to take action. It meant that there would be no inter-Allied military 
reinforcements available for Upper Silesia until at least 12 May - or longer if the Germans 
rejected the ultimatum. 26 This was cited by Hardinge when replying to Curzon's request 
that he check to see if the French and Italians could immediately reinforce Upper Silesia. 27 
Crowe foresaw the same problem when the German Ambassador also enquired about the 
possibility of additional Allied troops being despatched. 28 In fact there was little prospect 
of increasing the Italians' involvement, and no hope of French or British reinforcements 
arriving until the reparations crisis had been resolved. It was also politically impossible to 
use Reichswehr units in Upper Silesia. Therefore, to take action against the Polish Silesian 
insurgents, there appeared to be no choice but to use the German volunteers who were 
already arriving in Lower Silesia. 
Within days the existing Silesian Schutzpolizei (Protection Police) had been 
built into a 4,000 strong force using the volunteers and 'refugees' from the Opole area. 29 
In an attempt to re-establish the Commission's authority, British and Italian officers with 
the plebiscite police rearmed the remaining German police and recruited 3,000 volunteers 
from amongst those flooding in from the Reich . 
30 But apart from the Freikorps, probably 
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the most numerous German force was the Selbstschutz (Self-Defence Force). Formed at 
the instigation of the Orgesch and the Vereinigte Verbande heimattreuer Oberschlesier, it 
officially consisted of German Silesians recruited from the north and the west of the 
unoccupied parts of the plebiscite area and the towns and villages bordering the area's 
demarcation line with Germany. Whilst it included these local Germans and it was partly 
funded and usually led by members of the landowning aristocracy, it also included 
Arbedgmeinschaften men (Labour Associations 'hiding' the ex-Baltikum and Freikorps 
groups) and thousands of the Orgesch and the Oberland members who had arrived from 
other parts of Germany. 31 Such were the German forces being assembled against the 
Polish Silesians. It should be borne in mind, of course, that apart from the Commission's 
own force, these 'police' and Freikorps units had no more legitimacy than the various 
Polish units. In fact, the formation of German para-military units divided the Commission 
because after Le Rond's return to Opole, despite Percival and Marinis encouraging them, 
the French simply regarded these forces as German insurgents. Fortunately by II May the 
impasse between Berlin and the Allies over the reparation payments was over. 
The terms of the London ultimatum had caused Germany's Fehrenbach Cabinet to 
collapse. The proposal of its Foreign Secretary, Simons, of a superficial compliance with 
the reparation demands in exchange for assurances of British support over Upper Silesia 
was, however, carried over into the new Cabinet. This was formed on II May by the 
32 
outgoing Finance Minister, Josef Wirth. When Wirth's Cabinet accepted the terms of the 
ultimatum and began its pursuit of ErjTllung (Fulfilment), relations between Britain and 
Germany thawed immediately. 33 Such cordiality was so apparent that rumours about 
D'Abernon having 'promised Germany a favourable solution of the Upper Silesia question 
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began to circulate in the Foreign Office and in the other corridors of diplomacy. Inevitably 
they found their way into the press. 34 D'Abernon's diary extracts which he sent to Lloyd 
George via the Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey (bypassing Curzon and the Foreign 
Office) on a regular basis, appear to confirm that some understanding had been reached. 
On 24 May D'Abernon reported that Germany's new Foreign Secretary, Rosen, showed a 
'willingness to conform to any advice regarding Upper Silesia which His Majesty's 
Government might offer'. And on II June the Foreign Minister's Under-Secretary, von 
Haniel, told the Reichstag Foreign Affairs Committee that during the crisis over the 
London ultimatum, D'Abernon 'had assured Herr Stresemann that, in the event of 
acceptance of the ultimatum, the Upper Silesian question will be satisfactorily settled for 
35 Germany'. Yet, whilst Lloyd George and the Germans had long considered Upper 
Silesia an integral part of the reparations question, it was now the case that any outcome 
there which failed to satisfy Germany's very high expectations was bound to damage 
Britain's new-found status in Berlin. 
An important factor involving the insurrection was that Germany's new Chancellor 
had close associations with the financing of these volunteer and self-defence groups. Like 
many of his contemporaries, although realising their politics were hugely at variance with 
the Freikorpskampfers, they believed that these para-military forces were necessary to 
maintain the integrity of the Republic. 36 Therefore, when advised by von Seeckt to 
discourage them from intervening in the plebiscite area, Wirth ignored him. On 18 June, 
under a catch-all title of Commander of Seffitschutz forces, he appointed General Karl 
37 Hoefer to lead the Freikorps and the other volunteers against the Polish Silesians. By 
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this time, the skirmishing which had been taking place along parts of the Korfanty line had 
developed into heavy fighting between the Freikorps units and the Polish insurgents. 
Apart from their nervousness over possibly losing control over events in Upper 
Silesia should an insurrection go ahead, Korfanty and the Polish leadership had also feared 
the strength of the German reaction. Rose, who interviewed most of the Polish leaders 
later, wrote that, far from being the adventurers depicted in contemporary British 
accounts, they were 'sober patriots who knew the situation thoroughly, both in the land 
and on the wider horizon of German-Polish relations'. 38 They also knew their opponents' 
power and, as the German volunteers began to assemble, Korfanty had searched for a 
means of returning to the diplomatic route. As early as 8 May, during discussions with the 
Commission's General de Brantes in Gliwice, he offered to end the insurrection if the 
Commissioners provided him with a pretext to do So. 3' Korfanty even advanced some 
suggestions, but included the condition that, 'no German force of whatever description 
should be used against the Poles during the liquidation of the movement' . 
40 Given some 
modification, the Commission found most of the suggestions tolerable. They authorised de 
Brantes, to communicate this to Korfanty, To prove his good faith, however, Korfanty had 
to halt the Polish advance, stop attacks on persons and property, co-operate in re- 
establishing Commission-controlled railway services and call for a resumption of work. 41 
Korfanty accepted these demands on II May - the same day that the Wirth 
Cabinet accepted the London Schedule of Payments. 42 Percival, however, had second 
thoughts. This may have been related to the strength of the German para-mililutry forces, 
but also to the influence Hatzfeldt, von Moltke and other prominent local German leaders 
such as Lukaschek (whose expulsion he had blocked) had with the British and the Italian 
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Commissioners. Percival was now convinced Korfanty was just playing for time and that 
his main object was the restoration of economic conditions in Upper Silesia whilst 
remaining in permanent occupation of the industrial area. This was something Percival 
believed that the Germans could easily thwart by withholding food supplies, money for 
wages and preventing railway communications being restored. He pointed out to Curzon 
that, should conditions be made intolerable for them, then the workers would break away 
from the Polish cause - but his assertion that this might 'establish Bolshevism' shows how 
little he understood the Polish Silesians. The restoration of normal economic conditions 
was, therefore, an imperative for the Poles, but not for the Germans - provided that they 
did not worry too much about their fellow nationals isolated in the Upper Silesian towns. 43 
On the 13 May, Craig, the Commission's Director of Food Supplies, confirmed that these 
sanctions against the insurgents were already being exerted. Since the start of the 
insurrection the Germans had cut the amount of food supplies for distribution to towns in 
the occupied area. He also recorded that the German authorities were intensifying this de 
44 facto food embargo by discouraging their railway engineers from operating there. 
Percival also questioned Korfanty's ability to control the insurgents. Apart from 
the insurgents' clashes with the German para-militarists, his doubts were reinforced by 
their continuing confrontations with the reconstructed, mainly British-officered, all- 
German, plebiscite police force. However, fighting between the Polish insurgents and the 
inter-Allied military force had ceased within a few days. Overwhelmed by the insurgents' 
numerical superiority and sympathetic to their cause, a passive modus vivendi developed 
between the French troops and the Poles. This had the tacit approval of Le Rond. Less 
sympathetic, but unwilling to risk further casualties, Marinis had pulled most of the Italian 
Chapter 4 
310 
troops out of the areas occupied by the insurgents, leaving a token force supporting the 
French troops still protecting the mainly German-populated towns. 45 Nevertheless, with 
little sign of the insurgents complying with their demands, and indications that the 
Ambassadors' Conference was unhappy about the Commission negotiating with the Polish 
leadership, on 12 May the Commissioners publicly stated 'that it had not in the past and 
would not in the future negotiate with Korfanty'. 46 When Marinis suggested that their 
troops, backed up by artillery, make one final effort to end the insurrection, Le Rond 
baulked at this - asserting that French troops could not be used in that particular role 
without his government's special permission. Immediately after this exchange Percival 
telegraphed London to state that the Commission had been 'reduced to utter helplessness', 
and that his position had become impossible. He suggested the correct course would be for 
Curzon to accept his resignation - adding that it might be desirable for Curzon to consider 
withdrawing the whole British contingent from Upper Silesia. 47 
Like Percival, members of the British contingent had found the occupation a 
'degrading and humiliating' experience. 48 After informing the district controllers that there 
were no troops available to help them, the Commission had ordered all of its officials and 
employees to remain at their posts and make the best of things. Some complied, securing 
concessions from the insurgents and making effective interventions on behalf of the local 
inhabitants in their charge. 49 Others railed against it. 50 Bond, the district controller who 
had resisted the insurgents at Strzelce, resigned. 51 At Lubliniec, one British employee ran 
away. 52 As the insurgents settled into their new role, some took particular delight in 
humiliating the British officials at roadblocks with over-zealous searches of their baggage, 
the endless scrutiny of their papers, accusing them of spying and so forth, while the 
Chapter 4 
311 
French officials were being saluted and waved through. Craig and Percival's Adjutant, 
Captain Hutchison, criticised their colleagues and superiors to authorities outwith the 
Commission: in Craig's case in private letters to the Foreign Office; in Hutchison's by 
talking directly to Ws and Lloyd George himself 
In one letter, Craig recorded the great bitterness existing amongst the British 
officials. 53 In another, to Lindsay, an assistant under-secretary, he wrote 
There is hardly an official in any of the sections that can now contemplate the 
actions of the Commission, of the insurgents and of the Germans, without the most 
violent partisanship. MoreoveT, for many of the staffs it has now become a matter 
of personal prestige and I allude not only to the chief parfiCi WtS. 54 
He warned that passions were running so high and nerves were so much on edge that the 
British contingent was close to disintegration. 55 A communication to Ottley concluded 
with a half-promise that 'when the dust had settled, he would, 'have a very sorry tale to 
tell of British activities here since November'. ' '6 The person who did tell that tale, or at 
least his version of it, was Hutchison. 57 
Bearing in mind the state of personal relations described above and 
statements that were made later, it is clear that Hutchison's good relations with some of 
the French officials had caused Tidbury, Bourdillon, and other members of the British 
Headquarters staff at Opole to suspect him of having Polish sympathies - however 
unlikely this was. When a large German para-military force in Kluczbork threatened 
insurgent-held Olenso on 9 and 10 May, Hutchison played a peripheral role in negotiating 
a local 48-hour cease-fire. "' Immediately on his return to Opole, however, he felt 
compelled to resign when the British headquarters staff tried moving him with his wife to 
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a lesser post in Rybnik, a town which was occupied and seething with revolt. 59 In a 
statement made after Hutchison had left Opole, one senior British official wrote 
I became suspicious of his relations with the French, who in my opinion were 
endeavouring to utilise him to extract information, and from a political point of 
view I viewed him as a source of danger. This conviction became the more 
confirmed when it came to my knowledge that at the time of his departure from 
Opole, M. Ponset and Capt. Bastard [French officials] were at the railway station to 
see him off. 60 
Forty-eight hours later Hutchison, who was politically well connected, was back in 
London wreaking his revenge. Esdale Molson MP sent a note to the Foreign Office 
questioning the 'marked lowering of morale' amongst the officials and the 'anti-French, if 
not actually pro-German feeling' prevalent amongst the British Headquarters staff in 
Opole . 
61 But, even worse, on May 13, just a few hours before Lloyd George made a very 
highly controversial speech on Upper Silesia, Hutchison gained an interview at Downing 
Street where he no doubt provided the Mme Minister with his own highly coloured 
version of events in Upper Silesia. 62 
Colonel Pepys Cockerell, Ottley's successor as Controller of the Bytom 
district, was another official with political contacts. The industrial disputes in mines 
around Bytom had continued unremittingly after the plebiscite, culminating in the 
district's occupation on 3 May. Cockerell's office was attacked and he fled for his life. 63 
On 5 May, the Reuter news agency reported that he had resigned due 'to the insufficiency 
of the forces at his disposal'. 64 Craig later informed Ottley that Cockerell had refused 'to 
be associated with a government which was a farce'. 65 In the House of Commons, news of 
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his resignation brought forth some questions from its members. 66 Percival, however, 
persuaded Cockerell to remain and he returned to duty in Bytom. 67 Three weeks later, in 
one of the insurrection's most bizarre escapades, Cockerell drove a lorry containing 
fourteen German para-militarists, and an assortment of weapons from Kluczbork to 
Bodzanowice, a village located in insurgent-held territory close to the Polish border. On 
their arrival, the arms were distributed amongst the Germans who then proceeded to open 
fire on the Polish Silesian inhabitants. Two of the Germans were killed and three were 
badly wounded before the group was captured by Polish insurgents. 68 Cockerell was sent 
home with the recommendation that he rest until his nerves recovered. 69 
Whatever Cockerell's motivation was, it is clear that many of the longer serving 
British officials with the Commission found their position increasingly untenable as 
French passivity moved to near-active co-operation with the Polish insurgents . 
70 And their 
frustration was compounded by some of the insurgents taking the opportunity to 
demonstrate by word and gesture their resentment over what had been the generally 
consistent sympathy of the British officials for the German Silesian position. 
As we have noted, the only British officials in a position to resist the insurgents 
were the officers in charge of what was left of the Commission's plebiscite police force. 
Along with a few Italian officers who had also failed to subscribe to the emerging military 
policy of passive co-existence, they concentrated the remaining German police and the 
reinforcements that they had recruited, around Strzelce, Opole and Kozle. This was where 
the insurgents had ignored Korfanty's dictum and were still attempting to secure territory 
on the Oder's west bank. On 12 May, the Daily Express claimed that over 500 insurgents 
had been killed or wounded by the determined resistance of the German police. 71 
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Throughout the first week of the occupation British newspapers were fairly accurate over 
the origins, scale and objectives of the insurrection. Coverage over these first days 
concentrated on clashes between the insurgents and the inter-Allied military force - 
especially the French and Italian success in retaking and securing the towns. 72 Under the 
headline "British Hero", the Daily Mail ran the story of Captain Michalson, a plebiscite 
police officer, rallying the force's depleted ranks in a bid to resist a Polish take-over of 
Rybnik 
. 
73 Their coverage then began to take on a definite anti-Polish line and highlighted 
the splits between the Allies. On II May, The Times correspondent noted; 'The result of 
French partiality and unconcealed co-operation with the Polish cause is that any person 
with a sense of justice is driven to support and defend the Germans'. 74 Reports appeared 
that the insurgents were preparing to destroy mines and factories rather than give them 
back to the Germans . 
75 The Daily Telegraph praised the Germans' self restraint, but 
cautioned that 'the good impression this made in authoritative British circles would be 
neutralised by any attempt to appeal to forCe'. 76 
But, as we have seen, it was the British themselves who were helping to organise 
the German resistance. We have noted how German volunteers had boosted the plebiscite 
police force's numbers and that as early as 9 May the German para-militarist forces were 
unofficially assisting them against the insurgents. 77 In yet another development, on II 
May reports about a British officer commanding a German Freikorps unit, appeared in the 
78 Polish press. The Freikorps units had been itching to attack and had paid scant regard to 
Hoefer's strategy of holding a defensive position whilst awaiting the Allies' decision on 
the disposition of Upper Silesia. 79 Percival admitted to London that while some German 
80 bands were well in hand others were not. On 23 May the Foreign Office learned that 
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Keatinge, the senior British police officer, had sent Lieutenant Bennet to organise some 
Freikorps units and use them to attack the Poles. 81 A report to this effect appeared in The 
Manchester Guardian the following day. Percival denied it and defended Keatinge's close 
liaison with the German groups. 82 This, he argued, provided valuable intelligence and 
gave the British an influence over German activities which they would not otherwise have 
had. 83 The great contradiction in this was highlighted by the French newspaper Le Temps. 
It drew attention to the contrast between the Polish Government, which had claimed no 
authority over the insurgents and was attempting to close its frontier, and the German 
Government, on whose territory the German bands were being organised, armed, and then 
transported to invade Upper Silesia. 84 
As we have seen, the Polish Government had quickly disassociated itself from the 
insurrectionary movement and taken various measures designed to reassure the Allies. The 
Polish public believed Percival and Marinis had disregarded the will of the Upper Silesian 
Poles by allotting so little territory to them. But a conference between Prime Minister 
Witos and representatives from the various political parties in Poland endorsed their 
government's position. None of the foreign representatives in Warsaw, including the 
German Charge d'Affaires, believed the Polish Government was directly involved in the 
insurrection. 85 In a statement, the Polish Government reminded the population that no 
decision had yet been taken on Upper Silesia. A communiqu6 summing up the Polish 
Government's position was also issued. 
Although the Government fully realises the desperation of the Upper Silesian 
population dictated by fear that its wishes may be disregarded, it is nevertheless 
convinced that the insurrectionary movement will not attain its object. 86 
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The public recognised the necessity of their government having to adopt this line, but one 
of the Democratic Union's (Zw. D. ) newspapers, the Narod, warned the political leaders 
not to distance themselves too far from the Polish people. 87 However, illustrating the 
Polish administration's ambiguities, the State Defence Committee was still urging the 
88 
public to supply the insurgents with provisions, money and moral support. On the other 
hand, the Gazetta Poranna believed that every effort should be made to resolve the 
impasse 'without involving Poland in a war which should be fought not against Germany, 
89 but against the Allied Powers' . 
Special resentment was felt against Italy and Britain. 
Italian troops in Upper Silesia became the subject of considerable abuse in the Polish 
press. There were also several hostile demonstrations outside the Italian and the British 
Legations in Warsaw. 90 Again, the demonstrators were drawn mainly from the ranks of the 
socialist parties. After British officials had excused themselves from receiving a petition 
from the first of these demonstrations because, 'His Excellency was having his dinner', 
the Polish Socialist newspaper, Robotnik, asked why Poles were surprised at this when: 
'British officials are accustomed to deal in this manner with Hindoos, Kaffirs, Persians 
and the like. Why should they behave any differently in Warsaw? '9' 
This was a continuation of the Left's campaign against what they regarded as 
the 'shame, incompetence, and the paralytic blundering' of the Polish diplomats who had 
92 'bowed with the subservience of lackeys before the Allies'. Their principal target was 
the Foreign Mnister, Prince Sapieha. He had been under constant attack since his 
perceived faflure on the outvoting question in Upper Silesia and his conduct of external 
relations during the recent Wilno adventure. At the start of the insurrection he was in 
London seeking an opportunity to put the Polish case on Upper Silesia to Lloyd George. 93 
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Sapieha's statement deploring the insurrection as a 'great misfortune' and praising his 
Government's swift response, had been widely reported in Western Europe. 94 However, 
when comparing Polish diplomacy with the success that the Czechs had been achieving, 
the Robotnik concluded that Poland had been badly served by her diplomats in all of her 
dealings with the Entente. Blaming this on its Foreign Ministry officials being invariably 
drawn from the aristocracy, it concluded that 'far from knowing anything about the world, 
they had not even the faintest notion of the country which they represented'. 95 Responding 
to Max Muller's complaint about the demonstrations and the attacks on him in the Polish 
press, the Polish Government promoted articles aimed at calming the population . 
96 But 
Pitsudski's blasd attitude towards the insurrection (which he told Max Muller he blamed 
on Britain), and the enthusiastic support of the Polish press and public for the insurgents, 
caused the British Minister to recommend that ajoint Allied warning be delivered to the 
Polish Government. 97 This suggestion was supported from Berlin where the British 
Embassy was warning that the Upper Silesian situation was strengthening the hand of 
reactionary circles hoping the reparation terms would be rejected by the Reichstag. 98 
The Warsaw Legation's other great concern were the various reports about up to 
85,000 Polish army regulars massing on the Upper Silesian frontier. 99 To appreciate the 
credibility the Allies gave to the claims, we have to bear in mind that a few months earlier, 
in the aftermath of the Red Army's retreat from Warsaw, General Zeligowski's so-called 
'independent' patriotic military force had seized Wilno, for Poland. 100 Max Muller did not 
doubt that many regular Polish Army officers and soldiers were fighting for the 
insurgents. ' 01 The British Military Mission sent two British officers to the frontier to 
investigate. They met General Szeptycki, the General Officer Commanding the region, in 
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Krakow. He assured them that his force had not been mobilised and that the only troop 
movements that had occurred had been when the Polish Government had ordered that 
border security be tightened. If he were given orders to mobilise, Szeptycki promised that 
he would let them know. 102 He claimed that his soldiers were under control but he could 
not stop civilians crossing into Upper Silesia. After inspecting the frontier, the British 
officers confirmed earlier reports that lorries and trains were still crossing into insurgent- 
held territory and that Korfanty himself was making frequent crossings to visit the 
insurgents' headquarters in Sosnowice. 103 But in a signal to General Thwaites (DMI) sent 
from the British military mission in Warsaw on 10 May, General Carton De Wiart told 
him that Curzon was wrong if he believed the Polish Government or the Polish military 
authorities were implicated. He was convinced that they were not. 
The whole trouble is that the Government here is not strong enough to stop or 
punish the insurgents, and here any action committed for so-called patriotic 
motives, will always go unpunished, no matter what the action might be. '04 
That the Polish Government ran great risks in opposing the uprising is scarcely 
recognised in Tooley's less than sympathetic portrayal of the Polish Government's 
position. By misquoting Cienciala and Komarnicki, he attributes to them the view 'that the 
Polish Government very soon "seized the leadership" of the uprising'. 105 In fact, what 
Cienciala and Komarnicki do say is that once the insurrection had occurred, the Polish 
Government 'tried to limit it in scope and time and to use it as a short but powerful 
demonstration against the proposed Percival-Marinis line'. Warsaw did this by always 
presenting the Polish Silesians' case in every diplomatic note, interview and submission 
that they made. 106 Cienciala and Komarnicki attribute attempts to seize the insurrection's 
Chapter 4 
319 
leadership and direct it towards a more ambitious pathway, to the POW's young officers 
who had hoped this would force the Allies to recognise the Polish Silesians' claims. 107 But 
in Britain there was very little chance of that occurring. There, Curzon and the Foreign 
Office's senior officials reacted to news of the insurrection and German offers to assist the 
Allies in restoring order, by enthusiastically adopting Ottley's suggestion that uncontested 
parts of the plebiscite area, including Opole, be handed over to Poland and Germany 
immediately - thus leaving the Commission free to concentrate all of its military resources 
on what effectively was the disputed industrial triangle. 108 
On 7 May, Hardinge submitted this proposal to the Ambassadors' Conference in 
Paris where it received a cool reception. '09 Over the next few days, the increasingly un- 
diplomatic language of Hardinge's exchanges with the Foreign Office highlighted the fact 
that Upper Silesia had instigated yet another crisis in Anglo-French relations. 110 From 
Opole, Percival, Marinis and Gratier also supported the plan provided that the plebiscite 
police numbers were increased from 6,000 to 8,000, and the Allied force was reinforced 
by 10,000 non-French troops, plus cavalry, tanks, motor machine-guns, artillery and some 
aircraft. "' But, as already discussed, the Italians would not send any more troops, and 
Ottley's attempt to sound-out the War Office about the return of four battalions to the 
plebiscite area met the standard reiteration that 'the policy of the C. 1. G. S. was to avoid 
commitments in Europe unless and until the dangers within the British Empire had been 
dealt with'. ' 12 
The military aspects of the British proposal were discussed by Foch's inter-Allied 
Military Committee at Versailles. But they concluded that the plan would leave the inter- 
Allied force dangerously isolated with their lines of communication vulnerable. 113 The 
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Italian Ambassador also feared that handing territory over to the Poles might be 
interpreted as rewarding the insurgents, and its overall effect might be to strengthen 
Korfanty. Nevertheless, he was prepared to agree to the plan provided all of the other 
Ambassadors expressed an interest in implementing it. Unfortunately, they all saw faults 
with it. 114 After reading a report in the 9 May edition of the Daily Chronicle, even the new 
German Ambassador to London expressed concern. 115 German acceptance of the London 
Terms two days later failed to mollify Curzon who appears to have been particularly 
wedded to Ottley's proposal. Curzon was annoyed by what he considered to be specious 
French arguments, and their failure to offer an alternative means of resolving this danger 
to European peace. 1 16 
According to Hardinge, Curzon never understood the French psychology and this 
caused problems for him as the British Ambassador in Paris. 117 Nor did Hardinge's own 
long-standing grudge against Lloyd George and Curzon help matters. ' 18 Apart from 
eliciting French support over addressing a joint Allied note to Warsaw (delivered on 10 
May) and joining the other Ambassadors in Paris in urging that the inter-Allied 
Commission renew attempts to draw up a unanimous recommendation on Upper Silesia, 
Hardinge appeared content to let matters blow over. 119 But, compared to the Versailles 
Committee's objections (which had substance), the French political objections to the 
British plan were rather tenuous. 120 The French Government claimed to fear that the 
provisional occupation might become permanent and suggested that involving the Polish 
Government could 'lead to unforeseen complications'. 121 From Warsaw, Carton De Wiart 
speculated that one of these complications might be both sides moving troops into their 
allotted area and preparing for a pitched battle over the remainder. 122 On a more practical 
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note, Le Rond (and the Italians) warned that an evacuation of Opole would produce 
administrative chaos. He also pointed out that even the present inter-Allied force would be 
incapable of controlling the central district, let alone dislodging the Polish insurgents 
presently in occupation. 123 
The reaction in London was to condemn all these arguments as baseless. Means of 
coercion, such as breaking diplomatic relations with Poland, were mooted. 124 Waterlow 
described the military arguments as unintelligible and asked if the French Government 
were now allowing their soldiers to determine policy - which was rather ironic given that 
due to Britain's military priorities, the Foreign Office's political ineffectiveness in Upper 
Silesia was directly caused by the CIGS's continuing opposition to sending British troops 
there. 125 Suggestions and opinions such as these, combined with a renewed German 
propaganda onslaught, disquieting signals from Percival, and warnings from the German 
officials in London caused the Foreign Office to adopt an acrimonious line with the 
Ambassadors' Conference and the French Government. 126 Curzon reminded Hardinge that 
had the Commission expelled Korfanty in November, 'in all probability the present 
trouble would have been avoided'. He thought that asking the Commissioners to submit a 
unanimous report was 'futile', and even suggested that the Ambassadors' Conference re- 
examine the recommendations and reach a decision on Upper Silesia themselves - an idea 
Briand arrived at independently the following month. Curzon further suggested that the 
Ambassadors should call for an enquiry into the competence of the French military 
authorities in Upper Silesia because, 'the broad fact remains, that some 10,000 troops, 
equipped with artillery and tanks, have been powerless against forces which can be little 
more than a half organised rabble'. 127 
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At this point Hardinge dug in his heels. He suggested that the Conference's 
reasons for rejecting the British plan were sound and dismissed Curzon's suggestion that 
the Ambassadors should decide the division of Upper Silesia by themselves. Subject to the 
Poles assuming a proportion of Gennany's reparations and agreeing to an inter-Allied 
Commission being established to exploit Upper Silesian resources towards this end, the 
French, wrote Hardinge, were determined that Poland should acquire the industrial area. 
He believed partitioning Upper Silesia would complicate reparations and the general 
question of relations between the Allies and Germany. Therefore, whatever decision the 
Ambassadors' Conference might arrive at, the Supreme Council would inevitably over- 
rule it. Finally, Hardinge added, questioning the military competence of the French in 
Upper Silesia would achieve nothing, except perhaps cause Marshal Foch and other 
French military authorities to take umbrage. Having withdrawn their own troops from 
Upper Silesia, it would be 'invidious' for Britain 'to criticise the conduct of operations by 
other Allied troops in that area'. 128 
Furious with Hardinge for not dealing with the situation effectively, Curzon spent 
the night of 12 May concocting the draft of a telegram to reply to him. He obtained Lloyd 
George's comments on it the following morning just prior to the Prime Minister himself 
making a major speech on Upper Silesia later that day. 129 The themes of Lloyd George's 
speech and Curzon's telegram were remarkably similar. The French did not appreciate the 
gravity of the situation. A rebel Polish Silesian leader, protected by the French and Polish 
governments, had flouted the authority of the Allied Commission and openly defied the 
Treaty. French troops had failed to resist them and the French Government was pursuing 
the cession of the industrial area to Poland. The British Government could not agree to 
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15. The Pole Stars (Punch Almanac 1922) 
16. Poland start striking at Germany. 
One is allowed to do anything now. 
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this. Nor could it accept that it was disqualified from commenting on French military 
conduct just because their own force had been withdrawn and because it might cause 
Marshal Foch offence. If Hardinge's description of the French Government's intention 
was correct, he should inforin them that His Majesty's Government could not continue to 
restrain the Germans from taking counter-measures. The situation, however, was so 
dangerous that the Ambassador should inform Briand that both he and the Prime Minister 
were prepared to meet him in Boulogne at his convenience. 130 These points, combined 
with a remarkably ill-informed and offensive attack on Poland and the Polish people, were 
repeated in Lloyd George's parliamentary oration in the Adjournment Debate that same 
day, 13 May. 131 
Brought by Lloyd George to the House especially to hear the speech, in her diary 
his secretary and mistress, Francis Stevenson, describes how, fortified with a strong dose 
of port wine, the Prime Minister 'just let go about Poland - and the French'. 132 The Poles, 
he claimed, were recent immigrants to Upper Silesia, who had arrived there to work in the 
mines. The Germans had won the plebiscite by a majority of six to four. The British and 
Italian Commissioners wanted overwhelmingly Polish areas to go to Poland, but in areas 
where the combined town and country vote was German they wanted these areas to go to 
Germany. The Poles had now raised an insurrection and challenged the Versailles Treaty. 
Whilst not criticising Poland, nevertheless, the Treaty was the charter for Poland's 
freedom. But the Poles had not won the war. Polish soldiers fighting for the Allies 
(Russia] had been driven from the field like cattle, 'beaten, broken and scattered. At the 
same time, the Austrian and Prussian Poles 'fought to the end, shooting down Frenchmen, 
British and Italians who were fighting for Poland's freedom'. The liberty of Poland was 
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due to Italy, Britain and France. Germany would be strong again. Her 'able, courageous 
and resourceful people' would count for more and more. Russia too, although now a 
broken power would not remain so for it 'possessed inexhaustible resources' and was 
'peopled by a very gallant race'. It was therefore in Poland's interest to comply with all of 
the Treaty. Britain stood for fair play. The Allies must restore order in Upper Silesia or 
allow the Germans to do so themselves. 133 
The President of the Board of Education, H. A. L. Fisher, thought it one of the 
Prime Minister's finest speeches. 134 Stevenson noted that despite the predictably angry 
reaction in France, all of the English press backed Lloyd George. "' Under the headline 
'Fair Play Even To Germans' the Left-wing Daily Herald reported how differences 
between the French and British views on Upper Silesia and the Poles could not be more 
acute. 136 And, from Berlin, D'Abernon reported that Lloyd George was 'the most popular 
man in Germany'. 137 London and Warsaw were making separate, though unsuccessful 
attempts to elicit United States support on Upper Silesia. 138 The American press generally 
supported the British attitude but Lloyd George was blamed for suggesting using German 
troops against the Poles. 139 
The European press reviews in neutral countries revealed a more mixed reception. 
Some such as the Journal de Geneve deplored the possible effect of the British Prime 
Minister's speech, but the intention to restrain France was applauded. 140 In Holland, Het 
Volk described British policy as 'in keeping with a neutral standard of moderation, 
honesty and sincerity'. 141 But an article in the Niewe Rotterdamsche Courant interpreted 
Lloyd George's 'explosion' as a realisation that, if the British permitted France to embark 
on a policy of continental domination, 'England will be driven into her traditional role of 
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counterweight against a dominant European Power. 142 From Vienna, it was reported that 
the Austrian press had also greeted Lloyd George's speech with enthusiastic approval and 
that it had been given prominence in all of the newspapers. The opinion was that should 
Korfanty be allowed to override the decision of the Powers, then they feared that certain 
provisions of the Hungarian Treaty would not be fulfilled. 143 Prague took a similar line. 
There the Cesko Slovenska Republika pointed out that the British Prime Minister was 
simply asking for a strict application of the Peace Treaty, whilst simultaneously 'throwing 
cold water on some over-heated Polish heads'. 144 
Italian views were coloured by the deaths of their soldiers. All of the socialist 
papers disregarded the Silesia story, Avanti describing it as 'essentially a quarrel between 
capitalists'. Fascist papers such as Idea Nazionale claimed that 'British policy was anti- 
Polish for its own ends', and the paper led Italian nationalists' calls for a withdrawal from 
Upper Silesia. Mainstream papers, stimulated by the anti-French and the anti-Polish 
sentiment that they detected in Lloyd George's speech, praised it and quoted it in extenso. 
The prestigious La Stampa regarded the speech as 'an international event of the first 
order'. Significantly in view of future events, Rome's Messaggero did not, attacking the 
proposed Percival-Marinis frontier as inequitable 
Justice requires a more equitable ethnic division which can only be obtained by 
advancing the line into the mixed zone composed of oases of both races. The 
eastern part of this zone which has, here and there, a predominant Polish character 
should be assigned to Poland. The problem of economic unity should be solved 
with subsequent customs agreements. This middle policy could fitly be supported 
by Count Sforza. 145 
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In Warsaw, press reaction to the speech was initially muted, but after the full 
text had arrived the papers were filled with violent comment. The Kurjer Poranny asked 
from where Lloyd George obtained information on Polish questions for him to arrive at so 
many distortions. Narod stated that the British Prime Nfinister was mistaken in supposing 
that Poland should listen humbly to all orders, 'in particular to those of such indifferent 
allies as English statesmen'. 146 Others commented on Lloyd George's hypocritical 
insistence on strict compliance with the Treaty, whilst being quite prepared to break it 
himself by promising Upper Silesia to Germany. 147 The main complaint was that by 
inciting Germany to armed action, Lloyd George's speech could provoke another War. 148 
The Polish reply came from Witos in the Sejm on 18 May. This reaffirmed Poland's 
commitment to the Versailles Treaty, reasserted the Polish interpretation of the plebiscite 
clauses and again appealed to the insurgents to end their action. Although not wholly 
conciliatory in tone, nevertheless, he did not attack the British Government as such, and 
helped to calm matters. 149 Attention was also diverted by Prince Sapieha's resignation on 
19 May. This had resulted from an earlier vote of no confidence by the Sejm's Foreign 
Affairs Committee. However, because Warsaw had already acceded to Italian demands for 
Sapicha's deputy's removal because he had made some intemperate remarks about the 
Italian casualties in Upper Silesia, this meant that Sapieha remained until replaced by 
Skirmunt three weeks later. 150 
Watching events unfold, Max Muller himself questioned whether the British 
Government was making sufficient allowance for the Polish Government's difficulties. 
On 15 May he had pointed out that evidence was emerging that France had engineered the 
insurrection to coincide with their own planned advance into the Ruhr on 2 May. 15 1 This, 
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of course, had been averted by Lloyd George forcing them instead to agree to presenting 
the ultimatum on reparations to Germany. 152 Max Muller nevertheless felt that Witos now 
had Poland's internal situation in hand and intended to take effective measures to tighten 
up the frontier. But, continued Max Muller, if the Reichswehr marched into Upper Silesia, 
nothing could prevent the Polish Army's intervention. Whether or not the French would 
also intervene, he left to Curzon's judgement. However, the outcome could not be 
regarded with equanimity: 
if the blame is to be apportioned the French are mainly responsible but the fact 
cannot be overlooked that had we been in a position to fulfil our obligations and 
maintain troops in Upper Silesia the rising would almost certainly not have 
occurred and in any case it would have been promptly suppressed. 153 
British criticism of the French military's tactics was also commented on by Briand 
when replying to Hardinge's aide mimoire of 13 ý& Y. 154 Compiled on Curzon's 
instructions, the British Ambassador had delivered it to Briand just before Lloyd George's 
speech in the House of Commons later that day. 1*55 The French Premier's reply also 
covered all of the additional points of criticism made by the British Prime Nfinister as 
well. 156 Most of the French press had concentrated on ridiculing the historical inaccuracies 
contained in the speech. One newspaper, Figaro, regretted that Lloyd George should allow 
himself to be influenced by his well-known antipathy to Poland, whilst another, Gauloius, 
asked if Lloyd George's indignation had been provoked by 'certain obligations' related to 
Germany accepting the ultimatum. 157 Briand had also alluded to this rumour when 
rejecting British charges that he wanted the whole industrial area to go Poland. Should he, 
Briand asked, accuse the British Government of wanting to assign the whole of Upper 
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Silesia to Germany on no other basis than articles in the British press? 158 Reading this, 
Waterlow wondered if the French 'had got wind of the secret telegram' that they had sent 
to Percival saying just that, a few hours after the first results were announced!. 159 With 
regard to British criticism of the French troops in Upper Silesia, Briand pointed out that, 
like the Italians, the French had done their duty and also suffered dead and wounded 
casualties. Once the United States and Britain withdrew their units from the inter-Allied 
Military Force, the Commission's inability to suppress widespread insurrection had been 
inevitable. In his opinion 
It is not just to leave one or two Powers to bear by themselves responsibilities and 
burdens which ought to have been shared among all the Allies, and then to 
reproach them with their powerlessness and even to question their impartiality. 160 
Nevertheless, he could not agree to a German force being organised outside the plebiscite 
area in order to impose a solution within it. This would draw Poland directly into conflict 
and should this occur he said, France could not passively stand by. 16 1 This statement had 
been confirmed by reports from Paris where, it was said, Briand had given assurances that, 
if regular German troops entered Upper Silesia then the Ruhr valley would be immediately 
occupied. 162 London responded by instructing the Paris Embassy to investigate and if they 
received 'serious confirmation' of this, then they must inform Briand that this action was 
'inconsistent with the spirit of the Entente' and endangered the future of the Alliance. 163 
The most immediate practical effect of Lloyd George's speech was felt fully in 
Upper Silesia where the anti-republican, anti-Semitic Freikorps units, unable to contain 
themselves any longer, had pressed forward towards the Polish line. 164 As this first stage 
of the uprising reached a conclusion, there were diverse interpretations of the conditions in 
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Upper Silesia. Cienciala and Komarnicki describe the uprising as petering out. Yet British 
documents relayed to the Foreign Office, picture a country gripped by terror, women 
'being barbarously flogged' and men 'murdered in cold blood by Polish insurgents'. 165 At 
the same time, the British contingent's internal documents, such as the diary of the District 
Controller at Olenso, whilst not diminishing the dangers posed by the situation, reveal a 
high degree of co-operation between the insurgents, the German para-militarists, and the 
Commission's officials that is not apparent in Percival's reports. 166 Addressing the Sej m 
in Warsaw on 17 May, Witos claimed that the general strike had ended, most workmen 
had returned to work and that many insurgents had been withdrawn to avoid having them 
clash with the Freikorps and Selbstschutz units. He asserted that some districts were 
completely pacified and that if it had not been for the renewed fear of German attacks 
stimulated by Lloyd George's speech, there had been every hope of the movement's 
complete liquidation. 167 On the other hand, Bourdillon reported that with the exception of 
the towns of Katowice, Bytom, Gliwice, and Krol Hutta, which were still controlled by 
French troops, the Polish insurgents had reorganised the local administration everywhere 
by appointing their own Polish district controllers, town commandants, local police and 
other functionaries. Houses were being ransacked for food and equipment, arrests were 
commonplace, and some people had been carried off as prisoners into Poland. "58 This grip 
on the occupied area appeared to be have been further secured by Marinis's decision to 
169 
withdraw all of the Italian forces and concentrate them on the west side of the Oder. 
With regard to living and working conditions in the occupied area, water and 
power supplies had been maintained and Bourdillon reported that communications with 
Poland, including the rail links, remained open. The telecommunications systems were 
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functioning but he reported that only a few mines and factories were operating. In any 
case, he added, there were no means of shifting the coal from the mines or the goods from 
the factories because, apart from trains being run by the insurgents for their own purposes, 
the only other trains in the occupied area were the occasional French-escorted military 
ones, running from Opole to Gliwice. In fact, coal production, which had resumed after 
Korfanty's call for a return to work on II May, was climbing steadily towards half the 
normal production levels - see Chart 1. Whilst a proportion of the coal was being 
transported by rail into Poland, most was either used locally or stockpiled - see Chart 2. "0 
These restrictions on transportation, food and finance were all part of the unofficial 
German counter-campaign which Percival had earlier speculated about. Craig confirmed 
that it was now being encouraged by the German Upper Silesians' own Politische Leitung 
or 'Committee of Twelve'. 171 On 15 May, Percival reported that there were now food 
shortages in the industrial area because the German railwaymen would not run trains 
there. He also noted that there was no money to pay out wages because the Reichbank had 
declined to Provide the 250,000 marks German employers owed to the workers. 172 Ten 
days later Warsaw also refused a request for money and provisions. 173 In despair over the 
imminent exhaustion of Upper Silesia's Food Department's stock and the failure of his 
repeated attempts to get both the Commissioners or the German authorities to act, Craig 
telegraphed London on his own authority to alert them to the very serious humanitarian 
situation facing the towns if the conflict continued. 174 
As we have noted, Polish and some of the British accounts agree that at this 
particular point in the insurrection, the military conflict had become a relatively low key 
affair, with the Commission's officials staving off the threatened German attacks by 
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liaising between the two sides. Although Percival disagreed with him, Le Rond was 
optimistic that the Poles would soon retire and disperse. 175 On the afternoon of 15 May, 
from Bytom, the Polish Consul General informed the Commission that to prevent any 
further bloodshed, the Polish Executive Committee were to invite the insurgents to disarm 
and return home to their work. 176 A further telegram from General Brantes, relayed a fuller 
explanation. The Executive Committee believed that the insurrection had done enough to 
show the world 'that it would be folly to impose on it a fresh German yoke'. They 
declared that there had been no 'anarchy or excesses' and the tragic incidents that had 
occurred 'were deplored by all Upper Silesian Poles'. They declared that over 10,000 
insurgents had been dernobilised and that, as a first stage in the country's pacification, 
they would pull back their forces sufficiently to ensure that they avoided clashing with the 
German armed units. But 
in order that it should be possible to impose this sacrifice on our combatants, and 
that this should be successful, it is indispensable that [the] inter-allied Commission 
should supply us with moral arguments and real guarantees. - We request 
therefore that [the] zone evacuated by us may at once be occupied by [the] allies, 
so as to guarantee [the] Polish inhabitants against cruel reprisals such as they have 
already suffered in certain places. 
Signed, Korfanty, Roguszczek, Rumpfelt, Rymer, Grogek. 177 
Even if the Commission had been in a position to deliver the inter-Allied troops 
necessary to enable a peacefW dernobilisation to take place, the Polish leadership's new 
offer posed a problem. This was that since the earlier negotiations with Korfanty (8 -11 
May), because of the prompting by the Ambassadors' Conference and Percival's general 
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reluctance to deal with the Poles, the Commission had declared that it would not negotiate 
with the insurgents. 178 The new offer had also coincided with news about Lloyd George's 
speech which the Freikorpskiimpfers had interpreted as a British signal for them to push 
the Poles out of Upper Silesia. 179 However, it was. this escalation in military attacks at 
points along the Korfanty line, but especially around Kosel and towards G6ra 9w. Anny, 
rather than any scruple on the part of the other Commissioners, that scuppered this second 
chance to terminate the insurrection. "0 As for the influence British officials believed they 
had, writh the German para-military leaders, this proved of little value when they attempted 
to dissuade them from attacking the Poles. 18 1 
Percival again offered to resign and suggested withdrawing the British contingent. 
Sympathising with their plight, Curzon asked them to continue performing their task in 
'the interests of this country and of the European settlement'. 182 However, with the Poles 
associating British officials with the German cause and an increased threat of full-scale 
civil war, Percival had good reasons to harbour 'grave fears for the safety of the British 
officers'. 183 For example, at Olenso on 18 May, Polish leaders warned the British District 
Controller that should Major Creasy (a British police official whom they claimed had 
abused Poles and enquired about military dispositions) visit the town again, they could not 
guarantee his safety. '" By now Percival was approaching another breakdown. Discredited 
by the Poles and the French as a Germanpuppet, fixated with compiling evidence about 
the Polish Army's alleged collaboration and Le Rond's and French officials partiality, his 
reports had lost all objectivity and his conclusions were despairing. Believing it pointless 
to be continually promising the Germans that the Commission would restore the situation, 
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he warned Le Rond that a German offensive 'in which Upper Silesia would be overrun by 
a horde of iffesponsible bands', was now inevitable. 185 
On 15 May, von Moltke, who had replaced Hatzfeldt on the latter's resignation in 
frustration at the Commission's inability to restore order, suggested that the Reichswehr be 
placed under the control of the Commission's British and Italian officers. ' 86 A very similar 
suggestion was made to D'Abernon in Berlin the following day. He believed this would 
enable Percival to use the German para-military forces 'to clear the country of the 
187 invaders' 
. By now, Percival and 
his staff appear to have become so disconnected from 
reality that it was only the high probability of armed clashes with the French military units 
which restrained them from accepting the German requests to legitimise Keatinge's para- 
militarists by organising them into a security force directly under British control. 1811 
In what was to be his last lengthy despatch about the situation, Percival gave his 
animosities free rein. The Polish insurgents, he declared, were determined to provoke a 
German counter-attack, hoping that events would provide Poland with an excuse to 
intervene or give France a pretext to occupy the Ruhr. The Germans' patience astonished 
him. Seeing 'their country overrun by an army of bandits with the single object of taking 
from them by foul means what they cannot obtain by fair - is, I think, more than men of 
any nation can stand'. Not unexpectedly, they were taking matters into their own hands 
and were attempting 'to obtain by force of arms thatjustice which they have a right to 
expect from the Commission, and which the latter has failed to afford'. 189 The day after 
these opinions were despatched, on learning that Lloyd George had criticised the Italian 
Commissioner, Percival leapt to Marinis' defence, once again threatening to resign. ' 90 
Four days later, on 25 May, Bourdillon informed Curzon that 
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Colonel Percival is confined to his bed and is on the verge of a serious breakdown 
as a result of continuous strain. One or two members of his staff are in the same 
condition and I consider immediate relief should be sent to prevent a breakdown of 
British representation. 191 
In an non-attributable report prepared for Max Muller describing the working of the 
inter-Allied Commission in Opole, the Times and Morning Star regional correspondents 
both noted bow Percival's health had been giving way for 'the last month or two'. It was 
their opinion that he should not have been directing the British contingent's work during 
this time. The effect bad been worsened by Percival retaining control from his sick-bed - 
to which be had been increasingly confined since the insurrection started. He delegated 
very little to his staff, with the result that their work was 'unsystematic and haphazard', 
with time being wasted on referring matters to Percival. The two correspondents also 
declared that they could not identify any subordinate there who was 'strong-minded, 
broadminded and clear headed' enough to take-over. 192 Percival had the sameproblem. 
On finally tendering his resignation on 25 May 192 1, he informed the Foreign Office that 
he-did not consider his new deputy, Colonel Hawker, a suitable replacement. 193 Bourdillon 
was sent to London to explain this and Percival clung on until 30 May - the same day that 
Sir Harold Stuart, a recent Rhineland Commissioner, was appointed to succeed him as the 
new British Commissioner. 194 Writing privately to Crowe, Max Muller noted that several 
visitors to Upper Silesia had remarked on Percival's inadequacy for such a 'heavy and 
responsible task'. He also made the point that of late 'poor Percival seemed to be attaching 
more and more importance to his personal differences with Le Rond'. He hoped that with 
the advent of the new Commissioner, the shortcomings of the British section of the inter- 
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Allied Commission would be eliminated. 195 Happily, by this time, the only possible 
decision that could resolve the situation, namely the return of the British troops to Upper 
Silesia, had already been taken. 
The German Government had been seeking the return of the four British battalions 
since the start of the insurrection. 196 In London, their Ambassador had repeatedly claimed 
that British troops were 'the only real safeguard for restoring order'. 197 The new German 
Chancellor had declared that 'a few English troops' could change the whole situation. 198 
This situation was not unique to Upper Silesia. In the Rhineland occupation area the 
British were equally popular and the French equally despised. Now, with Germany having 
accepted the Allies' reparation ultimatum, occupation of the Ruhr valley was now off the 
British Rhineland force's agenda. The British troops on the Rhine were once again free for 
duty in Upper Silesia. In the Foreign Office, however, officials realised that the only way 
to get these troops there would be for Curzon to take the initiative. 199 Crowe had broached 
the subject on 14 May, asking Curzon whether the Prime Minister might now consider 
sending troops. Their presence appeared to be the only means of checking the 'unruly 
German elements in Silesia' whose actions, Crowe pointed out, might provide the French 
with a pretext for occupying the Ruhr. 200 Curzon, however, hesitated. 201 Crowe tried once 
more, reminding Curzon of Britain's treaty obligation to maintain order in Upper Silesia. 
This, said Crowe, was a duty that should not be taken lightly. He then proceeded to make 
an unfavourable comparison between Germany's forced compliance with the Treaty's 
provisions and the British Government's evasion of its responsibilities. 
When the Germans ... plead the 
difficulties of internal security they are met with an 
inflexible demand to give effect to their [treaty] undertaking. Are we in a better 
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position when we refuse to do our duty under the treaty on the ground that the 
despatch of troops-causes intemal. difficultieS? 202 
Crowe concluded by pointing out that sending the British troops back to Upper Silesia,, 
would not only increase the area's security and. put an end to the French jibes about the 
invalidity of the British criticism, but it would finally enable Curzon to 'take a firm line' 
with. France over Upper Silesian issues. 203 
This, pitch appealed to Curzon who, as we have seen, was indeed attempting to 
pursue that 'firm line'. Lloyd George concurred and citing his authority, Curzon informed 
the CIGS that they had decided to send five battalions back to Silesia. However, angered 
by Curzon's pre-emptive manoeuvre, Wilson recorded: 
I told him of course if he and the P. M. had settled the matter there was nothing 
more to more to be said about it except to send the battalions, but I would be 
failing in my duty if I did not tell him. plainly that it was madness; that five 
battalions solved noproblem.; that they might get into a horrid mess; that we did 
not know how long they would be there; that they would be under French 
Command, and quite possibly have a quarrel with the French troops; and so forth; 
and then I finished up by saying that how anybody in their senses could dream of 
sending troops to Silesia when Ireland was in the condition she was in passed my 
understanding. 204 
Shaken, Curzon consulted Lloyd George. He telephoned back to Wilson to say that the 
Prime Minister had now 'agreed to 4 Rhine battalions going to Silesia, but only if the 
French asked for our help, and if I [CIGS] could arrange it with-Foch'. 2"s Wilson-did so, 
but perhaps not quite as the politicians had envisaged. Before the Embassy in Paris had 
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processed Curzon's official enquiry, Foch let it be known that the situation did not require 
British battalions to be-sent to Upper Silesia 
. 
2"6 The representatives in Paris saw. this. as 
indicative of French military. policy there, but this view was not shared by Curzon. 
Suspecting Wilson's handiwork, he. pointed out that, 'This is not a French refusal. Only, 
207 so far, the. -refusal of Marshal Foch' . 
Indeed, when Briand wrote to London on-21 May, 
he welcomed the British Government's decision and asked that the move be 'promptly 
executed .. 
208 Similar messages about the troops were sent to Rome . 
209 Orders for all four 
Rhine battalions to proceed to Upper Silesia were despatched on 23 May. 210 
An unhappy Wilson warned the new Minister for War, Worthington-Evans, 'that it 
was an unwise,. and. possibly dangerous move', and advised him to alert the Cabinet . 
211 It 
was discussed in Cabinet the following dky during a wide-ranging examination of Anglo- 
French relations. Churchill, supported by Sir Austen Chamberlain, proposed attempting to 
pin French consent for British-backed economic concessions for Germany by offering 
France a written guarantee of military assistance in the event of an unprovoked German 
attack. This was rejected. Instead, the Cabinet decided to send six battalions to Up r pe 
Silesia. in place of the original four. 212 Once the troops were committed, Wilson ensured 
that the force was well equipped. Percival had requested that it be mobile, self-sufficient, 
with 'armoured cars, tanks and aeroplanes'. 213 Wilson described it as 'waspish'., 
suggesting that, though small, it had more than adequate firepo. wer. 214 
Since the British Army Council felt that the loyalty of Southern Irish regiments was 
questionable (andý therefore, could not use them in Ireland), Wilson decided to send two 
of them, the 2nd Battalion Leinster Regiment and the 2nd Battalion Connaught Rangers, 
out of Britain to join forces with the four Rhine battalions forming 'The British Upper 
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Silesian Force'. 215 Placed under the command of General William Heneker (Commander 
of the Independent Division on standby for service in Upper Silesia in 1919), the British 
force was divided into two under-sized brigades. The First Silesian Brigade was placed 
under the command of Colonel A-G. Wauchope, who had been British Commander during 
the recent plebiscite. This comprised his own 2nd Battalion the Black Watch, also the I st 
Durham Light Infantry and the 2nd Leinster Regiment. Colonel H. B. P. L. Kennedy was the 
Commander of the Second Silesian Brigade. This comprised the I st Royal Irish Fusiliers, 
the 3rd Middlesex Regiment and the 2nd Connaught Rangers. 216 A squadron of cavalry 
from the 14th Hussars was added in June and in September another Southern Irish 
battalion, the 2nd Munster Fusiliers, and one of the Northern Irish battalions, the 2nd 
Inniskilling-Fusiliers, arrived to reinforce thern. 217 Thus, until the Southern Irish Battalions 
were disbanded on the Irish Free State's formation early in 1922, Irish and Scots soldiers 
formed three-quarters of the British Silesian force. 
The initial movement of the 4,000 British troops to locations around Opole was 
completedbetween 26 May and 6 June .2 
18 The force was an integral part. of. the. inter- 
Allied Commission's military command structure but Heneker retained day to day control. 
From the outset he refused any orders that he believed favoured the insurgents at the 
expense of the Germans. To ensure an understanding between the French and the British 
Staff Headquarters, Wilson appointed Colonel Sir Edward Grogan as hispersonal liaison 
officer with Gratier. Whilst Grogan sent regular despatches to Wilson, his real task was to 
arrange for the exchange of information between the respective commanders and to ensure 
that each understood the other's point of view. 219 Ms appointment reputedly did not please 
Le Rond., who had been using his seniority and position as head of the Commission to 
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dominate Gratier on military matters. 220 But Wilson was determined that the military 
commanders would not repeat the Commissioners' mistakes, When difficulties between 
Gratier and Heneker were reported to him, Wilson reminded the British Commander that 
in this or any military operations you undertake it is essential to preserve the Allied 
facade vis-Li-vis the Poles and the Germans, otherwise it will give a handle for 
every kind of mischievous propaganda, and encourage efforts to effect a breach 
between the French and ourselves which must be avoided at all costs . 
221 
This was important. The local German press had been carefully presenting the British 
troops as separate strike force committed to action against the Polish insurgents. 222 In their 
conversations with Hoefer's Chief of Staff, the Times and Morning Star correspondents 
became convinced that the Germans intended to get the British fighting on their side. They 
had also warned Max Muller that many British officials on the Commission accepted this 
German interpretation but failed to realise its implicit danger. 223 Max Muller reported that 
Narod had published Hoefer's remarks about German and British troops fighting together 
against the French. He warned Curzon that should these ideas get around, then the Polish 
Government might lose influence with Korfanty who, in turn, might lose control over the 
Polish insurgents. Max Muller told Curzon that Britain's pro-German image was further 
reinforced by the British officers' near-total control over the all-German plebiscite police 
force. It was bad enough having the plebiscite police co-ordinating their actions against 
the insurgents with the Selbstschutz, but having them guarding Hoeffer's headquarters as 
well, seemed to Max Muller, 'rather a tall order'. 224 
The British military did realise the dangers and difficulties that being identified with 
one side posed for them. More than one officer equated their situation to Ireland, with 
Chapter 4 
343 
'Sinn Fein = the Poles, the UNY = Selbstschutz, Crown forces = inter-Allied Forces'. The 
difference was that 'the Poles were not murdering the inter-Allied troopS,. 225 A briefing 
paper alerting British military officers to this and other aspects of the conflict, remarked 
on the extraordinary situation existing there with Poles not objecting to French troops 
being behind their lines and Germans wanting to 'advance shoulder to shoulder with the 
British' to crush the Polish insurgents. But, the paper gave strong and valuable advice: 
Owing to German propaganda the Poles believe the British have identified 
themselves with the German cause, and would probably fire on advancing British 
troops. This is all the more certain as many of the Poles are without discipline and 
are recruited from a very low class. 226 
The officers were instructed to impress on their men the need for them to act impartially, 
and for them to emphasise that they were acting in concert with their French and Italians 
colleagues. Good will was essential and they must show 'by word and deed' that they 
valued and respected their allies. 227 It was not long before Heneker could claim that the 
inter-Allied soldiers were preserving the Entente and that the rank and file were 'the very 
2213 best of pals' . 
Before travelling on to Opole, Heneker spent one day (I June) in Berlin where he 
discussed the situation with D'Abernon; he also met von Seeckt, who assured him that the 
Reichswehr would not enter Upper Silesia. 229 Neither he nor Sir Harold Stuart had direct 
contact with the German Government - their requests for assistance and co-operation were 
made through the Foreign Office and D'Abernon. Heneker decided to establish the British 
headquarters at Strzelce and then try to occupy the high ground around Gora Sw. Amy - 
still the main area of conflict between the two sides. 230 As we noted earlier, unable to 
Chapter 4 
344 
contain themselves any longer, the German Southern Group had launched a full-scale 
operation against the insurgents holding this vitally strategic position. In the three days of 
fighting that followed, both sides had suffered heavy losses. The main fighting ended on 
23 May when the Freikorps forces, supported by Selhstschutz and the British led, all- 
German plebiscite police units, had stormed the hill . 
23 ' But the day after this celebrated 
Freikorps victory, the German Government had issued a decree outlawing all volunteer 
military organisations. 232 This had been done not simply in response to French diplomatic 
pressure and the threat to occupy the Ruhr. It was done because Berlin had misgivings 
over the many reports appearing about the Freikorps units' undisciplined and insensitive 
activities in Upper Silesia. 233 And, as Cienciala and Komarnicki have noted, the decision 
to disband them (nominal since they simply became official Selbstschutz units) was also 
clearly connected to the simultaneous announcement of the return of the British troopS. 234 
The decree nevertheless aroused intense bitterness in the ranks of the Freikorpskampfers, 
and provided the Weimar Republic's most vociferous opponents with yet another stick 
with which to beat it. When the Nazis took power twelve years later, one of their first 
actions was to commemorate the victory at Sw. Anny by erecting a monument there. 235 
Following on from the German Government's new-found understanding with Britain, 
Berlin had ordered Hoefer to tighten control over his men and prevent any further German 
advances. 236 When the British troops began arriving in Upper Silesia, in exchange for a 
more formal status and involvement in the decision-making process, the Selbstschutz 
tended to co-operate with any requests made by the British military officers. It was the 
role of Warsaw and the French to negotiate with the insurgents. 237 We should also note 
that when Heneker and Sir Harold Stuart arrived in Opole, although the situation was 
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Photo 3: Amphitheatre G ra Sw. Anny built during the Nazi era on the site of 
the Freikorps victory over Polish Silesian Insurgents May 1921. 
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Photo 4: Freikorps Memorial ra Sw. Anny 
(Plates have been removed) 
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Photo 5: Monastery on top of G6ra S'w. Anny 
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dangerous, it was not quite as dire as that which had confronted Percival. Apart from the 
French agreeing to bring the Selbstschutz into the negotiations and the renewed British 
military participation, the improvement was also attributable to an improvement in the 
German food supplies (after strong representations by Curzon), a slight easing in Anglo- 
French political tensions and, most importantly, the conciliatory nature of the proposals 
emerging from the Gliwice district military commander's (General Brantes) renewed 
negotiations with Korfanty. 238 On the other hand, with the Freikorps units absorbed into 
the Selhstschutz, Hoefer's control was far ftorn complete. Local skirmishing continued and 
in direct defiance of Hoefer's orders German breakouts were attempted from Sw. Anny, 
Kluczbork, and at other points along the Korfanty line. Hoefer's co-operation with the 
Allies was also conditional on the French forces continuing to protect the Germans 
occupying the towns. Although, on occasion, the French threatened to abandon them to 
the insurgents, for Hoefer their occupation had the advantage of tying most of the French 
units down and minimising French contact with his SelbstSChUtZ. 239 With the French 
garrisoning the towns and the Italians avoiding contact with the insurgents, the greater 
share of the work of separating the two sides and defusing the situation fell to the British. 
The plan eventually adhered to was similar to the proposal the Polish leadership 
had made on the 15 May which had been, as the Polish insurgents refired, an inter-Allied 
military force would occupy the vacated territory - preventing Selbstschutz units filling 
the vacuum. 240 Le Rond had blamed the Commission's rejection of this offer on Percival's 
refusal to deal with the insurgents . 
24 1 However, as we noted, there were no Allied troops 
available to occupy the area and renewed Gennan attacks around Kosel and Sw. Anny had 
caused a resumption of fighting. Ten days later Marinis and Percival proposed a variation 
Chapter 4 
349 
on Ottley's scheme (which had already been rejected by the Ambassadors') to allocate 
uncontested parts of the plebiscite area to the Germans and the Poles respectively. 242 Yet, 
despite Percival's and Marinis' modifications to Ottley's rejected plan, the Ambassadors 
turned the proposal down again. 243 This time, however, the rejection was because on 27 
May, the Polish leadership offered to surrender the occupied territory unconditionally. 244 
Welcoming Korfanty's proposal, the Commission reported to the Ambassadors 
that it could only be put into effect after the British troops had arrived. 245 Until then, the 
Commission still had no means of containing the Selbstschutz. The military staff in Opole 
drew up plans to implement their intervention strategy - later known as the 'neutral zone' 
scheme. But Heneker (then en route to Opole) expressed concern about the dangers of the 
plan, which involved inserting his British soldiers into the 'no man's land' between the 
Polish and German lines. Despite Korfantv's agreement to the plan, Heneker envisioned 
great difficulty persuading the belligerents to retire once the neutral zone was established. 
He feared that his British battalions would find themselves stuck in the middle of a de 
facto partition between two hostile nations. 246 
The practical difficulties in implementing the plan soon became apparent when,, 
two days after the Durham Light Infantry's arrival in Silesia, a German offensive pushed 
the insurgents back nearly into Gliwice. The Durhams inter-posed themselves between the 
two sides by occupying Sw. Anny's southern slopes. But they failed to gain the important 
high ground that Heneker had wanted because the Germans would not move. 247 The 
Leinsters had more success at Olenso on 7 June, when the Poles did agree to yield 
territory. 248 The Polish Silesians had responded to the arrival of the British troops by 
putting their case to them. 
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To the 
British troops in Upper-Silesia 
The Germans have tried to persuade you that you have been 
sent to Upper-Silesia to crush a rebellion against Great- 
Britain and the other Allied powers. They have painted us as 
black as possible for their own ends. 
Don't believe them 
We are not rebelling against the authority of the Allies. 
We are not Polish regulars disguised as Upper 
Silesians. 
We are not Bolsheviks. 
We are not ennemies[sic] of Great Britain, France and 
Italy; we are their loyal friends and many of us deserted 
from the German army during the Great War to serve in your 
ranks and help fight the Huns. 
We are workmen and farmers born and bred in the country, 
who will sooner die than go back to German rule... 
The only right a ""Polish swine" as the German's[sic], 
call us ever had was to get less wages than the Germans, and 
pay higher taxes and go and get killed for the Kaiser and 
Fatherland... 
We are condemned to live and die as white slaves in order 
to furnish cheap labour to our German masters... 
We are not telling you this ... to make you disobey orders, you 
are soldiers and we know that you must do your duty. We only 
want you to understand that we are not your ennemies[sic) ... 
249 
With an estimated 60,000 combatants facing each other on either side of the line, 
there were too few British troops to enforce their will. For example, in the relatively small 
180 square mile neutral zone that they had established after occupying Olenso, the 
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Leinsters had just 400 men to police it. This meant that the British troops had to rely on 
diplomacy, good humour and occasional threats, to prise the insurgents from their 
positions. They then had to apply these same skills to ensure that the insurgents did not try 
to return or that the Selbmschutz entered the neutral zone thus established. It was soon 
discovered that 'if threatened, the Germans would do as they were told, while the Poles, if 
well treated would do as they were asked'. 250 Contrary to Percival's reports, the British 
troops found most insurgents to be youths clad in various mixtures of civilian_clothes and 
uniforms. They carried a variety of arms and practically no equipment, lacked military 
discipline and it was not unusual for whole groups to disobey their officer. Nevertheless, 
in their own way, 'they managed to get things done'. 251 
The British troops also found passions on both sides were inflamed to unbelievable 
degrees of hatred and mistrust. Fed an incessant stream of stories from all sides about 
attacks, murders, battles, and atrocities, after time and effort expended investigating the 
allegations, the British troops came to the conclusion 'that there was no such thing as truth 
252 in Upper Silesia' 
. 
From experience, they also learned that the plebiscite police were 
incapable of impartiality and that the Poles regarded them as simply another German 
force. When on 14 June, the Polish and German forces were finally separated by one long 
continuous neutral zone, the British military force commanders discouraged the British- 
led plebiscite police from entering it. 
253 
In this new situation, the British military's behaviour not only caused some tension 
but it also displayed some confusion. Not only was there friction between British soldiers 
and the Commission's British officials: orders had to be issued reminding both officials 
and troops that even when these ex-officers were wearing military uniform, they had no 
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control over the military action. More seriously from a military point of view, in reports to 
Stuart, two of his officials, Colonel Hawker, and Major MacVey of the Communications 
Department, both mentioned that British troops were fraternising with the insurgents. 254 
And when visiting the area around Gliwice, they had found that the Middlesex battalion's 
officers appeared to be under the impression that the British and French troops were there 
to stop a German advance. Regarding the insurgents, their only orders were 'to return fire 
if fired at'. Hawker believed that the Connaught Rangers' officers had also failed to grasp 
the general situation. One told Hawker that keeping the Selbstschutz in check allowed the 
insurgents to concentrate their forces elsewhere, At Wauchope's Brigade Headquarters, 
Hawker noticed Polish flags flying over the building his Black Watch signallers were 
sharing with the Poles; and at the Polish 1 st Division's Headquarters near 14bgdy railway 
junction, a lieutenant there had told MacVey 
how the insurgents had been so agreeably surprised by the attitude which the 
British troops had taken towards them. They had anticipated their coming as 
enemies. The reverse had turned out to be the case. Insurgents and British now 
mingled in friendly fashion whenever they were thrown together. They played 
football with each other and carried out their respective duties without friction. 255 
To anyone who has served in the armed forces, the above descriptions bear 
the stamp of authenticity. Afraid that the British troops (these were the Black Watch), 
would soon be as friendly with the Polish insurgents as the French soldiers were, Heneker 
had Wauchope's brigade re-deployed closer to the British Commander's Headquarters at 
Strzelce where they would have much less contact with the Poles. 256 The confused sense 
of purpose that Hawker had found amongst the British military officers probably resulted 
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from the plan for the Polish withdrawal having not yet been formulated. This had been 
delayed because many considerations requiring delicate negotiations had to be resolved 
beforehand. 257 Not least were the two conditions submitted by the Poles on 8 June. The 
first of these was that the Selbstschutz should also withdraw and disband. The second was 
that a general amnesty should be granted and that after the withdrawal the Polish Silesians 
would not be treated less favourably than the Germans. 258 
Unsurprisingly, the German Silesians, making the most of their role as innocent 
victims, had great difficulty accepting these conditions . 
259 There were discussions between 
Commission representatives, Hoefer and the German Politische Leitung, face to face 
meetings between Heneker and Hoefer, and daily negotiations between Hoefer and 
Colonel Dillon, Heneker's Chief of Staff, before the many differences were eventually 
overcome. 260 The course of these negotiations are more than adequately recorded in the 
published British documents. Had all of the sides failed to agree, or had the Poles not 
withdrawn from the plebiscite area completely, Heneker had a 'bolder and more active' 
contingency plan which first involved cutting the insurgents' supply routes by seizing the 
Herby-Lubliniec and the Poznan'-Kluczbork railway lines. Then, after Keatinge had 
expanded the plebiscite police force to 15,000, with their aid and the acquiescence of the 
French, using the Selbstschutz as a rearguard, the British and Italian forces would stage a 
coup in and around the industrial area . 
261 This plan was Heneker's and Stuart's preferred 
option. In fact, well aware of the difficulty they would encounter getting the French to go 
along with such an action, they had only initially pursued the French-backed scheme for a 
progressive withdrawal of Polish forces so as to place them in a position to insist on 
French compliance with their plan once the Polish withdrawal had failed - as they 
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expected it would. 262 Therefore, anticipating implementation of their alternative plan, 
Stuart asked the Foreign Office to once again pursue the closure of the Polish-Upper 
Silesia frontier by having some Allied officers sent from Warsaw to monitor it. 263 By 
chance, Grogan later met these monitors when they were in Bytom. They told him that 
they were satisfied that no arms or munitions were crossing into Upper Silesia. 264 
German press reports that the Polish insurrectionary movement was being taken over 
by Communists 'waving red flags', found their way into American and British 
newspapers. British intelligence reported that party and secret meetings attended by 
prominent Communists from Germany and Russia, were frequently held in Opole and in 
the industrial districts. 265 One report claimed that a Red Army of 2 1,000 already existed 
and that the Comintern had made several million pounds sterling available for propaganda 
purposes in Upper Silesia. 266 Communists in neighbouring countries had been ordered to 
enrol themselves in the runks of Korfanty's troops and to do everything in their power to 
transform the Polish nationalist movement into a Bolshevik movement -a Bolshevik 
tactic that they had successfully practised further east. 267 Although there appears to have 
been some anarchic behaviour as this third insurgency drew to a close, most of these 
reports about Communist activity were generally crude right-wing German propaganda, 
bearing little relationship to the actual events. In fact, a Commission intelligence report 
later put the total number of Communist adherents in Upper Silesia at 5,4 10 of which only 
135 came from the Polish Silesian strongholds of Pszczyna and Rybnik. The vast majority 
could be found amongst German industrial workers inhabiting the industrial towns. 268 
On the 24 June, Korfanty signed up to the Commission's plan for the phased 
withdrawal of the insurgents from Upper Silesia. He also issued a proclamation calling on 
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the Poles to adhere to its conditions and to avoid any 'excesses'. Apart from the increased 
amount of German agitation in the towns and occupied territories plus Selbstschutz forays 
into them, there had also been an escalation in general lawlessness since the first talk of a 
Polish withdrawal . 
269 The final plan that emerged from the negotiations took account of 
German scepticism over the insurgents' ability and intention to withdraw peacefully. 270 
The Poles were to make four staged withdrawals within seven days. 271 Once the first stage 
was completed and this had been verified, the German Selbstschutz units would fall back 
to a new line - though still within the plebiscite area. The Poles would complete two more 
stages and once these had also been verified, both the Polish insurgents and the members 
of the Selbstschutz would leave the plebiscite area. Other conditions imposed were that 
only British troops would take-over Sw. Anny, an amnesty would be announced, and the 
local government officials displaced by the insurgents would be reinstated. If one side 
refused to complete a stage, the Commission would permit the other to return to its 
previous position. By not extending the amnesty to people found in possession of 
weapons, the Commission hoped that this would go some way towards disarming the 
population. 272 However, as Grogan predicted and as proved the case in practice, the 
pacification of the country would only be superficial because all arms would simply be 
concealed until the next emergency. 273 
Like the German Silesians, most of Wirth's Cabinet did not believe Korfanty's 
assurances that the Poles would withdraw, nevertheless, in response to intense Allied 
pressure, the German Government persuaded Hoefer and the Politische Leitung to also 
accept the plan . 
274 The Berlin Legation had warned London that Wirth's Government had 
already been weakened by 'their inability to show that acceptance of the ultimatum has 
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profited Germany [in] anything so far' . 
275 Hoefer signed the plan on Sunday 26 June - the 
same day that Heneker had held a garden party for over five hundred Allied soldiers, 
officials and their families in the grounds of his headquarters in Strzelce. Grogan thought 
that it had 'only required the presence of Korfanty and Hoefer to complete the picture 5.276 
The aim of the party was to cement inter-Allied friendship and Stuart believed that its 
success must have convinced the Germans and Poles of the Entente's Solidarity. 277 The 
withdrawal plan was implementedjust two days later. The insurgents and Selbstschutz 
faded into their communities, the external para-military forces left the area and by July 5 
2711 
the third Upper Silesian insurrection was over. 
Although the insurgents had offered to vacate the area they occupied before the 
British troops had arrived, the Allied threat to occupy the Ruhr valley (their main sanction 
against a German attack) might not in itself have prevented the less-disciplined elements 
of the Selbstschutz units from following up any early Polish withdrawal and re-igniting the 
conflict. One inescapable conclusion concerning the insurrection's relatively peaceful 
outcome must be that such a disastrous development was solely prevented by the renewed 
British military presence in Upper Silesia. This, and the patient but firm negotiating 
tactics of the British military officers in their dealings with Hoefer and the Selbstschutz, 
provided the German Silesians with sufficient confidence to allow the Allies one final 
opportunity to fulfil their Peace Treaty commitment to maintain order in Upper Silesia. 
The same was true if developments are examined in the wider context. Wirth's 
policy of fulfilment coupled with Britain's increased influence in Berlin (due to Lloyd 
George and D'Abernon's personal hints and intimations to the German Government to 
expect a favourable outcome of the Upper Silesian settlement), provided Berlin with 
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enough confidence to pressurise the recalcitrant German Silesians and their Freikorps 
allies to comply with the withdrawal plan. Therefore, leaving aside the degree in which 
the British Government's high-handed, if not arrogant, attitude contributed towards 
inciting the insurrection, all sorts of alternative scenarios, ranging from the ending of the 
Entente, to renewed warfare across Northern Europe, were possible without the British 
Army's return to Upper Silesia. Of course, all of this was appreciated in the Foreign 
Office, which made Wilson's call for Heneker's troops to be immediately withdrawn to 
the Rhine to be, in Curzon's words, 'out of the question'. 279 
From having been the main force establishing the neutral zone, during the Polish 
indurgents' withdrawal the British were mainly engaged in the plebiscite area's northern 
districts. As the insurgents retired, the British troops followed them through each phase of 
the withdrawal. Because of the lack of inter-Allied troops (and reflecting the status that the 
Allies had been forced to accord them), the Selbstschutz had been 'trusted' to fulfil their 
commitment to the plan. The British were also responsible for Tarnowski Gory, Bytom 
and their surrounding districts. Stuart had insisted on them occupying part of the industrial 
area and places with a predominantly German population. 280 Unlike the French, who had 
suffered casualties at the hands of the Germans, the British lost only one man during the 
establishment of the neutral zone and did not suffer any casualties during the insurgents' 
withdrawal . 
281 This relatively peaceful withdrawal was attributed locally to a long spell of 
cold weather dampening the Selbstschutz and the insurgents' fighting spirits. 282 However, 
some of the Middlesex did become embroiled in one unpleasant incident - typifying what 
would be the future experience of the French forces in Upper Silesia. Arriving at barracks 
in Bytom to take over the garrison there, they witnessed the wounding of two French 
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soldiers by shots fired from a crowd of Germans assembled to cheer the British troops' 
arrival. When the French Commandant went to investigate, he was shot in the back of the 
head at point blank range. According to the British reports, their troops immediately 
cordoned-off the area and attempted to stop French troops taking retaliatory action, but 
some of them opened fire on the crowd as it dispersed. Later, nearby, eight more Germans 
died after being either shot or bayoneted. The next day, a French armoured car fired on a 
crowd in Bytom wounding several more. 283 French troops also seized the mayor and nine 
hostages but the British Commissioner later interceded and secured their release. 2114 
With the withdrawal completed, Wauchope set up his headquarters at Brynek, 
north-west of Tarnowski Gory and detachments of the Black Watch were deployed across 
Lubliniec - territory familiar to them from their March visit. The Leinsters were located at 
Koszecin and the Durhams stationed around Opole. 285 After a detachment of Durham's 
had been called out to help quell disturbances there on 12 July, a sergeant was killed by a 
stray bullet. 286 Kennedy's Brigade Headquarters were at Kochice. The Royal Irish were 
located at Tarnowski and at Miasteczko and, as noted above, some of the Middlesex 
companies were in Bytom (accompanied by the British tanks). Others were located at 
Meichowice and Rokitnica. They were supported by the Connaught Rangers who were 
also deployed in and around Bytom. 287 Throughout the whole period the British forces 
were present in Upper Silesia, the British Divisional Headquarters remained at Strzelce - 
although Heneker himself took up residence at Schloss Turawa, the home of Count 
Gamier (one of Percival's recent confidantS). 288 
Heneker found that the 'British troops had been received everywhere with cheers 
and flowers and elaborate demonstrations of welcome' . 
289 A few days later, however, he 
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had to report that Polish miners in Bytom were threatening to strike in protest at the 
presence of the British troops there . 
290 As well as maintaining readiness in case a Polish 
putsch or a Bolshevik rising occurred before the Supreme Council reached a verdict on 
Upper Silesia's future, the British commander had planned on dispersing his troops in a 
manner that would assist the police to prevent infiltration and the passage of arms and 
munitions across the Polish border. 291 However, before long, Heneker came to the 
conclusion that a ftirther Polish insurrection was unlikely. He believed that the looting and 
destruction said to have been committed by the insurgents 'had done considerable harm to 
Poland's cause in Upper Silesia'. 292 But a few days later he was expressing his unease 
over reports that because of alleged weakness during their recent negotiations, certain 
influential Germans had managed to have Hoefer replaced. General von Lequis, his 
rumoured successor, was reported to have commanded a Reichswehr Brigade in Upper 
Silesia during 1919 when the Germans had committed 'terrible atrocities' against the 
Poles . 
2" Though both he and Stuart would later play it down, at this point Heneker 
thought it possible that the Germans were thinking of attempting to seize the industrial 
area. The British forces had their own contingency plans for a Polish or a German 
insurrection. Heneker warned that if either occurred, the consequences were likely to be 
considerable. 294 With this in mind, if there was to be any delay to the Supreme Council's 
Upper Silesian decision, then both he and Stuart wanted another British brigade sent 
out. 295 
The necessity for increasing the British military presence was further underlined just 
a few days later, when Heneker reported that France was preparing to send an additional 
infantry division (10,000 men) to Upper Silesia. 296 When Heneker and Stuart had insisted 
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that any inter-Allied military planning must compel the French forces to resist any future 
Polish rising, Le Rond had wanted even more troopS. 297 To Stuart, more French troops 
also meant a lesser ratio of British troops and the possibility that Le Rond would want 
Heneker's men concentrated in a much smaller area completely outwith the industrial 
triangle. 298 When the French also suggested that a German insurrection was inuninent, 
both Stuart and Heneker (who had been overwhelmed with German reassurances to the 
contrary), began discounting thiS. 299 Instead, they continued Percival's previous line, 
claiming that the Le Rond was seeking to introduce reinforcements in a bid to provoke 
German retaliation. This would provide the French with an excuse to occupy the Ruhr 
valley and give added salience to their argument 'that the heart of Upper Silesia should go 
to the Poles'. Heneker told the War Office that: 
1. On no account must a fresh French division be allowed to come here. 
2. If it does British troops must be augmented. 
3. Supreme Council should come to a decision as soon as possible for the time for 
it is particularly ripe. 300 
By that last remark, Heneker meant that despite the many press reports of the critical 
situation in Upper Silesia, it was in fact relatively peaceful and quiet. In the agricultural 
areas harvesting was now underway and industry was returning to normal production, 301 
He claimed that the only unrest being created was due to the deliberately provocative 
actions of the French military as they searched for German weapons, Freikorpskdmpfers 
and any other such undesirables who had not clewed the are& 302 Despite Henekees wordsý 
apart from a few politically opportune moments of peace, ftom this point onwards the 
French troops and Silesian Poles in the more marginal Polish voting districts experienced 
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escalating violence directed towards them by marauding bands of armed Germans and the 
(now-covert) local Selbstschutz units. 303 Nor were the Poles blameless. Relations between 
the Polish authorities and some of the ex-insurgents who had re-crossed the border back 
into Poland completely broke down. British intelligence reported that 43 were killed and 
wounded by the Polish Army in an engagement near Czestochowa. 304 Upper Silesia's 
POW organisation, however, remained intact. Through it, the Poles appear to have dished 
out as much as they received. Only two weeks after the insurrection had ended, Heneker 
reported that 6,000 Germans had already fled from the Rybnik distriCt. 305 And as 
minorities from each side began to seek safety in greater numbers, a spontaneous regional 
partition began to take shape. 
Another Anglo-French crisis erupted when the news arrived in London about the 
French decision to send another division to Upper Silesia. This decision had been taken 
without the least inter-Allied consultation. Berlin was set on denying the French division 
permission to transit across Germany. 306 After French and German threats and counter- 
threats painted both sides into their respective comers, it took skilful diplomacy on the 
part of Hardinge to resolve the confrontation. 30' France eventually sent 1,700 men, with 
the British and Italians sending 650 each . 
3' These numbers were eventually decided upon 
after the Supreme Council referred the question to the Versailles Military Committee on 
12 August. 309 This draft raised the total Allied forces to just over 20,000 men, which was 
an improvement, but well short of the 26,000 that had been decided on in 1919. Heneker 
eventually conceded that he could 'not keep the country free from disturbances unless he 
had 60,000 to 70,000' troops under his command - figures which closely matched the 
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64,000 soldiers that Foch had always insisted were necessary to garrison the plebiscite 
area properly. 310 
The insurrection had lasted for two months but a resolution to Upper Silesia's 
problems appeared as far away as ever. For various reasons, not least Briand's 
parliamentary majority, in the immediate aftermath of the insurrection it proved difficult 
to arrange a Supreme Council meeting to decide Upper Silesia's future. 311 Yet, from 
Opole, Grogan had reported to Wilson that amidst the many rumours concerning the 
region's fate and the gossip about British and French attitudes, what stood out was 'the 
necessity to arrive at some sort of solution - the best or even an indifferent one - 
qUiCkIY7.312 The Entente's continuing differences over Upper Silesia did not augur well for 
any agreement between them over its future. In London, as the apparent French 
procrastination continued, Foreign Office officials began to suspect that France now 
intended delaying that meeting and the decision as long as possible. 
summy" 
When the May 1921 insurrection was mooted, there may have been elements within the 
ranks of the Polish Silesians who had more drastic intentions in mind. However, the 
insurrection that did take place was essentially a demonstration by the Upper Silesian 
workers against what they considered was a British and Italian plot to force most of them 
back into Prussian bondage. Having tasted what Social Democratic Prussia and the new 
Germany had to offer them in 1919-20, they expected even worse than what had gone 
before. The insurrection's initial success might have encouraged some early hopes of a 
Wilno-style coup but this quickly faded in the face of the Allied and Polish governments' 
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opposition. Despite the allegations to the contrary, given its limited military resources, the 
Commission's response was all that it could have been. Too much weight cannot be 
placed on the opinion of the British Commissioner and his officials. They were not 
employed in Upper Silesia as military experts and most had their own particular axe to 
grind. It was noticeable that when British troops returned, Heneker was careful to avoid 
spreading his force as thinly as the French units had been one month earlier. Heneker also 
moved quickly to halt the instances of British troops fraternising with the Poles. He knew 
that had it continued it would have been difficult to use them against the insurgents. 
Given all of this, and the fact that French troops in Upper Silesia had experienced a 
hostile, German-run hate campaign for over eighteen months, it has to be said that British 
expectations about the impartiality of French officials and soldiers were highly unrealistic. 
Nevertheless, Gratier's action in preserving the major towns as 'safe-havens' for German 
Silesians undoubtedly helped contain what would otherwise have been a far more serious 
situation. And not withstanding Percival's effort to gather such material, it is impossible 
from the existing British documentary evidence to endorse British allegations of French 
complicity over the insurrection. The Commission's confused military reaction to the 
insurrection would also appear to have made this unlikely. It was probably the speedy 
resumption of the relaxed relationship between the French troops and the Polish Silesians 
that fed this suspicion. It is also worth noting that despite all of the charges about Polish 
regular units supporting the insurgents, there is little or no evidence of the Polish Army's 
direct involvement in the fighting in Upper Silesia- 313 Hardinge and Max Muller both 
complained that many of the British allegations to this effect were derived ftom German 
314 
sources. These were unsubstatAtated and 'distorted by national prejudice'. Visitingthe 
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German internment camp at Kottbus on 31 May, a British official found that out of 740 
315 
prisoners there, only 18 were not Upper Silesians. 
The involvement of the Freikorps units was one of the most fascinating aspects of 
the 1921 insurrection. The establishment of the Selbstschutz units under Hoefer was 
explicable in that it gave Berlin a degree of influence with German para-militarists 
operating outside its nominal control. The Freikorpampfer, however, were generally 
monarchists and all were vehemently opposed to the Republic. Some of the units in 
Upper Silesia had even been involved in the Kapp Putsch a year earlier, In justification it 
can be argued that Wirth's Cabinet was in a difficult position. The signing of the May 
ultimatum on reparations, committing themselves to ftdfilling the Treaty, was not a 
popular choice and they had made themselves prisoners of the British over Upper Silesia's 
future. They also faced stem political opposition from the militarist and reactionary 
parties. Most German industrialists opposed them because they wanted to implement 
higher taxation, and the new treaty-limited Reichswehr could not be used. Wirth and other 
senior political figures also believed that despite their political differences, the Frejkorps 
was still a necessary evil to be endured as long as a Communist coup remained a threat. in 
Upper Silesia the main threat came from the culturally inferior, universally despised Poles, 
therefore the volunteers' services could be accepted in the spirit of a patriotic crusade. The 
French units garrisoning the towns during the insurrection were under specific orders not 
to engage either the insurgents or the German volunteer units unless they were fired on. 
This meant that the French troops did not intervene when the Freikorps, Selbstschutz and 
plebiscite police were being used against the Poles - actions condoned, encouraged and 
sometimes even controlled by the Commission's British police officials. Nevertheless, the 
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German Government eventually found that the risk of an international incident (such as a 
clash between their volunteers and French troops) stemming from the FreikorpskUmpfers' 
lack of political and military finesse, became too great. Given this and the Allied pressure 
to comply with the provisions of the Peace Treaty, Wirth had no option but to officially 
disband the Freikorps. 
With few exceptions, the split between Le Rond and the other Commissioners was 
reflected at every level of Commission activity. The period around the middle of May was 
probably the lowest point in the Commission's fortunes. When Stuart arrived in Opole, he 
found that Percival 'had been too weak' and 'too ignorant of the details of administration' 
to prevent Le Rond dominating the CornmisSion. 316 This assessment, however, was a 
shade unfair on Percival. Stuart had arrived in Opole with a sizeable contingent of British 
troops whereas Percival had never enjoyed any military input, except over the month that 
the plebiscite had been held. It has to be bome in mind that despite having experienced 
Percival's administrative faings and well-aware that his staff had little confidence in him, 
the Foreign Office nevertheless returned him to duty in Opole the previous November 
knowing that his health was failing. 
In Poland the insurrection had tested the Witos Government and ended Prince 
Sapieha's tenure as Foreign Minister. Despite the strong surge in patriotic support for the 
Silesian Poles and the concerns of the Polish Left, which had very close links with the 
Polish Silesian workers, the Government held to its firm line. Unpopular as this was at 
first, their problems appear to have been more generally appreciated by the press and the 
public after the initial euphoria had diminished. There was also a realisation that in Poland 
in matters such as these, power did not necessarily reside with the SqJm. This was a lesson 
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rather rudely brought home to Max Muller when an element within the Polish military 
authorities ran a press campaign against the British passport office after a Polish Army 
officer had been charged with supplying 'important mobilisation plans to an English 
317 agent'. Max Muller attempted to elicit some credit from London for the part the Polish 
Government had played in calming press and public attitudes over the insurrection. This, 
however, drew no response from the Foreign Office .3 
18 Also discouraging were the results 
of his attempts to repair the damage to relations caused by Lloyd George's 13 May 
speech. Prior to this, most Poles had believed that it had only been Lloyd George who had 
opposed them. Now, wrote the Kurjer Warszawskj, they could see that the whole British 
nation 'doubted the possibility of Poland's continued existence. 3 19 This left France as 
Poland's only friend - which was probably how French business, with its eye on the 
Upper Silesian industries, wanted it. 
The third insurrection was brought to an end just four weeks after the return of the 
British troops and the arrival of the new British Commissioner. Their presence gave the 
German Government and the German Silesians' leaders sufficient confidence to withdraw 
the Selbstschutz from the part of the plebiscite area they occupied. As Stuart himself later 
acknowledged, General Le Rond was also 'successful in using his influence and prestige' 
to persuade the Poles to comply with the many conditions they found difficult to accept. 320 
The withdrawal was completed without force, but the presence of the British troops had 
been the essential factor. One wonders how different the whole plebiscite process might 
have been had the correct number of troops been present in the correct proportions on the 
Commission's arrival. Stuart and Heneker had little faith in what was initially Korfanty's 
plan for a phased withdrawal. Initially at least, both of them would have preferred a more 
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'muscular' approach. However, as Upper Silesia's complexities revealed themselves, they 
quickly realised that there was little alternative to the scheme. With some arm-twisting 
from Berlin, it was they who persuaded Hoefer and the German Silesians to also accept it. 
A far more equitable working relationship developed within the Commission after 
Stuart and Heneker's arrival. This was complemented by Wilson's determination not to 
permit any faltering of the military Entente. Several of Percival's closest colleagues found 
themselves re-deployed; and contributing to the relentless expansion of the Commission's 
bureaucracy Stuart had negotiated several more British Assistant District Controller posts. 
By September, even Heneker admitted to liking Le Rond . 
32' But a new understanding did 
not bring any alteration to the political balance. The French continued advancing Polish 
interests and the British and Italians did the same for the Germans. Nonetheless, though 
unofficially pursuing diverse policies over arms searches and implementation of border 
security in their individual military zones, by July 1921 inter-Allied relations in Silesia 
were far less embittered than between their political masters in London, Paris and Rome. 
The insurrection also marked the end of a period when the British Government had 
viewed Upper Silesia's disposal as primarily a German-Polish matter. During these early 
days in May the question evolved from a problem of economic recovery, ethnicity and 
reparations into one affecting the very future of the Entente and European security. Ottley 
(who had extended his Upper Silesian 'expertise' to include near-daily observations on 
international policy), described Upper Silesia as 'a symptom of the disease in the Entente, 
the fundamental divergence of policy between England and France. 322 Even before the 
third insurrection, it is fair to say that most of the influential contributors to British foreign 
policy-making had reverted to pre-Entente suspicions of France - viewing their policies in 
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Upper Silesia and elsewhere as a straight-forward attempt to ensure French security by 
dominating Europe- 323 With a few exceptions, British political leaders and their officials 
had conveniently forgotten the circumstances surrounding the decision to hold aplebiscite 
in Upper Silesia - also the manner in which Upper Silesia's administration and policing 
had been pushed on to a far from willing France. This had allowed Lloyd George, Curzon 
and the interested British officials to persuade themselves that the whole episode was a 
Gaulish ploy, using the 'imperialistic' Poles to stifle German and, by extension, European 
economic recovery. That these Poles might one day operate and develop Upper Silesia's 
economic resources was discounted as a fantasy. 
The British Government's attitude over this question was also coloured by the 
pressure that the increased Imperial demands had placed on the Army, resulting in the 
Army's continuing determination to avoid involvement in continental Europe. The similar 
fast-developing strand of 'isolationist' thinking in a Conservative dominated House of 
Commons also affected it. This supported the idea of 'Empire free-trade' which, though 
sounding traditionally liberal, was in fact protectionism -a 'retreat into Empire". The idea 
continued to grow until 1932 when the Ottawa Conference finally revealed the fallacy of 
its assumptions. The normally politically astute Lloyd George had destroyed his Liberal 
Party base in 1918 and his Government was dangerously, and eventually fatally, reliant for 
his parliamentary majority on this increasingly restless and hostile Conservative Party 
backbench. But even at the Peace Conference, Lloyd George had still been liberal (and 
perhaps calculating) enough to respond to what were fast becoming politically mainstream 
revisionist demands by the liberal radicals and socialists - though where Poland was 
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concerned, there were very few politicians outside Germany who were more revisionist 
than the British Prime Minister. 
However, the most important specific factor governing the British policy on Upper 
Silesia at this time was Lloyd George and D'Abernon's 'understanding' with the 
Government in Berlin. Just as granting the plebiscite had overcome the difficulties in 
getting the Germans to sign the Peace Treaty. so the May ultimatum on reparations 
pe coupled with D'Abernon's reassuring 'understanding' on Upper Silesia, had stop d 
France occupying the Ruhr valley. However, after that, D'Abemon had used the German 
Government's expectations on Upper Silesia to elicit their compliance over other matters 
of concern to Britain such as disarmament and the official disbandment of the Freikorps 
then the Selbstschutz. The 'understanding' had also been helpful in getting Berlin to 
persuade Hoefer to implement the plan ending the insurrection - an action bought at 
considerable domestic political cost to the Wirth Government and ultimately the whole 
Weimar system. The following is a small extract from a longer poetic protest reflecting the 
sense of outrage felt by most influential German Silesians following Berlin's action urging 
that the Selbstschutz be withdrawn and disbanded: 
Well then, awayftom Berlin and our 'Representatives? ' 
This cry of torture let it be screamed out, 
not into Germany - who abandoned and betrayed us - 
but into the civilised world. 
Possibýy in England 
Who is our last and only hope. 
And it ends by explaining that: 
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We Upper Silesians are now aware, 
that the heaviest torture yet is 
our native land has sold, betrayed and abandoned us. 
Graf Huberts Gamier - Turawa. 324 
As pressure mounted for a meeting to decide Upper Silesia's frontier, Granier's 
despair was matched by the Wirth Government's own trepidation over its outcome. On a 
trip to Lower Silesia, the German Chancellor had found that the lack of any tangible 
achievement from the German Government's fulfihnent policy had made 'the population 
nervous and depressed'. They were also fearfW that the outcome of the Supreme Council 
meeting to decide Upper Silesia's future, when it was held, would be unfavourable to 
Germany. D'Abernon agreed that the Upper Silesia decision had become a 'veritable 
obsession' in the minds of the Government and the German public. 325 As the Foreign 
Minister, Rosen, reminded D'Abernon, Britain could never find a more favourable 
German Government to work with than theirs, adding that 'he could not believe that the 
British Government would allow a decision to be taken which would unseat itq. 326 For 
Lloyd George, his politics of expediency had started to catch up with him. 
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3 1. APWO 46/47 pp. 56-5 8,7 May 1921 and ibid pp. 59-62,9 May 192 1. Waite 
Vanguard ofNazism pp. 228. Draws attention to the former Baltikum employed in 
Upper Silesia as 'mine labourers'. See also PRO FO 371/8810 C4500/4500/92 
Secret Intelligence Report on Reactionary Movements in Germany 6 March 192 1. 
32. Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany p. 256; Cienciala and Komarnicki, 
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press refering to the recent revelations in The Manchester Guardian regarding the 
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Arms p. 42) knew D'Abemon in Germany then, and described him as 'the apostle of 
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35. HLRO F/54/1/26 D'Abernon to Hankey (Secretary to Cabinet) 26 May 192 1. 
Enclosure: Page of DAbemon's Diary, 26 May 192 1. Reports favourably on the 
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192 1. See also Tooley, National Identity and the Weimar Republic p. 256. which 
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Cienciala and Komarnicki (From Versailles to Locarno p. 65) cite Polish sources 
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Kurjer Warszawski II May 1921 Declaration of the Prime Minister on the Upper 
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leaders of the insurrection and the inter-Allied Commission in Opole'. And in FO 
371/5899 C9790/92/1813 May 1921 Percival denies KoTfanty's reported statement 
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43. PRO FO 371/5898 C9445/92/18 Percival to Curzon 9 May 1921; and ibid FO, 
371/5898 C9789/ 92/18 Percival to Curzon 12 May 1921. 
44. PRO FO 371/5909 C9789/92/18 (Private letter) Craig to Lindsay 14 May 192 1. 
Craig pointed out that it would not be the insurgents in the occupied rural areas who 
starved, but the Germans who were living in the besieged towns. See also FO 
371/5909 C 11582/92/18 (Private letter) Craig to Ottley 25 May 192 1. Craig recounts 
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They are starving their own people in the towns on the off-chance that they might be 
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Percival to Curzon 17 May 1921. See also ibid No. 88 pp. 107-1 10 Curzon to 
Cheetham 18 May 192 1. The French Ambassador claimed that 'General Le Rond 
had received specific orders ftom Marshal Foch not to authorise any movement of 
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48. PRO FO 890n Newton (Krol Huta) to Percival 17 May 192 1. See also FO 890/11 
Villiers-Lemming to Percival 18 May 1921. Villiers-Lemming believed that; The 
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49. PRO F0890/8 Beal to Stuart 14 July 192 1; FO 890/10 Diary of Captain H. de, C. 
Toogood; FO 890/6 Minute by Watts re. Instructions to Colonel Crichton in 
Katowice regarding requests for help by German Silesians. 
50. PRO FO 890/11 Statement by Villiers-Lemming on events in Rybnik, including the 
funeral of 16 Italian soldiers, 8 May 1921. See also HLRO F/25/1/34 Hankey to 
Lloyd George 25 May 192 1, Enclosure: Private letter from a controller in Bytom to 
General Malcolm 21 May 1921. 
51. PRO F037115905 C19592/9218 (Copy of private letter) Craig to Ottley 6 May 1921. 
See also DBFP Vol. XVI, No. 77 pp. 96-97, Percival to Curzon 17 May 1921. Bond 
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52. PRO FO 371/5904 C10767/ 92 /18 Percival to Curzon 13 May 1921. Enclosure: 
Statement by Mr. J. Willmott to Lt. Col. Tidbury 13 May 192 1. Willmott sought 
refuge with the Polish insurgents outside Lubliniec after escaping from a hostile 
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53. PRO FO 371/5909 C 115 82/92/18 (Private letter) Craig to Ottley 25 May 192 1. 
54. Ibid, Cl 15809/92/22 (Private letter) Craig to Lindsay 14 May, 1921. 
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55. ]bid F. W. Oertzen, So This Is Poland (London 1932) p. 99. There is no 
indication in British records supporting this publicatiows claim that'seventeen 
senior British officials of the international administration resigned and went home'. 
It is mentioned here because this source is Nazi propaganda but cited in several 
serious works on the subject. 
56. PRO FO 371/5905 C 10592/92/18 Private letter Craig to Ottley 6 May 192 1. 
57. Although there is a truth underlying most of Hutchison's claims and statements, 
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An author, journalist, artist and inveterate self-publicist with good political contacts, 
he wrote several books which generally exaggerated his own role in the events. He 
served with the Commission for just six months. See his interesting obituary in The 
Times Friday 5 April 1946. 
58. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 48 p. 69 Percival to Curzon 10 May 192 1. Percival reported that 
5,000 Germans from Kluczbork intended attacking Olenso, that night and that the 
Poles there had threatened to retaliate by killing all of the Germans there if they did. 
See PRO F0890/10 Diary of Capt. Toogood 9 -10 May 1921. Despite Hutchison's 
claims (Footslogger pp. 289-292) he only signed the local armistice as a witness. It 
was Toogood (Olenso's District Controller) and the District Controller of Kluczbork 
who negotiated the agreement defusing the situation. 
59 Hutchison, Footslogger p. 292. 
60. PRO FO 371/5908 C 11227/92/18 Bourdillon to Wigram 26 May 192 1; Enclosure: 
Statement by Director of Communictions W. D. Cruickshank, regarding Hutchison's 
attitude re. British Section of the Commission, 23 May 192 1. 
61. PRO FO, 371/5899 C9834/92/18 Major J. Elsdale Molson M. P. to Harinsworth 
(Under Secretary of State Foreign Office) 12 May 192 1. Major Clarke rejected 
Hutchison's allegations. As did Colonel Tidbury - see F0371/5902 C10431/92/18 18 
May 192 1. See also FO 371/5908 C 11227/92/18 Bourdillon to Wigram 26 May 
1921 for statements alleging all sort of alleged petty misdeamours by Hutchison. 
These were compiled in Opole and forwarded to the Foreign Office. 
62. Hutchison, Footslogger pp-292-293. 
63. Daily Express Wednesday 4 May and Friday 6 May 192 1. 
64. The Daily Telegraph Friday 6 May 192 1. 
65. PRO FO 371/5905 C 10592/92/18 (Private letter) Craig to Ottley 6 May 192 1. 
66. House of Commons Debate (H. of C. Deb. ] Fifth Series, Vol. 141, Col. 2165 
Thursday 12 May 1921. 
67. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 86 pp. 104-106 Percival to Curzon 18 May 192 1. 
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68. PRO FO 890/10 Toogood to M. Le Prefret 12 June 192 1. See also FO 371/5916 
C14411/92/18 Parliamentary Question 12 July 1921 in which Lieutenant Colonel 
Guinness M. P. asked if French press reports to the effect that Cockerell had been 
captured by the Poles, wearing a German uniform and carrying papers in the name 
of Pannitz, were true. 
69. PRO FO 371/5912 C12765/92/18 Stuart (Opole) to Curzon 16 June 1921 Enclosure: 
Lieutenant Colonel Pepys Cockerell 12 June 192 1. 
70. Two of Bodzanowice's local landowner's sons were in Cockerell's party. 
7 1. Daily Express Thursday 12 May 192 1. 
72. PRO W0106/1492 has a collection of contemporary press cuttings on the subject. 
73. Daily Mail Monday 9 May 1921. 
74. The Times Thursday 12 May 1921. 
75. Daily Express Thursday 12 May 1921 and Ae Daily Telegraph 12 May 192 1. 
76. Ibid. 
77. PRO FO 371/5898 C9445/92/18 Percival to Curzon 9th May 1921. 
78. PRO FO 371/5899 C9790/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 13 May 1921. 
79. Waite, Vanguard ofNazism p. 229. 
80. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 76 p. 96 Percival to Curzon 17 May 1921. 
81. PRO FO 371/5904 C10745/92/18 23 May 1921. Memorandum by Major Ottley. 
82. The Manchester Guardian Tuesday 24 May 1921. 
83. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 112 pp. 139-140 Curzon to Percival 24 May 192 1. Keatinge 
denied the reports ( ibid No. 117 p. 144 24 May 1921) but Percival decided to recall 
him and Bennet'for a few days so that a stop may be put to these rumours'. Four 
days later Percival reported ( ibid No. 132 pp. 154-155 28 May 192 1) that the 
German press had now published a denial that British officers had taken part in 
fighting against the insurgents, 
84. lbid, No. 91 pp. 111-112 Cheetham (Paris) to Curzon 19 May 1921. 
85. PRO FO 371/5897 C9223/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 4 May 1921. 
86. PRO FO 688/10/50 No. 232 Max Muller to Curzon 7 May 1921. 
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87. PRO FO 371/6817 N5770/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon Enclosure: Summary of 
Events in Polandfor the week ending IIthAIay 1921. The ZwjazekDemokracji was 
a party of the political left. 
88, Ibid. The Warsaw press reported that the administrators in the governments 
different departments were holding meetings and passing their own resolutions 
supporting the insurgents - see PRO FO 688/10/50 draft tele. No. 237 Max Muller to 
Curzon 9 May 1919. 
89. Ibid. This was a newspaper sympathetic to the Klub Pracy Konstytucyjnej (KPK). 
Another, the Kurjer Warszawski, a newspaper sympathetic to another centre right 
party the Narod Zjednocczenie Ludowe (NZL), hoped that the representatives of the 
political parties supporting the Governments position really did, 'and that they 
would do their utmost to check the present insurrection'. 
90. Daily Express Thursday 5 May 1921 reported that crowds shouting Down with 
England! 'had besieged the British Legation in Warsaw. Max Muller had refused to 
meet them. Police were called to clear the crowd away when they tried to force their 
way into the Legation's forecourt. They wanted to present a petition complaining 
about the conditions under which the plebiscite vote had been held and to advance 
their demands over the shape of the final settlement. In his report to Curzon, Max 
Muller reported that this crowd (see PRO FO 688/10/50 No. 286 (Draft) 3 May 
192 1) consisted of 'six delegations in all, accompanied by crowds largely composed 
of students'. The petition, from the Executive Committee of the Union of Polish 
Socialists, was accepted by 'one of the servants'. 
91. Ibid, No. 233 (Draft) Max Muller to Curzon 9 May 1921. Enclosure: Robotnik 
(founded by Pitsudski in 1894) article published May 7 192 1. This attributes the 
failure of the diplomats to win support for Poland Io the subservient tone 
introduced during the days of bowing and scraping. 
92. Saphiea had hoped to put Polands case to the Foreign Office and the British Prime 
Minister before any final decision was taken. Max Muller informed Curzon (DBFP 
Vol. XVI No. 18 p. 42 13 April 192 1) about Sapieha's proposed trip to London, Paris, 
and Rome, explaining that he thought that the real reason for the trip was the attacks 
on Sapieha and the administration - the opposition accusing them of incompetence 
and neglect of national interest. But Curzon informed Max Muller ( ibid No. 19 
p. 42 18 April 192 1) that it would be 'highly improperfor either he or the Prime 
Minister to receive Polish representations on Upper Silesia. Crowe had already 
refused a German request on 14 April - see PRO FO 371/5895 C7946/92/18. 
Max Muller explained to Curzon (DBFP Vol. XVI No. 21 pp. 4344 21 April 1921) 
that he had argued why the Foreign Office will not discuss the matter with the Polish 
representatives, but he added that; There is unfortunately an irradicable impression 
here that in this matter [Upper Silesia] His Majestys Government are prejudiced 
against Poland in favour of Germany and therefore refusal to receive Germans as 
well as Polish delegations will, I am afraid, hardly be regarded as 'proof of 
impartiality'eithee. Sapieha did visit London and a minute by Crowe dated 2 May 
1921 (see PRO FO 371/5986 C8882/92/18) on his conversation with the Polish 
Foreign Minister recorded that Sapieha hoped that Lloyd George would listen to his 
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views on Upper Silesia before coming to a decision. But Crowe informed him that 
the Prime Minister was busy with other matters and that he would first have to read 
the Commissioners' recommendations. A memorandum by Vansittart (F0371/5898 
C9544/92/18 5 May 1921) indicates that Sapieha! s source of information in the 
Supreme Council was Count Sforza. Minutes by Gregory (Head of the Northern 
Department) and Curzon, indicate that Sapieha was seen by Curzon but he had 
refused to discuss Upper Silesia with him. 
93. Daily Express Wednesday 4 May 192 1. See also Cienciala and Komamicki, From 
Versailles to Locarno pp. 64/65. 
94. Prince Eustace Sapieha was born a British subject. His father had been an officer in 
the British 5th Dragoon Guards. He was a landowner in Austrian Galicia and in 
Gorodno, Lithunia. His upbringing was typical of the Polish aristocracy, including 
higher education in Switzerland. Unlike some of his fellow Polish professional 
diplomats, he carried no unsavoury baggage from having had previous appointments 
with the Austrian Foreign Ministry. In fact, he was regarded by the British 
establishment one of their own, and had served as Minister in London before his 
appointment as Foreign Minister in June 1920 - details on London appointment in 
PRO FO 608/61 13319 Wyndham to Curzon 21 June 1919. 
95. PRO FO 668/19/50 No. 233 (Draft) Max Muller to Curzon 9 May 1921, Enclosure: 
Robotnik article 7 May 1921. 
96. Aid, No. 302 (Draft) Max Muller to Curzon 10 May 192 1. See also ibid II May 
192 1. An article published on the 7 May edition of Paderewskils Rzeczpospolila, 
pointed out that whilst; 'In the days of our slavery, hostile manifestations against the 
representative of one of the partioning Powers on the territory of another of these 
Powers had a certain charm and even an importance as a struggle with two of our 
enemies, but transfer such practices to the present state of affairs... is both improper 
and positively harmful and can be interpreted to us as a symptom of immaturity'. 
97. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 35 pp. 55-56 Max Muller to Curzon 6 May 192 1. Max Muller 
met Pitsudski at an operatic event in Warsaw where they talked at length about 
Upper Silesia. After Pilsudski had blamed Britain for what was happening there, 
Max Muller asked him to prevent members of the Polish military forces involving 
themselves. Piksudski, however, repeated an earlier claim made by the Deputy 
Foreign Minister namely, that the Government was in no position to act against the 
overwhelming feeling of the country. 
98. Ibid. No. 40 p. 61, Kilmarnock to Curzon 8 May 192 1. 
99. Daily Express Thursday 5 May 192 1. A report from Berlin the day before claimed 
that 85,000 regular Polish troops were concentrated on the Polish-Upper Silesian 
frontier. See also PRO F0371/5897 C9195/92/18 4 May 1921 a telegram from the 
United German Political Parties of Lubliniec to Curzon who complain that; 'The 
largest part of the Kreis of Lubliniec has been occupied since yesterday by Regular 
Polish troops who are mostly dressed over their uniform (which is absolutely 
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coffect*).. '. And ibid C9228/92/18 Percival to Curzon 5 May 1921. Inter-Allied 
troops have been ordered to resist any incursion by the Polish Army. * Translators note. 
100. PRO FO 331/5897 C9223/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 4 May 1921. German 
Chargg d"Affaires in Warsaw raised this in an interview with Max Muller. The 
Germans were highly sensitive to the fact that (in their interpretation), they had lost 
Poznania and other areas in West Prussia through a Polish insuffection. 
101. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 47 pp. 68-69 Max Muller to Curzon 9 May 1921. 
102. PRO FO 371/5898 C9617/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 9 May 1921 and WO 
106/1492 No. 369 British Military Mission in Warsaw to War Office 9 May 192 1. 
See also DBFP Vol. XVI, No. 47 pp. 68-69 Max Muller to Curzon 9 May 192 1. 
Before the insurrection, General Szeptycki had told Max Muller that he dared not 
increase the number of troops on the border, because it aroused the suspicions of the 
Germans and the Allied governments, who feared it might be a build-up for an 
invasion. To avoid desertions to the insurgents in Upper Silesia, Pilsudski had 
ordered that only Galicians and no Poznanians would be stationed there. 
103. PRO W0106/1492 No. 372 Military Mission Warsaw to DMI 10 May 1921. 
104. Ibid, G294 General Carton de Wiart to DNH II May 192 1. 
105. Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany pp. 255-256. See also Cienciala and 
Komamicki, From Versailles to Locarno pp. 63/64. 
106. PRO FO 371/5898 C9366/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 7 May 1921, Enclosure: 
Polish Government Press Release on Silesia; FO 371/5901 C 109180/92/18 9 May 
1921; F0371/5899 C9667/92/18 9 May 1921; F0371/590OC9898/92/1811 
May 192 1, Enclosure: Speech in the Sejm. by Prime Minister Witos on 10 May 192 1. 
107. Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany pp-255-256. See also Cienciala and 
Komamicki, From Versailles to Locarno pp. 63-64. 
108. PRO FO 371/5 897 C9159/92/18 5 May 192 1. File Index Minute by Waterlow 
recommending that, to avoid having'a second Zeligowski on our hands, 'the 
Foreign Office should: 
Attempt to have British troops returned to Silesia. 
Have the Ambassadors demand that Poland close its frontier. 
Hand-over the uncontested plebiscite areas to Germany and Poland. 
Apart from localising the problem, Waterlow suggested the measure would also 
release the large security presence in Opole for more active duties and the current 
administrative staff could be reduced because fewer district controllers would be 
necessary. Crowe also suggestedthat Korfanty be if possible arrested and 
adequately dealt with'. Curzon thought all this wasA very good idea. Let us try it'. 
See also DBFP Vol. XVI, No. 36 pp. 57-58 Curzon to Hardinge 6 May 1921. 
109. Ibid, No. 38 pp. 59-60 Percival to Curzon 7 May 1921. 
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110. These communications are fully documented in DBFP Vol. XVI No's 38,42,45, 
46,50,51,53,55. The file index minutes, which are not published, reveal how 
frustrated the London officials were with Hardinge and the French - see also PRO 
F0371/5898 C9374/92/18 and PRO F0371/5899 C9758/92/18. 
111. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 39 p. 60 Percival to Curzon 7 May 1921. These estimates were 
sent at Curzon's request -see ibid No. 34 p. 55 Curzon to Percival 6 May 1921. 
112. PRO FO 371/5899 C9669/92/18 6 May 1921. Ottley Memorandum on Visit to 
Military Intelligence Re. British Troopsfor Upper Silesia. General Thwaites stated: 
" Our home obligations were of far greater importance than any obligations we 
might have assumed under the Peace Treaty from a military point of view. 
" That four battalions of infantry would be lost in proportion to the number of 
Poles alleged to be in revolt. 
" That their position would be very precarious in the event of the Germans taking 
military action against the Poles. 
113. DBFP Vol. XVINo. 38 pp. 59-60 Hardinge to Curzon 7 May 1921. See also jbid 
No. 45 pp. 65-67 Hardinge to Curzon 9 May 1921. 
114. Ibid. 
115. PRO FO 371/5899 C9857/92/18 9 May 1921. Crowe Memorandum on visit from the 
German ambassador who had read that the Allies would Wallowing Germany to 
occupy line of the Oder, whilst handing over southern and eastern districts, 
including the industrial area, to Korfanty's Poles'. 
116. DBFP Vol. XVINo. 55 pp. 75/76 Curzon to Hardinge 13 May 1921. 
117. Charles Hardinge Old Diplomacy: The Reminiscences ofLord Hardinge of 
Penshurst (London 1947) p. 253. Hardinge also thought that Lloyd George imagined 
himself to be tactful and understanding with foreigners, whilst in reality he was 
hopeless with them. 
118. Ibid, p216. These were over detrimental official reports about the Gallipoli and 
Mesopotamian campaigns published in June 1917. Curzon was sent by the War 
Cabinet to suggest to Hardinge, that he could'ease the situation! by resigning. 
119. DBFP Vol. XVI, No. 38 pp. 59-60 Hardinge to Curzon 7 May 192 1. See ibid 
No. 45 pp. 65-67Hardinge to Curzon 9 May 1921. Also ibid No. 54pp. 74-75Max 
Muller to Curzon II May 1921. 
120. PRO FO 371/5899 C9758/92/18 12 May 1921 (DBFP Vol. XVI No. 53) for 
unpublished minutes by Foreign Office officials. 
121. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 38 p59 Hardinge to Curzon 7 May 1921. Although the French 
were unequivocal in refusing linkage between reparations and Upper Silesia, they 
had established their own linkage to the extent that in Le Ronds recommendation, 
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they had included the Polish Government's offer to pay Germany's proportion of 
reparations for Upper Silesia. This was another reason for not agreeing to the plan. 
122. PRO WO 106/1492 G294 Carton De Wiart to DW II May 1921. 
123. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 46 pp. 65-67 Curzon to Hardinge 9 May 1921. 
124. PRO FO 371/5898 C9373/92/18 9 May 1921 (DBFP Vol. XVI No. 3 8). Minute by 
Waterlow. 
125. PRO FO 371/5899 C9758/82/18 12 May1921 (DBFP Vol. XVI No. 53). Minutes by 
Foreign Office Officials. 
126. PRO WO 106/1492 G294 Carton De Wiart (Warsaw) to DMI (War Office) II May 
1921. 'Percival's estimate of the troops we should have to send to restore order I 
consider ridiculous. The appearance of four battalions, I am sure, would be enough 
to quieten things... I do not want to criticize his estimates. but he greatly flatters the 
military qualities of the Poles and the Germans of today'. 
127. DBFP Vol. XVI, No. 50 pp. 70-71, Curzon to Hardinge 10 May 1921. See also ibid 
No. 51 pp. 71-72 Curzon to Hardinge, 10 May 1921. 
128. Ibid, No. 53 pp. 73-74 Hardinge to Curzon II May 192 1. 
129. IHLRO F/I 3/2/20 Curzon to Lloyd George 13 May 192 1. '1 am so appalled at the 
French and Silesian situation & attitude of France - and so shocked at reluctance of 
Hardinge to deal with the matter effectively that I have spent the night in concocting 
a draft telegram which I would like to bring down to you in the morning before your 
speech in the H. of C'. 
130. DBFP Vol. XVINo. 55 pp. 75-76, CurzontoHardinge 13 May 1921. See also PRO 
FO 371/5905 C 10826/92/18 13 May 192; Copy of Hardinge's Aide Mlmoire to 
Briand which relays Curzods message to Briand practically verbatim. 
M. H. of C. Deb. 5th Series, Vol. 141, Cols. 2353 - 2386 Friday 13 May 1921. 
132. A. J. P. Taylor (ed. ) Lloyd George -A Diary by Francis Stevenson p. 216 13 May 
192 1. 'It was a remarkably able speech - he was never in better form - full of the 
most sparkling passages and trenchant phrases. But I am afraid it will cause some 
trouble! ' 
133. Hof C Deb. 5th Series, Vol. 141, Cols. 2380 -2386 Friday 13 May 1921. 
134. CCA HDLM Acc; 800 Box 3 Transcript H. A. L. Fisher Diary 13 May 192 1. 
135. Taylor (ed) Lloyd George -A Diary by Francis Stevenson p. 216 15 May 1921. 
136. Daily Herald 14 May 192 1. 
ChaTftr 4- Notes 
385 
137. HLRO F/54/1/25 Private letter DAbernon to Davies 14 May 1921. 
138. PRO FO 371/5908 Cl 1420 Geddes to Curzon 19 May 1921. Enclosures: 
Department of State Press Release - Communication From Polish Minster 
Washington II May 192 1; Reply by Secretary ofState 14 May 192 1. The reply 
states that the boundary disputes are 'a matter of European concern, in which, 
in accord with the traditional policy of the United States, this Government should 
not become involved'. See also FO 371/5901 C10240/92/18 Geddes to Curzon 18 
May 192 1. This confirms London! s instructions to request the United States 
Government to participate in'early meeting of Supreme Council and that the support 
of United States government may be counted upon in endeavour to bring about 
satisfactory solution of this serious question'. It was followed up by agreements 
to supply information and liaise with the American Embassy in London. 
139. Jbid, C 10247/92/18 Geddes to Curzon 18 May 192 1. An exception to this 
unanimity was the New York Tribune. 
140. PRO FO 371/5904 C 10636/92/18 Russell to Curzon 21 May 192 1. Report on the 
Swiss press reaction to Lloyd George's speech of Friday 13 May 192 1. 
14 1. PRO FO 371/5905 C 10895/92/18 Graham to Curzon 23 May 192 1. Reports 
Netherlands's press reaction to Lloyd George's speech of 13 November 192 1. 
142. Ibid, Enclosure: translation of article from Rotterdamsche Courant dated May 
18th, 1921 (evening edition) entitled 'ENGLAND and FRANCE. 
143. PRO FO 371/5901 C10275/92/18 Ornally to Curzon 15 May 1921. The rising in 
Upper Silesia had produced a coal famine in Austria. Its press was unanimous in 
condemning the Poles. They feared that the Hungarians might imitate them and 
refuse to honour treaty provisions regarding West Hungary and the Pecs district. 
144. PRO WO 106/1492 WL783 Prague radio intercept May 15 192 1. 
145. PRO FO 371/5904 C1068/92/18 Buchanan to Curzon 21 May 1921. Review of the 
Italian press reaction to Lloyd George's speech of Friday 13 May 192 1. The day 
before the speech the Tribuna deploredthat this loss of Italian lives should be made 
to serve a political end by influencing Italian opinion against Poland in a matter 
which calls not for passion but for equity. 
146. PRO FO 371/6817 N6257/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 25 May 1921 Enclosure: 
Summary ofEvents in Polandfor week ending May 25,1921. The Narod also stated; 
? olish independence was a right which Poland had won, and not a gift which had 
been graciously bestowed upon hee. See also FO 371/5901 C10292/92/18 
Wroblewski to Curzon 18 May 1921 who responded to Lloyd George's speech by 
pointing out that his statement about Polish troops fighting for the Russian, German 
and Austrian armies 'will be read in Poland with a feeling of deep wrong. The fact 
that the youth of Poland, tom in three parts as a result of the partitions, was forced to 
fight on the side of Poland's oppressors against one another will remain a page of 
tragedy on the records of modem civilisation'. 
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147. PRO FO 371/6813 N5945/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 18 May 1921, Enclosure: 
Summary ofEvents in Polandfor week ending May 18,1921. 
148. PRO FO 371/6817 N6257/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 25 May 1921, Enclosure: 
Summary ofEvents in Polandfor week ending May 25,1921. 
149. PRO FO 371/5903 C10550/92/18 Scrivenor to Curzon 20 May 1921, Enclosure: 
Prime Minister Witos's Speech May 18 1921 - Position of the Polish Government 
with Regard to Mr. Lloyd George's Speech. See also Cienciala and Komarnicki 
From Versailles to Locarno p. 69. 
150. PRO FO 371/5900 C9881/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 13 May 192 1; and ibid 
C9926/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 14 May 192 1. Max Muller had been assured 
that the determining factor in the vote was Prince Sapieha's failure to see Lloyd 
George in London. See FO 371/6813 N5945/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 18 May 
1921, Enclosure: Summary ofEventsfor the week ending May 18,1921. Seealso 
FO 371/6813 N5947/117/55 Max Muller to Curzon 18 May 192 1, Enclosure: 'Press 
Interview Given by Sapieha in Warsaw. Max Muller notes that during the interview, 
whilst praising France, Sapieha did not mention his treatment in Britain. His 
resignation on 19 May 1921 was a loss to British interests because he was regarded 
as sympathetic to their views. But it was a very one-sided relationship and the 
Foreign Office did little to help him. Max Muller's concern was that Sapieha'has at 
least some courage and knowledge of affairs. Moreover, his disappearance would 
almost certainly wreck whatever hope there may be of an admirable settlement of 
Vilna questioW. 
151. PRO FO 371/5900 C9935/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 15 May 1921. 
152. Boadle, Winston Churchill and the German Question in British Foreign Policy 
p. 152. See also DBFP Vol. XV Chap. IV Proceedings ofthe Fourth Conference of 
London and Records of Conversations connected therewith April 30 - May 5,1921. 
153. PRO FO 371/5900 C9935/92 Max Mullerto Curzon 15 May 1921. 
154. PRO FO 371/5900 File Index Minutes 15 May 1921. In asking for British troops to 
be sent, Crowe reminds Curzon that; 'After all, we are really bound under the 
treaty to meet the obligation of taking our share in keeping order in the plebiscite 
area. I would deprecate our taking this obligation too lightly'. 
155. PRO FO 371/5905 C10826/92/18 Aide MAmoire handed by Lord Hardinge to 
M. Briand on May 13 1921. This was a re-working of Hardinge's instructions from 
Curzon which the Foreign Secretary had drafted with Lloyd George earlier that day - 
see DBFP Vol. XVI No. 60 p. 80. 
156. DBFP Vol. XVINo. 66 pp. 85-89 Briand to Lloyd George 14 May 1921. There 
was an English translation prepared for the Cabinet - see PRO F0371/5902 
C 10444/92/18 14 May 192 1. 
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157. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 64 pp. 83-84 Hardinge to Curzon 14 May 1921. Summary of the 
French press responses to Lloyd George's 13 May speech. 
158. Ibid, No. 66 pp. 85-89 Briandto Lloyd George 14 May 1921. 
159. PRO FO 371/5907 C 11166/92/18 Minute by Waterlow responding to Briand's 
memorandum to Lloyd George 14 May 192 1. 
160. DBFP Vol. XVI No, 66 pp. 85-89 Briand to Lloyd George 14 May 1921. 
161. Ibid. 
162 Ibid, No. 63 p. 83, Hardinge to Curzon 14 May 1921. SeePROFO371/5900 
C9949/92/18 Cheetham. to Curzon 14 May 192 1. Report on Briand's domestic and 
foreign press conference at which he read out a long statement of his views on Lloyd 
George's 13 May speech. See also ibid C9900/92/18 Cheetham to Curzon 15 May 
192 1: contains a ftulher press statement by Briand made the previous evening. 
163. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 70 p. 90-91 Curzon to Cheetharn 16 May 192 1. Briand was to be 
reminded of the agreement reached at San Remo (April 18 - 26,1920) whereby no 
coercive action, such as the invasion of German territory, was to be undertaken 
unless in concert with the other Allies. 
164. Waite, Vanguard ofNazism p. 22 8. 
165. Cienciala and Komamicki, From Versailles to Locarno p. 67. See also DBFP Vol. 
XVI No. 97 p. 121 Percival to Curzon 22 May 192 L 
166. PRO FO 890/10 Diary of Captain Toogood 12 -19 May 192 1. 
167. PRO FO 371/5903 C10550/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 20 May 1921 Enclosure: 
Prime Minister Witos's Speech May 18 192 1. 
168. PRO FO 371/5901 C9982/92/18 Bourdillon to Curzon 13 May 192 1. Bourdillon 
also notes that the British and Italian officials were frequently shot at and constantly 
threatened within the occupied area. 
169. PRO FO 371/5904 C 10677/92/18 Buchanan to Curzon 18 May 192 1, Enclosure: 
'Report by General Duncan, Military Attache Rome, to Ambassador 17 May, 192 1'. 
Marinis had also informed the Italian General Staff that in the event of full-scale 
fighting between the Poles and Germans, he proposed adopting a neutral attitude. 
170. PRO F0371/5901 C9982/92/18 Bourdillon to Curzon 13 May 192 1. See also 
F0371/5926 C 19093/92/18 Coal Production Figures May-August 192 1. 
171. PRO FO 890/16 pp. 20-23 Report on the Upper Silesian Commission's Department 
offood Control 1919-1921,31 July 1922. This describes the problems during the 
insurrection. On the advice of the newly constituted German Silesians' Politische 
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Leitung or Council of Twelve (political and trade union representatives headed by 
Father Ulitzka) the German Silesians hoped to establish, in Craig's words, 'such a 
state of desperation in the towns that the Selbstschutz would be warranted in 
opening an attack for the relief of the towns'. 
172. PRO FO 371/5900 C9938/92/18 Percival to Curzon 15 May 1921. 
173. Cienciala and Komarnicki, From Versailles to Locarno p. 72. 
174. PRO FO 371/5906 Cl 1052/92/18 Craig to Ottley 19 May 192 1. 'Some towns face 
famine already. Blame for the food impasse attaches to both the insurgents and the 
German authorities but chiefly to latter who have admittedly adopted a policy of 
starvatioif. 
175. PRO FO 371/5900 C993 8/92/18 Percival to Curzon 15 May 192 1. See also jbid 
C9988/92/18 Percival to Curzon 13 May 1921. Le Rond had asked the Commission 
to send the Polish Consul General in Opole to meet Korfanty (in Bytom) and request 
him to hasten the demobilisation of the insurgents. 
176. PRO FO 371/5901 C10113/92/18 Percival to Curzon 16 May 1921. 
177. Ibid. The officers responsible for the attacks on the Italian troops had been 
cashiered and dismissed. 
178. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 43 pp. 63-64 Percival to Curzon 8 May 192 1. On II May 
Percival informed Curzon ( ibid No. 52 pp. 72-73) that Le Rond has accepted the 
Polish insurgents offer. Two days later, however, Percival informed Curzon ( ibid 
No. 56 pp. 76n7) that the Commission had made a public statement on 12 May to the 
effect that it would not in the future negotiate with Korfanty. When the Commission 
sent the Polish Consul General to speak to Korfanty, Percival had 'declined to be a 
party to sending an emissary on behalf of the Commission'- see FO 371/5900 
C9988/92/18 Percival to Curzon 13 May 1921. 
179. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism p. 228. 
180. PRO FO 371/5901 C10143/92/18 Percival to Curzon 17 May 1921. This records 
that Note addressed by Polish Committee [CIO 113/92/18 Percival to Curzon 16 
May 1921 above] is being treated as not having been received'. 
181. PRO FO 371/5900 C9938/92/18 Percival to Curzon 15 May 1921. 
182. PRO FO 371/5900 File Index Minutes 14 May 1921. Curzon turned down 
WaterloWs suggestion that they publish Percival's telegram - see DBFP Vol. XVI 
No. 56 pp. 76-77 13 May 1921; and ibid No. 69 pp. 90-91 Percival to Curzon 16 
May 192 1. 
183. PRO FO 371/5904 C10525/92/18 Percival to Curzon 20 May 1921. 
184. PRO FO 890/10 Diary of Captain Toogood 18 May 192 1. 
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185. PRO FO 371/5900 C9902/92/18 Percival to Curzon 15 May 1921. 
186. Ibid Also ibid C9938/92/18 Percival to Curzon 15 May, 1921. Le Rond stated 
that in the event of Reichswehr forces arriving there in large numbers he would 
concentrate the French troops in Opole and Gliwice. See also PRO FO 371/5902 
C10517/92/18 Percival to Curzon 21 May 1921 re. Prince Hatzfeldts resignation. 
187. Jbid, C9978/92/18 DAbernon to Curzon 16 May 192 1. 
188. PRO FO 371/5901 CIO 143/92/18 Percival to Curzon 17 May 192 1. 
189. PRO FO 371/5904 C10625/92/18 Percival to Curzon 20 May 1920. This account of 
the situation contains a 36-page Appendix giving details about the insurgents, their 
actions and the Commission's affairs 
190. PRO FO 371/5902 C10467/92/18 Percival to Curzon 21 May 1921. Curzon replied 
( ibid 22 May 1921) and confirmed that there was no truth in the report that Lloyd 
George had demanded the replacement of General Marinis. 
191. PRO FO 371/5905 C10827/92/18 Bourdillon to Curzon 25 May 1921. See also 
DBFP Vol. XVI, No. 128 p. 15 1, Curzon to Percival 27 May 1921 thanking him for 
his services and promised that a new commissioner plus replacement officials would 
soon be appointed. 
192. PRO FO 371/5911 C12400/92/18 Max Muller to Crowe I June 1921, Enclosure: 
'Report by Correspondents of the Times and the Morning Star prepared for 
Max Muller 30 May 192 1'. This was prepared at Max Muller's request. 
193. PRO FO 371/5905 C10827/92/18 Bourdillon to Curzon 25 May 1921. 
194. PRO FO 371/5908 C 11304/92/18 Note from Waterlow to Curzon 30 May 192 1. 
See also FO 371/5907 CI 1219/92/18 Tidbury to Curzon 30 May 1921 informing him 
that Percival's health necessitates his immediate departure to Czechoslovakia for rest 
and recuperation. Another signal ( ibid Hawker to Curzon 30 May 192 1) followed 
claiming that Percival had asked him (Hawker) to take over as Commissioner from 
that day. 
195. PRO FO 371 C12400/92/18 Max Muller to Crowe I June 1921. 
196. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 32 p. 54 Kilmarnock to Curzon 6 May 1921. 
197. PRO FO 371/5899 C9857/92/18 Crowe Memorandum - Conversation with German 
ambassador 9 May 192 1. 
198. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 59 p. 79 DAbernon to Curzon 6 May, 1921. Wirth said that; 
'As a fellow Deputy [in the Reichstag] he knew Korfanty well and Korfanty 
was as obstinate as a bull. Nothing would stop him but force'. 
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199. PRO FO 371/5897 C9296/92/18 File Index Minutes 7 May 1921. See also FO 
371/5899 C9758/92/18 Hardinge to Curzon II May 1921. Minute by Crowe who 
thought; 'The likelihood was small as the opposition comes ftom the Chief of the 
General Staff himself to whom the argument of our obligations under the treaty and 
the responsibilities for keeping order in the plebiscite area does not appeal'. 
200. PRO F0371/5900 File Index Minutes. Note by Crowe dated 14 May 1921. 
201. Ibid, Nfinute by Curzon 14 May 1921. 
202. Ibid, Minute by Crowe 15 May 192 1. 
203. Ibid. 
204. Jeffery, The Military Correspondence p. 175 Wilson to Rawlinson 18 May 192 1. 
This has to be seen in context. Tliirty seven soldiers, police and civilians had 
recently been murdered in Ireland in one week. Wilson did not approve of Lloyd 
George's speech in the House of Commons on May 13 either, observing in his diary 
about'the mess Lloyd George had got into by his idiotic speech last week about 
Silesia, 'and forecasting that he would now wantto send some troops there to get 
him out of the mess'- see IWM DS/Misc/80 Reel 9, Sir Henry Wilsons Diary 18 
May 192 1. 
205. Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson Vol. 2 p29 1. This contains Wilson! s 
diary account of these exchanges with Curzon. 
206. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 84 p. 103 Curzon to Cheetham 18 May 1921. See ibid No. 90 
p. III Cheetham to Curzon 19 May 192 1. Foch had said this to Sackville West who 
was the British Secretary at Versailles. See also IWM HRW2/12G/33 Sackville 
West to CIGS 19 May 192 1. Wilson had contacted Foch by telephoning Sackville 
West. 
207. PRO FO 371/5902 File Index Nfinute by Curzon dated 19 May 1921 and related to 
DBFP Vol. XVI No. 90 p. I 11. 
208. PRO FO 371/5902 C10459/92/18 Cheetham to Curzon 21 May 1921. 
209. lbid, C10371/92/18 Curzon to Buchanan 21 May 1921. 
210. PRO FO 371/5904 C10627/92/18 Buchanan to Curzon 23 May 1921. 
211. PRO F0371/5902 C10510/92/18 Curzon to Cheetham 23 May 1921. Edmonds, The 
Occupation ofthe Rhinetandp. 224. See DBFP Vol. XVI No. 785 p. 884 Robertson 
to Curzon 25 May 192 1; the British High Commissioner on the Rhine complained 
about first learning of the removal of all of his infantry battalions from the Gennan 
press. See also Jeffrey, The Military Correspondence pp. 268 Wilson to 
Worthington-Evans 23 May 192 1. Foch replaced the four British battalions detached 
from Cologne by placing four French battalions under General Moorlands 
command. 
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212. Ibid pp. 268-269, Wilson to Sackville West 25 May 1921. See discussion in CCA 
HDLM Acc 800 3 (Transcript) H. A. L. Fisher Diary, Thursday May 24 192 1. 'A 
French alliance proposed by Winston and supported by A. C. [Austen Chamberlain] 
opposed by AIR [Balfour], Curzon, and P. M. Worthington-Evans opposed 
sending battalions to Silesia, P. M. insists; no danger of conflict with French. We 
decide six battalions instead of foue. Boadle, Winston Churchill and the German 
Question in British Foreign Policy pp. 158-160, considers this meeting and its 
overall context in Anglo-French relations. Churchill believed that giving the 
French the security that they desired would be repaid by them taking a more relaxed 
view on concessions to Germany. A half-hearted offer was eventually made by 
Lloyd George at Cannes in January 1922. The Locarno Treaty was negotiated in 
1925. 
213. PRO FO 371/5903 C10573/922/18 Percival to Rhine Army H. Q. 22 May 1921. 
An officer from 12 Squadron, Royal Air Force, stationed near Cologne visited Opole 
to see if they could contribute to the operation. Despite the Germans and, to a lesser 
extent the Poles, using aircraft, 12 Squadron remained in the Rhineland. 
214. Jeffery, The Military Correspondence p. 269. Wilson to Sackville West 25 May 
1921. 
215. Ibid, pp. 268-269. See also Edmonds The Occupation of the Rhineland p, 225. 
216. Ibid. There were also two field artillery batteries, a company of field service 
engineers, four tanks plus the usual detachments and services such as motor 
transport, field hospital and so forth. APWO 46/1116 July 1921 provides a 
complete breakdown of the British force and their locations in Upper Silesia. 
217. Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland p. 237. 
218. Aid, p. 230. See also PRO WO 106/977 GOC BAOR to War Office 18 June 1921. 
This is a complete list and date on which all British Army units entrained and 
arrived in Upper Silesia, also initial locations. For the strength of Allied Forces in 
Upper Silesia before and after reinforcement in September 1921 see FO 371/5927 
C3345/92/18 Sackville West to Hardinge 16 September 192 1, Enclosure. 
Situation September Total 
21 August 1921 Reinforcements September 1921 
French 9,691 1,700 11,391 
British 4,033 650 4,683 
Italian 3,592 650 4,442 
219. IWM HHW2/128/41 Wilson to Sackville West 17 June 1921, 
220. IWM HHW2/60/3 Heneker (Opole) to Wilson 12 June 192 1. 
22 1. IWM HHW2/60/5 Wilson to Heneker 17 June 192 1. 
222. PRO FO 371/5911 C12400/92/18 Max Muller to Crowe I June 1921. 
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223. Ibid, Enclosure: 'Report by Correspondents of the Times and the Morning Star'. 
30 May 192 1. 
224. PRO FO 371/5911 C12400/92/18 Max Muller to Crowe I June 1921. 
225. IWM HHW2/60/2a Dillon to Wilson 10 June 1921. 
226. IWM HHW2/60/3 Notes on Present Situation for British Officers, 3 June 192 1. 
227. lbid 
228. IWMHHW2/60/3 Henekerto Wilson 12 June 1921. 
229. IWM HHW2/60/1 Heneker to Wilson I June 192 1. 
230. Ibid 
231. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism p. 229. Heavy fighting was taking place ftom 18 May. 
The German offensive began 21 May culminating in the storming of the Polish 
positions on 23 May. For a highly romanticised account see von Oertzen, So This is 
Poland pp. 100-103. See also Cienciala and Komarnicki, From Versailles to 
Locarno pp. 71-72 for a factual account. 
232. DBFP Vol. XVINo. 119 pp. 145-146, DAbemonto Curzon 25 May 1921. 
233. Ibid 
234. Cienciala and Kormarnicki From Versailles to Locarno pp. 70-72. See also PRO FO 
371/5905 C 10875/92/18 D'Abemon to Curzon 20 May 192 1. And FO 371/5905 
C 10884/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 22 May 192 1. On 14 and again on the 20 May 
1921 General Nollet's Inter-Allied Control Commission ordered disbandment of the 
volunteer levies. 
235. Waite, Vanguard ofNazism p. 230. The monument erected in 1933 is buried in dense 
undergrowth in a wood. The plates and insignia have been removed. An adjacent 
40,000 capacity amphitheatre, built between 1934 and 1938, is in good condition. 
236. Ibid, p. 229. 
237. IWM HHW2/60/3 Heneker to Wilson 12 June, 192 1. This explains the close co- 
operation. Hoefer even had a liaison officer attached to Heneker's staff. 
238. DBFP Vol. XVI, No. I 11, No. 115, No. 126, No. 127; and ibid No. 113 pp. 140-14 1, 
Curzon to Hardinge 24 May 192 1. See also ibid No. 129 p. 152, Percival to Curzon 
27 May 1921. 
239. PRO FO 371/5902 C10388/92/18 Percival to Curzon 19 May 1921. The inter-Allied 
troop dispositions on 18 May 1921 were as follows: 
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Gliwice 
I Battalion (Italian) 
6 Companies 
I Sqn. Cavalry 
4 Batteries 
4 Armoured Cars 
DYIQM 
5 Companies 
I Battery 
Opok 
I Battery (liahan) 
I Battery 
2 Battalions 
I Sqn. Cavalry 
3 Tanks 
4 Armoured Cars 
Rabbor Tarnowski G= Kozle 
2 Battalions (Italian) 3 Companies 2 Battalions (Italian) 
4 Armoured Cars I Battery (Italian) 
Katow*ce Myslowice Dabrowka Mala Zabrze 
7 Companies I Company I Company 2 Companies 
3 Tanks 
Pyskowice Strzelce 
I Company 2 Companies 
Nicolow Pszcana 
I Company I Sqn. Cavalry 
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Chapter 5 
Referral to the League of Nations, 
The Decision and Hand-Over. 
By mid- 192 1, Anglo-French differences over their future relations with Germany were 
most vividly illustrated in the impasse over Upper Silesia, From a British political quick- 
fix to induce Germany to sign the Peace Treaty, the Upper Silesian plebiscite and the 
Polish supporters' refusal to be reincorporated in Germany had elevated the future of this 
industrial region into one of the most crucial issues governing Anglo-French relations, 
even threatening the future of the Entente itself. Tacit Anglo-German and Franco-Polish 
understandings over the territory, continuing French insecurity, the need for European 
economic revival, an agreement on reparations, and Germany's future as a democracy, 
were amongst the many issues turning the Supreme Council's forthcoming decision on 
Upper Silesia into one of broad international concern. 
For Poland, struggling to rebuild a national economy after 150 years of partition 
and its recent experience of devastating warfare, Upper Silesia's coal mines and its 
industries would be a vital acquisition. But Germany was passionately interested in 
retaining the region's resources in order to rebuild its own economy. The provisions of 
the Versailles Treaty prevented either side from taking unilateral action. However, the 
Treaty's only real guarantee was continued co-operation between Britain and France, 
something the German Foreign Office was constantly working to undermine by 
manipulating factors such as reparations to create tensions within the Entente. While the 
French stuck to what can only be described as a rigid interpretation of its provisions, in 
Britain, even before the signing of the Treaty, the first whiffs of appeasement had 
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become apparent. This had grown apace and now, two years later, Upper Silesia's future 
degenerated into a battle of wills between Paris and London. 
Viewing this from the sidelines were the recently appointed officials to the new 
League of Nations. Though always recognising that the redefinition of the Upper Silesian 
frontier was ultimately a Supreme Council responsibility, several of them felt that it was 
just the type of problem the League had been set up to deal with. Some also saw in it an 
opportunity to raise their organisation's profile and demonstrate to a sceptical world just 
how their new institution could find a solution where the present parties could not. 1 
This concluding chapter describes the latter stages of the Upper Silesian plebiscite 
saga, including the efforts made by the League of Nation's officials to have the border 
question referred to them. It analyses British, French and Italian reactions to the Opole 
Commissioners' recommendations and examines the limited extent to which the British 
were prepared to compromise over awarding the majority of the industrial district to 
Germany. The background to the Supreme Council's referral of the dispute to the League 
of Nations is also examined, as are the difficulties which the League encountered in 
setting about its task. Reactions in Germany and Poland to the League's decision are 
analysed, as is the effect of that decision on the League's credibility in British governing 
circles. Finally, although the chapter deals mainly with the final stages of the plebiscite 
saga within an international context, nonetheless it also describes economic conditions in 
Upper Silesia as well as aspects of life for the soldiers and officials awaiting the decision 
and then the inter-Allied Commission's orders to disengage. 
The Opole Commissioners' recommendations (see Map 4 p. 262) had arrived in 
London on 4 May 1921 - too late to be considered by the London Conference which was 
2 
then underway. In the Foreign Office, officials took the opportunity to analyse them, but 
during the course of this third insurrection and its immediate aftermath yet another 
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problem arose - difficulty in getting the French to agree upon a date for another Supreme 
Council meeting to discuss them. Both Warsaw and Berlin had been pleading for a final 
decision on Upper Silesia's future. The Commissioners and Allied military commanders 
in Upper Silesia had echoed their pleas. But while the Silesians were gathering in what 
was a bumper harvest under the blazing mid-July sunshine, relations between France and 
Britain deteriorated still further. 3 Visiting the troops in Upper Silesia, the DNH, General 
Thwaites, found support for his belief that to avoid the British force becorning embroiled 
in any renewed conflict, the Supreme Council would have to make up their minds well 
before all the harvest had been gathered in. He estimated they had about six weeks to 
reach a decision, implement it, then evacuate Silesia before the fighting resumed. 4 But 
however much this hurried course of action appealed to Thwaites and Sir Henry Wilson 
(who wanted the British troops out immediately), the Foreign Office's attempts to initiate 
another Supreme Council meeting constantly foundered on differences between Paris and 
London. 5 
These differences were encapsulated in the recommendations that had been received 
from Opole. 6 Following hints from London, Percival had joined Marinis in grudgingly 
awarding a few mines and some coal reserves to Poland. And as we have seen, Le Rond 
had gone much ftuther, recommending that the whole of the industrial area be awarded to 
the Poles. With the Commissioners' recommendations now in place, the British, Italian 
and French officials now concentrated on shaping their own ideas and their governments' 
policies into proposals which they thought might win acceptance at the next Supreme 
Council meeting. In the Foreign Office, it was noted that the three Commissioners' only 
point of agreement was that neither On nor their governments wanted the core- 
manufacturing district (the industrial Uiangle), to be partitioned. And whilst the British 
later derided Le Rond's proposals, it is interesting to note that at least two senior Foreign 
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Office officials recognised the validity of the French Commissioner's arguments. 
Commenting on Le Rond's views, Waterlow observed that whilst it was 
not difficult to find flaws in General Le Rond's case ... 
it cannot be denied that, 
from the point of view of the intention of the Treaty, it has theoretical strength, 
which makes it necessary that we should be very sure of our ground in making 
any attempt to set it aside. 7 
Crowe was also 'much impressed with the force of General Le Rond's arguments'. 
He agreed that the Treaty envisaged partitioning Upper Silesia on the basis of each 
separate commune's vote. However, he pointed out that the Treaty had not differentiated 
between the size of these communes nor allowed for the vast disparity in the number of 
residents within each of them. This meant that adopting Le Rond's line would force 
many thousands of Germans into Poland - creating what Lloyd George had feared would 
be another 'Alsace-Lorraine'. On the other hand, retaining the industrial towns for 
Germany would involve awarding Germany 'a large majority of communes who have 
voted for Poland'. Therefore, to avoid violating the Treaty's fundamental principle of 
self-determination, Crowe suggested 
If His Majesty's Government want to insist on saving the important industrial 
district round the three German towns (Bytom, Krolewska Hutta, Katowice) for 
Germany [it would be best to] join the industrial area to the German territory west 
of the Oder by a small corridor ... No 
doubt this would constitute a geographically 
awkward German salient ... 
but, economically, such an argument would, I think, 
be defensible. 8 
It is difficult to judge whether or not Crowe's scheme to run a corridor through the 
Toszecko-Gliwice district to the industrial district was satiric comment or a serious 
proposal. If serious it was an advance in British thinking. All of the schemes developed 
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by his junior officials had contrived to restrict the Polish award to the Pszczyna and 
Rybnik districts. If it was satirical, then this was lost on Ottley, who regarded Crowe's 
proposal as practical provided the communications to the industrial triangle remained in 
German hands. However, after excluding the territory around the canals, roads and 
railways linking the industrial district to Germany, almost half the Polish vote still 
remained outside Poland. ' Despite this, Curzon approved the proposal. Therefore, by 
adopting what Ottley described as the 'Crowe line' (which approximated the 'British 
Delegation Line' in Map 7 p. 422), the Foreign Office quickly established Britain's 
compromise position should the Supreme Council reject the Percival-Marinis line. 10 
A similar review was undertaken in Rome. But whereas the British had not 
announced their conclusions, the Italian Foreign Mnister, Count Sforza, gave the British 
and French ambassadors a memorandum outlining his own proposals, These had already 
appeared in the Italian press three days earlier. " Sforza rejected his own commissioner's 
advice and instead proposed dividing up Upper Silesia's population and territory in a 
manner directly proportionate to each side's share of the total plebiscite vote. 12 He 
sketched two formulas for this (see Map 6). Since both violated the British and French 
governments' fundamental axiom on the industrial triangle's indivisibility, Sforza's 
initiative generated a great deal of resentment in London, Paris and, of course, Berlin. In 
Warsaw, some Polish optimists regarded it as qualified Italian support. ' 3 But in Upper 
Silesia, Marinis opposed the proposals and, not wanting to undermine Wirth's professed 
policy of Erfullung, the Italian ambassador in Berlin also played them down. 14 Under the 
plan Poland would receive 90% of Upper Silesia's coal reserves, most of the coal mines 
and all other minerals mined there. Ottley claimed that anyone who proposed partitioning 
the industrial triangle could not be aware of how industry worked or have any interest in 
Upper Silesia's future. 15 But Rome's proposal was still-born. The Giolitti-Sforza 
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government only lasted a few more weeks and when the new Foreign Minister, Marquis 
della Torretta (who had worked with Le Rond on the Polish Commission and the Eastern 
Frontiers Committee in Paris) was appointed, Sforza's proposals disappeared from public 
view. 16 Paradoxically, the final League's solution (see Map 8) closely matched Sforza's 
initiative. 17 The long road leading to this solution had started in Paris on 24 May; the day 
the Chamber of Deputies had endorsed Briand's foreign policy. 18 
Though Prime Minister of a government supported by the conservative Bloc 
National, Briand had come to office quietly intent on international reconciliation. This 
was a delicate political balance. Experienced in the vagaries of the Third Republic's 
political system, Briand had insisted that the Deputies endorse this policy before he took 
any major decisions. Three days later the British ambassador, Lord Hardinge, reminded 
Briand that he had promised to call a Supreme Council meeting when that debate had 
been concluded. '9 At this time (27 May), Briand believed that the Upper Silesian crisis 
had eased and that a resolution of the frontier issue was far less urgent . 
20 Regarding the 
Commissioners' recommendations, Briand simply dismissed them, telling Hardinge that 
the necessary political, juridical and ethnogruphical knowledge that was required to 
21 
adjudicate in such matters went far beyond the competence of military officers. The 
Commission had also been unable to reach a unanimous agreement because its members 
had been influenced by local prejudices. 22 Briand suggested that before the Supreme 
Council discuss Upper Silesia, a commission of experts (diplomats, engineers and 
lawyers) ought to meet in Paris to review matters and draw up a report. 23 Allowing time 
for this to be done, he estimated that there could be a meeting of the Supreme Council on 
about 5 jUne. 24 This would also give British troops time to complete their deployment . 
25 
Meanwhile, should Curzon approve, these technical experts could meet in Paris to 
compile their submission for the Supreme Council. 26 
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Responding, Curzon suggested that Briand's proposal be discussed at a preliminary 
meeting of the Supreme Council; and he observed that should these experts ever meet, 
then Upper Silesia appeared a far more appropriate location for their enquiries than 
Paris. 27 The French pointed out that in Upper Silesia the technical experts might be 
corrupted by the same local influences that had affected the Commission. However, for 
the time being, they conceded the point. The preliminary Council meeting was another 
matter. Apart from the difficulties involved in assembling so many busy ministers at 
short notice, the French Government felt that a preliminary meeting was unnecessary. 
They claimed that the public opposed such frequent meetings, they inflamed the press, 
provoked criticism and, in Upper Silesia's case, the speculation that was generated could 
28 lead to ftuther disturbances in Poland and Germany. France instead proposed that each 
country send three experts to Upper Silesia with instructions to prepare a report based 'on 
the terms of the Treaty and the results of the plebiscite by communes, taking into account 
29 geographical and economic conditions'. On receipt of the experts' report, which was to 
be presented within a fortnight, a Supreme Council meeting would be held to discuss its 
findings. 30 
The British did not reject Briand's attempt to set the plebiscite commissioners' 
recommendations aside for it appeared to be that, in essence, he was only searching for 
the same elusive consensus which the reviews conducted in London and Rome had also 
sought. Nevertheless, having been alerted to Percival's resignation, the British officials 
saw in Briand's proposal an opportunity to get rid of Marinis and Le Rond as well. 
Curzon also suspected that Lloyd George wanted to accommodate Briand for wider 
political reasons such as Anglo-French differences over Greece and Turkey. 
Writing to the Prime Nfinister on Curzon's behalf, Crowe welcomed Briand's 
attempt to obtain 'the opinions and advice of a fresh body of men'. Nevertheless, 
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explained Crowe, setting up experts independently of the Commission might prove to be 
difficult. Instead, he suggested that the most important part of Briand's plan would be 
fulfilled if the three military commissioners were replaced by civilian administrators. A 
rejuvenated Commission could re-examine the issues and might succeed in producing a 
unanimous recommendation. Even if unanimity was impossible, the solutions emerging 
from their review could perhaps be referred to arbritration. 31 
In Geneva meanwhile, Philip Baker, a young but influential League of Nations 
official, was thinking along these very same lines. 32 But in concluding his note to Lloyd 
George, Crowe had cautioned that 'the League of Nations would have to be excluded for 
many reasons, one of which is the necessity of carrying the United States with US'. 33 At 
the time, Curzon was seeking American support for British policy in Upper Silesia. 34 
Apart from having refused membership, for domestic political reasons Washington could 
have nothing to do with the League. Yet within a few days of Crowe writing to Lloyd 
George, Briand's proposal that a commission of experts review matters fell temporarily 
into abeyance. This was because the news of Percival's resignation had signalled a series 
of violent attacks on him in the French press. Condemning his 'pro-German activities, 
the press blamed his 'obstructive attitude' over negotiating with Korfanty for prolonging 
the insurrection. Some even suggested that his illness was simply a diplomatic pretext for 
London withdrawing him. 35 Similar allegations had been made earlier in a note which the 
Office. 36 Quai d'Orsay sent to the Foreign I Suspecting the French Government's collusion 
in these attacks, Curzon informed Paris 
that the careful and sympathetic consideration which we have given M. Briand's 
proposals has been ill requited by the re-iteration of these insinuations against 
Colonel Percival. It is possible that some practical form may eventually be found 
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for the suggested body of experts, but in the circumstances I prefer to postpone 
further discussions... 37 
This brought this first phase of each of the three Allied governments' appraisal of the 
commissioners' recommendations to a close. While Sforza remained at the helm, Rome 
was willing to shift from their commissioner's minimalist stance. Paris claimed it wanted 
to throw over the Commissioners' recommendations and restart the evaluation, this time 
using qualified specialists. London wanted to see all three Commissioners replaced and, 
if necessary, by way of compromise, was willing to concede agricultural territory around 
Tarnowski Gory and Lubliniec. But over the following weeks, British attention became 
focussed on keeping apart the Seffitschutz and the Polish insurgents in Upper Silesia. 
Curzon planned on raising the question of replacing the Commission when he 
next met Briand. Hardinge, however, pre-empted him . 
38 After receiving a series of 
pessimistic reports from Sir Harold Stuart, who had been appointed as the new British 
Commissioner in Opole, Curzon resumed complaining to the French about the delay to 
the Supreme Council meeting. A bi-lateral meeting was therefore arranged with Briand 
39 in Paris on 18-19 June. Prior to leaving London, Curzon received a note from Lloyd 
George concurring with the suggestion that Commissioner posts should be reserved for 
civilians . 
40 Reasoning that a solution to the Upper Silesian situation could never be 
reached while such a 'bigoted Polophile[sic]' as Le Rond controlled the Commission, 
Lloyd George endorsed Curzon's proposal to urge the French to replace him. 41 
Whilst the British were anxiously attempting to arrange a Supreme Council meeting, 
they were also taking good care over who would attend. Curzon wanted to maintain the 
principle that territorial settlements were the exclusive preserve of the principal Allied 
and Associated Powers (Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and United States). 42 When the 
British Minister in Brussels, sought permission to give the Belgian Foreign Minister a 
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copy of an Upper Silesian briefing paper that had recently been issued to the United 
States' ambassador in London, this was refused and he was warned not to discuss the 
43 
subject with Belgian minsters. The Foreign Office was anxious to prevent France 
rallying support from countries such as Belgium, whose governments also legitimately 
viewed Upper Silesia's future as affecting their own country's security. However, this 
subject was not raised when Curzon finally managed to discuss Upper Silesia with 
Briand in Paris. 44 
Although the French Premier would not budge on the important points and much of 
what he did agree to later unravelled, the French press regarded the meeting as beneficial 
to the Entente's relations. 45 With regard to Curzon's immediate concerns over ending the 
insurrection, Briand refused to contemplate using military force to recover the industrial 
46 area from the insurgents. Like Millerand who had rejected Hardinge's query, Briand 
also adamantly opposed reconstituting the Commission on a civilian basis. Nevertheless, 
he agreed with Curzon's proposal that the present commissioners should be asked to 
review their recommendations to see if they could compile an unanimous report, either 
by themselves or with the help of technical advisors. 47 Should the Commission think this 
unlikely, the British Government would consider referring the matter to a commission of 
technical experts (such as Briand had proposed earlier), sitting either in London or 
pariS. 48 Finally, Briand agreed to the Supreme Council meeting in Boulogne to settle the 
Upper Silesian question sometime after 10 July. 49 Despite the limited gains, at a Cabinet 
meeting on 21 June, Lloyd George congratulated Curzon on his'successful mission to 
50 Paris which had done so much to improve relations between the two countries'. 
In Opole, Marinis had wanted immediate compliance with Curzon's request that the 
Commission review their recommendations on Upper Silesia, but Stuart and Le Rond 
feared that either London or Paris would leak any decision they arrived at, re-igniting the 
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insurrection. 51 Stuart confirmed that the question would be discussed when order had 
been restored. 52 This drive towards a consensus was severely damaged when London 
received a report from Paris about Briand having told the Chamber of Deputies that he 
believed the whole Upper Silesian industrial area should be awarded to Poland. 53 Curzon 
well understood that the Bloc National and other French nationalists were demanding this 
but in their meetings Briand's conciliatory attitude, particularly over this frontier issue, 
54 had given Curzon grounds to hope that some compromise would be achieved. Curzon's 
hopes were further dashed when Stuart telegraphed informing him that after reviewing 
the Commission's previous recommendations on Upper Silesia's frontiers and studying 
some new proposals, the Commission felt that 
there is no probability of them reaching a unanimous decision on the question of 
the frontier between Germany and Poland. They consider on the other hand that 
local conditions require that the position of uncertainty ... should be terminated as 
soon as possible. And they therefore trust that decision of Supreme Counci I will 
be given at an early date. 55 
Each of the commissioners had been well aware of his government's intentions 
regarding the disposal of the industrial triangle. For all three of the commissioners to 
have reached an agreement had required two to disregard their own Foreign Minister's 
wishes. Since their independent status had long-proved to be only nominal, this had 
always been unlikely. In fact, all three commissioners had simply continued advancing 
their own government's viewpoint. Although completely disagreeing with them, Marinis 
had advanced Sforza's recent proposals. In Stuart's case, the British Commissioner 
altered the Percival-Marinis line to one closely resembling the compromise line recently 
drawn up by the Foreign Office. Le Rond stuck to his guns. 56 The inescapable conclusion 
was that since these divergent aims were being formulated at the highest level, the whole 
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issue really had to be negotiated within the Supreme Council itself - something that had 
been long apparent, if not to Curzon, then to most of his officials and advisers. 57 
Apart from the continued concern over Upper Silesia's security, pressure for an 
early Supreme Council meeting was mounting from other sources. Berlin was hinting that 
the prolonged insecurity and failure to see any tangible reward for its compliance, could 
cause the Wirth Cabinet to fall. 58 On a practical note, the thrust of British diplomacy was 
about to be diverted towards the forthcoming Washington Conference. 59 This made the 
settlement an urgent matter. But just when all the other parties to the dispute were united 
in demanding an immediate decision, the French started prevaricating again - insisting 
that the proposed commission of technical experts meet in Paris first, and questioning the 
wisdom of holding a Supreme Council meeting before an additional French division had 
been deployed to secure the unruly areas in Upper Silesia (see Chapter 4). 60 From this 
point onwards, published British official documents relating to Upper Silesia concentrate 
on this aspect of the Anglo-French exchanges to the exclusion of all else. It is sufficient 
to say that whereas the British were willing to accept Berlin's assurances about German 
behaviour in Upper Silesia, the French were not. Prior to discussions on Upper Silesia's 
future, the French wanted the region under much firmer military control, and they insisted 
61 on calling in technical experts beforehand . 
Of course, unlike the more experienced British diplomats and senior officials 
involved in handling the Upper Silesian problem, a violently pro-German adviser such as 
Ottley never for a moment regarded Briand's request for expert consultation as a genuine 
search for compromise. Now, like Ottley, several of the Foreign Office officials also 
suspected that Briand was playing for time, hoping that the Wirth Cabinet would fall, the 
reparations payments be renounced and France provided with an excuse to march into the 
Ruhr valley and further destabilise Germany. 62 However, these suspicions overlooked the 
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fact that Briand had staked his political life on maintaining Allied unity; that after the 
withdrawal of German forces from Upper Silesia, a renewed build-up of the Seffistschutz 
(which by September saw over 44,000 Silesians and other Germans in its ranks) had 
taken place, and that the French administration's reliance on expert opinion was partly 
attributable to their different cultural approach to government: 'specialists' flourishing in 
the French civil service whereas it was 'generalists' who tended to rule from Whitehall. 63 
Perspectives differed elsewhere. In Poland, it was the British and the Italians who 
were regarded as the guilty parties delaying the Supreme Council's meeting. Believing 
Sforza had favoured Poland's cause before falling from power, some Polish newspapers 
accused the Italians of dragging out the decision on Upper Silesia until he had gone. " The 
left of centre Narod claimed that it was Britain's failure to allow Briand's request for an 
investigation by experts, which was obstructing the decision-making process. 65 Three 
weeks after the insurrection ended, Curzon finally acceded to Briand's request that a 
Committee of Experts be appointed to draw up a report on Upper Silesia for the Allied 
leaders. Doubting the experts' ability to reach a unanimous recommendation, Curzon 
nevertheless promised that provided Briand summoned the Supreme Council, Britain 
would send three experts to the Committee. 66 Briand agreed; the Committee of Experts 
met in Paris on 28 July and a Supreme Council meeting was scheduled for 8 August. 67 
The Polish press also blamed Anglo-French differences for encouraging a spate of 
German attacks on French troops in Upper Silesia. 68 But writing to Wilson at the end of 
July, Grogan (who sent the most balanced of the British reports from Upper Silesia) felt 
both sides were using terror as a political instrument. Nonetheless, his intuition told him 
that 'Upper Silesians as a whole, would view with great relief even a moderate decision 
69 of the Supreme Council' . In Berlin, D'Abemon also detected signs of compromise 
amongst 'leading Poles' there. Claiming that they now appreciated the urgent need to 
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define their frontiers, he quoted one of them as having described Poland as being 'like a 
man without a skin'. 70 
Poland's industry and commerce had been placed in an intolerable position by the 
German trade embargo and the multiplicity of fiscal matters which were accelerating the 
depreciation of the Polish mark .71 
The embargo on Polish trade was a particularly 
powerful weapon for the Germans, and its dire consequences were raised repeatedly by 
the Warsaw Legation's commercial department. After visiting Poland on behalf of the 
Bradford Chamber of Commerce (who sought to recover pre-war debts of E500,000 from 
Polish textile manufacturers), the town's AP., Colonel Willey, communicated with the 
Foreign Office to emphasise the danger that the embargo posed for British commercial 
interests. Since it was plain that it would remain in place until the frontier was settled, he 
urged an early decision over Upper Silesia's future. 72 But despite pleas from Poland and 
from German manufacturers to relax some aspects of the trade embargo, the German 
Finance Mnister was reported to have stated 
Politically we are in a weak position with regard to Poland, but we are quite 
strong economically. Therefore we are not going to make any separate 
arrangement for economic matters for, from that moment we should be bound 
hand and foot as far as these political questions are concerned. 73 
The drawn-out saga of Upper Silesia was also being reported as having a detrimental 
effect on morale in Poland. When interviewing leading Polish politicians, a Dutch 
correspondent reported that several of them had stated quite openly to him that any 
74 
frontier would be better than no frontier at all . D'Abernon was also reporting that his 
sources were claiming that Warsaw's Poles had become very disenchanted with the 
Upper Silesian troubles. According to one source, if Poland received favourable access to 
its materials and products, and a say in running Upper Silesia's affairs, about 120 of the 
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Polish deputies would accept partition of the industrial area. D'Abemon thought that this 
information could perhaps be employed by the negotiators and suggested that some 
obscure economic clauses, 'whose value cannot easily be appraised', might be employed 
75 to help the Germans to accept partition. Commenting, Max Muller admitted that 
tensions were being created by the troubles and that the trade embargo was a problem, 
but he denied that the Poles were ready to sell out Upper Silesia. 76 This repudiation by the 
man on the spot makes D'Abernon's second-hand information appear to be little more 
than wishful thinking on the part of Berlin. 
As the date of the Supreme Council meeting approached, the British sought to keep 
the lid on the situation in Upper Silesia by urging the Germans to ignore the many 
'provocations' being perpetuated by the French. 77 Rosen stressed to D'Abemon that he 
was doing everything he could in order to keep Upper Silesia quiet. In London, the 
Foreign Office was flooded with official and unofficial reassurances about the German 
Silesians' good behaviour and denials about a planned uprising should the decision of the 
Supreme Council go against them. 78 Wild rumours were also much in circulation. For 
example, D'Abernon suggested that if Poland won most of Upper Silesia, Korfanty was 
planning to form a new independent state with Posen and part of Galicia, in order to 
79 
avoid exploitation by Poland or the French . On 
31 July, the German and Prussian 
Governments appealed to Upper Silesians and Germans to avoid any 'thoughtless action 
80 
which would endanger the unbiased and just decision which we claim'. However, 
speaking in Bremenjust two days later, after first astonishing the Poles by attributing 
their country's rebirth to Germany's wartime sacrifices, Wirth went on to attack the 
4political passion and unbridled arrogance' ruling in Warsaw. 81 
Not to be outdone, sources close to Ludendorff (whose star was now rapidly 
descending), relayed his sanguinary prediction that 'whatever the outcome of the 
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Supreme Conference [sic], there will be a German and Polish rising, France will join in 
and Germany will have no other recourse but to appeal to Soviet Russia for help'. 82 In 
fact, by mid- 1921 Soviet Russia had its own internal political difficulties. These problems 
reflected back on to Lloyd George. His long pursuit of a recently signed Anglo-Soviet 
Trade Agreement had not only annoyed the French but also alienated many Conservative 
members of his coalition and he was under continual attack by the Northcliffe press. 113 A 
violent article suggesting Lloyd George was now the most distrusted man in the world, 
was published by The Times. 84 Commenting on this from Warsaw, the Rzeczpospofita 
noted that should these press attacks continue, then 'Briand may perhaps be able to settle 
the problem with another politician [rather] than with the open enemy of Poland'. 85 
Witnessing the breakdown of confidence in the Powers' ability to deliver a just 
settlement in Upper Silesia, on 22 June Philip Baker had written to his superior, the 
League's Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond. Believing Upper Silesia to be an issue 
affecting world peace, he suggested that it was within the League's remit to deal with it. 86 
He informed Drummond that his colleagues within the Secretariat were generally 
favourable. The French, he thought, would not resist this suggestion. It was simply a 
matter of getting the British to support the proposal. However, Baker felt that Lloyd 
George would not be persuaded if the suggestion came directly from the League. " He 
discussed this with one of the League's Italian officials, Bernardo Attolico, who had 
agreed that it might be possible to get the Italian Government to make the proposal. He 
realised that fixing a frontier acceptable to both parties would not be easy; nevertheless 
I think they [France and Britain] have stiffed up forces in Poland and Germany 
that they cannot now control, and which any force that the Supreme Council may 
be willing to use against them will not frighten. I believe the answer, and the only 
answer, lies in the application of the Covenant. 88 
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Baker's correspondence (unavailable to Joseph Harrington in 1978) suggests that 
Drummond was reluctant to interfere in Upper Silesia because the Peace Treaty specified 
that Poland's boundaries were to be determined by the Allied Powers . 
89 But by mid-July 
Baker had became convinced that, despite the ending of the insurrection, without a 
League solution there would be war. 90 Of course, there was also a large element of 
opportunism in his motivation. Baker was passionate about the League and he was not 
alone in his impatience to show the world what he believed it could do. He had a wide 
range of political contacts and his political base in Britain included the radical-libend 
members of the Labour Party Advisory Committee on International Questions. It has to 
be said that this committee was not very well disposed towards Poland, especially over 
Upper Silesia. 91 On 20 July, Baker wrote to Arthur Henderson, the Labour Party leader, 
to draw his attention to the League's recent successful mediation between Finland and 
Sweden over the Aaland Islands. He pointed that 
if only the same methods could be applied in other disputes, and especial-ly these 
which affect the great Powers, we should very soon see the authority of the 
League established and an entirely new international atmosphere created. 92 
That same day, Baker sent a note to his fTiend Lord Robert Cecil whom, as Under 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1919, had helped to draft the League's Covenant. They 
had already discussed an initiative on Upper Silesia. Cecil had warned him that the 
attitude of the British Government, its diplomats and its officials towards the League, 
verged on 'semi-hostility'. 93 This was another reason why Baker believed that Lloyd 
George was the only person capable of referring the dispute to the League. He wanted 
Cecil to galvanise Drummond into supporting the plan and for him to prepare the ground 
in Whitehall. 94 Another distinguished figure canvassing on behalf of the League was the 
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former Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, who had often suggested a League solution to 
the influential Cabinet Secretary, Maurice Hankey. 95 
As we have seen, apart from persuading Lloyd George on the merits of a League 
solution, Baker's scheme also hinged on Attolico convincing the Italians that the League 
could help resolve the impasse. Writing to Attolico on 21 July, Baker emphasised how 
entrenched the respective positions had become. In Germany, all aspects of political 
discourse were dominated by Upper Silesia, yet it appeared that the Poles were unlikely 
to accept any line 'not outrageously in their favour'. 96 Referring back to Lloyd George's 
13 May speech and his threat to allow the Reichswehr to move against the Polish 
Silesians, Baker thought that it had been a long time since the Prime Minister had 'shewn 
so much determination to take a public stand on any matter of intemational Politi&. 97 
After outlining to Attolico how he believed the League should handle the matter, Baker 
concluded by noting that, provided the League maintained impartiality, the process would 
attract such immense publicity 'it would be almost impossible for the Parties to refim its 
verdict'. 98 Baker closed by stressing that this successful outcome could only be achieved 
by the British and Italians co-opemting. And, should the Italians propose a referral to the 
League at the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Council, he believed 
It would be a great new geste for the Italian Government to make, and I imagine 
would greatly strengthen their position in Italy... From the League point of view 
it would have the advantage that it would permanently establish the authority of 
the [League) Council and the League in general, and it would certainly induce 
Germany to apply for admission at one. 99 
There is no indication whether the British Foreign Office was aware of this League 
initiative. With Sforza gone, its reports indicated that Rome was once again backing the 
Percival-Marinis line. 100 By the end of July, however, it seemed clear that sections of the 
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Italian press were advocating that Italy should adopt the role of mediator at the Supreme 
Council meeting in Paris. 101 A few days later the Italian Government's commitment to 
the Percival-Marinis line seemed far less assured. Unaware of any other reason for this, 
Crowe commented that 
It becomes more and more clear that there is no real change in Italy's attitude. She 
continues to profess the utmost readiness to support the British view but in fact 
Marquis della Torretta like Count Sforza before him, keeps in with the French. 102 
By this time, the meeting of the Committee of Experts, which had commenced in Paris on 
28 July, was drawing to an inconclusive ending. The British experts who had been sent 
had not been selected to bring any fresh thinking to the problem. The lawyer, Sir Cecil 
Hurst, worked for the Foreign Office. The diplomat was Curzon's Private Secretary, 
Charles Tuflon, who was accompanied by Waterlow. The engineer was Major Clarke, 
the Commission's Economics Department official responsible for Upper's Silesia's 
mines. 103 They were accompanied by Ottley. 104 Clarke's sympathies were entirely with 
the mine-owners and the German managers. As head of the Central Department, 
Waterlow's concerns were also with Germany, Whilst Hurst, who was not enjoying the 
exceptionally warm weather in Paris, thought the whole Silesian business was 'very 
tiresome! '. 105 Shortly after beginning their deliberations, the Comn-dttee of Experts had 
been joined by the three inter-Allied Commissioners who had arrived from Opole to 
address the meeting of the Supreme Council. 106 Having reviewed the recommendations 
themselves and got nowhere, they had even fewer fresh ideas than the 'experts'. 
In any case, the extent the British experts could manoeuvre in settling the frontier 
issue had already been circumscribed. A Foreign Office memorandum, examining the 
frontier and all other current proposals, had been prepared beforehand for the British 
experts. Briefly, because the Upper Silesian plebiscite area was 'not an indivisible 
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constituency', the memorandum correctly rejected Germany's claim to the whole region. 
On the other hand, the memorandum discounted both Sforza lines because 'they cut the 
middle of the industrial triangle in a manner condemned as impossible by all experts'. 
And because he employed the Kreis instead of the commune as his unit for measuring the 
vote, Le Rond's solution was also deemed invalid. However, when describing the merits 
of the Percival-Marinis line, the memorandum stood two of these last three points on 
their head. It claimed that the industrial triangle was indivisible and that all of the 'Polish 
communes' adjacent to the 'German towns' were in fact suburbs and that they must share 
the towns' fate. Regarding the British experts' compromise position should the Percival- 
Marinis line prove unacceptable, Curzon stipulated that the 'Crowe Line' (see 'British 
Delegation Line' on Map 7) fully accorded with the Treaty's provisions. This was the 
maximum that Britain would grant Poland. 107 
On 5 August, Tufton reported to London that at that morning's meeting the experts 
had recognised that any agreement on a frontier line was impossible. For the French 
experts the question of whether or not the Rybnik and Pszczyna districts could be 
separated from the industrial triangle was the main stumbling block. 108 Although a slight 
German majority existed within the industrial triangle, the large Polish majority in the 
Rybnik and Pszczyna districts meant that, taken as a whole, there was a Polish majority 
across the whole industrial area. Simple arithmetic dictated that to justify awarding the 
complete industrial area to Poland (including the industrial triangle), the French required 
that the whole area be considered together. Conversely, to justify awarding the industrial 
triangle to Germany, the British required that the Rybnik and Pszczyna districts be 
awarded to Poland separately. As later events proved, the truth was that Upper Silesia's 
whole south-eastern area was one vast industrial zone. Apart from the manufacturing 
plant and the mines, there were so many additional interdependent 
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factors (communications, public utilities, labour and organisation), that the industrial area 
could not sensibly be split into convenient parts. 109 
For the British forces in Upper Silesia, these were the concerns of the politicians. 
They preferred service in Cologne to a long winter's service in Upper Silesia, and the 
announcement of the imminent meeting of the Supreme Council had been more than 
welcome. ' 10 In Stuart's absence in Paris, Heneker had been appointed deputy British 
Commissioner with Kennedy acting as the British military commander. "' Although the 
battalions' headquarters were generally located in the nearest schloss, the British troops 
spent most of their time living in and patrolling around 'small rather dirty and very dull 
villages'. 112 Temperatures were well above 92 degrees Fahrenheit, forest-fires were 
commonplace. The 14th Hussars had a particularly trying time patrolling the long open 
border with Poland. 113 Stuart had recognised how difficult the conditions were and he 
had negotiated a pay increment for the British troops from the Treasury. However, on 
discovering that this would come out of the Army's existing budget, Wilson cancelled 
it. 114 Curzon had earlier refused British soldiers and officials permission to accept a 
commemorative medal struck by Le Rond in his role as President of the Commission . 
11 5 
But the British officials' antipathy towards the French troops was not shared universally. 
For example, the Durharns had to participate in the French-controlled inter-allied flying 
columns frequently sent into rural areas 'to show the flag', round up undesirables and 
requisition any arms that they had discovered. Grogan reported that the manner in which 
the French troops treated the German-speaking population was alienating the British 
troops from their allies. 116 That said, the Durhams' regimental history stresses that the 
Battalion 'resolutely refused to be drawn into taking sides against the French'. "7 The 
Leinsters' regimental history also laments the ignorance and misrepresentation about this 
aspect of service in Upper Silesia by people who were not present and by many 'who 
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should know better'. Its author claims that the British and French officers and men 
identified with each other and for their part, the British 'regarded them as very fine 
soldiers'. 118 
As we have noted, the French troops were increasingly subjected to violent 
attacks from German Stosstrupps (shock troops). French press reports about attacks on 
their soldiers were one of several factors driving French politicians to seek ever-tougher 
measures against Germany. 119 Urban clearing operations conducted by the French troops 
after the insurrection, had forced Selbstschutz members from outside Upper Silesia back 
to the German estates as agricultural workers or forest guards. But some of their military 
formations remained armed, hidden away in the forests. The Stosstrupps themselves were 
generally recruited ftom amongst German refugees concentrated in Gliwice and Zabrze. 
After the insurrection, neither the German refugees there, nor the many Polish refugees 
inhabiting a camp near Pszczyna, had returned home because they feared being killed by 
their neighbours. There was also some Polish dissatisfaction with French officials who 
had led them to believe that by voluntarily ending the insurrection, they would strengthen 
their claim to the industrial districts. They also felt that they had not received sufficient 
support from the French in the Commission and abhorred having German officialdom re- 
imposed on them. Like the Germans, the Silesian Poles had also retained their military 
ce; dres and continued giving their young men military training. 120 
One French military report on Upper Silesia identified unemployment as a major 
cause of disaffection at this time. Because unemployment hit the working classes hardest, 
it mainly affected Polish-speaking Silesians. The report attributed the lack of work to a 
decrease in business, employers refusing to engage ex-insurgents, and the ending of 
compulsory military service in Germany. The latter being blamed for pitching three extra 
classes of young men onto the labour market. The report also noted the manner in which 
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Communists were using the present difficulties to mount a particularly violent campaign 
against the employers, though not against the Entente, Commission or the inter-Allied 
troops. 12 1 Heneker himself identified unemployment as a potential source of trouble for 
the Commission. The British force cornmander did not doubt that the general insecurity, 
political dissension and a lack of raw materials all contributed towards unemployment, 
but he believed that it was principally due to the German Government's unofficial ban on 
trade with Poland. In a report to London he claimed that all of the Silesian manufacturers 
were willing to meet orders from Poland 
which they have to a great extent already received but cannot execute owing to 
the refusal of export licences. These orders appear sufficiently large to make a 
considerable difference to the number of workmen employed in the industrial area 
and consequently to preservation of order. 122 
Ironically, it had been the Foreign Office (at Percival and the Berlin Embassy's behest), 
which had blocked Le Rond's attempt to wrest control of Upper Silesia's imports and 
exports from the German Government a year earlier. 123 
All of this was overshadowed by expectations over the Supreme Council's 
decision. As the date of the meeting in Paris approached, posters appeared all around the 
larger towns announcing that the final decision would soon be taken. The inteT-Allied 
troops were confined to barracks and placed on standby. Grogan hoped that local 
disorders would be avoided by a speedy promulgation of the final decision and the 
partition decree that he expected. 124 Responding to press speculation that the whole 
industrial area would be placed under international control, Prime Minister Witos told the 
Sejm that Poland would accept no temporary solutions. 125 
The British delegation arrived in Paris on Sunday, 7 August. Ilat evening Lloyd 
George met Briand privately to explore some means whereby Upper Silesia could be 
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handled without either of them striking an irrevocable position. Two things were clear 
from the outset. First, Briand did not want to break the Entente. Secondly, French public 
opinion would not permit him to go very far towards meeting the British position. To 
avoid an immediate deadlock and give them both time to discover some private basis for 
an agreement, the two leaders decided that after they had heard from the various experts 
and listened to the three Commissioners, they would find some excuse to refer the whole 
question back to the Committee of Experts. Once they had reached a private agreement, 
its details would be communicated to the experts who could then present it to the Council 
as an agreed report. 126 The thinking was that Briand could more easily make concessions 
ostensibly on the advice of the experts, rather than be seen having them forced on him by 
Lloyd George. 127 The two leaders adhered to the first part of their agreement, but their 
inability to strike a deal required them to modify the plan's outcome. 
The official meeting of the Supreme Council began the following afternoon and 
Tan until Saturday 13 August. Apart from one day devoted to questions about the Allied 
differences over Greece and Turkey, Upper Silesia was the sole topic of debate. Records 
of the official sessions are published in the official British documents. 128 Campbell has 
described these public sessions as 'five days of difficult and often bitter negotiations'. "' 
But Hankey in fact assessed these discussions as no more than mere adjuncts to Briand's 
and Lloyd George's private conversations. He also recorded that, despite the profound 
differences of principle involved, the cases were presented 'in terms of great moderation 
and admirable temper' and that 'the tone of the Conference was admirable throughout'. 130 
In the light of this evidence, Campbell's interpretation needs to be modified. 
Cecil Hurst presented the British case. Stuart also spoke. Despite the fears that 
had been expressed to the contrary, at this point, the British line appears to have been 
generally supported by both the Italians and the japaneSe. 131 These British experts 
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contended that the industrial towns and the large German populations they contained 
should not be given to Poland. At the same time, they admitted that connecting these 
Germans to the 'German mainland' would necessitate incorporating some 'Polish 
communes' into Germany. Hankey noted the most telling point made against the British 
case. This came from a French delegate who pointed out that while 'the British scheme 
only gave 155,000 out of 500,000 Poles in that part of Upper Silesia to Poland, it gave 
607,000 out of 687,000 Germans in that part of Upper Silesia to Germany'. 132 
As pre-arranged, Lloyd George and Briand had the question referred back to the 
experts for re-examination. 133 The net result of the experts' deliberations and of the 
British and French leaders' private bilateral conversations, was that the French would 
push their north-south line back to Zabrze, but no further - see Map 7 (p. 422). This 
proved to be unacceptable to Britain both on ethnic and economic grounds. 1 34 On the 
fourth day of the talks (11 August), Lloyd George met Briand three times but with no real 
results. These later sessions were given additional urgency due to developments over the 
current British negotiations with De Valera on Ireland requiring Lloyd George to leave 
Paris for London at noon the following day. After one last inconclusive private meeting, 
the British sent the French their final proposal. 135 
The situation changed dramatically, however, when Lloyd George and Curzon 
met the Italians over dinner that evening for separate talks. Not long after they had started 
Torretta. the Foreign Minister, stated that it was his view that the case should now be 
submitted to the League of Nations or someone else for arbitration. Claiming that 'the 
British Government had always been willing to refer the question to the League if they 
could not reach agreement', Curzon concurred immediately. And just as Baker had 
hoped, without much ftuther discussion, both sides agreed that this idea be put to the 
French. 136 
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137 Attolico delivered the news to Geneva by telephone the following morning. 
Drummond's hastily drafted reply promised that 'the League Council would secure an 
amicable and satisfactory solution'. 138 The same morning (12 August) the French Cabinet 
met and formally rejected Britain's 'final proposal. According to the published British 
documents, Lloyd George and Briand immediately conferred and the moment the British 
Prime Minister proposed referring Upper Silesia to the League, Briand jumped at the 
offer. 139 Hankey thought that Briand appeared gratefid to have found a way out of the 
impasse justifying his political climb-down, and at a hastily convened meeting of the 
Supreme Council 'the proposal was favourably registered amid general goodwill'. 140 
Reminding the meeting of the dangerous situation still existing in Upper Silesia, Lloyd 
George asked that the League Council be urged to complete its work quickly. He then 
departed for London leaving Curzon and the Supreme Council to sort out the details. 14 1 
Whilst the British Prime Minister was famed for ad hoc decision-making and was 
anxious to get away from Paris, it has to be said that even for him, the speed and alacrity 
with which he seized on Toretta's proposal suggested some forethought - as did Briand's 
own apparently ready acceptance of it the following morning. Upper Silesia's referral to 
the League Council matched Baker's prescription much too closely to be a coincidence. 
What is noticeable about the official version of the meeting with the Italians is that it was 
Curzon who responded to Toretta's suggestion. The Foreign Office files contain no 
documentary evidence confirming Curzon's claim that Britain had kept a League option 
in mind - quite the contrary in fact. But this is not too unexpected. At that time all the 
League business with Britain was transacted through a Foreign Office official working in 
Hankey's Cabinet Office. 
If such a plan existed, the place to find it was either there or in Downing Sbvet 
The evidence in fact suggests that it was Hankey who persuaded Lloyd George to refer 
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the question to Geneva. Before the Cabinet Secretary had (in his words), 'put the 
suggestion of reference to the League before responsible Ministers and Departments', he 
had twice met Drummond to clarify what procedures the League Council would adopt to 
resolve the issue. 142 And Hankey's diligence to his work also reveals that within at least a 
couple of hours of the British and the Italians agreeing to propose Upper Silesia's referral 
to the League, Lloyd George obtained Briand's agreement to it as well. This is deducible 
from a telegram Hankey sent to Balfour that same evening. It informed Balfour that 'the 
Supreme Council have decided to refer the Upper Silesian question to the League of 
Nations' and requested that he break his holiday in Switzerland to represent Britain on 
the League Council. 143 This helps explain the officially recorded outburst of concorde in 
Paris the following morning before Lloyd George returned to London. There is also one 
ftirther indication that Lloyd George had travelled to Paris with referral to the League as a 
final option. Meeting him off the train from Paris, the deputy Cabinet Secretary, Thomas 
Jones noted that: 
He [Lloyd George] was in good form describing the way he had pulled off the 
reference of Upper Silesia to the League of Nations - the P. M. has kept it up his 
sleeve until the last minute. He was immensely pleased with the dramatic 
character of the whole procedure. 144 
VA-tichever way Lloyd George presented the decision, there was no denying how much 
it meant to Baker and the League's supporters. The League was doing vital humanitahan 
work in Eastern Europe, but on the political front the opposition from the United States 
had made the governments who were League members even more reluctant to use its 
services. 14'This breakthrough explains why in his history of the League, F. P. Walters 
describes the referral a 'a red-letter day in the League history'. 146 Writing to Cambridge 
academic Lowes Dickinson (the originator of the idea of a post-war League of Nations), 
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Philip Baker described the decision as 'a great triumph'. 
147 Repeating that term, he urged 
148 Cecil that he should 'so inculcate any press people he met' . And 
leading by example, 
he wrote to the editor of the Daily News, describing the referral as 'the biggest thing that 
has yet happened to the League' . 
149 Baker told him that 
It is a definite acknowledgement by the Supreme Council that their methods have 
failed and that they are obliged to resort to ours. I wish that they had brought it 
two months ago... However, the great thing is that it has been brought, and I am 
quite certain that in some way or another we shall be able to achieve a result that 
will be accepted. 150 
Cecil also viewed it as 'a good thing' that it had been 'done in such a way as to have the 
appearance of "passing the bricVto the League'. He urged Drummond to ensure that he 
only appointed really first rate people to the commission to whom the question would be 
referred. '5' However, within a few days of receiving this advice from Cecil, Drummond 
152 found himself scraping around to find a suitable team. 
The referral had taken the British press completely by surprise. Learning that Lloyd 
George was leaving Paris, some of the journalists there had sent in copy announcing that 
the talks had broken dowTL But as Campbell has noted, outwardly these negotiations had 
appeared 'difficult and often bitter '. 153 Reporting on them to Wilson, Sackville West had 
remarked that the Foreign Office officials talked about the French 'as if it were they who 
had been the enemy'. 154 When Lloyd George told his Press Secretary about the decision 
to refer Upper Silesia to the League, Riddell thought he was joking. And when, in turn, 
Riddell broke the news to the press, he found journalists laughing out loud in disbelief 155 
The German press was also surprised by this turn of events. The Deutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung saw the decision as an admission that Upper Silesia was now an international 
question. The Berliner Tagbiatt's optimistic interpretation was that the French were 
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abandoning their Polish obligations. Others were encouraged by what they saw as the 
loosening of the Entente. A few were cautious, correctly predicting that the Rybnik and 
Pszczyna districts would now be lost. The Centre Party's journal Germania, however, did 
not expect the League Council to support France over matters involving Britain. Vorwiirts 
regarded it as a success for French procrastination, but felt confident that 'one can assume 
from the steadfast attitude of Lloyd George that he is sure of his ground'. 1-6 Only the left- 
wing Freiheit struck a discordant note, attacking the bourgeois press for ascribing 
Britain's attitude towards Germany as one of 'friendliness'. It instead claimed that only 
'Economic and Capitalist motives have really decided English policy. 157 
In Warsaw, the Kurjer Poranny agreed with this view, accusing the British of not 
considering their honour, 'only pecuniary gain'. The general feeling across Poland was 
hostile: that the decision was contrary to the terms of the Peace Treaty. British control of 
the League Council was taken for granted and this further delay gave rise to even more 
discouragement. But apart from varying degrees of press abuse directed at the British and 
Italian governments, officials in the British Legation in Warsaw reported that the decision 
had been received 'more calmly than might otherwise have been imagined'. '-" 
In Upper Silesia itself, the political effect was quite far-reaching. Denied significant 
military reinforcements in what would now be an extended period of occupation, the 
Commissioners took several measures aimed at preventing further disturbances. Whereas 
all formal contact with the population had previously been through the district controllers, 
the Commissioners now agreed to liaise with 'satisfactory leaders' appointed by the 
German and Polish communites. 159 Responding to Heneker's linking of the German trade 
embargo on Poland with unemployment and the possible generation of renewed Upper 
Silesian disturbances, Curzon waived his previously firm opposition to the Commission 
controlling Upper Silesia's exports. 160 And in a bid to reduce the incidents between 
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French military forces and the German-speaking population, the inter-Allied 'flying 
columns' were curtailed. Meanwhile, the British and Italian forces had gone even fin-ther 
by deliberately ignoring the proliferation of arms. On 5 September, the state of siege 
(martial law) was lifted across Upper Silesia. 161 This in itself did not halt the shootings, 
the raids or the attacks on French troops over the six crucial weeks the League spent in 
investigating and preparing its recommendations for the Supreme Council. What it did 
do, however, was to reduce the amount of direct contact between the military and civilian 
population and maintain the air of a general, if uneasy peace. 
For the League, arriving at these recommendations and the reception they received 
from the British political establishment, was not an easy one. One key to understanding 
why the British so willingly referred the Upper Silesian dispute to the League Council 
had been the new institution's handling of the Aaland Islands dispute. Sovereignty rested 
with Finland, but the island's population had voted overwhelmingly to transfer it to 
Sweden. The League had sent a three-man commission to investigate and in June 1921 
the League Council endorsed their commission's judgement that 
a minority had the right to fair and just treatment within the state: but it could not 
be permitted to separate itself from the country of which it was paM and 
incorporate itself within some other state because it desired to do so. Such a 
doctrine would lead to international anarchy. 162 
This thinking precisely matched the British Government's view of Upper Silesia. They 
had reason to hope that the League Council would repeat that judgement here. 
Cienciala. has advanced the view that Lloyd George assumed that with Italian support, 
the French would be outvoted in the League Council. 163 However, Hankey had thought 
that Britain's view on Upper Silesia was so overwhelmingly fair and correct that any 
impartial tribunal would to find in Germany's favour. Corresponding with Drummond 
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after the League Council's recommendations had been published, Hankey made it crystal 
clear that he had only advocated a League solution because in their earlier discussions 
Drummond had given him 
the clearest possible impression that if it was referred to the League, they would 
deal with it precisely as they did with the Aaland Islands dispute; that is to say 
they would appoint a perfectly independent and impartial tribunal which would be 
altogether above suspicion and which, after hearing both sides of the case, would 
give a judgement. 164 
Drummond had intended forming just such a tribunal, but he found it impossible to 
settle on anyone of sufficient authority at such short notice who would be acceptable to 
all the interests involved. 165 This problem was compounded by some foreign ministers' 
fears that the enquiry's outcome would upset the Germans or one of the other Powers, 
and they reputedly pressurised their nationals into not participating. Even the diplomatic 
corps was not exempt. " For example, Drummond wanted the Spanish Ambassador in 
Paris, Quinones de Leon, who was also Spain's representative on the League Council, to 
act as the League's rapporteur. 167 As rapporteur, Quinones would have presented an 
'objective assessment' of the case to the League Council. It would have then appointed 
the independent commission which Drummond was trying to assemble, to assist the 
rapporteur in finding the necessary solutions. 168 But pressure from Berlin on Quinones 
caused the Spanish Government to refuse him permission to accept the role. 169 This, 
together with Drummond's inability to find suitable commissioners, and then a demand 
by Balfour and several other Council members for the matter to be dealt with using the 
League's own resources, forced a change of plan. 
The League Council itself comprised four permanent members (the Allied and 
Associated Powers) and four non-permanent members (elected by the League Assembly). 
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The four non-permanent members at this time were China, Belgium, Brazil and Spain. 170 
It was decided that the President of the League Council, Viscount Ishii of Japan, would 
present the report and the idea of appointing another rapporteur and three independent 
was abandoned. 171 Instead, the Council decided that its four non- 
permanent members would form a sub-committee, investigate the dispute and then 
recommend the line that the new frontier should take. These recommendations would be 
discussed by the whole League who would make the final recommendation to the 
Supreme Council - the only body that could implement it. 
172 TIfis was the very procedure 
commended to Balfour by the Foreign Office as being most in accord with British 
interest; which were that the League should reach a speedy conclusion. Sir Cecil Hurst 
thought that this procedure would save between one and three months time. 173 But the 
Foreign Office's recommendation was at odds with Downing Street's expectation of a 
outside tribunal or some form of arbitration. 174 
Hankey immediately expressed his concern to the Foreign Office about the danger of 
undue French influence inherent in these procedures; especially over the League 
Council's wish to employ its own technical experts. 175 Baker was also unimpressed by 
the procedure. He believed that the method used to arrive at the new frontier not only had 
to be seen to be fair but must also be authoritative. Whilst he felt that the non-peTmanent 
members might provide an impression of impartiality, Baker felt that their authority 
-would not very greatly impress the world, still less the popular imagination of the 
German people'. He also thought that the short time-scale precluded a proper study of the 
problem and feared that observers would quickly learn 'that the bulk of the work wfl] 
have been done by the Secretariat and merely accepted and approved by the League 
Council. " 76 Baker's pessimistic forecasts were not unfounded and some of them were 
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repeated later by Hankey and Lloyd George's former foreign policy advisor, Philip Keff - 
by now the editor of The Daily Chronicle. 177 
The League Secretariat appointed two experts who had previously worked with 
them. 178 And though not yet officially involved in the procedures, Balfour and the other 
representatives of the League's permanent members also prepared themselves - though 
not necessarily from their own government's briefings. 179 A few days after the referral, 
Stuart and Major Clarke (Ottley was fatally ill), visited Balfour in Switzerland to deliver 
briefing papers and instruct him over the frontier line the Foreign Office wanted him to 
secure. Balfour, however, just like the League's French representative Uon, Bourgeois, 
who was anxious to avoid having his hands tied by direct instructions from Paris, wanted 
to maintain his independence. Therefore, after giving the experts a polite hearing, Balfour 
thereafter maintained his distance from all the British experts who arrived in Geneva to 
advise him. "'0 Gajda is probably correct in viewing Balfour's independent attitude and his 
influence on the other representatives as the greatest factor involved in the League 
reaching a decision which all parties could, to some degree or other, accept. However, he 
appears to have been highly influenced by the views of Czechoslovakia's Foreign 
Minister, Eduard Benel. 
In conversations with Balfour, Benes; had cited parallels between Upper Silesia and 
the similarly industrialised neighbouring Duchy of Cieszyn. The Supreme Council had 
recently awarded what was generally acknowledged to be ethnically Polish territory there 
to Czechoslovakia solely on economic grounds. Benel told Balfour (somewhat illogically 
and disingenuously), that if Cieszyn could be successfully partitioned then this suggested 
that a frontier could be cut through Upper Silesia's industrial triangle without too much 
economic disruption. lgl Balfour wrote that in Benesw"s judgement 
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either the so-called French or the so-called Anglo-Italian solution would leave 
behind it permanent sources of discontent; and that the only path by which final 
peace could be reached, was one which declined to over-estimate the important 
but, after all, only very recent effects of industrial development, and, basing itself 
on more fundamental considerations, left industry to readjust itself to the new 
Conditions. 182 
From the outset, the League Council had interpreted the Peace Treaty's Upper 
Silesian Articles as giving primary consideration to ethnographic factors. 183 Therefore 
this advice from Bend"to Balfour further strengthened this intention. As we have already 
seen, an ethnographic frontier would require the much-coveted industrial triangle to be 
divided. Hoping to minimise the inevitable economic disruption that an ethnically based 
partition would cause, the League employed its two recently appointed experts to develop 
schemes that would mitigate the consequences. To arrive at the new frontier, the sub- 
committee (guided by members of the League Secretariat), fixed it by dividing the 
territory in proportion to the votes cast for each side. To reduce the large minorities this 
created, and accommodate problems caused in certain districts by geography and by 
particular economic conditions, 'certain non-mathematical considerations' had to be 
introduced to modify the line which the sub-committee had arrived at. 184 The final line 
that emerged gave the Germans 22,000 less than the number who voted for them, and the 
Poles 22,000 more. But Drummond! s attempt to rectify even this discrepancy by giving 
the town of Lubliniec to Germany, was opposed by Balfour who believed that the railway 
junction there should to go to Poland. 1" Superficially, these numbers appear equitable 
but one must bear in mind that within the ratio of voters the League's sub-committee was 
working to, over 25% of the German votes had been cast by outvoters; who, by definition, 
did not reside in Upper Silesia. 186 
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By late September, most of the measures that the League would recommend had 
already been leaked from Geneva. The reactions to them in London and Berlin are 
described in various publications and therefore require little elaboration here. 187 Balfour 
reported most developments to the British Cabinet even before the League Council had 
discussed them. Apart from the frontier line, there were to be regulations ensuring free 
movement of goods across the frontier and the continued use of the German mark 
throughout the region. Poland had to maintain its provision of coal to Germany at home 
market prices for several more years. German capital was to be saved from any Polish 
expropriation for fifteen years. Schemes related to the protection of the respective 
minority populations were also likely to be developed. Even the dismissal of German 
foremen would be prohibited. Balfour claimed that once the new frontier was in place it 
would be evident to everyone that, although Poland had gained territory and population, 
the economic regulations would considerably favour the existing German owners. "' 
With such authoritative information about the League Council's recommendations 
leaking out of Geneva, one might question Lloyd George's real commitment to German 
interests; why did he never react to the reports circulating about the League's proposals? 
There may be a clue in his House of Commons speech of 16 August. Reporting Upper 
Silesia's referral to the League, he appeared to suggest that any understandings or 
promises had ended the moment that Upper Silesia became the League Council's 
business. 
Now that it has been referred, the whole question goes there, and not a part of it. 
What I mean is that they [the League Council] are not bound in the least by any 
proposals or counter-proposals made either by the French or the Italians, or by 
ourselves ... On the other 
hand the Germans are not bound by any proposals made 
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by the Italians or ourselves, and the whole question will be dealt with on the basis 
of the Treaty. 189 
It is also possible that Lloyd George never knew how the League's recommendations 
were developing until too late in the day. Hankey, who had recommended the referral to 
Lloyd George and therefore had an interest in the outcome, was on holiday during the 
main recommendation's formulation. In late September, when Balfour had reported the 
League's likely decision to London, the Prime Minister too was on holiday at Gairloch in 
Scotland - an inaccessible location with very poor communications (thirty miles to the 
nearest railway and the only telephone one mile distant in the Post Office). Lloyd 
George's holiday was overtaken anyway by urgent discussions on such matters as 
unemployment, national expenditure and new talks with Sinn Fein. 190 Back in London, 
with Balfour reporting directly to the Cabinet, Curzon took little interest in the League 
discussions. 
In the Foreign Office, officials politely rebuffed German notes that arrived pleading 
for Britain to intervene to prevent the industrial triangle's partition. Germany's Foreign 
Minister wrote to Curzon on 6 October, to complain that the proposals taking shape in 
Geneva were 'contrary to what Mr. Lloyd George has been trying to bring about. He 
claimed that handing over two-fifths of Upper Silesian territory to the Poles would create 
an extremely difficult economic situation in Germany and undermine the Government's 
work for a better understanding with Britain. He hoped that Britain was not withdrawing 
its assistance and asked Curzon to pass these comments on to the Prime Minister. 191 
Curzon's reply sympathised with Rosen's anxiety but claimed that from the moment the 
Supreme Council had sought the League's advice, he had refrained from any intervention 
in the process. 192 He also wrote that he had no knowledge of its likely recommendations - 
which was untrue. Two days earlier, a copy of Balfour's note anticipating the 
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recommendations had been forwarded to the Foreign Office and been commented upon 
by Curzon. 193 In D'Abernon's opinion, Rosen's warning that the German Government 
would fall (and British influence be eliminated) if Poland gained any part of the industrial 
triangle, was 'perhaps too tragic a view'. 194 Coming from someone who had spent the 
past five months dangling British support on Upper Silesia in front of the Germans, this 
comment may appear highly complacent. It stemmed from D'Abemon's belief that 
anything awarded to the Poles now would prove to be only temporary. He expected that 
for Poland 'political bankruptcy in some form or another' was just around the comer and 
that Germany and Russia would repartition the country as soon as those two powers grew 
strong again. 195 
When the League Council's finalised recommendations were forwarded to the 
Supreme Council in Paris on 12 October, their content was widely known. 196 Even before 
Briand had received the League's decision, the Daily Express went ahead and published 
the proposals. 197 The solidly German voting areas around Opole and west of the river 
Oder were to be returned to Germany. The Polish voting districts of Pszczyna and Rybnik 
were awarded to Poland. In and around the industrial triangle, Gliwice, the Toszecko- 
Gliwicki district, Zabrze, Bytom and a small pad of the surrounding area were given back 
to Germany. The remainder of the Bytom district went to Poland, as did Krolewska Hutta 
and Katowice. In the north, parts of Tamowski Gory and Lubliniec also went to Poland 
with Kluczbork and Olenso returning to Germany (see Map 8). 1" All the economic 
measures Balfour had predicted were to be included in a German-Polish Convention 
designed to maintain the region as a single economic unit for fifteen years. An 'Upper 
Silesian Nxed Commission' composed of a Pole and a German under a neutral 
chairman, would execute the Convention. An 'Arbitral Tribunal' comprising two lawyers 
under a neutral president would resolve disputes arising from the Convention. 199 The 
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League Council also suggested that the 1919 minorities treaty already signed by Poland 
200 
should be extended to the areas of Upper Silesia awarded to the Poles. 
In a press interview, Balfour defended the League's recommendations. He said 
that while there would certainly be inconveniences, these would be diminished by the 
regulations being introduced. Balfour also claimed that the League Council had enjoyed 
complete independence and that the decisions taken had been unanimous. 201 One 
newspaper was surprised to note that Balfour had agreed to the League's decision without 
consulting his Government. 202 Asked to comment on Berlin's negative reaction, Balfour 
said that 'nothing could be more suicidal to Germany than to try and wreck the whole 
scheme'. 203 
News of the decision had created political and emotional turmoil in Berlin. 
Reuters reported Wirth describing the League's decision as a miscarriage ofjustice that 
could only prejudice Germany's policy of an honourable fulfilment of her obligations to 
the Entente. Germany's monarchists and ultra-nationalists who wanted to maintain an 
attitude of 'obstructive resistance' to the Allies, were claiming that Wirth's so-called 
policy of 'subservience' had failed and they were threatening to bring the Government 
down. However, Wirth hung on, pinning his hopes on the Supreme Council easing the 
recommendations . 
204 But there was little hope of this. Both Briand and Lloyd George had 
undertaken to accept whatever the League decided and could not easily reject this - 
although Briand apparently tried to have the transitional economic measures nullified. 205 
This news about the League's decision coincided with a further collapse of the 
German mark. Berlin attributed this to the Upper Silesian crisis accentuating the various 
political influences already at work as well as anticipation about the fall of Wirth 's 
Cabinet. Commenting, the Daily Express claimed that this political crisis had nothing to 
do with Upper Silesia. The German Government was politically weak and frightened to 
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control spending in a country still enjoying enormous private wealth. Instead, the German 
Government had resorted to the printing press which had resulted in one long economic 
boom accompanied by endemic inflation. 206 In fact, Germany's economic problems were 
far more complicated than the Daily Express was making them out to be. For example, 
there had been an unprecedented world-wide speculation in German currency which had 
compounded the problem. 207 Even the economist J. M. Keynes, whose famed critique of 
the Peace Treaty had done much to discredit Poland's claim to Upper Silesia, had dabbled 
in this - losing over L2 1,000 in the process. 
208 
There was of course little sympathy for Germany in France. Commenting on 
German public opinion, Le Temps thought it 'perfectly natural' that having heard so 
many polemical speeches about Germany's need for Upper Silesia's industrial triangle, 
that there should be 'an explosion of rage and hatred' when part of it was taken from 
them. 
Because it was not possible in August to reconcile French and British policies it 
was thought on the other side of the Rhine that the League of Nations would take 
into consideration the policies adopted by the Government in London. They never 
considered for a moment that the Council of the League has sufficient moral 
independence to judge on lines of absolute equity. 209 
Apart from some critical views by the Downing Street-controlled Daily Chronicle 
about the manner in which the decisions had been reached, mainstream British public 
opinion was generally non-committal about the League Council's recommendation. 
Dissent was restricted to the radicals, liberals and socialists who seized on the award as 
proof of the impossibility of Germany paying any more reparations. But The Morning 
Post's leader of 17 October warned that whilst the Germans would try to convey this 
impression, it would be false. The reality was that Germany's overwhelming economic 
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interest in Upper Silesia was retained for another fifteen years. It was not political control 
of this territory that counted, but economic control of the industries and the mines. 
If Germany has these in her hands and Poland is forbidden to take any measure to 
divert the trade into Polish channels, the shell of these districts may go to Poland, 
but the kernel of the nut will remain with Germany. Germany will continue to 
draw the wealth of Silesia into her coffers. Silesian minerals will still be at the 
disposal of the German industrial system. 210 
The paper also attacked Lloyd George's Polish policies. It found that they all appeared to 
be aimed at strengthening Germany and noted that, whilst the Allies wanted Poland to be 
a strong balance against Germany in the East, and to act as a barrier between Russia and 
Germany as well, then 
with Poland forbidden to protect her new industries, just as she was not permitted 
to rule her minorities or control her only outlet to the sea, it would appear that the 
country was being thrust - much against her will - under Germany's economic 
dornination. 211 
In Cabinet, various ministers expressed concern over the partition of the industrial 
triangle but Balfour's involvement had made the decision ex cathedra Balfour had 
promised Drummond that he was 'ready to speak anywhere in defence of the Upper 
212 Silesia solution including, if necessary, the House of Commons'. With such heavy 
weight support for the decision, with Lloyd George under constant domestic political 
pressure, with the Washington Conference looming and a multitude of other national and 
international problems demanding attention, Cabinet members critical of the solution 
were disinclined to provoke a deeper split in the British Government's ranks than already 
existed. Official British recrimination was, therefore, necessarily conducted in private and 
mainly directed at the procedures the League had employed to reach their decision. For 
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example, Philip Keff told D'Abernon that the Upper Silesia decision had not been well 
received in British political circles; nobody believed that it would work and that it had 
discredited the League. 213 Replying, D'Abernon lamented his sudden (but temporary) 
loss of influence in Berlin, but thought it best to keep quiet and not draw attention to it . 
214 
After studying Britain's reaction, Drummond complained to Keff about The Daily 
Chronicle's repeated attacks on the League's decision. 215 But Keff replied (much as 
Baker had done earlier) that outside the League Council, nobody really knew who had 
made the Upper Silesian recommendations. He claimed that this was because everyone 
realised that the League Council's non-permanent representatives were all diplomats, 
incapable ofjudging the political and economic factors that had been involved in making 
the decision. He believed 'public opinion would never trust the League of Nations if it 
settles questions involving the peace or war of the world in that kind of fas[h]ion'. 216 
But the person who had real grounds for attacking these procedures was Hankey. As 
we have seen the Cabinet Secretary had sold Lloyd George the idea of referral to the 
League. At a chance meeting with Baker in Victoria Railway Station on 22 October, 
217 
Hankey seized the opportunity to air his grievances. When Baker returned to Geneva, 
he relayed Hankey's views to Drummond who wrote asking Hankey to send the 
'somewhat violent letter' he had already been preparing for hiM. 218 This duly arrived, and 
there can be little doubt that Lloyd George shared the views expressed in it. 219 11ankey 
objected to the procedure, the participants and the manner in which the question was 
handled. He had been 'bitterly disappointed' to learn that the agreed procedure had been 
discarded. He attacked the integrity of the non-peTmanent members', claiming that the 
Belgian was a notorious Francophile and implying that since 'of the remainder, two were 
Dagos and one a Chink, they were debarred them from making any judgement. Because 
'both the Dagos were Ambassadors in Paris who naturally, neither wished to lose their 
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jobs [n]or have them made disagreeable' they too must have been susceptible to French 
pressure. As for Balfour, Hankey gathered that Drummond 'had squared him' earlier. He 
also complained about the League's failure to consult any of the British, French and 
Italian experts such as Stuart and Clarke in Geneva. In Hankey's opinion, the experts 
employed by the League could not possibly have had the knowledge or the experience 
which the Allied experts possessed. He had never heard of an arbitration process that 
failed to listen to all sides, yet the representatives of the German and the Polish 
governments had also been ignored. Given the defective procedure adopted, the decision 
which they had arrived at could have been much worse. Nevertheless, he still expected 
the solution to prove unworkable, sowing the seeds of a future war. 
Luckily, British public opinion is not very interested in Upper Silesia and the 
friends of the League have secured a fairly good press here... As it is, I feel that it 
has shaken confidence and I have the gravest doubt as to whether anyone in the 
official world here will again feel inclined to take the initiative in referring 
important questions to the League. 220 
The importance of Hankey's views on the League should not be under-estimated. His 
position in the governments of five successive British Prime Ministers, meant his 
personal views must have been influential throughout the League's existence. However, 
as we have already seen, many of his remarks were without foundation. The difficulties 
in forming a commission have been stated above. In supporting the idea that non- 
permanent members should investigate the dispute, Balfour had not followed 
Drummond's but the Foreign Office's advice. With regard to the Polish and German 
representatives in Geneva not being heard, first the League was not conducting 
arbitration and, second, the British themselves had long refused to meet and discuss the 
problem with the representatives from either Warsaw or Berlin. In fact the Poles had 
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spared the League Council an awkward procedural problem by waiving their right as a 
League member to address the CoUnCil. 221 
Replying to Hankey, Drummond therefore defended the integrity of the four non- 
permanent members. He was very sure that the French had not pressurised Hymans and 
Quinones, the two members whom he believed in and rated the most highly. He believed 
that all four of the Council's non-permanent representatives had treated the case 'solely 
according to the terms of the Peace Treaty' . 
222 As to their failure to consult the Allied 
experts, Balfour had partially explained this in a letter to the Cabinet on 29 September. 223 
Drummond expanded on this, stating that the Allied experts had been deliberately ignored 
because the League had wanted to avoid recreating the atmosphere prevalent in Paris in 
August where the situation had reached 
a point where Upper Silesia seemed likely to cause a definite breach between 
England and France, with, to my mind, incalculable results for the peace of 
Europe ... In these circumstances the question was referred to the League, and you 
got a recommendation within six weeks. Of course, this recommendation has not 
been popular in various countries... but I know that the decision was not based on 
either motives of opportunism or expediency. 224 
Dnunmond believed that the Upper Silesian decision had 'eliminated a factor which has 
been disturbing both the economic and political life of Europe for far too long' and that it 
would now 'allow British and French relations to regain a certain amount of harmony 
For this reason alone, he was convinced that the League's work could be adequately 
defended. 225 
But the one place where the Upper Silesian decision could not be defended was 
Berlin. On 22 October, two days after the Ambassadors' Conference had sent Germany 
official notification of the Upper Silesian decision, the German Government tendered its 
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resignation. 226 What had been held out to Wirth as the reward for his Erfullung policy, 
had been denied to him. The parties of the Right, such as Stresemann's Volkspartei 
(People's Party), benefited from the country's disappointment and rushed to reject the 
Upper Silesian decision. Their rejection prevented the formation of a much broader 
coalition than the weak centre-left group that had comprised Wirth's first Cabinet. Some 
British political observers felt that the Entente had made a great mistake in failing to give 
Wirth some tangible reward for his apparent co-operation with the Allied demands. 227 But 
whatever the case, none of the centre-right parties would help form a new administration 
and Wirth's weak coalition was returned to power once again on 26 October. An Allied 
ultimatum for a German commissioner to be appointed to help negotiate Upper Silesia's 
transitional economic arrangements with the Poles had forced their return. When the new 
Cabinet met the only significant sacrifice had been that of Foreign Minister, Rosen. The 
Cabinet's first action had to be a defacto acceptance of the Allied conditions. 228 A note 
handed in to the Ambassadors' Conference the following day, stated that 
The German Government acknowledges receipt, with deep disappointment, of the 
Supreme Council's Note of Oct. 20a'lt sees in this economic and territorial dictate 
not only an injustice to the defenceless German people, but an injury to the 
Versailles Treaty of which the decision made at Geneva and subsequently 
accepted by the Allied Powers is a violation. 229 
In Poland, after disappointment at the referral to the League, the public's interest in 
Upper Silesia had been revived in early October by increasing press speculation over 
what the League's recommendations might be. The Kurjer Polski cautiously forecast a 
decision sympathetic to Poland. Several journals optimistically predicted the first Sforza 
line (Map 6 p. 406) as the new frontier. 230 Significantly, none expected the Polish claim to 
be met in full. Pursuing its anti-British line, the Kurjer Poranny predicted that there 
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would be no justice from the 'Geneva Department of the London Foreign office " . 
231 
Coincidentally, in London, Take lonescu, Rumania's Foreign Minister, had just been 
arguing the case for better Anglo-Polish relations - though admittedly in not very 
flattering terms to Poland. He told Curzon that he considered 
The Poles were in many respects the most childish, the most stupid and the most 
difficult [people] to deal with in Eastern Europe. They had a complete lack of 
political experience and they did not appear to have a single man who deserved 
the name of a statesman. At the same time their existence as a nation was essential 
to the Stability of Europe . 
232 
These sentiments were, of course, very much in keeping with Curzon's and the Foreign 
Office view of the Poles. Ionescu. also confirmed for London rumours that Warsaw was 
tired of Upper Silesia and wished for a settlement of some sorts . 
233 That said, rumours 
about the decision abounded. One persisting in the Polish press alleged that the British 
Government were displeased with the League's forthcoming decision and was trying to 
have it amended. The Kurjer Warszawski published an interesting report about a German 
attempt to retain Upper Silesia's industrial area in exchange for granting Poland large 
trade credits and a favourable Geman-Polish commercial treaty. 234 Reporting the same 
story to London the previous month, D'Abernon had deemed it 'outside practical 
politiCS'. 235 However, once the first real news about the League's decision broke, it was 
quickly apparent that, even if they were not entirely content with the outcome, the Polish 
Government were relieved that it had not been worse. 
On 6 October, Max Muller was able to report that as far as the League's 
recommendations were known, ministers, officials and 'the intelligent public' had 
received them if not with enthusiasm, then reawnably well enough. He added that the 
general tone of the Polish press was one of 'resigned acceptance. 236 Some , such as the 
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moderate Kurjer Polski, even described the recommendations as 'a laudable effort to find 
a solution'. 237 That said, there was no shortage of opposition. Dissent came mainly from 
the right: the most vociferous criticism being published in the Narodowa Demokracja 
newspapers. Their claim that the recommendations had provoked intense indignation 
throughout Poland and Upper Silesia is questionable . 
238 Nevertheless, even the socialist 
Robotnik felt able to criticise the recommendation on nationality grounds - complaining 
that over 700,000 Poles would still be forced to endure Prussian domination. The left of 
centre Kurjer Poranny agreed, describing the decision as a 'political and geographical 
monstrosity' bearing no resemblance to the plebiscite results. 239 More pertinent was the 
Rzeczpospofita's description of the economic arrangements as being 'a glaring violation 
of the Treaty of Versailles' - which was true (a point also made by Berlin a few days 
later) . 
240 The conservative Rzeczpospofita had also been consistent in its opposition to 
any form of international control over the territory. 241 It is true that members of the 
Ambassadors' Conference, acting for the Supreme Council, also had worries about the 
validity of the transitional economic arrangements. Crowe agreed that it was theoretically 
possible for the German or the Polish governments to reject the decision on these 
grounds. Whilst he thought it unlikely that Poland would scupper the deal, Crowe thought 
it possible that the Germans might be so 'blind to their own interests' as to reject it. 242 
But, as we have already seen, even if most Germans favoured rejection, the Allied 
military threat to the Ruhr was a very effective deterrent against them taking action. 
Unlike the Germans, the political leaders in Poland did notjoin in this opposition 
to the League's recommendations. As early as 17 October, the leaders of all the Polish 
parties represented in the Sejm informed Skirmunt, the Foreign Mnister, that they 
approved of the Allied decision in principle. The following day, Skirmunt announced that 
Warsaw intended to secure the peaceful adaptation and enforcement of tins decision and 
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expressed the hope that the 'negotiations with Germany over economic co-operation in 
the industrial area may in the long run have a beneficial effect on the relations of the two 
countries'. 243 Skirmunt's statement of intent was confirmed on 26 October when the Sejm 
unanimously accepted the Allied decision. 244 
Introducing a resolution by his government, Witos first admitted that the division of 
Upper Silesia was not the occasion for rejoicing and that the rights of the Polish nation 
had not been fulfilled. Nevertheless, he believed that the League's work had clearly been 
based on considerations ofiustice. He pledged that the nation would take all measures 
necessary to secure the safety of the Polish minority outside Polish Upper Silesia, while 
at the same time, observing all of its obligations towards the national minorities within it. 
Poland's premier then added that the Polish people 
intended to collaborate in the economic reconstruction of Europe and accepted the 
decision of the Supreme Council as one of the bases for this work... Having fixed 
her frontiers on the East and West, Poland wished to follow the path of peaceful 
labour and was fidly confident that this desire would receive the support of the 
245 
civilised world. 
In reporting this, Max Muller added that in the country 'the attribution of part of Upper 
Silesia to Poland is seen as an event of historical importance in the life of Poland'; the 
press and public had generally endorsed the action of the Sejm and the government. 246 
Indeed, as details of the economic recommendations became better understood in 
the days and weeks following this endorsement, a gradual reappraisal of Britain's role in 
forging the settlement emerged in the Polish press. The Rzeczpospolila paid tribute to the 
League, stating that 'the manner in which it had done its work ... inspired the greatest 
respect and left no doubt as to its good faith'. 247 The paper also regarded the decision as 
justification of Paderewski's and Dmowski's wartime policies, all of which had been 
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17. The Silesian Goose; or the Judgement of 
Geneva (Punch, 19 October 1921) 
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based on co-operation with the Allies -a remark aimed at Pilsudski's 'collaboration' with 
the Central Powers . 
2U By early December the centre-left Kurjer Polski was claiming that 
British policy now appeared to be less hostile towards Poland. This was attributed to 
Balfour's influence. 249 Finally, in what was probably the most remarkable turn-around, 
the Rzeczpospolita devoted a leading article to the history of Britain's attitude on the 
Upper Silesian question. Admitting that British actions in the plebiscite area had been 
dictated solely 'by a desire to see fair play', the writer concluded that Britain's motives 
over the period in question should now be generally regarded as credible. 250 
Had this been a government-controlled newspaper, the sceptical reader might well 
have associated this revisionism with attempts to attract British capital into Poland and 
Upper Silesia. This was partly the case. One cannot ignore the fact that many Polish 
leaders feared that the exploitative nature of French financial interest in Poland was 
helping France establish a monopoly situation. There was also a well-founded suspicion 
that French co-operation would last only until Russia was powerful enough to replace 
Poland as their counter-balance to Germany. 251 
Lt. Commander Kenworthy M. P. was one public figure later involved in an 
attempt to introduce British financial expertise into Polish Upper Silesia. 252 Touring the 
region shortly after the frontier had been referred to the League, he had reported to Lloyd 
George that 
every British officer and British official stationed in Upper Silesia is convinced 
that the handing over of the Industrial Triangle to Poland would mean the ruin of 
the province and would be a crime of the first Magnitude. 2 -13 
This heavily slanted report was just one of literally dozens of letters and petitions which 
had flooded into the Foreign Office and Downing Street shortly before the League's 
recommendations were announced. These reflected how much the indecision had affected 
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conditions in Upper Silesia itself Nearly all pleaded for Lloyd George to prevent Upper 
Silesia's partition. For example, one petition forwarded to Lloyd George by the German 
voters in Olenso and in Kochanowice (in the Lubliniec district), had been raised on their 
learning that the British Delegation's final line in Paris (Map 7 p. 422), had allocated 
254 
them to Poland . They were currently 
in the British military sector and this 'betrayal' 
shook their confidence in 'England' and generated local unrest. 
There was an increased incidence of disturbances in rural areas after the decision 
was announced. The forested area around Dobrodzien and in the north of the district, 
contained what Heneker described as 'unruly German Silesians' who were armed. 
Trouble arose when a local Polish leader was murdered. Suspects were detained but the 
Selbstschutz threatened to set them free . 
255 The Leinsters were sent to the area and 
Heneker told Count Praschma, the Commission's new German representative, to inform 
local leaders that if the situation did not improve, he would send five more battalions and 
'hunt down and shoot the Germans responsible for the trouble'. 256 
Kluczbork was another town that had posed major problems for the inter-allied 
forces. With its overwhelming German population able to provide cover, the town often 
acted as a sanctuary for fugitives. 257 But the most disturbed rural area was in the Italian 
zone around Raciborz. A large tract of forest on the east bank of the Oder was infested 
with bands of robbers who emerged at night to plunder and harass the nearby inhabitants 
of the opposite persuasion. This caused the different communities around it to exhibit a 
high degree of mistrust towards each other. Polish miners would not allow the German 
administrators to return to Rybnik's mines and the Germans in Raciborz district would 
not permit Poles to return to their homes there. 258 
In addition to 'normal' levels of crime in and around the industrial towns, the mixed 
nature of the communities there still gave rise to isolated outbursts of political violence. 
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The British experienced particular difficulties sharing the policing of Bytom district with 
the French . 
259 After four French soldiers were maltreated in Krolewska Hutta one 
evening, the French company sent to restore order on the streets had bayoneted several 
Germans 
. 
260 As we have seen, Heneker considered that much of the existing discontent 
derived from a lack of work. 1-fis reports to London emphasised that unlike everywhere 
else in Germany, where there was full employment, the Upper Silesian factories were 
experiencing difficulty remaining open. Some were working a fluee-day week. Also, it 
remained to be seen how effective the new powers granted to the Commission to override 
Berlin and issue its own export licenses, would be in creating jobs. Heneker concluded 
So long, however, as the fate of Upper Silesia is uncertain, industry will be 
severely handicapped, for the manufacturers hesitate to take, and the merchants to 
give, orders for goods which the turn of political events may make it impossible to 
deliver. 261 
As the League's deliberations progressed, Le Rond, Stuart and Marinis had each 
returned to their posts in Opole. 262 The British again expressed concern over whether or 
not the French troops would oppose any Polish insurrection. 263 in London, the Army 
Chiefs stressed to the Foreign Office that, provided Heneker's hands were not tied by 
political constraints, the Commission had enough Allied troops to handle any situation 
once the decision on Upper Silesia was announced. Heneker had decided that he would 
quash any disturbances immediately they occuffed4 encouraging the Italians and the 
French to do likewise. The War Council was adamant that when the troops were with. 
drawn this time, under no circumstances would they return. 264 Although both Marinis and 
Stuart anticipated violent demonstrations or even a general strike when the decision was 
announced, the French did not expect any trouble. Nevertheless, the Commission once 
again banned public demonstrations, arranged to maintain transport in the event of a 
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railway strike and took measures to monitor 'Comintern activity'. On 14 October, the 
first accurate accounts of the League's recommendations appeared in the Upper Silesian 
press. 265 Stuart issued his staff a memorandum stating that 
all British officials will not only themselves loyally accept the decision but they 
will, if the opportunity offers, advise the inhabitants of Upper Silesia, of both 
parties, to recognise it as being an independent conclusion, reached after careful 
and exhaustive research. 266 
From this distance in time and with the great gift of hindsight, it seems remarkable today 
that the British Commissioner should have to warn his officials not to criticise an Allied 
decision or openly sympathise with a section of the population. 
Not surprisingly the League's recommendations provoked bitter disappointment 
amongst the German Silesians. Rumours circulated that the decision would be resisted. 267 
From Opole, Grogan reported that whilst the local German press had called for energetic 
protest, the Polish press had advised 'moderation and resignation and acceptance of the 
new frontier line'. 268 It was quickly apparent that the French had been correct and that the 
decision would not be resisted in Upper Silesia. Reviewing the award, Stuart granted that 
it was possible that stricter compliance with the Treaty would have been even more 
unfavourable to Germany than the League's recommendations. But, he cautioned: 
I am afraid, however, there is a feeling in Germany that England has betrayed her, 
and this feeling that she has not received justice even under the terms of the very 
hard Treaty she signed may have a serious effect upon the German political 
situation both now and in the future . 
269 
Major Clarke, who had very close relations with the Upper Silesian mine owners and 
industrialists, agreed. He believed that the decision had left very little of value to 
Germany in the industrial triangle. 270 On 26 October, Wirth, in his speech to the 
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Reichstag announcing the composition of his new Cabinet, had emphasised the scale of 
the German losses to Poland in Upper Silesia. They were, he claimed 
* Coal Mines - 49 to Poland (34.6 million tons) 
12 to Germany (7.1 million tons) 
* Zinc and Lead Mines - 12 to Poland (266,000 tons) 
6 to Germany (39,000 tons) 
* Blast Furnaces - 22 to Poland (400,000 tons) 
35 to Germany (I 57,000[sic] tons) 
* Silver Production - 2,000 grams of silver annually valued at 15 
million gold ma& to polan(L271 
That said, when signing the Peace Treaty, Germany had agreed to renounce 'all rights 
and title over the portion of Upper Silesia lying beyond the [new] frontier line'. The 
transitional economic arrangements that the League Council had proposed (whereby 
German private capital was effectively protected and granted control over its own 
activities for a further fifteen years in what was to be another sovereign country) were 
therefore particularly generous. 272 Nevertheless, as Clarke was quick to point out, this 
was not how the German mine owners and industrialists viewed the situation. 
They state that they had been manoeuvred into such a position that if they co- 
operate with the Convention, they fatten a beast for somebody else to kill at the end 
of a certain time. If on the other hand, they refuse to co-operate in the Convention, 
they will be unable to pay Reparations and the French will occupy the Ruhr. "' 
Even then, they argued further, before the next fifteen years were up, France was bound 
to occupy the Ruhr under some pretext or other. Thus, the disaster coWd not be avoided. 
Strangely, given his long opposition to Polish aspirations in Upper Silesia, Clarke did not 
think that the League's scheme was hopeless. If the League appreciated the scale of the 
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industrial problems, if suitable representatives were appointed to negotiate the German- 
Polish Convention, if the Mixed Commission and the Arbitral Tribunal were run properly 
- then it was just possible that the 'many evils inherent in the parfition of the industrial 
area could be avoided'. But, he added 
One cannot, however, forget that the two parties to the convention are perhaps the 
bitterest political enemies who could be found in Europe at the present moment. 
The Poles have not yet shown any sincere desire to get on with their neighbours; 
the Germans on the other hand, were smarting under a sense of injustice. This 
injustice may appear to outsiders to be exaggerated, but it is real to them. 274 
As for the Polish Silesians, Stuart claimed that they were already preoccupied over 
the administrative appointments to be made when Upper Silesia's sovereignty was 
transferred to Warsaw. They wanted the Polish Republic to fulfil a pledge that had been 
made at countless public meetings about these posts going to Upper Silesians. 275 The 
Polish Silesian workers did not want to swap one set of colonialists for another. However, 
it was to be several more months before the territorial transfers could take place. This was 
because the Conference of Ambassadors had also stipulated that the status quo would be 
maintained until the German-Polish Convention had been negotiated and signed . 
276 All of 
this had been unwelcome news for Stuart who reminded Curzon that on accepting his 
post in May, he had been told that his appointment would be for about two months, `7 
The opening of the German-Polish talks was delayed until 23 November because 
Germany objected to the League's nominee, the very experienced Swiss diplomat 
Gustave Ador, as a chair for the negotiations. 278 Felix Colonder, a former President of the 
Swiss Confederation was eventually appointed in his place . 
279 T-hiS appointment had been 
expedited only after the Commissioners in Upper Silesia had warned their respective 
Governments that, although the Allied decision had been received there with comparative 
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not to be sad about not getting a fair 
share of Silesia: m7he band& kcsv 10 be 
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calm, 'there were many dangerous undercurrents which may at any moment gain force 
280 
and cause a serious disturbance to public order' . One that 
had already been mentioned 
by Stuart was the large influx of unemployed persons of both sexes arriving from Poland. 
Lukaschek, now the openly acknowledged German Silesian leader, had told Stuart that 
the 'Congress [ex-Russian Partition] Poles regarded Upper Silesia as the land of milk and 
honey'. Lukaschek explained that these migrants worked for a much lower wage than 
either Silesian Germans or Poles, and that some, such as the domestic servants, willingly 
worked solely for food and shelter. They were currently excluded from employment in 
the mines and factories but, wrote Stuart 'such difficulties could not be dealt with 
effectively by an expiring government . 
281 
The delay to the negotiations was also unwelcome news for the British Army. They 
had expected to be out of Upper Silesia before Christmas. 292 In Wilson's opinion, Upper 
Silesia's referral to the League had been 'simply a sign of the total incompetence, 
incapacity and impotence' of the politicians. 283 When the delay was announced, Grogan 
reported that even the French officers were depressed . 
2" A few days later Gratier was 
stunned to learn that he was about to be replaced as the Allied force's Commander in 
Chief He told Grogan that it was probably related to his early difficulties with Heneker 
and because the British commander was in fact senior to him. 285 Grogan however was 
sure that Gratier, like his staff officers, really attributed it to Le Rond's machinations in 
Paris. 286 That said, the British soldiers found Gratier's replacement, General Naulin, 
easier to work to work with, and the three Allied commanders developed a harmonious 
relationship which endured through to the final withdrawal. 287 
The news of the League decision had not been accompanied by the disorders that 
the British and the Italians had expected . 
288 There was, therefore, great disappointment 
amongst the British troops when, after making optimistic speculations; about their date of 
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departure, they learned that they had to remain until the German-Polish negotiations had 
been concluded. Settling down for what promised to be a very cold winter, their daily 
routine of 'supporting the civil power' was relieved by establishing regular training 
programmes. Some battalions took this a stage further. After initial training in Scotland, 
parties of the Black Watch Regiment's young recruits would arrive to undergo further 
training in Silesia before being sent off to join the I st Battalion in India . 
289 The discipline 
amongst the British troops was good but their health was often a problem. Bronchial 
infections were commonplace and many men were hospitalised when slight cuts or 
scratches became inflamed and dangerous. Precautions were taken to keep scabies and 
skin diseases under control, but Heneker lamented the fact that despite 'every form of 
convenience, treatment and care, and supervision', venereal disease remained his force's 
290 most serious form of wastage. 
During Stuart's frequent absences, Heneker's elevation to the Commission also 
gave him a chance to re-impose some military discipline on its British contingent. The 
British military commander 'deplored the incompetence and bad behaviour which had 
been displayed by the Commission's British officers, ex-officers and offCialS'. 291 He 
blamed the Foreign Office for appointing them without making proper checks on their 
background. Just as Percival had done twelve months earlier, during December 1921 
Heneker dismissed several officials whose behaviour he considered had lowered British 
prestige. In a circular issued to each British official, he warned them that I drunkenness in 
public, and the association with women of low type and doubtful morals in public places 
could not be condoned'. Noting that their 'Correct actions and demeanour' were vital to 
the establishment of their impartiality and authority, he pointed out it was the duty of the 
senior officials 'to see that their comrades and subordinates behave as British Gentlemen 
should'. Any misbehaviour would be punished with instant diSMiSSal. 292 
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Wilson had planned to visit his troops in Cologne and Upper Silesia in November, 
but the visit was cancelled because of his heavy work schedule. 293 Heneker had intended 
'putting him up' at Schloss Turawa. Since Count Gamier, the owner and the campaigning 
representative of Upper Silesia's German landowners lived there as well, this could have 
created an interesting situation, but one Wilson would probably have enjoyed. 294 Heneker 
had instead to write to the CIGS to complain about the forces' frustration at the recurrent 
delays and Stuart's desperation to get the British out of the region. He noted Stuart had 
295 
gained the impression that the French did not want to leave. And when visiting London 
in December, Stuart told the Foreign Office that he was convinced that the French were 
296 
prolonging the occupation in order to retain their troops on Germany's eastern flank. 
Again in January 1922, he reported German fears that that in order to guarantee 
reparation payments the French were ready to propose a permanent military occupation 
of German Upper Silesia. 297 
These allegations about French intentions always left Wilson unmoved. The Geddes 
Committee Report had reached the War Office at the end of December and, despite the 
Army's increased commitments across the Empire, it demanded army savings of L20 
million over the following year (27% of projected estimates). This Treasury pressure to 
cut spending increased Wilson's already high valuation of Anglo-French military co- 
operation. He had recently told the Imperial Defence Committee that: 
The only power in Europe that has a really powerful and up to date Army and Air 
Force is France. Seeing the whole continent of Europe is in chaos it is a very 
fortunate thing that one of the most pacific of all nations has realised the 
importance of force in carrying out the wishes and orders of the Supreme Council. 
England was exceptionally fortunate in having such a friend at such a moment. 299 
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The Army Council discovered that its proposed abolition of 28 battalions and eight 
cavalry regiments would only save E8 million. Sixteen of the battalions to be disbanded 
were to come from the decommissioning of all eight Irish Regiments. Wilson opposed the 
disbandment of the Ulster Regiments but only managed to save one. This meant the end 
for all five Irish battalions serving in Upper Silesia. 299 
At this point Wilson himself decided to retire to become an Ulster NT - the British 
Government's negotiations with De Valera had been 'the final straw'. 300 Wilson had been 
particularly annoyed by Lloyd George's failure to warn him that at a meeting of British 
and French Heads of Government in Cannes in January 1922, he would be offering the 
French a security guarantee against 'unprovoked German aggression'. This ill-defined 
promise was designed to induce the French to pursue a less relentless policy against the 
Germans, support British policies in Europe and attend Lloyd George's Conference in 
Genoa, which he hoped would also be attended by the Russians and the Germans. It was 
this uninformed aspect of Lloyd George's style of government that profoundly irritated 
Wilson. Although favouring a military alliance with the French, Wilson was delighted to 
learn that Poincare (who had replaced Briand during the talks), had practically walked out 
on the British Prime Minister. 301 In the concluding paragraph to his last paper for the 
Cabinet, Wilson gave a clear warning. He had hoped that the Great War would have 
made such a deep impression on the members of the Government 
that a repetition of the terrible losses and disasters both during the war and since 
the war would have been impossible. If on the other hand High Policy ignores 
High Strategy and on the other hand High Strategy is ignorant of High Policy our 
terrible experiences will be repeated in the not distant future. 302 
Wilson was elected and duly took his seat in parliament, Just five months later, on 22 
June, the Irish Republican Army gunned him down outside his London home. 
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By April, five English battalions had arrived in Upper Silesia to replace the 
Leinsters, Inniskilling Fusiliers, Connaught Rangers, Munsters and the Royal Irish. They 
were the I st Yorkshire Light Infantry, 2nd Cornwall Light Infantry, I st Yorkshire Light 
Infantry, I st Gloucestershire Regiment, 2nd Kings Royal Rifle Company and the I st 
Nfiddlesex Regiment Ooining the 3rd Battalion which had been serving there since June 
192 1). 303 This changeover effectively reduced the strength of the British forces because 
1,670 men were retained in Cologne pending full military withdrawal from Upper Silesia. 
The inter-Allied forces' remaining period in Upper Silesia was characterised. by 
increasingly severe German attacks and ambushes on the French troops in particular 
Because the attacks were invariably related to arms searches instigated by French 
officials, the British and Italians tended to blame them as the authors of their own 
misfortune. 304 The two most notorious incidents occurred in Gliwice. Attempting to 
recover arms seized from their secret weapons dump, armed Germans made a machine 
gun and grenade attack on the temporary quarters of the French troops guarding them. 
305 Two French soldiers were killed and 20 wounded. In the second incident 23 French 
soldiers were reported killed and ten critically wounded when land mines were exploded 
beneath them during a search for weapons reportedly hidden in old family vaults in 
Gliwice cemetery. 
306 
Although the French were especially targets, the British did not escape unscathed. 
At Wirek (Antoniehutte) near Katowice, a British soldier, Sergeant Storer, was murdered 
by the Poles after being identified as an intelligence agent. 307 This was exceptional. As 
Colonel H. B. Kennedy pointed out in 1943. 
the Germans could not have been more pleasant or tried to do more for the 
[British] troops ... I think 
it was probably 75% genuine, tho' the Gennan is always 
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subservient to anyone who is his master ... with the Poles we had very little 
contact. 308 
During the winter of 1921-22, the reality then was that for the ordinary British soldier, 
service in Upper Silesia was quite uneventful. For the officers, home leave was granted 
and almost all regimental memoirs mention the hospitality that they received on the large 
German estates - most especially the horse riding and the hunting expeditions. Amongst 
Polish historians in Silesia today, it is this perception of Anglo-German friendship that 
endures and colours their perception of British partiality. 
In December 192 1, the Boundary Commission completed delimiting the new 
frontier . 
309 The Geneva Convention, then (at 300 pages) one of the longest treaties ever 
negotiated, was signed on 15 May 1922. By the end of the month it had been ratified in 
both the Sejm and the Reichstag - the latter draped in black mourning sheets for the 
occasion. After the formal ratifications were exchanged in Opole on 3 June the territorial 
hand-over proceeded. Felix Colonder, who had chaired the Convention negotiations, 
became President of the new Mxed Commission (located in Katowice), and Georges 
Kaeckenbeek, a Belgian lawyer, became President of the Arbitral Tribunal (located in 
Bytom). Handing over ceremonies were held at eight of the biggest towns starting with 
Katowice on 20 June and ending with Opole on 9 Jul Y. 310 Edmonds provides an 
interesting account of the Allied withdrawal, including how British units had to cover the 
French withdrawal after their departing trains had come under German gunfire. 311 
A descriptive account of the ceremony marking Tarnowski Gory's hand-over to 
312 Poland on 25 June, is recorded in the Black Watch's quaTterlyjoumal. DuringMayand 
June the League Council's line had become a physical reality on the ground. At the same 
time, the Polish white and red flag started appearing over the district's cottages and even 
over some of the official buildings. As the great day approached, arches and festoons 
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constructed from fir tree branches, were erected throughout the district. Despite having 
voted 7-1 for Germany, many of the town's population also erected them. In the back- 
ground however, behind these expressions of loyalty, the author of the journal was much 
more impressed by the sight of the 'the huge exodus' of German families and businesses 
moving themselves over to the German side of the new frontier. 313 
The hand-over ceremony itself was a simple affair. A party of about 40 Black Watch 
soldiers and the Battalion's pipes and drums marched to the area in front of the Rathaus 
where the flags of Britain, France and Italy were flying. Drawn up beside them was a 
Polish brass band accompanied by 50 Polish police. At one o'clock the Commission's 
district controller, Major Beresford, and a Polish representative signed the transfer 
documents. As the Allied flags were hauled down, the Black Watch presented arms. When 
the Polish flag was raised and broken out, the Scottish soldiers presented arms once again 
and the Polish brass band played the Polish national anthem. Then, with their rifles 
shouldered and their pipes and drums playing, the Black Watch marched off the parade, 
down through the town to the railway station. There they joined their colleagues aboard an 
awaiting train and departed for Cologne immediately. The journal records that 'as the train 
steamed out there were few regrets and some even prophesy that within the lifetime of this 
314 
generation the German flag will again fly from the Rathaus' . 
Summary 
As the third insurrection ended, all the parties involved in Upper Silesia with the 
apparent exception of France, sought a speedy resolution to the dispute. Upper Silesian 
business enterprises were suffering from uncertainty over their future; Britain and Italy 
wanted their troops out before there was any more trouble; Poland desired the economic 
gains a decision would bring; and in Berlin, Wirth's Cabinet desperately needed to show 
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Germany some return for their much despised policy of Erfflllung. Nevertheless, the 
Upper Silesian Commissioners' differing interpretations of the plebiscite results had still 
to be discussed and decided on by the Supreme Council. 
The third and final Polish insurrection had undoubtedly shifted the British position. 
Having taken no account of the Polish Silesian aspirations prior to it, the British were 
forced to consider at least the minimum that the Poles would accept. But no matter how 
many different permutations of territory and the voting results were attempted, British 
aims and Polish aspirations could never be reconciled. This was because the nub of the 
Upper Silesian problem was that neither Britain nor France would willingly concede the 
industrial triangle's partition: the obvious outcome of a territorial division based on the 
plebiscite results - flawed as they were. 
In June 1921 Britain tried to persuade Briand to call a Supreme Council meeting to 
resolve the impasse. The French argued, not unreasonably, that no meeting should be 
held until the insurrection was over and the area brought under strict military control. 
However, when the insurrection finally ended in early July, Briand suggested that the 
inter-Allied Commissioners' military backgrounds meant that they were unfamiliar with 
political and economic affhirs and that this should have disqualified them from making 
recommendations affecting Upper Silesia's future. Instead, he proposed that a Committee 
of Experts be established to re-examine the evidence and make new recommendations to 
the Supreme Council. This suggestion can be viewed either as a deliberate stalling tactic 
or else a commendable attempt to reach a consensus. If the latter, and if successful, then 
its outcome would have carried 'scientific credibility', broken the impasse, and permitted 
France, Britain and Italy to compromise without losing face. Nevertheless, the British 
were suspicious, believing that France aimed to prolong its presence in Upper Silesia to 
maintain pressure on the German Government in the hope that Germany would break-up 
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into its constituent parts. A unilateral attempt by the French to reinforce the inter-Allied 
force in Upper Silesia with an extra infantry division was regarded as part of this plan. 
The British Government supported Sir Harold Stuart's opposition to the arrival of 
the additional troops. But they did not reject Briand's contention that the Commissioners' 
limited experience of political and economic affairs had made their recommendations on 
Upper Silesia's future questionable. In fact, supported by Lloyd George, Curzon used this 
very argument in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the French leaders to replace Le 
Rond. Further delays to the Supreme Council meeting and the Commission's continued 
inability to arrive at an unanimous recommendation when asked to review their earlier 
decisions, forced Curzon to concede Briand's Committee of Experts, though in a much 
reduced form. 
The British contribution to this committee, which first met in Paris just a few days 
before the Supreme Council opened on 8 August, was limited. Whilst the British experts 
did have extensive knowledge of the subject they remained highly prejudiced against the 
Poles and were also under instruction to preserve the industrial triangle for Germany. 31 5 
No consensus could have been achieved and none was. This returned the onus on finding 
what was essentially a political solution back to the Supreme Council, where it had really 
always belonged. 
Briand's political position had been made clear to Lloyd George at their private 
discussions on the evening prior to the Supreme Council meeting on 8 August. For a long 
time it had obviously not required any great insight to realise that it would be very 
difficult to achieve an agreement with the French. This being the case, Lloyd George had 
arrived in Paris intent, should all else fail, on referring the problem to the League - an 
idea suggested by Hankey who had carefully checked how the process would work 
beforehand. There can be little doubt that Balfour and Drummond - the latter probably at 
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Cecil's behest, had persuaded the Cabinet Secretary about the merits of the scheme. 
Philip Baker co-ordinated the campaign with the Italians. Baker and other similarly 
dedicated young officials in Geneva had been anxious to demonstrate the new 
organisation's power to change the world. Upper Silesia was especially attractive to the 
League because the question had all of the elements that the new institution's founders 
hoped it could overcome - an intractable international problem; a threat to European 
peace and stability; the failure of Great Power diplomacy. Baker believed that settling the 
Upper Silesian question would prove the League's worth. 
It was also the case that Britain and France, the key players on the Supreme Council, 
really had no options available without threatening the end of the Entente, something 
Briand and, for all his bluster, Lloyd George wanted to avoid. The Entente's demise 
would have been an enormous diplomatic victory for Germany. What is unclear from 
Baker's papers and other British documents, is whether or not Lloyd George and Hankey 
knew that when they met the Italians on the evening of II August, Torretta would initiate 
the proposal to refer the Upper Silesian question to the League. Taking the great caution 
with which every other new Upper Silesian proposal had generally been met with as a 
yardstick, the alacrity with which the League proposal was received would indicate that, 
on balance, we could say that they probably did know. Given the easy manner in which 
information leaked from Geneva coupled with a French aptitude for gathering political 
intelligence, it is also highly probable that Briand was well aware of the League's efforts. 
Nonetheless, it was important for both French and British prestige that the suggestion 
should come from a third party. The Italians provided this service. For, as Stuart later 
pointed out, despite Lloyd George's claim to the contrary, neither Italy nor Japan had 
definitely committed themselves to the British point of view. 316 
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Internal division had prevented the Supreme Council acting out its customary role 
as the sole arbitrator of European politics. The League Council therefore had every 
reason to be delighted with Upper Silesia being referred to them. A successful settlement 
was bound to raise the League's prestige as an international authority. The question now 
was whether they could succeed where the Supreme Council had fitiled. The advantage 
the League possessed was that provided its representatives were left to act independently, 
they were unencumbered by the baggage of British hints and half-promises to Germany 
and the French desire to maximise damage to Germany. And, since they were working 
within the terms of the Versailles Treaty, this meant that the industrial triangle could be 
divided. Unfortunately, thanks to the way the plebiscite area had been originally defined, 
and the manner in which the League chose to interpret the plebiscite vote, thousands of 
Silesians who voted for Poland were again denied their choice. 
Instead of simply moving the Polish border west to include as many Polish voting 
communes, voters and their dependants as possible, the League decided to treat the 
plebiscite area as a single constituency. First, they split the territory in proportion to the 
total overall votes cast for each side. They then adjusted these totals to equalise the size 
of the minority of voters that they left each side of the new frontier. 317 Leaving aside the 
point that the vote was taken by communes, when they started counting voters heads, the 
League disregarded the fact that Polish voters' families tended to be larger than the better 
educated, socially aspiring, German families. This methodology also perpetuated the 
fantasy that the 180,000 German outvoters and 10,000 Polish outvoters; lived in Upper 
Silesia. This distorted the actual situation on the ground. The Polish voters (and their 
children) left in the German area were real enough, but over 25% of the voters being 
counted as German did not live in Upper Silesia. However, by the time the Ambassadors' 
Chapter 5 
473 
Conference had endorsed the League's recommendations, Upper Silesia's population had 
tired of the struggle and most were ready to accept any half-reasonable settlement. 
For Germany, the League recornmendations were the great British betrayal, 
boosting the nationalist right and undermining Germany's centre and left parties, whose 
leaders were attempting to make the new order work. The hysterical press reaction in 
Germany which followed the League's decision overlooked the highly favourable and 
unprecedented econornic provisions that the League Council had included to ease the 
transition. And while the decision did end the life of Wirth's first Cabinet, most of its 
problems might be more justly attributed to their mishandling of the growing economic 
crisis that was of Germany's own making. What the loss of territory in Upper Silesia did 
do was provide Germany with more spurious arguments for evading reparations and gave 
the nation's sense of injustice over the outcome of the war another boost. 
In Britain the general public was never much interested in Upper Silesia. This was 
reflected in the restricted press coverage following publication of the League Council's 
recommendations and confirmation by the Ambassadors' Conference. However, the 
political left saw the League's recommendations as confirming the necessity to support 
and nurture the fledgling German democratic state. What damage the League did to its 
own reputationwith the decision on Upper Silesia amongst an already sceptical British 
political establishment can only guessed at, for within a few months Lloyd George was 
talking to j ournalists, about creating 'a real League of Nations'. And, in a memorandum to 
Drummond in June 1922, Baker reported that the British Prime Nfinister's attitude to the 
League had grown so hostile that he would soon attack the League 'principally on the 
ground of the Upper Silesian decision'. 3 18 But whatever Lloyd George's attitude, the 
most hopeftd outcome of the League's recommendations was that they at last permitted 
Germans and Poles to start deciding aspects of their own future between themselves. 
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German and a Polish workman to travel to Geneva to speak to them). 
175. PRO FO 371/5923 C 16893/92/19 Procedure of the League ofNations in Regard to 
Upper Silesia. Record of a conversation with Sir Eric Drummond 19 August 192 1. 
Minutes by Waterlow, Crowe, and Curzon. See also F0371/5924 C17684/92/18 
Briand to President of the League of Nations 24 August 192 1. Translation by the 
League Secretariat: Historical Summary of the Work of the Peace Conference on the 
Question of Upper Silesia. 
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176. CCA NBKR 4/454 (Copy) Baker to Cecil 4 September 192 1. Baker was still insisting 
on a commission to advise the non-permanent sub-committee. He recommended that 
there should be no publicity given to any of the proceedings that were likely to give 
an advanced indication of the decision. 
177. SRO Lothian Papers (Copy) Kerr to Drummond 17 November 192 1. Kerr had 
moved from Lloyd George's advisor on foreign policy, to become the editor of what 
was generally regarded as Lloyd George's own press outlet. 
178. HLRO F/25/2/25 Balfour to Secretary Cabinet (Hankey) 29 September 192 1. 
See also SRO Lothian Papers GD40/17/82 Drummond to Keff 21 November 192 1. 
Enclosure: 'Draft Article on the Preparation of the Council's Recommendations 
regarding Upper Silesia'by Paul Mantoux. 
179. HLRO F/25/2/25 Balfour to Secretary Cabinet (Hankey) 29 September 192 1. 
180. Ibid Balfour noted how after sending Bourgeois 'personally and unofficially -a 
copy of the Foreign Office case (with all the anti-French criticisms eliminated ) he 
[Bourgeois] got quite nervous and seemed to think that he must at once communicate 
it to the Quai d'Orsay, this bringing down upon the unhappy Council the counter case 
of his own experts'. Balfour quickly withdrew the document to avoid the Council 
being compelled to go over all the old ground. 
181. Gadja, Postscript to Victo? y pp. 138-139. However, where Gadja writes that'Lord 
[sic] Balfour did not accept the Foreign Office point of viev/, this needs to be 
qualified. He did accept London's ideas on the procedure that the League Council 
should adopt. As we have seen (Note 174 above), Stuart claimed that these League 
procedures were also favoured by the British experts. It should be noted that, by this 
time, most Foreign Office officials were reconciled to a compromise deal. it was 
those close to the Prime Minister who were most upset by the League Council's 
recommendations. 
182. PRO F0371/5925 C18382/92/18 15 September 1921, Enclosure: Letter to Cabinet 
Secretary from Balfour re. conversation with Eduard Beneg. Beneg was also 
Czechoslovakia's League representative. He had told Balfour that the frontier 
problems in Cieszyn were 'very similar to that which had to be dealt with in Upper 
Silesia! - see also Cabinet Paper C. P. 3306 A minute by Waterlow reveals how he 
mistakenly believed that Benes ideas 'doubtless carried little weight with Mr. 
Balfour when he reflected'. 
183. IHLRO F/25/2/25 Balfour to Secretary Cabinet (Hankey) 29 September 192 1. The 
copy distribution list included the Prime Mnister. 
184. SRO Lothian Papers GD40/17/82 Drummond to Keff 21 November 192 1, 
Enclosure: pp. 35-36. 
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185. HLRO F/25/2/39(a) 10 October 1921 Statement by Monsieur Hymans of the Opinion 
of the *Committee ofFour with regard to the Results ofthe Plebiscite and the 
Frontier Line. See also HLRO F/25/2/39 Drummond to Hankey 29 October 192 1. 
*the non-permanent members' sub-committee 
186. The Daily Express Thursday 13 October 192 1. 
187. Cienciala and Komarnicki, From Versailles to Locarno pp. 79-82; Walters, History 
of the League ofNations pp. 146-148; Kaeckenbeek, The lnternational Experiment 
of Upper Silesia pp. 7-11; Harrington, The League of Nations And The Upper 
Silesians Boundary Dispute, 1921-1922 pp. 86-91; Campbell, 'The Struggle for 
Upper Silesia 1919-1922'p. 382-384. 
188. FILRO F/25/2/25 Balfour to Hankey 29 September 192 1. Balfour ended his letter 
outlining the general tone of the imminent proposals with aP. S. I do not think the 
existing German owners will have much to complain about'. 
189. The Times Wednesday August 17,192 1. 
190. G. C. Peden, 'The Road to Gairloch: Lloyd George, Unemployment, Inflation, and 
the Treasury View', Twentieth Century British History Vol. 4 (1993) No. 3, pp. 224- 
249. 
191. HLRO F/53/3/10 (Copy) Private and Very Confidential. Rosen to Curzon 6 October 
192 1. Rosen suggested that the Supreme Council could postpone accepting on the 
League Council's recommendation by insisting that the League Council members 
travel to Upper Silesia. And, 'if this were not feasible, at least the next meeting of 
the Supreme Council might be delayed so as to pin time for preparing for a better 
solution. I think that it would be understood in all countries of the world, no such 
great political change should be carried out at the present moment. 
192. HLRO F/53/3/10 Curzon to Rosen 19 October 1921. Curzon replied'The German 
Government appear to have sources of information on this subject that are not open 
to me'. 
193. PRO F0371/5927 C19350/92/18 Cabinet Secretary to Crowe 4 October 1921 
Enclosure: Balfour to Secretary Cabinet 29 September 192 1. Waterlow minuted 11 
think we had better keep this to ourselves. There is nothing to be said for the sort of 
compromise that the four [non-permanent members] are apparently about to 
proposel. 
194. D'Abemon, The Diary ofan Ambassador., Versailles to Riqpallo 1920-1922 p. 214 
7 October 192 1. 
195. HLRO F/54/2/4 D'Abernon to Hankey: page of his diary for 7 October 192 1. 
196. CCA NBKR 4X/40 Minutes of the Extraordinary Session of the Council of the 
League ofNations pp. 16-24 'Recommendation of the Council of the League 
Forwarded to the Supreme Council of the Principal of Allied Powers on 12 August, 
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1921'. See PRO FO 371/5928 C19698/92/18 for an English language translation of 
the League Council's recommendation of 12 October, 192 1. 
197. The'outvoters' comprised 180,000 out of the German total of 707,392 votes - see 
Chapter 4 of this work. 
198. CCA NBKR 4X/40 Minutes of Extraordinary Session of the Council of the League of 
Nations p. 19 Appendix 1: Description of the Frontier-Line Between Germany and 
Poland in Upper Silesia!. 
199. Ibid. pp. 20-23, Appendix 2, 'Transitional Measures of an Economic Nature'. See 
also Harrington The League ofNations and the Upper Silesian Boundary Dispute, 
p. 90. And Kaeckenbeek The International Experiment of Upper Silesia pp. 9-1 1. 
200. NBKR 4X/40 Minutes of the Extraordinary Session of the Council of the League of 
Nations p. 24 Appendix 3: 'Rights of Nationality and Domicile and Protection of 
Minorities in Upper Silesia'. Over the following years implementing this brought 
about a concerted avalanche of appeals to the League by Germans in Upper Silesia 
indirectly backed by Berlin. 
201. The Cologne Post Sunday 16 October 192 1. The interview had been given in London 
the previous day. Harrington ('League of Nations and the Upper Silesian Boundary 
Dispute'p92) however, cites Balfour's niece Blanche Dugdale's biography (Arthur 
James Baýfbur Vol. H. p. 674) which claims that Balfour was 'disappointed at the 
meager[sic] area allotted Germany. This is at odds with the evidence. 
202. The Morning Post Friday 14 October 192 1. 
203. The Cologne Post Sunday 16 October 192 1. 
204. Ibid, Friday 14 October 1921; The Daily Chronicle Wednesday 19 October 1921. 
205. Campbell, 'The Struggle for Upper Silesia! p. 3 85. 
206. Ae Daily Express Thursday 13 October 1921; The Morning Post Friday 14 October 
192 1; The Daily Chronicle Wednesday 19 October, 192 1. The latter notes that in the 
last week of September 1921 some 4,000 million marks were added to the German 
currency. At face value, this was around double the total pre-war circulation. 
207. D. A. Aldcrofý From Versailles to Wall Street (London 1977) p. 76. 'The boom's 
outstanding feature was speculative buying in commodities, securities and real estate 
and the very large number of transactions were at inflated prices ... The financial orgy 
was made possible by the extremely liquid state of firms as a result of huge wartime 
profits, relatively easy money conditions and large scale creation of bank credit. A 
good deal of speculative activity was based on borrowed money.. '. See also The 
Daily Chronicle Wednesday 19 October 192 1. The rapid fall of the mark may, 
however, have catastrophic effects... For some time German industry has enjoyed a 
spurious prosperity owing to the fact that the external value of the mark fell faster 
than the internal, and the difference operated as a bounty on the German export 
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trade. But the conditions which made this possible were essentially conditions of 
disease, not health. An eventual collapse seems inevitable, and it now seems not 
unlikely to be a crash, If so, its repercussions will be felt far outside Germany and 
will tend still further to delay Europe's business revival'. 
208. Elizabeth Johnson (ed. ) The Collected Writings ofJohn Maynard Keynes Volume 
XVII 'Activities 1920-1922 Treaty ofRevision and Reconstmction (Cambridge 1978) 
p. 131 'Speculating himself ... Keynes 
lost E13,125 of his own money and E8,498 
belonging to a small syndicate for which he had invested. 
209. The Temps 13 October 1921 (Quoted in The Morning Post Friday 14 October 192 1). 
210. The Morning Post Tuesday 17 October 1921. 
211. Ibid. The leader also drew attention to the fact that there was no unemployment in 
Germany whilst British manufacturing had shut down in the face of low priced 
German competition, bolstered by the mark's low exchange rate. It concluded by 
remarking that; 'Possibly, if our Prime Minister had been less concerned about the 
unity of the Germany and more concerned about the unity of the United Kingdom, he 
might have better served the interest and the security of his country. 
212. PRO FO 371/5928 C19761/92/18 Hankey's Notes Cab. 78(21) para. 2. See also SRO 
GD/I 7/82 (p. 12) (Copy) Kerr to D'Abernon 18 October 192 1. 
213. Ibid, (p. 19) D'Abernon to Kerr 20 October 1921. 
214. CCA NBKR4/463 (Copy) Baker to Cecil 14 October 192 1. Baker asked Cecil to 
persuade Balfour to return from Scotland to take part in any Parliamentary debate 
called when the recommendations were published officially. 
215. SRO GD40/17/82 (pp. 20-23) Drummond to Kerr 20 October 192 1. 
216. Ibid, (pp. 24-26) (Copy) Kerr to Drummond 17 November 192 1. 
217. NBKR 4/363 (Copy) Baker to Cecil 25 October 192 1. Hankey had said that at first 
he had ob ected very strongly to the League's recommendations, but he was now j 
more or less reconciled to them. What he most strongly found fault with was the 
procedure adopted. 
218. HLRO F/25/2/36 Drummond to Hankey 24 October 192 1. Drummond enclosed a 
copy of the letter he had sent to Kerr explaining why he had not been able to follow 
his original plan of using a commission or tribunal - see SRO GD40/17/82 (pp. 20- 
23) Drummond to Kerr 20 October 1921. All of this correspondence was being passed on 
to Lloyd George. 
219. HLRO F/25/2/35 (Copy) Hankey to Drummond 21 October 1921. Attached to a copy 
of this faref which Hankey gave to Lloyd George, is Hankey's annotation dated 26 
October. It reads 'Dear Prime Minister, This is a copy of the private letter I wrote to 
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Eric Drummond about Upper Silesia. I had to allow my wrath to cool before I 
could write civilly! ' 
220. Ibid. See also PRO FO 371/5922 C 16544/92/1 (Draft Copy) Crowe to Balfour 16 
August 192 1. This informed Balfour that on Drummonds return to Geneva, the 
League's secretary general would deliver Foreign Office papers to him, together with 
their arguments. Drummond was an ex-Foreign Office official. 
22 1. CCA NBKR 4/460 M. Askenazy (Polish Delegation) to Viscount Ishii (President of 
Council) 29 August 192 1. Since Germany was not a League member, there was a 
legal question over whether Germany had a right to speak. It is possible that Poland 
did not exercise her right to be heard simply to prevent Germany from getting a 
chance to speak. 
222. HLRO F25/2/35 Drummond to Hankey 29th October 192 1. In drawing Lloyd 
George's attention to this letter, Hankey annotated it; Trime Minister, This letter 
from Dummond is very interesting and throws a good deal of light on the Silesia 
business. 3 November 192 1'. 
223. HLRO F25/2/25 Balfour to Hankey 29 September 1921. 
224. HLRO F25/2/35 Dnunmond to Hankey 29 October 1921 
225. Ibid. 
226. The Cologne Post Sunday October 23 192 1. The Coalition consisted of the Majority 
Socialists, Wirth's Centre Party, and the Democrats. It was the differences in the 
Democrats which forced the resignation. See also DBFP Vol. XVI No. 352 pp. 368- 
371 Hardinge to Curzon 19 October 1921 Enclosure: Decision ofthe Conference of 
Ambassadors and a Draft Letter to German and Polish Delegations, Respecting 
Upper Silesia. This confirmed the League's recommendations and required that 
1. German-Polish Boundary Commission to be established and proceed with 
the delimitation of frontier. 
2. Within six days, Germans and Poles to nominate plenipotentiaries to mixed 
commissions under a neutral chairman. 
3. Within eight days Germans and Poles to nominate one plenipotentiary each 
under a League chairman to negotiate under a League chairman a general 
economic and minorities treaty. 
4. When sufficient progress has been made in delimitation and in negotiation 
of the general convention, Germans and Poles to be notified by Plebiscite 
Commission that they are free to take over their respective territories. 
227. HLRO F15412n D'Abernon to Hankey 26 OctoberI92 1: pages from his diary 25 
October 192 1. Apart from D' Abernon's and Hankey's initial reaction, there is little or 
no evidence in the British documents of any remorse or sense of guilt over letting 
Wirth down. D'Abemon felt Germany had obtained a very favourable solution 
228. The Cologne Post Thursday 27 October 1921. See also DBFP Vol. XVI, No. 357 
p. 375, D'Abernon to Curzon 28 October 192 1. After his resignation Rosen told 
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D'Abemon that'England by her indifference or simplicity at Geneva has rendered a 
very bad service to Europe as well as to Germany and to herself . No greater blunder has been made in history except that of Germany in 1914. We thought of the Serbian 
business was merely a local affair, you think the same of Upper Silesia but you are 
wrong.... Personally I believe England was negligent at Geneva: most people are 
convinced that she deliberately abandoned the German case which she had defended 
so ably and eloquently at Paris'. 
229. The Cologne Post Thursday 27 October 1921. See also DBFP Vol. XVI, No357 
pp. 375-376 Hardinge to Curzon 27 October 1921. Worms London of the German 
Government's reply but that since in accordance with the Allied demands, they were 
appointing a plenipotentiary, this was being taken as acceptance of all the conditions 
and stipulations laid down in the Allies' decision. 
230. PRO FO 371/6818 Nl 1269/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 5 October 1921 Summary 
ofEvents week ending 5 October 1921. 
231. PRO FO 371/6818 NI 1560/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon II October 1921 Summary 
ofEvents week ending 11 October 1921. 
232. PRO FO 371/6831 NI 1289/123/55 (Copy) Curzon to Sir. H. Dering 5 October 192 1. 
233. Ibid 
234. PRO FO 371/6818 N 11560/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon II October 1921 Summary 
ofEvents week ending II October 1921. 
235. PRO FO 371/5924 C 17500/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 30 August 192 1. 
236. PRO FO 371/5927 C19605/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 12 October 1921. The 
reports provoked a denial and this was issued through the Polish Foreign Office - see 
FO 371/ 5929 C20194/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 12 October 192 1, Enclosure: 
'Max Muller to Skirmunt. The British Minister reported that thishad produced a 
good effect! . 
237. PRO FO 371/5924 C20195/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 16 October 192 1. 
238. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 343 pp. 359- 360 Max Muller to Curzon 16 October 1921. 
239. PRO FO 371/5924 C20195192/18 Max Muller to Curzon 16 October 192 1. 
240. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 343 pp. 359-360 Max Muller to Curzon 16 OctobeTI 92 1. 
241. PRO FO 371/5924 C20195/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 16 October 192 1. 
242. Ibid, No. 344 p. 360 16 October 1921 by Sir E. Crowe He suggested that if the 
Germans refused to accept the decision then Poland should still be permitted to 
occupy the territory it had been allotted. 
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243. PRO FO 371/5929 C19972/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 18 October 1921. This was 
before they had received official notification of the decision from the Ambassadors' 
Conference. 
244. PRO FO 371/5930 C21155/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 29 October 1921, 
Enclosure: Resolution of the Diet'. 
245. Ibid. 
246. PRO FO 371/6818 N 12314/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon I November 1921 
Summary ofEvents week ending I November. 
247. lbid, N12064/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 25 October 1921. 
248. Ibid, N12314/123/55 Max Mullerto Curzon I November 1921 Summary ofEvents 
week ending I November. 
249. Ibid, N13593/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 7 December 1921 Summary ofEvents 
week ending 7 December. 
250. Ibid, N13836/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 14 December 1921 Summary ofEvents 
week en&ng 14 December. 
251. PRO FO 371/6829 N 13313/514/55 Max Muller to Curzon 4 December 192 1. The 
Polish Government was anxious to avoid any impression that Silesia was a closed 
preserve for the French. Poland would welcome British capital to exploit Silesia and 
was prepared to grant concessions for this purpose. Cienciala and Komarnicki 
(From Versailles to Locarno pp. 82-87) also describes French economic interests in 
Upper Silesia during this period. 
252. PRO FO 371/8133 N4709/579/55 Hoare to Ovey 12 May 1922, Enclosure: An 
article published in the Rzeczpospolita 10 May 192 1, entitled 'Foreign Chevaliers De 
L'Industrie I and attributed by the British officials to Korfarity. KenwoTthy was a 
prominent British populist-radical, well regarded by the political Left. Early in 1922 
he was involved in the establishment of a British company which aiming at taking 
over ownership of Polish Upper Silesia! s privately owned metal industries. But, 
although registered in Britain the reality was that it would only have had a small 
British investment, the vast majority of the assets would remain with the existing 
German owners who feared that the Polish Government would expropriate the 
businesses later. Kenworthy's partners were a British businessman named Slater 
(described by Korfanty in the article as a 'London loafee) along with a British 
freelance agent named Garner who was Working for German interests in Upper 
Silesia. Another leading British figure involved in setting up these 'dummy 
companies' was Lord Cozens Hardy whose group aimed at securing the private 
mines for the existing German owners. 
253. PRO FO 371/5926 C18806/92/18 Hankeyto the Under Secretary of State, Foreign 
Office 29 September 192 1, Enclosure: 'Upper Silesia!. On the tour, Kenworthy was 
accompanied by a Mr. Garner (see Note 252 above). The agent, named Garner, had 
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been a member of the inter-Allied Commission for Olsztyn plebiscite. He had then 
arrived in Upper Silesia to work for Korfanty's Polish Plebiscite Commissariat. 
When he was dismissed he had contacted Ottley in London and then returned to 
work for the Germans. Korfanty later described Garner's services as 'limited to the 
drawing of a salary in pounds sterling' - see FO 371/8133 N47709/579/55 Hoare to 
Ovey 12 May 1922, Enclosure: The Rzeczpospolita 10 May 1921 Foreign Chevaliers 
De LIndustrie. 
254. PRO FO 371/5925 C 17806/92/18 Petition by the inhabitants of Olenso (Rosenberg) 
and Kochanowica (Kochanowitz) 27 August 192 1. 
255. PRO FO 371/5923 C16926/92/18 Henekerto Curzon 23 August 1921. 
256. lbid. 
257. Ibid During this episode of disturbances that Heneker was reporting, attempts to 
arrest German suspects had been prevented by the town's inhabitants. There had also 
been disturbances when the Commission had tried dismissing and deporting 1,500 
German's deemed to be 'of unsuitable character' but had been recruited into the 
Plebiscite Police force by the British during the insurrection in May/June (PRO 
F0371/5918 C 1500/92/18 24 July 192 1). On 31 July Major Keatinge arrested the 
murderer of the French Commandant Montalegre, who had been shot at point blank 
range when British troops had entered Bytom on July 4. He was hidden in a house in 
Kluczbork - see The Cologne Post Upper Silesian Edition, Tuesday 2 August 192 1. 
258. IWM HHW2/60/14 pp. 62-67 Heneker to Wilson II November 192 1. The Durhams 
and some French troops were sent down to help restore order in the area. See PRO 
FO 371/5932 C22163/92/18 Heneker to Curzon 21 November 1921. Heneker had 
asked the German Government representative to tell local Germans to take action 
over the 'unruly elements' around Raziborz. The population there had threaten to 
strike if the French troops were not withdrawn. See also F0371/5931 C22104/92/18 
Stuart to Curzon 16 November 192 1, Enclosure: 'Report on the Refugees in Upper 
Silesia, August to November' by Lt. Colonel W. Williams, 10 November 192 1. 
259. PRO FO 371/5929 C19991/92/18 Heneker to Curzon 31 August 1921. Heneker 
complains about the British district controller having difficulty working with the 
local German para-military leaders and with the French, who are not aiding him. 
260. PRO FO 371/5924 C17598/92/18 Heneker to Curzon 1 September1921. 
'Population in the British zone is absolutely quiet, certain elements amongst the 
industrial workers in the French zone giving a great deal of trouble. Robbery and 
intimidation are rife.. '. 
26 1. PRO FO 371/5924 C 17723/92/18 Heneker to Curzon 6 September 192 1. 
262. PRO FO 371/5925 C17989/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 9 September 1921. 
263. PRO FO 891/1 Report by Colonel Hawker II September 1921 . General Naulin, who 
had replaced Gratier, said if opposed by 60,000 armed Germans the idea of armed 
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resistance was out of the question. The same applied to a Polish armed insurrection, 
however, he believed that the French had enough influence in Warsaw to bring any 
Polish Silesian force under control. See also DBFP Vol. XVI No. 339 p. 335 Stuart to 
Curzon 14 October 192 1. There are several documents on this subject. 
264. PRO FO 371/5925 C 18546/92/18 Secretary War Office to Under Secretary of State, 
Foreign Office 22 September 1921. 
265. PRO FO 371/5921 C20026/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 14 October 1921. 
266. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 354 pp. 372-373 stuart to Curzon 21 October 1921. 
267. Ibid. 
268. IWM F[HW2/61/18 p. 188 Grogan to Wilson 22 October, 192 1. 
269. PRO F0371/5930 C21068/92/18 Stuart to Crowe 28 October, 192 1. 
270. Ibid, Enclosure: Major Clarke to Stuart 25 OctoberI921. 
271. Ibi(4 C20854/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 27 October, 1921 
272. Ibid, C20509/92/18 24 October 1921. Memorandum on League ofNations Decision 
by F. Thelwell, Commercial Secretary, Berlin Embassy. 
273. Ibid, C21068/92/18 Enclosure: Major Clarke to Stuart 25 October 1921. 
274. Ibid. 
275. Ibid, C21001/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 28 October 1921. The area of Polish Upper 
Silesia was 3,182 square kilometres with 973,335 inhabitants. As promised, Warsaw 
granted it semi-autonomous status and its own parliament but retained control of its 
foreign affkirs and defence. The 1931 census recorded the population as 1,295,000 
(92.3%) Poles but only 90,600 were registered as Germans. In a referendum held on 
3 September 1922, German Upper Silesia rejected autonomy within the German 
Federation with 90% voting to remain as an autonomous province of Prussia - see 
DBFP Vol. XVI No. 412 4 September 1921. 
276. PRO FO 371/5929 C20337/92/18 Hardinge to Curzon 22 October 1921. 
277. PRO FO 371/5930 C20490/18 Stuart to Curzon 21 October 192 1. Stuart wanted to 
know how long the negotiations would take, He warned that should the Commission 
continue past the beginning of December he might have to resign because he had 
urgent private affairs to attend to in England. The Foreign Office copy of the reply, 
dated 31 October, asks him to stay on because 'his services would be difficult to 
replace'. He was granted a period of absence. 
278. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 359 p. 376 Curzon to Hardinge 29 October 1921. Ardor withdrew 
his nomination, The Germans suspected that he would be biased against them. 
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280. PRO FO 371/5931 C21862/92/18 Stuart to Curzon II November 192 1. Referring to 
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Allied Governments and the League of Nations do not sufficiently appreciate the 
importance of speedy action in this respect See also DBFP Vol. XVI No. 366 
pp. 380-381 Stuart to Curzon 12 November 1921 The Commissioners warned that 
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uncertainty about the powers' intentions served to increase the influence of the men 
of violence. The rapid depreciation of the mark affecting economic activity was also 
cited and they concluded by pointing out the ever-increasing expense of the whole 
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281. PRO FO 371/5931 C21862/92/18 Stuartto Curzon 11 November 1921. 
282. PRO FO 371/5922 C 16634/92/18 Heneker to War Office 15 August 192 1. 
283. lWM HH2/12G/53 (Copy) Wilson to Sackville West 16 August 192 1. He wrote, 'Of 
course the League of Nations is simply a sign of the total incompetence, incapacity 
and impotence of the'Fools'... How the League will get a decision when the Tools' 
cannot I do not know, because the members of the League are only inferior 'Fools' or 
otherwise they would be superior Tools', or else not 'Fools' at all: For 'Fools' read 
'Frocks ". 
284. IWM HHW2/61/11 Grogan to Wilson 17 August 1921. 
285. IWM HHW2/61/12 pp. 168-170 Grogan to Wilson 27 August 192 1. See also PRO 
W033/1004 Precis H p. 69 'Military Situation in Upper Silesia August 1921 
286. PRO WO 106/977 Grogan to DMO 27 August 192 1. 
287. IWM FIRW2/61/17 Grogan to Wilson 15 October 192 1. See also NVM 
HHW2/61/13 pp. 172-174 Grogan to Wilson 31 August 1921 for details about 
Naulin's career. 
288. lWM HHW2/61/17 Grogan to Wilson 15 OctoberI921- Naulin had not expected any 
trouble. 
289. BWA 05: 486 (411) 42 The Red Hackle Vol. I No. 4 January 1922. Even the Black 
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- see BWA 69: 798 Digests I April 1921-31 March 1923. See also Ward, Faithful - 
The Story of the Durham Light Infant? y pp. 538-539. 
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Conclusion 
The Upper Silesian plebiscite stands as a monument to what ultimately proved to be 
the destructive political improvisations Lloyd George practised throughout the Paris 
Peace Conference. The plebiscite's raison detre had been to conciliate the new 
German republic. Nevertheless, it developed into one of the most effective wedges 
that German diplomacy was able to employ to split the Entente. The granting of the 
Upper Silesian plebiscite and the actions Britain took in relation to it were amongst 
the first faltering steps of Britain's inter-war Appeasement policy. Associated with the 
1930's and the 'guilty men of Munich', Appeasement's roots unquestionably extend 
back through Locarno to Lloyd George, the Fontainbleau memorandum, and the more 
conciliatory line Britain started to adopt towards Germany mid-way through the Peace 
Conference. There were several good political reasons for this change of direction. 
Amongst these were indications that the British public's desire for revenge had started 
to abate. The warnings by the more liberal wing of the British political establishment 
that if the German government was not given a degree of support, Germany might fall 
prey to either the Bolsheviks or reactionary monarchists, also began to be heard. 
The influential interests controlling Upper Silesia's capital and resources, and 
the successive German administrations which poured funds into the German campaign 
to retain the territory, cannot be blamed for pursuing each and every avenue open to 
them. After all, Upper Silesia was worth billions of marks to the German economy. A 
lack of foresight by the Polish Commission in Paris caused several German populated 
districts within Upper Silesia to be allocated to Poland. This action diluted Poland's 
legitimate claim to the region's coal mines and industries but legitimised Germany's 
objections to the annexation of the territory - as stipulated in the Draft Peace Terms. 
But by granting a plebiscite in this, one of the most important economic regions in 
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Central Europe, the Peace Conference had inadvertently caused yet another problem. 
Upper Silesia's future became entangled in the bitter battle over reparations played out 
between Germany and the Allies at the innumerable conferences and meetings that lay 
ahead of them. 
Had Germany been crushed and broken up in defeat, as many in France had 
wanted, or had it been conciliated and welcomed into a new community of nations, as 
many British and Americans had hoped, succeeding events might have been different. 
However, like the Upper Silesian settlement, the series of inter-Allied compromises 
that comprised the Peace Treaty, left most Germans bitter and resentful. They came to 
believe that they had not lost the war: for many their only regret was in not having 
won it. Recovering the 'lost territories', evading reparations, and preventing the loss 
of Upper Silesia, became the political objective of all Germans. This failure to either 
crush or to conciliate created grave tensions between Britain and France over how to 
deal with Germany. Britain was anxious for Germany to be re-established as the motor 
of European economic recovery: France was not. 
Upper Silesia featured increasingly in these disputes and Germany was not 
slow to exploit this. Carefidly at first, overtly later, the German Foreign Office used 
Upper Silesia to accentuate the differences between Britain and France. This was not 
difficult once Britain reneged on its military commitments in Upper Silesia, leaving 
France with responsibility for most of its administration and policing - something they 
had not sought. British representatives such as Malcolm and D'Abernon in Berlin, 
Percival in Opole, and Ottley in London, were cultivated and used by the Germans. 
Whenever trouble broke out in Upper Silesia, they and most of the other British 
representatives and officials were quick to criticise the French. When the Germans 
wanted to make a point, it was invariably made through the British representatives. 
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Having similar cultural backgrounds, it had not been difficult for the Germans to 
persuade the British that if complex Upper Silesian industries were transferred to 
Poland then, as with the ancient world, they would be undermined by the barbarians. ' 
British historiography generally views the events surrounding the plebiscite as 
a series of illicit Franco-Polish conspiracies designed to enhance French security by 
eliminating the Germans' economic capacity in Upper Silesia. It usually portrays the 
plebiscite as a British attempt to ensure 'fair play' for the Germans - overlooking the 
inconvenient fact that, initially, it was a British political device designed to overcome 
Germany's opposition to the Peace Treaty. The much wider international aspects of 
the plebiscite are usually ignored. There is no evidence to support British suspicions 
or allegations about French complicity in the Polish Silesians' actions. Whilst French 
officials and soldiers in Upper Silesia did enjoy seeing Polish gains at the Germans' 
expense (for example, the Bytom Agreement), this was only from the point of view of 
a shared interest in this. And unlike the support of the British officials for Germany, 
and the British Army's intermittent participation in policing the plebiscite area, the 
French actions, including Le Rond's recommendations to the Supreme Council, were 
always within the Peace Treaty's parameters. 
Considering the joint sacrifices they had made, and although relations during the 
war had at times been tense, after the Peace Treaty was signed, Britain adopted a very 
unsympathetic political attitude towards France. The British believed that Germany was 
flat on its back and that it would take decades to recover from the war. The War Office 
procurement plans were put under a 'ten year rule - an ongoing financial constraint which 
assumed no major war would occur for that period ahead. But to the French, the German 
giant was far from dead. It was unscathed by invasion, its industrial base was intact, and it 
possessed a population of 70 million to France's 40 million. 2 France, therefore, had good 
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reason to fear a third German invasion and it sought to maximise the Treaty's effect on 
Germany by demanding that every condition be complied with to the letter. After the 
Anglo-American security guarantee disappeared in January 1920, they intensified these 
efforts. Sir Henry Wilson had a high regard for the French military staff, but his view was 
far from the general attitude adopted by most Army senior staff and by British politicians. 
Claiming that the war had been fought to rid the world of this type of intimidation, critics 
labelled the French 'militarists'. Nevertheless, British politicians and officials still saw 
some value in the Entente as a mechanism with which to restrain France. 
This began to change when the French policy of strict compliance with the Treaty 
started conflicting with the British advocacy for Germany's economic recovery. As the 
acrimony between France and Germany mounted, it seemed certain that a combination of 
French intransigence and German non-compliance would drag Britain into a French-led 
occupation of the Ruhr valley, with all the ramifications this would hold for Germany's 
economy. To avoid this, and pursuing its goal of German recovery, Britain adopted the role 
of mediator -a self-imposed remit that quickly extended to the resolution of every Franco- 
German squabble. Achieving compromise required Britain to restrain French demands. At 
the same time, it had to encourage German compliance with the Treaty. The problem with 
this was that Britain was also an interested party over questions such as reparations. Given 
British self-interest, his tendency towards 'quick fix' solutions, and his ability to browbeat 
lesser negotiators into submission, Lloyd George was particularly unsuitable as a mediator, 
The upshot was that in defending the Germans' interests, the British alienated the French - 
increasing their sense of insecurity. At the same time, attempting to induce the Germans to 
comply vvith the Treaty, the British entered into promises and 'understandings' contrary to 
the spirit of the Peace Treaty. For example, the British unilaterally agreed with Germany 
that the final total reparations bill should be linked to Upper Silesia's future -a German 
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manoeuver delaying receipt of the total reparations bill. Then, to prevent the Allies being 
forced to occupy the Ruhr, the British induced the Germans to accept an interim reparation 
bill in exchange for Britain supporting Germany's retention of Upper Silesia's industries. 
Interestingly, both of these ideas originated in Berlin. Therefore by successfully 
linking Germany's future economic performance with reparations and the plebiscite's 
outcome, at a stroke, Berlin succeeded in bringing British policy directly into conflict with 
the interests of her two allies, France and Poland. These differences intensified when the 
plebiscite results indicated that on a strict interpretation of the Peace Treaty, the whole of 
the industrial area should have been awarded to Poland. Even before these linkages and 
commitments had been made, however, problems had been developing between the British 
and French members of the inter-Allied Commissions operating in Germany. In Assize of 
Arms, Morgan remarked on the gulf in attitudes separating the British and French after the 
war. Noting the light-hearted manner in which London received the victory with parties, 
fireworks, dancing and so forth, he compared this with the highly restrained celebrations 
held on the Champs Elysees on the night of the Me de la Victoire. There he saw an 
equally crowded but sombre Paris, appear to look to the Riture with grim-foreboding. 3 He 
felt that this difference was reflected in the attitude of the Allied forces in the Rhineland 
and those serving on the inter-Allied Commissions. For the French, whose future security 
depended on how many hurdles could be erected to prevent the feared German resurgence, 
disarming Germany and the plebiscites was serious business. For the British officials, their 
ingrained public school ethos dictated that there should be 'fair play' for the Germans. 
This was nowhere more apparent than Upper Silesia, where the gulf between the 
Commission's British and the French officials became legendary. Here, the British sense of 
'fair play' does not appear to have been extended to the Poles. To most of the British 
officials, the Polish Silesians were of a 'very low class'. They did not have very much to 
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do with them. The Poles were ill dressed, spoke a strange language and were 
troublemakers. Like the Irish, to whom Lloyd George compared them, they were tearing 
apart a well-ordered society (Prussia) to seek freedom in a new country (Poland) that 
would probably not last five years. Of course, not all the British officials regarded the 
Poles thus. These were fairly typical of the views held by the seconded military officers - 
selected because they spoke German. Like Percival, most were unsuited to the delicate task 
of arbitrating between the communities there and organising a plebiscite in what became a 
powder keg of ethnic tensions. If Percival's selection as British Commissioner was a great 
mistake, then his continued service after his first nervous breakdown verged on folly. It 
was not Percival's fault. He had been pitched into a situation without any British military 
presence supporting his authority. His unsuitability for the task was acknowledged by the 
Foreign Office yet they ignored his repeated offers to resign. 
There was no doubt amongst Upper Silesians about the partiality of the British 
officials. When the British troops arrived, the Poles also regarded them as being solely in 
favour of the Germans. Though their regimental histories beg to differ, these British troops 
eventually ended up treating the Polish Silesians much as the Germans had done. French 
officials and troops were regarded as being much softer towards the Poles. They would 
protect Polish interests - provided this was in accord with French interests. On the ground, 
this dichotomy may not have been such a bad thing. It could be argued that in attempting to 
resolve such ethnic conflicts, the ability of each contending party to have confidence, even 
trust, in one of the powers policing them, is better than all sides distrusting what might be 
disinterested neutrality. It had been to give the Germans the confidence to go ahead with 
the plebiscite, that British troops first appeared in Upper Silesia in March 192 1. And it had 
been on that basis they returned in June to help terminate the third and final insurrection. 
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If this Anglo-French dichotomy had some merit within Upper Silesia, it had none 
when it came to deciding the territory's fate. As soon as the plebiscite results were known 
Britain pinned its colours to the German mast. However, this thesis has demonstrated the 
fallacy of the British arguments about Germany's numerical strength across the plebiscite 
area - something the Foreign Office officials had also recognised. It has not only shown 
how outvoting increased the German's numerical vote by over 25%, but explained why 
outvoting had a minimal effect on results in the industrial communes - both numerically 
and when the plebiscite result is interpreted in accordance with the Peace Treaty. We also 
know that the British were not making a disinterested assessment of the voting. The French 
wanted reparations to cripple Germany, Lloyd George wanted them to keep his Coalition's 
Conservatives quiet. Britain also had an unofficial commitment to Wirth's Cabinet. After 
ostensibly pursuing their 'fulfillment' policy and having used their influence to prevent 
full-scale civil war in Upper Silesia, the German Cabinet now anticipated retaining the 
industrial districts. But France continued to support Poland's case over Upper Silesia and 
an another deadlock ensued. 
Recognising an opportunity to raise their organisation's profile, League of Nations' 
officials had been canvassing London and Rome for the problem to be referred to them. 
The outcome was a disaster for the whole of Upper Silesia. Using the plebiscite's 6 to 4, 
German to Polish voting ratio, the League arrived at what later proved to be an unworkable 
partition of the industrial area. It was divorced from reality, and required a near-permanent 
League presence to arbitrate between the two parties. Economically, the Geneva Protocol 
had left everything much as it had been. The same people owned and ran the factories, the 
mines and other industries. They were protected and could not be removed. As for the local 
inhabitants in the industrial area, they experienced great difficulties with the practicalities 
of living and working in an area of such high inter-dependence yet where the streets were 
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partitioned, and ridiculous working arrangements and administrative divisions had been 
imposed. Even the German currency had been forcibly retained in areas that were now 
Polish sovereign territory. None of this accorded with the Peace Treaty. The economic 
arrangements had been made for Germany's benefit, but this was never acknowledged. The 
outcome had also displeased the Polish voters. Correctly believing that they should have 
received the whole industrial area, they had more right to complain than the Germans. 
The whole episode had been an exercise in Great Power expediency for which the 
Upper Silesians ultimately paid the price. As for the British half-promises and intimations 
to Germany, there is a certain logic in accepting Lloyd George's Commons statement that 
referral to the League cancelled all previous commitments - that is until one recalls that 
prior to the referral, Hankey and Lloyd George believed that the League's decision would 
favour Germany. It is arguable who was manipulating whom, but the decision resulted in 
Wirth's Government falling and the Foreign Secretary, Rosen, joining the list of those 
sacrificed to Lloyd George's expediency. In Warsaw, Upper Silesia was only one of a 
series of important differences with London. Nevertheless, whilst the Poles were relieved 
to learn that they would be getting some share of Upper Silesia's wealth, they were not so 
pleased with the economic restrictions and the fact that over 500,000 Poles still remained 
on the German side of the new Upper Silesian border. Lloyd George's ill-informed attacks 
on the Poles and his many rebuffs to their ambitions had witnessed British influence in 
Warsaw diminishing to near non-existence. 
Philip Keff 's 1920 explanation to Rumbold that the Poles had misunderstood Lloyd 
George's attitude towards them, and that the British Prime Nfinister was 'not in the least 
anti-Polish', is difficult to accept. 4 Both Poland and Upper Silesia were victims of Lloyd 
George's disastrous tenure in overall charge of British foreign policy. On his arrival in 
Paris for the Peace Conference, apart from two years wartime diplomacy he had little 
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experience of foreign affairs. After eclipsing president Wilson by force of personality and 
assuming the defacto leadership of the Allied Powers, he went on to dominate decision 
after decision. The Versailles Peace Treaty's much criticised compromises have Lloyd 
George's name stamped all over them. Throughout the subsequent rounds of conferences 
and meetings his unassailable position as leader continued. His domination was such that 
French leaders tried cutting back the frequency of the meetings. Norman Davies points out 
that during this period British foreign policy was often dictated by Lloyd George's weak 
position within his Coalition. Whilst this might have held true for some aspects of their 
policy towards Poland, this was certainly not the case regarding Polish claims to Upper 
Silesia. 5 Foreign policy choices are not always obvious or easy to make. When decisions 
are taken many factors have to be balanced. But whether Lloyd George's foreign policy 
choices are viewed retrospectively or not, it is obvious that the consistency with which he 
listened to the amateur and ignored informed advice, supported the wrong leader, pursued 
the wrong course of action, or simply dodged the problem with the short-term 'fix', went a 
long way towards undermining the Peace Treaty, establishing Appeasement and preparing 
the political circumstances for World War II. 
Many of Britain's differences with Poland stemmed from their differing responses 
to the Soviet regime. By mid- 1919, British policy in East Central Europe had settled on 
encouraging a new 'liberal' Russia to emerge from the chaos of the Russian revolution. ' 
British aid to the 'White Russians' and then Lloyd George's own determined pursuit of the 
Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement (signed 16 March 192 1), were designed to help to bring 
this about. Pilsudski's idea of a Polish-led federation of Border States clashed with British 
policy and it was this which so animated Lloyd George's advisers over Poland's presence 
in parts of Lithuania and East Galicia. Britain regarded both as potential members of a 
liberal Russian Federation. After Denikin was defeated, with Belarus, the Ukraine, and 
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areas of Lithuania falling under Bolshevik control, Pi4sudski had set about attempting to 
reverse Bolshevik encroachment into the ex-Tsarist states and Poland's still undefined 
eastern border regions. However, after defeating the Soviets outside Warsaw in August 
1920, Pilsudski found himself lacking the necessary political support in Poland to sustain 
the ill-equipped Polish Army's momentum back through the ex-Tsarist Border States. 
Despite repeated British charges of 'Polish imperialism', the Poles settled their ftontier 
with the Soviets as far to the east of Warsaw as was prudent and possible. 7 Both Curzon 
and Lloyd George believed Polish actions were the cause of the region's instability, and 
this perception helped to influence British policy towards the Polish Silesians. 
The new Soviet-Polish frontier embraced most Poles living in these materially 
devastated border areas. However, at different points along it, the population included 
large minorities of Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Lithuanians and Jews - many of the latter 
forced to move there by the Russians during the partitions. Whilst the Upper Silesian 
plebiscite saga ran its course, Britain was championing the cause of these different 
minorities in the League of Nations and making formal representations to the Polish 
Government. A similar concern about the inclusion of the 'culturally superior' Germans 
within Poland's western frontiers, governed British policy in Upper Silesia. History shows 
how justified the British concerns were that the inclusion of large minorities in Poland's 
border regions would be exploited by Poland's more powerful neighbours. Perhaps it was 
this vindication of their inter-war criticism that induced Britain to accept a totalitarian 
solution to the ethnicity problems at the Potsdam Conference in 1945.8 
The importance of the plebiscite's origins, the part it played in international affairs 
and its role in the demise of the Entente, demands that Upper Silesia be awarded far greater 
prominence than it currently enjoys in English-language commentaries about this period in 
European history. The same can be said about the plebiscite itself The many economic and 
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social questions it raises, and the origins of Upper Silesia's ethnic diversity are themselves 
intrinsically interesting. With so many important and historically interesting matters related 
to the plebiscite, it is to be regretted that in most works, these details are lost amidst the 
hurried confusion of events which occurred in Europe between the Peace Conference and 
the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. One of the main reasons for this omission may have 
been the failure of British officials who had served in Upper Silesia to publish accounts of 
their experiences. 9 Without these, with most official information locked away in archives 
for decades, the whole of Silesia becoming part of Poland, and Poland incorporated into 
the Soviet Bloc, the subject probably proved less and less interesting to Western historians. 
Finally, what of the Upper Silesians themselves? The economic system that Upper 
Silesian industries operated under was laissezfaire at its worst - with the state institutions 
and its administration geared towards supporting the German employers and managers. 
This system had driven most German workers in heavy industries into the arms of the 
Socialists, but in Upper Silesia, the workers' awakening political consciousness had taken 
them into the Polish nationalists' camp. The privations endured during the First World War 
convinced many that their future lay with the resurrected Polish state. However, Father 
Emil Szramek, a Katowice parish priest, noted that 
A Silesian is like a reed, which 
Depending on where the stronger wind blows ftom 
Leans sometimes to one side, sometimes to the other. 10 
Fearful of losing what little they had, and promised a reformed, revitalised, socially just 
Germany, responding to the best efforts of the German campaign, in March 1921 over 
3 10,000 Polish-speaking Silesians supported Germany and the status quo. On the other 
hand, despite the German campaign's best efforts, despite the dire condition of Poland, and 
because they believed that they had little else to lose, over 55% of Upper Silesia's resident 
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and immigrant voters in the industrial districts cast their vote for Poland. " This amounted 
to over 70% of the Polish vote. No better claim for union with Poland could have been 
made. No better claim could have been rejected. 
Britain's role in Upper Silesia between 1919 and 1922 is not one of which it can be 
particularly proud. Despite the outcome of the First World War, Germany had remained 
continental Europe's strongest economic power and potentially its greatest military power. 
It is one of the great ironies of the 20th Century that in 1939, when Britain finally drew the 
line that Hitler should not cross, it did so along Poland's western frontier - an Allied nation 
British post-war policy had deliberately weakened in Germany's favour. Leaving aside the 
origins of the plebiscite and Lloyd George's frantic search for a means to induce Germany 
to sign the Peace Treaty in 1919, Upper Silesia's industrial districts should still have been 
awarded to Poland without restriction solely on the basis of the 1921 plebiscite result. This 
would have made Poland a far more economically viable and influential country during the 
inter-war period. The conduct of the British towards France regarding the matter of Upper 
Silesia's inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission and the Allied military force must certainly 
justify the French traditional view ofperfide Albion. As for the Upper Silesians, after they 
had restrained themselves at the Allies' request throughout most of 1919, British demands 
for a plebiscite condemned them to almost three years of conflict. To this may be added the 
difficult inter-war years of Upper Silesia's partition and the Nazis' dreadful revenge when 
the German Army returned at the start of the Second World War. After 1919, the British 
had somehow or other seen their policies in East Central Europe as providing a force for 
stability. The truth is that just as their refusal to recognise or support the ex-Tsarist Border 
States had encouraged instability in eastern Poland, British support for Germany's cause in 
Upper Silesia destabilised the territory and forced an unjust outcome on to the majority of 
the inhabitants living and working in its industrial heartland. 
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Conclusion - Notes 
A. D. Mayer, 'Later Development of SilesW , Baltic and Scandinavian Countries Vol. 111 No. 2 (May 1937) p. 351. 
2. A. Lentin Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson and the Guilt ofGermany (Leicester 
1984) p. 109. 
3. Morgan Assize ofArms p. 5. 'I remembered London on that night at Berkeley, the 
brittle crackle of fireworks in the Park and the vociferous cheering of the 
crowds. And I remembered Paris on the night of the Fete de la Victoire, a 
pensive Paris, crowded but silent, the Champs Elysees, illuminated by four great 
urns resting on four great alters, each bearing the name of a martyred city, 
ARRAS, ST. QUENTIN, CAMBRAI, PERONNE, whence emerged a smokey 
flame .... Beside the moumftd 
beauty of these flaming shrines, our London 
fireworks now seemed to me a meretricious thing'. 
4. Norman Davies 'Lloyd George and Poland, 1919-20', Journal of Contemporary 
History Vol. 6/3 (197 1) pp. 13 3. 
Ibid. 
6. PRO FO 371/43 80 PID 549 23 July 1919. Memorandum Suggested Basisfor a 
Russian Federal Republic by Professor J. Y. Simson. 
7. Davies, 'Lloyd George and Poland' pp. 134. This notes that it never struck the 
British odd that while they were condemning Poland's rule over five million 
White Russians and Ukrainians was as 'imperialism' and 'militarism', it was quite 
in order for Great Britain to rule over 450 million non-English subjects. 
8. Davies, Europe p. 1060. In 1939 the Germans expelled whole Polish populations 
from the 'Polish Corridor' and Upper Silesia at 24 hours notice. At Teheran in 
1943, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin redefined the Soviet Union's and 
Germany's post-war frontiers with Poland. At the 1945 Potsdam Conference, 
population exchanges aimed at creating a homogeneous Poland were agreed. 
the Soviet administration carried this out between 1945 and 1948. Millions of 
Germans were moved from what had now become Polancrs former German 
territories (including Upper and Lower Silesia), into what became East 
Germany. They were replaced by millions of Poles displaced from Belarus, the 
Ukraine and other areas of eastern Poland annexed by the Soviet Union. A 
similar exodus of Germans occurred on Silesia! s border with Czechoslovakia 
when all Sudetenland Germans were expelled, 
9. Apart from D'Abernon's occasional diary entry in An Ambassador ofPeace 
Vol. 1, and material cited from Seton Hutchison's Footslogger, the only other 
British official's published memoirs found to date are Major Fitzroy Gardner's 
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Days and Ways ofan Old Bohemian (London 1922) and a small chapter in More 
Reminiscences ofa Old Bohemian (London 1929). Gardner was a member of 
the plebiscite police. His remarks confirm the closeness of the British and the 
Germans. Hutchison' s Upper Silesia Revisited 1929 (London 1929) is not about 
the plebiscite but connects the British coal industry's problems after the General 
Strike in 1926 with the Polish coal exports from Upper Silesia. This is clearly 
the child of Germany's Wirtschaftspolitische Geselischaft or the Foreign 
Ministry's Eastern Department - see Christoph M. Kimmich The Free City: 
Danzig and German Foreign Policy 1919-1934 (Yale 1968) pp. 78-84 for the 
structure of the Weimar propaganda activities against Poland. 
10. Emil Szramek, who died in Dachau concentration camp in 1942, also wrote that: 
A Silesian is like a boundary stone 
He has one side turned in the direction of Poland 
And the other in the direction of Germany. 
11. This figure falls to just over 51% if the outvoters are included. 
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